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SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis is to describe and discuss some aspects 
of the status of, and opportunities for, women in Germany in the 
years between the impact on Germany of the world economic crisis, 
which followed on the Wall Street crash in October 1929, and the 
early years of the Second World War, when the German army was still 
victorious and the Nazi regime was attempting to wage war with 
only a partial war economy. The significance of the year 1933, 
with the Nazi takeover of power, in this decade is inescapable; but 
it is increasingly clear that many of the political, economic and 
social policies pursued by the Nazis when in Government were 
pre -figured in developments conceived and even set in train in the last 
years of the Weimar Republic, often as a direct result of the 
depression and its effects. The most serious of these, the massive 
unemployment in Germany in the early 1930s, did much to condition 
attitudes to the position of women, particularly with regard to their 
employment - in manual and professional occupations alike - outside 
the home. Nazi ideology indeed affected policies concerning women, 
but it was conveniently in tune with the needs and the mood of the 
time; thus, for a short time Nazi ideology seemed to have practical 
application, in providing justification for the provision of jobs for 
men at the expense of women. This situation rapidly changed, as full 
employment was achieved, and a shortage of labour became Germany's 
problem in the later 1930s, particularly once war broke out in 
September 1939. Then, a conflict developed between the Party 
ideologues and the men in charge of day -to -day Government, a conflict 
which was resolved in favour of the former in 1941, no doubt partly 
because women were reluctant to provide the labour which was badly 
needed. 
The depression, Nazi ideology, and the build -up to a partial 
war economy affected policies towards women not only in employment 
of all kinds but also in the realm of higher education. The broad 
categories into which this work falls therefore include higher 
education and senior schooling, as well as employment outside the 
home and, particularly, the professions. Since attitudes in these 
areas were partly conditioned by, and partly conditioned, attitudes 
towards the position of women in the family, particularly as child - 
bearers, some discussion of marriage and morals is included. The 
part played by the women's organisations in the Imperial and 
Republican periods necessitates some brief discussion of them, while 
the Nazis' attempt to organise German women - with a marked lack of 
success - must also be considered. Naturally, many omissions remain; 
this work cannot claim to be a comprehensive social history of 
women in the 1930s. 
The points which are of most general interest here are the 
continuity of policy from about 1930 to 1935/36, in spite of - or 
perhaps because of - the assumption of power by the Nazis, the 
failure of the Nazis to institute a fully totalitarian regime largely 
because of their dependence on positive support from the people, and 
the conflict between Party and State. With regard particularly to 
women, it is clear that while equality of rights and equality of 
opportunity were not achieved in the Weimar years, enough progress 
was made in securing a place for women in employment generally, in 
the professions and in higher education, for attempts at discrimination 
against them - before as well as after 1933 - to fail to have 
significant effect. The net result of the 1930s was, in fact, to 
consolidate their position in these areas, once the Nazis' immediate 
political and foreign ambitions necessitated an increase in personnel 
in them in the later 1930s. This was in spite of the Nazis' 
overwhelming obsession with the birth rate, which led at first to 
attempts to remove women from activity outside the home, and then to 
preoccupation with providing for the welfare of employed women. 
Connected with this, the 1930s also witnessed a reversal of the post- 
war tendency to underestimate the contribution to the life of the 
nation of the full -time housewife and mother. For "Aryan ", "politically 
reliable" German women, then, the Nazi regime brought some benefit, 
and the disadvantages experienced by women were very often those 
which men, too, suffered. But benefit and disadvantage alike were 
conditioned not by the needs or desires of individual Germans or of 
groups of Germans; the needs of the State, as interpreted by the 
Nazi Party, and particularly by Hitler, had primacy in every area 
of policy. 
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1. 
PREFACE 
Remarkably little of substance has been written about the 
position of women in Germany in the inter -war years. The Weimar years 
are particularly neglected, with only occasional references to 
women's status, and those chiefly as parentheses. The major 
exception to this is a panegyric by an American, Hugh Wiley Puckett, 
called Germany's Women Go Forward; this was published in 1930 and gives 
some idea of developments after the Great War. The leaders of the 
middle -class Women's Movement wrote a history of their campaigns, 
but this is chiefly concerned with the period before 1914. The 
relevant chapters of Werner Th8nnessen's Frauenemanzipation are 
particularly thin in a work on Social Democratic women which is 
generally sketchy. For Nazi Germany, there is an interesting and 
competent, but purely descriptive account of the years up to 1936, 
in Clifford Kirkpatrick's Woman in Nazi Germany, which was first 
published in the United States in 1938. There were also numerous 
pamphlets produced by the Nazis themselves, and by Communists in Britain 
and abroad; both these sources are useful, but they can hardly be 
termed reliable, the Nazis, naturally, painting an idyllic picture of 
their ideology in practice, of their rescue of women from the 
degradation of the Weimar system, and the Communists extravagantly 
claiming that the Nazis had enslaved women, distorting the picture to 
fit their own rigid ideology. 
In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in the 
history of female emancipation and the Women's Movement, no doubt 
partly at least as an accompaniment to the rising feminism, or 
"women's lib ", of the 1960s and 1970s. The most recent product of this 
has been the thesis by Dr. Richard Evans on the feminist movement in 
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Germany up to 1919, which in some respects forms a useful introduction 
to this thesis. Before that, Dr. David Schoenbaum had included a 
colourful but haphazard chapter on women in the Third Reich in his 
thesis, subsequently published as Hitler's Social Revolution, Richard 
Grunberger had produced an entertaining but often inaccurate chapter 
on women in his generally suspect Social History of the Third Reich, 
and Joachim Fest had written about Die Deutsche Frau and Mutter, a 
piece more about ideology than social analysis, in what is now in 
English The Face of the Third Reich. Each of these has its points of 
interest but none gives a coherent picture of the position of women in 
the Third Reich, nor even of any aspect of it. Thus, relatively little 
is known about the position of women in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, 
although a substantial corpus of mythology exists. 
It is the aim of this work to describe and discuss some aspects 
of the status of, and opportunities for, women in Germany in the years 
1930 to 1940. This period forms a logical unit whose bounds are the 
impact of the world economic crisis on Germany and the Nazi regime's 
attempt to wage war with only a partial war economy, while the 
German army is still victorious. To have tried to cover the years of 
the Second World War would have been unwise, for two reasons: it 
would have added substantially to the size of a work that is already 
large; and it would have introduced a disproportionate amount of 
material which referred to a highly abnormal situation, one which the 
Nazis saw as an interruption of their domestic policy, but one which 
was necessary if this was ever to be implemented. To have drawn to 
a close in 1939, with the outbreak of war, would not, however, have 
been much more satisfactory, since trends which were apparent then, 
and which had manifested themselves even earlier, can be 
conveniently followed into the first full year of the war, and largely 
left there because the failure to defeat or make peace with Germany's 
only remaining foe, Britain, meant that the ad hoc arrangements made 
in 1939 -40 for war production, and the gearing of society to a war 
situation on a temporary basis, would have to be transformed into a 
longer -term system. 
Within the decade 1930 to 1940, the significance of the year 
1933 is inescapable; the appointment of Adolf Hitler as German 
Chancellor on 30 January and the rapid progress towards the creation 
of a one -party State, effected in July 1933, had far -reaching 
implications for all Germans. But to have begun this work in 1933 
would have been to neglect - as others have done - the vital last 
years of the Weimar Republic, when trends were already apparent in 
many aspects of economic and social, as well as political, 
development which were to be intensified, or, more often, distorted 
after the Machtübernahme (Nazi assumption of power). The year 1933 
continues to hold a magnetic attraction for Germans and for historians 
of Germany; to this extent, Nazi propaganda has been highly successful, 
since it was the Nazis themselves who first depicted 1933 as a great 
turning -point in German history, as the year of "the national 
awakening ". 
Indeed, the events of 1933 heralded changes in every aspect of 
German life; but these were conditioned by German traditions and 
experience as well as by Nazi ideology. It is not, in any case, easy 
to gauge the significance of Nazi policies without some knowledge of what 
they replaced. Study of developments in the last years before the Nazi 
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takeover, particularly from 1930, reveals that there is a strong 
degree of continuity in German domestic policy in the years 1930 to 
1935/36. It has long been realised that "the descent into 
dictatorship" began even under the Brining Government, with resort to 
the use of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution resulting in the 
overriding of the parliamentary system by Presidential decree, but 
there has been little attempt to investigate whether this trend in the 
political sphere is paralleled in economic and social policyl. One of 
the major themes of this work is that there was continuity in 
domestic policy in the first half of the 1930s, in spite of the 
momentous events of 1933, simply because of the cataclysmic and all - 
pervading effect of the world economic crisis, which began in autumn 
1929, on Germany. The changes which took place in 1935/36 are 
indicative of two factors: by this time, the Nazis had made their 
medium -term plans, and were beginning to implement them within the 
context of their long -term aims; but at least as important is the 
end of the depression, and the consequent end to the emergency measures 
initiated to alleviate its effects, particularly the massive 
unemployment which had been its chief characteristic. 
To say this is not to deny that the position of women was 
affected by the coming to power of a Party which, indeed, had very 
fixed ideas about the role women should play in the life of the nation. 
But before the Nazis came to power the position of women in Germany had 
already been deeply affected by the economic crisis which had thrown 
1. Christoph Fahr, "Schulpolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Reich und 
Ländern: Das Scheitern der Schulreform in der Weimarer Republik ", 
Das Parlament, 17 October, 1970, makes some interesting points 
about continuity in educational policy in the late Weimar and early 
Nazi period. 
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millions of people in manual, clerical, managerial and professional 
positions out of work. It was the condition of the labour market - 
with the gradual but consistent reduction of unemployment figures 
from 1933, to a situation where there was, in the later 1930s, a 
shortage of labour which became acute in 1940 - which was 
undoubtedly the single most influential factor in the development 
of attitudes to and opportunities for women in wage and salary - 
earning positions outside the home. Its impact went far beyond 
the narrow employment situation, affecting also educational policy 
and official attitudes to women in the family context, and brought 
Nazi theory about women's role into sharp conflict with the needs of 
the German economy, in its widest sense, in the later 1930s, 
particularly once Germany was at war. 
The broad sections into which this work falls therefore include 
the position of women within marriage and family life, the employment 
of women outside the home, and educational and professional 
opportunities for women. The part played by women's organisations 
in compaigning for better opportunities for women throughout the 
period of the Empire and the Republic necessitates some brief discussion 
of them, while the energy expended on trying to build up a massive 
organisation of women to guide them towards activities approved of, 
and indeed arranged by, the Nazi party justifies the inclusion of a 
chapter on "The Nazi Organisation of Women ". Limitations of space 
have led to the relative or even complete neglect of aspects of the 
subject which may seem important, and for which material is available; 
for example, it has not been possible to include more than passing 
references to the girls' branch of the Hitler Youth, the Bund deutscher 
Mdel, while the Labour Service could have received a far more detailed 
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treatment than it has in Chapter 3. Only fleeting mention is made 
of social mores, although the position of the unmarried mother is 
discussed in Chapter Two, and nothing is said about the contribution 
of women - like Ricarda Huch and Klithe Kollwitz, for example - to the 
cultural life of the Weimar Republic. The day -to -day life of the 
working -class woman is alluded to at times, but not described in any 
systematic way. Particularly in the chapters on education and the 
professions, the emphasis is on a very small minority of German 
women indeed. But it was in these two areas that questions of women's 
rights and opportunities were most alive, in Germany as in other 
European countries and North America. If the women affected by reforms 
in these areas even now constitute only a larger minority, it is 
nevertheless true that achievements there have eventually opened up 
questions of equality for women generally, in the legal, economic and 
social contexts. 
With regard to the 1930s themselves, it has been firmly 
asserted, and equally firmly believed, that the assumption of power by 
the Nazis meant a complete transformation in the position of women, 
and a transformation for the worse. Writing in January 1934, 
Alice Hamilton, an American doctor, asserted, on the basis of her own 
observations and information from inside Germany, that 
"German women had had a long and hard fight but they 
had won a fair measure of equality under the Republic. Now 
all seems to be lost and suddenly they are set back, perhaps 
as much as a hundred yearsi -. 
This was very much the kind of picture that tended to be given by those 
who had emigrated from Germany in and after 1933 for political 
1. Alice Hamilton, "Woman's Place in Germany ", Survey Graphic, 
January 1934, p. 26. 
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reasons1. But it is an accurate representation of neither the 
situation between the end of the Great War and 1933 nor that after 
1933. The "fair measure of equality" achieved in the 1920s was, as 
disgruntled feminists and socialists constantly complained during the 
Weimar years, enshrined in the Constitution of 1919, but not in the law 
of the land. The provisions of the Civil Code of the Empire, which 
became effective in 1900, had given men decisive superiority within 
the marriage relationship, and while legislation was not forthcoming 
to implement the clauses of the Weimar Constitution which declared, 
for example, that both parents should have responsibility for the 
upbringing of their children, they remained purely pious affirmations 
of intent, without any legal effect. And while it was no doubt 
reasonable to assume from Nazi utterances before 1933 that in the 
Third Reich women would be sent back to the home en masse, the fact 
is that the Nazis, like any other party, found that proclaiming 
ideology in the safety of opposition was one thing, but that when 
they were put in the position of exercising power circumstances 
which were partly beyond their control, partly of their own making, 
obliged them to modify, and in some cases to abandon, previously - 
formulated policy. Thus they found that during the Second World War 
they had to try to persuade married women and even mothers to go out 
to work, and not devote themselves entirely to home and family - the 
role deemed most suitable for women in Nazi theory. 
There is a risk in trying to revise earlier views of an 
historical phenomenon like National Socialism: a recent reviewer 
1. E.g., Judith Grunfeld, "Women Workers in Nazi Germany ", Nation, 
13 March, 1937. The author was an active member of the SPD in 
Germany up to 1933. 
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expressed concern that revision might lead to a softening of 
attitudes towards this most evil of movements1. Thus, the difficulty 
in pointing out where critics of the Nazis have been in error, and 
especially where they have wrongly attributed bad or philistine 
policies to them, is that one may be suspected of consciously or 
unconsciously defending the Nazis. To try to avoid this, I must therefore 
now assert that I do not believe that it is possible to defend those 
who ruled Germany between 1933 and 1945. We all know that they committed 
the most heinous crimes, of courting and causing a long and terrible 
war which brought death or immense suffering to millions of people 
throughout the world, and of treating with revolting and unspeakable 
brutality certain minorities, especially the Jews, for whom they 
nurtured an implacable and irrational hatred. Recognition of this 
makes it impossible for us to regard any aspect of Nazism 
dispassionately, and rightly so, I believe. But this should not place 
a taboo on analysing parts of the Nazi system in a methodical way; to 
explain it is not to justify it. I say this because at various 
places in this work I am obliged to state or to imply that "this aspect 
of Nazi policy brought some benefit to women" or "the Nazis did not initiate 
this policy which was disadvantageous to women ". To make such remarks, 
within highly restricted areas of discussion, is not to say that the 
net result of Nazi policies towards women was favourable, nor is it to 
say that the motives behind any apparently beneficial actions were 
benevolent. 
Some understanding of basic Nazi beliefs and aims is essential 
1. Gordon Brook -Shepherd, "More Noises from the Bunker ", Sunday 
Telegraph, 15 July, 1973, says "How can you reassess Hitler 
except upwards ?" 
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to a discussion of their policies towards any group in society, in 
this case the female sex. From the hotch -potch that was Nazi ideology, 
the following assumptions consistently emerge. In the first place, 
the traditional divisions of class and creed were superseded by the 
fundamental division - in the Nazi view - of race. The Nazi leaders 
genuinely and fanatically believed that Jews, Slays and the coloured 
peoples were inferior types of being; had they been less sincere in 
this belief, they might have been less dangerous. As it was, they 
claimed that the "Aryan" race, to which those of German stock 
belonged, had, in order to protect and preserve itself, to use every 
means at its disposal to destroy these "inferior peoples" before they 
destroyed the "Aryan" race. The inherent malevolence of non -"Aryans" 
towards the "Aryan" race was accepted as the logical corollary of 
their inferiority. 
To further the survival of the race most fitted for leadership, 
physical exercise became a cult, while strength and "Nordic" 
features became vital attributes. Quality, in this sense, was not, 
however, enough; in order to overcome the teeming hordes of these 
"inferior peoples ", the relatively small numbers of the "Aryan" race 
would have to be increased, urgently and on a huge scale. It was 
this obsessive line of thought, absolutely basic to the Nazi 
Weltanschauung (philosophy of life), which conditioned the Party's 
attitude to the role of women, since women are the child -bearers of 
a nation. Men, as the other half of the genetic equation, were by no 
means exempt from official concern in this context: they were 
exhorted to marry young, and even, if they were public employees, 
threatened with being passed over for promotion if they did not marry 
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and start a family1. But women's biological function made her much 
more the focus of the concern of the Nazi leaders in questions of 
population policy. This applied only, of course, to the "Aryan" 
race; women of other races could be worked to death or tortured in 
concentration camps, while intricate legislation was prepared to 
protect the reproductive capacity of "Aryan" women. It was, after 
all, not at all desirable, in the Nazi view, that non -"Aryans" should 
procreate, since this only increased in number the enemies of the 
"Aryan" race. For this reason, it was pointed out in 1939 that the 
strict prohibition of abortion did not apply to Jews2. 
Within the "Aryan" race, the primary division was that of sex, 
providing two complementary, not antagonistic, elements which each 
played a predetermined part in the gigantic jig -saw which was the life 
of the Volksgemeinschaft (national community). As Frau Scholtz- Klink, 
leader of the Nazi women's organisation, told some of its members in 
1936, "the guiding principle of German women to -day is not to campaign 
against men but to campaign alongside men "3. While men very definitely 
played the leading role in the Nazi State, with women excluded from 
political life, the Nazis did not accept that they were subordinating 
women completely to men; rather, they claimed, they were drawing a 
distinction - the natural distinction - between the areas of activity 
of men and women, so that each sex might better perform its function 
for the good of the nation. This insistence on the separation of the 
1. "Der Beamte soll frühzeitig heiraten ", Westdeutscher Beobachter, 
3 August, 1937. 
2. BA, NSD30 /vorl. 1836, Informationsdienst..., March 1939, "Anwendung 
nur auf das deutsche Volk ". 
3. "Die Aufgaben der deutschen Frau ", VB, 27 May, 1936. 
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sexes is a crucial feature of Nazi policy towards women, in all 
areas of life. The sexes, then, were to come together only for the 
most important function of all, that of procreation. The Nazis 
turned to the ancient Teutonic relationship - or, at least, what 
they thought it had been - where man was the warrior and woman the 
homemaker. They claimed that civilisation, especially in industrial 
society, had undermined the relationship between the sexes by altering 
the "natural" roles of man and woman, and held that the differences 
between the sexes should not be denied or ignored, but gladly accepted, 
and indeed emphasised. 
In the Nazi view, the chief difference was that man was 
essentially productive, and woman fundamentally reproductivel. By 
the same token, man was creative while woman was imitative. Thus, 
woman's position in Nazi society was to be one which gave her the 
chance to exhibit her "natural" qualities - sympathy, self- sacrifice and 
comradeship, rather than demanding of her the "unnatural" attributes of 
independence, intellectual ability or a competitive spirit. Following 
from this, then, the Nazis were at once ideologically opposed to 
the employment of women outside the home, to more than a very limited 
amount of academic education for girls, and, above all, to feminists 
and all proponents of equal rights for women who, they claimed, 
treated the sexes as identical when they were rather "gleichwertig aber 
nicht gleichartig" (equivalent but not the same)2. 
1. Elfriede Eggener, "Die organische Eingliederung der Frau in den 
nationalsozialistischen Staat ", doctoral dissertation for Leipzig 
University, 1938, p. 24. 
2. "Die Geschlechter im Dritten Reich ", Frankische Tageszeitung, 17 
April, 1934. 
"Dies aber ist die 'Lady " , Das Schwarze Korps, 2 May, 1940. 
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In matters relating to women in society, then, the Nazis 
were diametrically opposed to all that the liberals and socialists, 
both men and women, had campaigned for before 1918 and had continued 
to support in the 1920s. The franchise, too often regarded as itself 
constituting emancipation, was the symbol of the struggle to win 
equal rights for women, and so although the Nazis did not propose 
to deny women the right to vote, they claimed that they would bring 
an end to the disgraceful situation where women were present at, and 
even participated in, the activities of the Reichstag; the ballot -box 
had, they claimed, sullied German womanhood1. The "liberal -democratic- 
Marxists" and "Jewish -intellectuals" who had brought this about had 
tried, said the Nazis, to disguise the differences between the sexes, 
and the result had been the aping of men by some women in a ridiculous 
caricature, in terms of character, aspirations and outward appearance2. 
1. Hitler expressed his views on the subject frequently, e.g., "I 
detest women who dabble in politics.... In 1924 we had a sudden 
upsurge of women who were attracted by p litics.... They wanted to 
join the Reichstag, in order to raise the moral level of that 
body, so they said. I told them that 90% of the matters dealt with 
by parliament were masculine affairs, on which they could not have 
opinions of any value.... A man who shouts is not a handsome sight. 
But if it's a woman it's terribly shocking.... In short, gallantry 
forbids one to give women an opportunity of putting themselves in 
situations that do not suit them ". Hitler's Table -Talk, London, 
1953, pp. 251 -52, 26 January, 1942 (Evening). 
BA, R451I/64, DV?' Reichsgeschäftsstelle, Frauenrundschau, 4 March, 
1932, "Nationalsozialisten and Frau ", p. 1141. 
2. Hitler's speech to the Nazi women's organisation at the 1934 Party 
rally, Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, Wtirzburg, 
1962, p. 451. 
Rudolf Hess, "Die Aufgaben der deutschen Frau ", VB, 27 May, 1936. 
G. Vogel, Die Deutsche Frau: Im Weltkrieg und im Dritten Reich, 
Breslau, 1936, vol. III, p. 5. 
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There were indeed grounds for these accusations, however 
masked they might seem to be by the Nazis' vicious hysteria. It was 
not only in the most noticeable aspects, such as the wearing of 
trousers, the copying of men's hair -styles, the ostentatious 
smoking of cigarettes in public, that women had tried to imitate men, 
and thus prove their equality with them. The founding of the Open 
Door International for the Economic Emancipation of the Woman Worker in 
1929 had led to the raising of demands in Germany that measures of 
labour protection - measures actually favourable to women in terms 
of their physical health - be revoked, since they prevented women from 
enjoying complete equality on the labour market1. The Communists could 
perhaps be accused of wanting the best of both worlds, but their demands 
for equal pay for equal work and, in addition, increased maternity 
benefit and labour protection for women, were more sensible than the 
Open Door's indiscriminate demands for equality at any price2. 
The Open Door and its supporters were, however, in a tiny 
minority, and by characterising Weimar democrats as sharing their 
views the Nazis deliberately misrepresented the political and social 
climate of the Republic, for their own ends. The large body of 
conservative opinion, a majority of which was female, in the 
influential Roman Catholic Centre Party and in the German Nationalist 
camp, opposed the excesses of radical feminists, the more consistent 
but still extreme views of the Communists, and even the cautious and 
at times half- hearted egalitarianism of the Social Democrats, while 
1. Report in JADG, 1930, pp. 191 -92. See also Chapter 3, pp. 119 -20. 
2. BA, R2/18554, proposal for a Bill put to the Reichstag by KPD 
members, 16 October, 1931. 
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liberals in the People's Party and even in the Democratic Party 
were coming to the conclusion by the late 1920s that in some cases 
freedom had been abused. Together the Nationalists, the Centre 
and the People's Party, with some support from the Democratic Party, 
planned to introduce a Bill to permit censorship as part of their 
campaign against "filth in the theatre and in literature "1. The 
Churches were active in the front line of those fighting to uphold 
traditional moral values as they saw them2, and the moderate feminists 
were concerned only to consolidate the modest gains they had made since 
the turn of the century, not to promote an egalitarian revolution. 
Gertrud Bäumer, leader of this group of middle -class feminists, found 
it completely natural that even her most gifted pupils should want 
more than anything to marry and have a family, which would absorb all 
their interest and energy3. In domestic affairs, then, apart from 
minority fringe groups of extremists, the word most applicable to the 
political and social atmosphere in the Weimar Republic is possibly "moderate ", 
but much of the time more probably "conservative ". 
The governments of the Republic were bound to look conservative, 
with the Centre Party unique in participating in every one from 1919 -32. 
The coalition nature of these governments tended to mean stalemate, 
1. BA, Kl.Erw., no. 267 -(1), letter from R. Gl5ckler of the DDP 
Ortsgruppe Hildesheim to Gertrud Bäumer, 23 December, 1928. 
2. "Soziale Kundgebung des Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentages, 14. 
bis 17.6.1924" and "Aufruf des Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchenausschuss 
vom 25. Mai 1932 ", AfB, 1932, no. 2, pp. 88 and 95 -96. 
Flann Campbell, "Birth Control and the Christian Churches ", 
Population Studies, 1960, pp. 136 -38. 
3. BA, op. cit., no. 258 -(1), letter from Gertrud Bäumer to Marianne 
Weber, 12 September, 1931. 
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particularly when the Social Democrats joined the Centre in government 
in the years 1919 -23 and 1928 -30. The Centre was pathologically 
terrified of any change which would undermine the position of the 
Roman Catholic Church or promote Bolshevism, and it therefore 
endeavoured to block any measure proposed by the nominally Marxist 
SPD, in spite of the latter's conservatism as demonstrated in the 
events of 1918 -19. There was minimal room for manoeuvre in a 
situation where the secession of one of these parties from government 
would precipitate the government's fall, and necessitate once again 
a casting about for a viable partnership among the parties, or else a 
new general election. The disastrous outcome of Brüning's resort to 
the latter method in September 1930, when the Nazis increased their 
parliamentary representation from twelve to 107, might seem to 
justify the reluctance of earlier coalitions to use it, and their 
preference for compromise instead. 
But compromise meant the abdicating of legislative initiative 
in any issue that was mildly contentious; the result was that the 
clauses of the Weimar Constitution which declared the equality of women 
in the family and in the opportunities available in education and the 
professions were not transformed into law. The agitation of the radical 
feminists throughout the Weimar years, and to some extent the 
increased activity of the Communist Party in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, was the response to governmental inaction on this front. But it 
was not only political differences and political convenience that 
conditioned this situation. The chief preoccupation in Germany for 
most of the Weimar period was the financial and economic position of 
the country after the disasters of the Great War and the inflation of 
the early 1920s; there was only a brief period of apparent recovery 
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before renewed disaster in 1929 -30 again demanded the full attention 
of the government, and relegated serious discussion of equal rights 
for women to the realm of theory. Indeed, the economic crisis 
created a situation where not only was progress towards equality for 
women halted, but where voices were increasingly raised which 
demanded that men be given preference in job opportunities of every 
kind, with jobs in very short supply. The call for a restriction of 
women to their "natural" occupations, in the home and with children 
was raised by many who were not Nazis, and became increasingly 
popular as the depression grew only deeper. Thus, the Nazis were able 
to win support not in spite of their view of women's role - which would 
no doubt have been far less popular in time of economic stability - 
but actually because of it. The groundwork for measures they would 
introduce to reverse the progress made in opening up opportunities for 
women was laid before they came to power. 
CHAPTER ONE 
General Introduction 
A. The Background 
The granting of the national franchise to all German women 
over twenty in November 1918 was the symbol of the emancipation 
for which the feminist movement in its various branches had fought 
since the founding of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein 
(General German Women's Association) by Luise Otto in 18651. In 
some respects it was merely a symbol: the Imperial Civil Code, 
which had come into effect as recently as 1900, and which remained 
in force regardless of the change in 1918 from Empire to Republic, 
was permeated by a paternalistic assumption of woman's dependence 
on man which had ceased to be valid before the Great War. Indeed 
single women were put on an equal footing with men as far as 
written law went; but the vast majority of women would marry at 
some time2 and thus accept the authority a husband might choose 
to exert in most aspects of family life. The husband, for example, 
had the right to choose the place of residence, the names and 
religion of the children of the marriage, and the character and 
duration of their education. The wife was "entitled and obliged 
1. For a detailed and fully- documented account of some aspects of the 
feminist movement under the Empire, including the campaign for 
suffrage reform, see the unpublished D. Phil. thesis by Richard J. 
Evans, "The Women's Movement in Germany, 1890 -1919 ", Oxford, 1972. 
See also Katharine Anthony, Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia, 
New York, 1915. 
2. In 1900, e.g., in a female population of 28.6 million 16.4 million 
were single; but almost 10 million of these were under 15, and a 
further 1.6 million between 15 and 18; thus only 5 million women 
over 18 were single, compared with the 9.7 million who were married 
and the 2.4 million who had been married; and no doubt many of the 
younger single girls, at least, would still marry. Figures from 
St.J., 1909, p. 4. 
2. 
to conduct the family household ", and she was also obliged to 
work in her husband's business, insofar as this was customary in 
their social position. The husband was entitled to prevent his wife 
from working for another person if it was clear that her employment 
was "prejudicial to the interests of the marriage "; he also had 
direct control of any money his wife might have or acquire, as a 
dowry or legacy, for example. 
There was one clause in the Civil Code which was of novel 
significance for the married woman: this was the provision that she 
might dispose freely of any money which she earned by her own effort 
from gainful employment outside the home1. The 1907 census showed 
that there were 8,243,498 women in full -time employment, constituting 
almost 34% of all employed Germans - of whom 2.8 million were married. 
If 1.8 million of these probably did not, as "assisting family members "2 
receive a formal wage, there nevertheless remained a million married 
women who were in a position to benefit from the independent earnings' 
clause of the Civil Code, and the enhanced status in marriage which it 
implied. While this provision was realistic, the Civil Code did on 
the whole treat women in a backward- looking way; but, as a British 
commentator observed, to adopt a more modern approach to the status of 
women would have raised irreconcilable opposition, and doubtless been 
an obstacle to the acceptance of the Code as a whole3. 
1. M. Greiff (ed.), Bfrgerliches Gesetzbuch, Berlin and Leipzig, 
1930, pp. 747 -63. 
2. Figures from St.J., 1914, pp. 14 and 16. 
3. E. Schuster, "The German Civil Code (1) ", Law Quarterly Review, 1896, 
P. 32. 
If some of the new legal provisions did seem 
patriarchal in both tone and substance, they nevertheless lacked 
the complete subjugation implied in the codes of some other countries, 
including the two at the political extremes of pre -1914 Europe. In 
Republican France, the clause "le mari conserve toujours sa prérogative 
de 'puissance maritale' avec son droit a 'l'obéissance"" remained in 
force until as late as 19381. In Tsarist Russia, section 107 of 
the Imperial Code was even more dogmatic: a wife's duty was "to obey 
her husband as the head of the family, to be loving and respectful, 
to be submissive in every respect, and show him every compliance and 
affection, he being the master of the house "2. This conception of 
marriage is highly reminiscent of the Pauline view, expressed in 
Ephesians V: "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands as unto 
the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is 
head of the Church...." St. Paul's teachings certainly influenced and 
informed the attitude of the Christian Churches towards marriage, after 
as well as before the Great War. 
Although women's legal position within marriage left much to 
be desired, the feminists had nevertheless made some gains in the 
years before the Great War, most notably in the field of education. By 
1914, women were admitted to full matriculation in the universities of 
every state of the Empire. The corollary of this, the provision of 
facilities for academic secondary schooling - as an alternative to 
1. Robert H. Lowie, Towards Understanding Germany, Chicago, 1954, p. 208. 
2. Rudolf Schlesinger, The Family in the USSR, London, 1949, p. 281. 
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the genteel, anti-intellectual H8here TLichterschule - had also 
been realised. These achievements were largely the result of a 
sustained campaign begun by the middle -class women's movement in the 
1860s and brought to success around the turn of the century under the 
leadership of Helene Langet. Education was the feminists' first point 
of attack on a male -dominated society because they realised that 
adequate educational opportunities were essential if women were ever to 
challenge men in the more specialised categories of employment, whether 
skilled manual, clerical or professional. In addition, it was clear 
that the under -education of women was a continual, if spurious, 
justification for their relegation to political inactivity and gentle 
submission in the home. 
The feminists' campaign here was directed only at those areas 
of education where women were at a noticeable disadvantage, senior 
schooling and higher education; the numbers involved were therefore 
extremely small, since for every girl who attended a senior school of 
any kind in 1911 there were twenty -five girls at elementary school, and, 
further, only 9% of all senior school pupils attended the new Lyzeen 
or Studienanstalten, which alone provided an avenue to higher education2. 
But the pioneering work in the interests of a tiny minority was to 
prove of inestimable value to the somewhat larger numbers of girls 
who would enjoy the chance to exploit their academic abilities to the 
full in future decades, particularly once a wide range of professional 
1. A good, brief account of these developments is to be found in 
Friedrich Paulsen, Geschichte des Gelehrten Unterrichts, Berlin 
and Leipzig, 1921, vol. 2, pp. 776 -81. 
2. Figures from St.J., 1914, pp. 322 -25. 
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opportunities - restricted to teaching, medicine and social work 
before 1918 - was accessible to women. 
It was the Great War that gave women the chance to obtain 
positions which had previously been exclusively male preserves. This 
was particularly the case in industry, where women were increasingly 
brought into skilled and responsible positions as men were called up 
for active service. Women were not included in the Hindenburg 
Programme of 1916, which provided for the conscription into industry 
of all civilian men, but they were strongly encouraged to volunteer 
for work and responded in large numbers1. Their reward was a moderate 
narrowing of wage differentials, so that by the end of the war they 
were, on average, being paid about half of men's wage rates2. Middle- 
class women, too, contributed to the war effort; Gertrud B ,umer, 
leader of the Bund deutscher Frauenvereine (League of German Women's 
Associations), founded the Nationale Frauendienst (National Women's 
Service) in 19143 to mobilise volunteers for welfare work and for the 
making of clothing for the armed forces. Large numbers of middle -class 
women also volunteered for the Red Cross4. 
While working -class and middle -class women were serving their 
country in a practical way, the path to higher education was open to 
1. Charlotte Lorenz, "Die gewerbliche Frauenarbeit während des Krieges ", 
in James T. Shotwell (general ed.), Der Krieg und die Arbeits- 
verhaltnisse, Stuttgart, 1928, pp. 319 -20. 
2. Gerhard Bry, Wages in Germany, 1871 -1945, New York, 1960, p. 205. 
3. BDC, Gertrud B,umer's file, "Lebenslauf ", undated ( ?1936). 
4. Lorenz, op. cit., p. 319. 
Evans, op. cit., pp. 297 -98, 324. 
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those middle -class girls who had been the first to benefit from 
the reforms in senior schooling immediately before the war. With 
potential male students at the front, girls were admitted to German 
universities in increasing numbers; whereas their immediately 
pre -war share in the student body had been 5% or 6% by 1916 it had 
risen to 9.5%, a level that would be maintained until it rose 
again after 19231. All these developments suggested that when the 
war ended women would be in a strong position to demand greater 
opportunities, even equality of opportunity, in employment of all 
kinds, including freer access to the professions; in addition, it 
was becoming increasingly less defensible to deny women a voice, 
through the suffrage, in the affairs of the nation. 
B. Women's Rights in a Political Context 
The end of the Imperial regime, coming at the same time as 
the armistice in 1918, meant the removal of one of the major obstacles 
to women's advancement generally and to their enfranchisement in 
particular, the Kaiser. The caretaker Socialist Government was 
quick to extend the suffrage to women, and the election of forty - 
one women deputies as almost ten per cent of the membership of the 
National Assembly in January 1919 seemed to bode well for rapid 
progress towards equality of opportunity between the sexes2. It was 
thus in a mood of optimism that Marie Juchacz of the SPD made the 
1. Figures from St.J.: 1923, p. 318; 1924 -25, p. 357; 1928, p. 509. 
2. Hugh W. Puckett, Germany's Women Go Forward, New York, 1930, 
p. 252. 
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first speech to be delivered by a woman in a national representative 
capacity, in the National Assembly at Weimar on 11 February, 1919: 
"I should like to say now that the 'woman question' in Germany 
no longer exists in the old sense of the term; it has been 
solved. It will no longer be necessary for us to campaign 
for our rights with meetings, resolutions and petitions. 
Political conflict, which will always exist, will from now 
on take place in another form. We women now have the 
opportunity to allow our influence to be exerted within the 
context of party groupings on the basis of ideology"1. 
It needed only a decade to show that the claims made by Marie 
Juchacz had been premature, and the hope implicit in them illusory. 
By 1930 the radical feminists were convinced that progress towards 
equality for women had been frustrated throughout the 1920s because 
of the continuing majority of men in every parliamentary party. In 
fact, women's representation in the Reichstag actually dropped in 
the mid- 1920s, to a share of around six per cent2, although after 
the election of November 1932 it again reached a figure of nine 
per cent, when there were thirty -five women deputies3. The 
enfranchisement of women had meant only, said the radicals, that 
they were now represented; they remained powerless4. More moderate 
feminists echoed this view: for Katharina von Kardorff, one -time 
People's Party deputy in the Reichstag, the chief obstacle to 
progress was precisely the arrangement which Marie Juchacz had 
1. "Aus der Rede vom Marie Juchacz als erste deutsche weibliche 
Abgeordnete, 11.2.1919 ", Vorwärts, 14 November, 1968. 
2. Puckett, loc. cit. 
3. Report in BF, January, 1933, p. 5. 
4. Lida Gustava Heymann: "Deutsches Debacle ", FiS, November 1930, 
p. 2, and "Frauenbefreiung ", FIS, September October 1932, p. 5. 
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welcomed, namely the dispersal of the women representatives into a 
large number of political parties, with partisan allegiance given 
priority over the solidarity of the female sex. If women were ever 
to make progress towards equality they would, she claimed, have to 
act together as a combined non -party pressure group, although she 
and her associates did have reservations about the creation of a 
Women's Party as such. 
In fact, given the sharp differences of opinion both between 
and among socialist and middle -class women, the formation of a 
Women's Party by women of all shades of political opinion was not a 
practical proposition at any time during the Weimar years. A degree 
of co- operation was achieved briefly, in 1930, when women Reichstag 
deputies from all political parties - except the Economics Party and 
the NSDAP, neither of which had women representatives - came together 
in a study group to discuss matters of particular interest to women. 
But this arrangement lapsed after July 1932, as increasing political 
bitterness made collaboration impossible2. 
The basic reason for the disappointment of the high hopes 
entertained by feminists immediately after the war was neatly 
pin -pointed by Katharina von Kardorff: "Our equality with men," 
she observed, "is written into the Constitution but not into the Civil 
Code "3. Indeed Article 109 of the Weimar Constitution stated that "All 
Germans are equal before the law. Men and women have fundamentally 
the same civil rights and obligations ". Then, Article 119 acknowledged 
1. BA, Nachlass Katharina von Kardorff, no. 38, 1927 -32, "Brauchen wir 
eine Frauenpartei ? ", 22 January, 1930, pp. 44 -65. 
Ibid., no. 27, letter from Emma Ender to Katharina von Kardorff, 5 
January, 1931, p. 75. 
2. Report in BF, October 1932, p. 6. 
3. BA, Nachlass Katharina von Kardorff, no. 38, loc. cit. 
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that the Civil Code's view of the marriage relationship was out 
of date: "Marriage is based on the equality of the sexes ". And 
Article 128 affirmed the right of women to equality of opportunity 
in public life and the public service with the words: "All citizens 
without distinction are eligible for public office in accordance 
with the laws and according to their abilities and achievements. All 
discriminations against women in the civil service are abolished ". But 
these statements were not of themselves sufficient to transform the 
position of women in Germany: legislation alone could alter existing 
laws and, particularly, the Civil Code, and until it was forthcoming 
they remained in force as before. 
The continuing majority of men in all parties should not of 
itself have prevented the enactment of measures to promote equality 
for women, since several of the post -war political parties were 
pledged to support the implementation of the Constitution, including 
the clauses which would reform the Civil Code where it discriminated 
against women and which would provide equality of opportunity for 
women in employment and public life. Of the middle -class parties 
the Democratic Party (DDP) was the most unequivocally in favour of 
equality for women; indeed, the outstanding figure in the pre -war 
middle -class women's movement, Helene Lange, was one of the founders 
of the DDP1, and other prominent feminists, including Gertrud Bäumer 
and Marie- Elisabeth Luders, joined it in 1918. Esteem for Helene 
Lange was such that she was created Honorary President of the DDP2. 
1. HA, reel 37, fol. 736, Mitteilungen des Reichsfrauenausschusses 
der DDP, 20 May, 1930, "Helene Lange ". 
2. BA, R45111/14, Protokoll über die Sitzung des Parteiausschusses 
der DDP, 25 May, 1930, pe 44. 
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The People's Party (DVP) was almost as committed to the achievement 
of women's rights: its 1919 programme stated, in a paragraph 
entitled "The Woman Question ", that the party was in favour of the 
"political, economic and legal equality of the sexes...and...the 
admission of women to all offices and positions on condition of having 
the requisite preparatory training.... "1. 
During the 1920s both these parties developed a network of local 
groups of women party workers, co- ordinated in each case by a National 
Women's Committee which published a newsletter to circulate information 
about the party activity of women at the local level and to feature 
items of particular interest to women2. The aims of the DDP's National 
Women's Committee were to defend and propagate the idea of democracy, 
to promote the DDP, to educate German women to civic responsibility, 
and to achieve equality for women3. Doubtless in recognition of the 
active part played by women in the party, and in the hope of attracting 
more female support, the party - now the "Staatspartei" - held 
discussions in summer 1932 about the possibility of giving second place 
on the national list of candidates for the next general election to a 
woman4, a practice adopted in some state elections5; but nothing came 
1. BA, 84511/62, "Grundsatte der DVP 1919" (1931 reprint), Sammlungen 
...verschiedener Parteien, pp. 150 -51. 
2. HA, op. cit., 20 April, 1930. 
BA, 84511/64, DVP Reichsgesch,ftsstelle, Frauenrundschau, 4 March, 
1932, p. 1141. 
3. HA, op. cit., 20 January, 1930. 
4. BA, 845111/51, Protokoll über die Sitzung des Parteiausschusses der 
DDP, 7 July, 1932, p. 109. 
5. BA, K1.Erw., no. 267, letter from Gertrud Baumer to Emmy Beckmann, 
undated ?1929). 
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of theml. The DVP, however, did put their long -serving deputy Dr. 
Elsa Matz forward as the third candidate on their list for the 
election in March 19332, Dr. Matz was President of the DVP's 
Women's Committee and a member of the executive committee of the 
party3. The DVP's Women's Review paid tribute to the loyalty of 
the party's women members in March 1932, describing their "tireless" 
activity in supporting the party throughout the country4. But by this 
time both the liberal parties were becoming very weak indeed, to the 
extent that Lida Gustava Heymann, referring to the DDP even in 
November 1930 had asked, in a parenthesis, "Does it still exist ? "5. 
The mass of women continued to be strongly influenced by the 
more conservative power groups, the Roman Catholic and Lutheran 
Churches and, to some extent, the Nationalist Party (DNVP). The latter 
had admitted women to political activity before the war more out of 
self -defence against the socialists and the liberals, who had gladly 
enlisted women's aid, than out of conviction; in fact, the DNVP's 
chief women's organisation, the Deutscher Frauenbund 1909, was 
specifically opposed to feminists of any political colour6. Nevertheless, 
the DNVP had its own National Women's Committee, which in 1933 
1. Reply by the DDP to a questionnaire sent to each 
on the eve of the March 1933 election, about the 
of women candidates, reported in BF, March 1933, 
2. Reply by DVP to the BDF's questionnaire, BF, op. 
party by the BDF 
putting forward 
p. 8. 
cit., p. 9. 
3. Elsa Matz's entry in Reichstags- Handbuch, Berlin, 1930, p. 417. 
4. BA, R45I1/64, loc. cit. 
5. Lida Gustava Heymann, "Deutsches Debacle ", FiS, November 1930, p. 2. 
6. Walter Kaufmann, Monarchism in the Weimar Republic, New York, 1953, 
p. 130. 
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claimed that it was obvious that the party was in favour of 
"protecting equal rights for women "1. After all, the DNVP had 
consistently presented women candidates at general elections 
throughout the Weimar period, the most distinguished of whom was 
Paula Muller- Ottfried, President of the Evangelical /omen's 
Association, who was a Reichstag deputy throughout the 192052. 
It was abundantly clear, however, that the DNVP and the 
Evangelical Church, whose political views were very similar, aimed 
to mobilise women for the purpose of forming an opposition to 
progressive ideas which included pacifism, increased employment 
opportunities for women at all levels, and any kind of "permissiveness" 
in social behaviour or sexual morality3. Certainly, it did seem that 
women preferred order to disorder; there was a higher proportion 
of women's votes among those for Hindenburg in the Presidential 
election of March 1932 than among those for any other candidate, 
and women were in a minority of voters for the extremist candidates, 
both Communist and Nazi4. The raison d'etre of Evangelical women 
seemed to be to uphold the idea that women's role was, and should be, 
that of housewife and mother; the Evangelical /omen's Association 
1. Reply by DNVP to the BDF's questionnaire, BF, loc. cit. 
2. Cuno Horkenbach (ed.), Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis heute, Berlin, 
1930, p. 718. 
3. "Soziale Kundgebung des Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentages, 14. 
bis 17.6.1924" and "Aufruf des Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchenausschuss 
vom 25. Mai 1932 ", documents reproduced in AfB, 1932, no. 2, pp. 88 
and 95 -96. 
4. BA, R4511/64, DVP Reichsgeschäftsstelle, Frauenrundschau, 6 April, 
1932, "Zur Hindenburgwahl am 10. April ", p. 1167. 
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made its position clear in January 1932 with the pronouncement 
that "German Evangelical women see in the child the God -given 
natural perfection of marriage ". In their view, only medical 
reasons could justify refusal by a married couple to have children'. 
The views of the Roman Catholic Church were certainly as 
uncompromising as those of the Evangelical Church; but, even so, the 
Catholic Church realised that to give no ground at all on the "woman 
question" would be only to its own disadvantage. Therefore the 
political wing of the Church, the Centre Party, reluctantly made some 
concessions to the feminists in its 1918 programme "Centre Party and 
the New Political Order ". For the first time a Centre Party manifesto 
supported women's suffrage and made mention of "the contribution 
of women in political life ". While regretting that circumstances 
necessitated the sanctioning of women's admission to the "brawling 
and quarrelling" of politics, the Centre Party put a good face on it 
by asserting that 
"we are convinced that we shall find in our women enthusiastic 
fellow- combatants and energetic helpers.... The counsel of 
experienced women will be indispensable to us in creating a 
new state structure.... "2. 
But the continuing reactionary attitude of the Roman Catholic Church 
was epitomised in the Papal Encyclical " Quadragesimo Anno" of 1931, 
which demanded an end to the employment of married women3, and which 
1. Ibid., Frauenrundschau, 28 January, 1932, "Deutsch - Evangelische 
Frauen für die Erhaltung von Ehe und Familie ", p. 1111. 
2. BA, R451I/62, "Zentrum und politische Neordnung: Ein Programme ", 
Sammlungen...verschiedener Parteien, p. 39. 
3. Quoted in Leo Zodrow, "Die Doppelbelastung der Frau in Familie und 
Erwerbsberuf ", Stimmen der Zeit, 1962 -63, p. 376. 
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aroused the ire even of women who could in no way be termed radical 
or socialist1. On the other hand, a representative of the Centre 
claimed to have found considerable support, particularly among 
women, for the party's view that women could not fulfil the demands 
of two full -time jobs - one of these being that of housewife and 
mother - satisfactorily; he also maintained that the man "is, and 
remains, the provider for and head of the family "2. This, then, was 
the attitude towards the position of women in society of the one 
political party which was in every German government from 1919 to 
1932. 
The ascendancy of the Centre was to some extent facilitated 
by the splitting of the SPD during the war, a circumstance which was 
particularly serious for the working women's movement3. Most of the 
leading women socialists of the pre -war period, notably Rosa Luxemburg 
and Clara Zetkin, belonged to the radical wing of the party, and 
therefore found themselves in opposition to the SPD's war -time policies, 
finally becoming leading members of the German Communist Party (KPD) 
on its founding at the end of 1918. These women had always disliked 
the at times latent, at times overt?antifeminism of the rank and file 
of the SPD4. In the KPD, the radicals were determined to return to 
1. BA, Nachlass Katharina von Kardorff, no. 34a, 
1931, PP. 79 -93. 
2. BA, R2/1291, letter from W. Rompel to Gärtner 
of Finance, 10 April, 1929. 
"Papst contra Frau ? ", 
at the Reich Ministry 
3. This "working women's movement" was not so much a women's movement 
as a part of the socialist movement. There were women's groups 
within the SPD and the KPD, but these were composed of women who 
were full members of the respective party. See Alice Rühle- Gerstel, 
Das Frauenroblem der Ge- nwart. Eine Ps cholo_ sehe Bilanz, Leipzig, 
NsdL, "Kommunistische 1932, pp. 142 -43, and BA, R58 1146, RMdI 
Frauenbewegung ", 5 March, 1932. 
4. Werner Thönnessen, Frauenemanzipation, Frankfurt, 1969, PP. 84 -98. 
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basic Marxist ideals, and so the liberation of women from all kinds 
of discrimination would follow naturally from the liberation of the 
working class from capitalism, since it was the capitalist system, 
with its bourgeois morality, which had brought about the subordination 
of women in society and in the economy1. 
If the SPD had become bureaucratised before 1914, the process 
was only intensified by the secession of the radicals and its new -found 
respectability as a party of government. Docile moderates like Marie 
Juchacz and Gertrud Hanna became the chief spokeswomen of the party; 
these loyally upheld official party policy, and were at pains to 
remind women members that they were first and foremost members of the 
SPD, and that their women's organisation was only one constituent of 
"this great party "2. Gertrud Hanna firmly believed that, in the 
socialist trade union movement, at any rate, positive harm would result 
from any attempt to isolate women in their own groups, and found 
herself having to remind male trade unionists at times that the interests 
of their movement would be better served by keeping women in it as 
full members, alongside the men3. More than one delegate to the 
SPD's 1927 congress voiced the opinion that not nearly enough was 
being done by the party to interest women in all aspects of daily life 
and to mobilise their support for SPD policies generally, not just 
those of particular relevance to women; the middle -class women's 
1. G. G. L. Alexander, Kämpfende Frauen, n.p., 1924, pp. 3 -4. 
2. Marie Juchacz's speech to the Women's Conference at the 1927 SPD 
Party Congress at Kiel, 27 -29 May, 1927, found in the published 
proceedings of the Congress, Berlin, 1927, p. 302. 
3. "Frauenarbeit und Gewerkschaften ", Gewerkschaftszeitung, 11 January, 
1930, p. 22. 
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movement and the liberal parties were felt to be much more active 
and successful in this1. 
But although the SPD was nominally committed to the pursuit of 
equality between the sexes, it had been a party to the Demobilisation 
Orders of the post -war years which had the effect of dismissing 
women from jobs to make way for men returning from the forces2. In 
addition the onset of the Depression in 1929 -30 gave rise again to 
hostility among working men and within the socialist unions towards 
what they regarded as female competition for the ever -decreasing 
number of jobs3. The SPD could boast the highest percentage of 
women deputies in their parliamentary party, as compared with the 
other parties; but women never held positions of the first importance 
in the party4. During the Weimar period the SPD was incapable of 
shaking off prejudices which had a long tradition, while at the same 
time exhibiting complacence about the things they had achieved. 
On the other side of the socialist camp there was no equivocation 
whatsoever. The break -away KPD trade union organisation, the 
Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO), founded in 19295, was fully 
explicit about its policy, which included the abolition of wage 
1. Report of the SPD's 1927 Party Congress, pp. 303 -04, 308. 
2. Thannessen, op. cit., pp. 100 -02. 
3. Ibid., pp. 105, 118 -19. 
4. Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1918 -33, New Haven, 1964, 
p. 81. 
5. Hermann Weber (ed.), V5lker hart die Signale, Munich, 1967, pp. 22- 
23, 126. 
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differentials between men and women, within the context of a campaign 
for a general rise in wages, as well as more thorough protection for 
women workers and longer paid leave for expectant and nursing mothers. 
The RGO also campaigned for equal salaries for men and women white - 
collar workers, and for the repeal of provisions, reintroduced in 
1932, permitting the dismissal of married women civil servants. In 
a clear reference to the contentious question about whether a woman 
should be dismissed from public employment if she had an illegitimate 
child, the RGO's manifesto asserted its opposition to "any 
interference in the personal life of women civil servants "1. 
The end of the 1920s saw the intensification of KPD activity 
in Germany, with the directive from Stalin that Social Democracy, 
above all, must be combated. Intensive propaganda campaigns were 
launched with the aim of encouraging women, especially, to join the 
proletarian struggle for a "Soviet Germany "2. The belief that 
capitalism in Germany was reaching its crisis with the Depression 
led to particularly energetic recruiting drives in 1931 and 1932. 
These did bear fruit, but, given that the situation was particularly 
favourable to Communist agitation - with compulsory wage cuts and the 
shortage of jobs - the results were disappointing, especially among 
women in the heavy industrial areas. Local women shop stewards were 
felt by the executive to have neglected opportunities, and so greater 
1. BA, R45 /vorl. 10, RGO Referenten Materialien, October 1932, "Die 
Arbeiterinnen in die Einheitsfrontaktion ", pp. 12 -13. 
2. BA, R58/1145, 6 February, RMdI /NsdL, 6 February, 1931, "Kommunistische 
Prauenbewegung" . 
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central control was proposed and new targets for women's recruitment 
were set in March 19321. 
C. The Middle -class Women's Movement in the Weimar Republic 
In addition to the split in the socialist camp, the middle - 
class women's movement, in which there had already been sharp 
differences of opinion before the war2, was now divided into two 
groups whose attitudes had diverged considerably. Those who had been 
in the leadership of the Bund deutscher Frauenvereine (BDF)3 before 
the war, and who had organised the Nationale Frauendienst during it - 
the group led by Gertrud Bäumer - largely associated themselves with 
the DDP in local and national politics, but also continued to be 
active in their separate women's organisations within the BDF. The 
other, smaller group was more radical, not affiliated to any 
political party but wholeheartedly republican; it was strongly 
feminist, pacifist, and thoroughly disenchanted with the "establishment" 
of the women's movement which, felt the radicals, had been tamed and 
institutionalised by its nationalist stance in the war, and bought off 
by a few concessions to the feminist lobby after it. 
The final split had come in 1915 when a small group of middle - 
class feminists, led by Lida Gustava Heymann and Anita Augspurg, had 
condemned the BDF for volunteering to assist the war effort, and had 
1. BA, R58/1146, RMdI /NsdL, 5 March, 1932, pp. 5 -13. 
2. Evans, op. cit., discusses these differences in detail, as a consistent 
theme of his work. 
3. The BDF was a nationwide co- ordinating association of middle -class 
women's organisations of a charitable, vocational, professional 
and social nature. 
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preferred to join with women pacifists from other countries in 
founding the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 
at The Hague. The WILPF pledged itself to work for peace and 
disarmament and to lobby governments in all countries to try to 
achieve this1. As the organisation developed, in time of peace, 
its demands became more far -reaching with as decisive an application 
to domestic as to international affairs. In the election campaign 
of 1930 the German branch of the WILPF urged its esmillidefts to canvass 
and vote for candidates from any party which supported its twelve 
demands, which included the abolition of the death penalty, the 
implementing of the Constitution's provisions which promoted 
equality for women and for the illegitimate child, the repeal of 
the severe abortion law, paragraph 218 of the Criminal Code, and a 
ban on the production of and trade in weapons2. Campaigning for 
total disarmament, the WILPF preached the pointlessness of trying 
to create protective devices against the use of poison gas and air 
attacks on the civilian population; the only solution, as they saw it, 
was to outlaw such threats by international co- operation, which would 
bring to an end the irresponsible expenditure of vast sums of money 
on armaments which was criminal in time of economic depression3. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given their militant feminism, the 
radicals, like the more moderate feminists, were opposed to the 
creation of a Women's Party. They proposed rather that at elections 
1. Rühle- Gerstel, op. cit., pp. 137-38. 
2. "Zur Reichstagswahl ", FiS, September /October 1930, p. 1. 
3. Report in FiS, April 1929, p. 8. The 1929 editions of Die Frau im 
Staat devoted a high proportion of their space to articles and 
reports on matters connected with war, peace, and poison gas. 
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there should be a "women's list" composed of women from the various 
political parties in proportion to the parliamentary representation 
of the parties. This would, they claimed, have the result of giving 
women a larger representation and greater influence in the legislature 
than they had during the 1920s; but the radicals also felt that 
experience had shown that Germany's women were not yet sufficiently 
politically mature for their schemel. 
The German branch of the WILPF cast its net wide in trying to 
attract support for its views. Although most of its leadership 
regarded the Churches as bastions of reaction, it nevertheless 
realised that their influence was still considerable, and therefore 
tried to win their support for the disarmament campaign. The WILPF 
contacted Adam Stegerwald, a leading member of the Centre Party, and 
its representatives even obtained an audience with the Papal Nuncio, 
Pacelli; they then used their tenuous connection with these names to 
try to win over the Christian Trade Union organisation2. The German 
branch was also extremely active on the international scene, playing 
host to a full meeting of the League in Frankfurt in January 19293. 
Three years later, another conference, of all international women's 
pacifist organisations, was held in Munich, under the chairmanship of 
the local WILPF leader, Constanze Hallgarten4. This meeting was 
1. "Frauenpartei? Nein, Frauenlisten ", FIS, April 1931, p. 9. 
2. IfZ, MA 422, frame 5797, letter from Karl Genzier to Otte, General 
Secretary of the Association of Christian Trade Unions, 19 November, 
1928. 
3. Ibid., frame 5794, "Die modernen Kriegsmethoden und der Schutz der 
Zivilbevölkerung ", proposals for the Frankfurt International 
Conference of the WILPF, 4 -6 January, 1929. 
4. "München: Kämpferin gegen den Krieg", Süddeutsche Zeitung 15 September, 
1966. 
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reported by the Nazis under the title "Pacifist scandal in Munich "1. 
Besides disarmament, the other major issue which absorbed the 
energies of the radicals of the WILPF was the position of women in 
post-war Germany. The magazine of this group, Die Frau im Staat, 
founded in 1918 by Lida Gustava Heymann and Anita Augspurg, and 
edited by them2, devoted considerable space in every issue in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s to pointing out how little progress had 
really been made in winning equality of opportunity and equality of 
rights for women. It was here that they really felt themselves to be 
out of sympathy with the liberal women of the BDF, who, not unjustifiably, 
were proud of the achievements they had made in the pre -war period, 
particularly in the field of education. The liberals were well aware 
that far less progress had been made during the 1920s than had been 
anticipated by both themselves and the radicals, in the euphoria of 
1918 -19 with the granting of the suffrage and the writing into the 
Constitution of many of their demands3. But although the liberals 
realised that much had been left undone - especially with the Civil 
Code unamended - they nevertheless gave the impression, to the radicals 
and to the young, who had not actually been involved in the struggles 
of the Imperial period, that they were complacent, always harking back 
to the things that they had achieved and to their contribution to the 
war effort. 
1. IfZ, MA 135, frames 136366 -67, NS-Korrespondenz 2, 15 January, 1932, 
"Pazifisten -skandal in Mönchen ". 
2. Lida Gustava Heymann's entry in Wer ist's? 1928, p. 656. 
3. Looking back over the 1920s, Dorothee von Velsen referred, in a 
letter to Gertrud Baumer, to "the disappointment at having achieved 
nothing ". BA, Kl.Erw., no. 296 -(1), letter of 8 March, 1934, p. 31. 
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At first sight the ground between the liberal and the radical 
groups in the middle -class feminist camp was not so very great. Both 
groups favoured improved opportunities for women at all levels and in 
all areas - economic, political, social, legal, cultural - and both 
were outspoken in their attacks on a male- dominated society. In 
addition, the liberals came out strongly in favour of close international 
co- operation after the Peace Treaties had been signed. In a way, 
however, their motive was different from that of the radicals, who 
consistently and unconditionally supported disarmament and internationalism; 
the liberals worked rather from the premise that if Germany were 
disarmed compulsorily then they would campaign tirelessly to achieve 
general disarmament1. But the liberals did genuinely believe that 
peace must be preserved, and that the international activity of 
women, whether generally in League of Nations' affiliates or 
particularly with women from other countries, was not merely desirable 
but actually essential. 
Gertrud Balmer, for one, was the German delegate to the League 
of Nations' committee on youth affairs, as well as being a representative 
at international disarmament discussions2; it was, after all, largely 
for her "outspokenly pacifist and feminist outlook" that she was not 
only dismissed from the public service by the Nazis in 1933, but even, 
from 1935 to 1937, denied the right to publish her writings3. 
1. See, e.g., report in BF, 15 January, 1932, p. 1: "Das ohnmachtige, 
waffenlose Deutschland...hat naturgemäss das allergrösste Interesse 
daran, dass das Ziel der Abr{istungskonferenz erreicht wird ". 
2. Gertrud Baumer's entry in Das Grosse Brockhaus, 1967, vol. 2, p. 393. 
Emmy Beckmann (ed.), Des Lebens wie der Liebe Band, Tübingen, 1956 
(letters of Gertrud Bäumer), letter to Emmy Beckmann, 14 September, 
1930, p. 40. 
3. BDC, Gertrud Baumer's file, "Aktenvermerk ", 26 October, 1937, p. 3. 
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Her friend Dorothee von Velsen, also a member of the DDP, and 
President of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein, was a member 
of the committee of the World Union for Women's Suffrage, and was 
also in 1932 the Reich Government's representative for social matters 
and women's affairs in the German delegation to the League of Nationsl. 
Marie Elisabeth Lüders, a DDP Reichstag deputy throughout the 1920s, 
and a prominent member of the BDF and the Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund, 
was a member of three international committees, including the Society 
for a European Customs Union, and was, in addition, a leading member 
of the German Society for the League of Nationsl. The BDF itself 
became fully committed to working for universal disarmament, and in 
1932 organised a giant petition to gain support for this3. 
The liberal women of the BDF were also concerned with questions 
of youth welfare, employment prospects for girls in time of economic 
stringency, education of all kinds, and altogether anything which 
they felt was of interest to women. At their meetings they could call 
on representatives of the state governments, for example Frau Zeisler 
from Saxony or Marie Baum from Baden, to report on policy in the 
different Lander. They could also call on representatives of some 
Reich ministries to explain the policies and the work of the central 
government; women in this category included, apart from Gertrud Baumer 
at the Ministry of the Interior, flare Mende in the Ministry of 
1. BDC, 8393, Dorothee von Velsen, "Lebenslauf ", October 1937. 
2. Horkenbach, op. cit., pp. 709 -10. 
3. Report in BF, 15 January, 1932, p. 1. 
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Economics and Kate Gaebel at the central office of the Employment 
Exchanges1. These women were themselves living examples of the 
progress that had been made in winning acceptance for the 
appointment of women to public office. This meant, however, that 
these women were necessarily associated with the policies of the 
governments for which they worked; since it was precisely these 
governments which were failing to introduce progressive legislation 
which would benefit women, the women associated with them came in 
for a share of the criticism heaped on them by the radicals. 
Naturally, the Reich governments were felt to have been particularly 
reprehensible since legislation was still wanting, after a decade, 
to implement the relevant clauses of the Constitution. As in all 
other matters, however, any Government was rendered ineffectual by 
its precarious coalition character, the growing succession of short - 
lived administrations serving only to increase Ministers' reluctance 
to introduce controversial measures. 
The radicals understood this difficulty, and in the Depression 
years they also appreciated that the Government's room for manoeuvre 
was negligible. Their argument, however, was that it should have 
been possible to achieve something more for women during the less 
troubled years of the 1920s, and that the blame for not agitating 
continuously to this end lay squarely with the women of the BDF, 
although they also condemned women in the SPD and the trade unions2. 
In an article entitled "Women's Liberation ", published in autumn 1932, 
Lida Gustava Heymann, in her pungent style, began with the words, 
1. "17. Generalversammlung des BDF in Leipzig ", BF, 15 October, 1931, 
pp. 3 -4. 
2. Lida Gustava Heymann, "Frauen Heraus ", FiS, March 1930, pp. 3 -5. 
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"Women's movement: How remote it sounds; it meant something once ". 
But even in the past, she felt, the BDF had been out of touch with 
reality, just as it assuredly was by 1930: 
"Then, as now, the Bund lacked visible vitality; then, as 
now, the Bund had ossified; then, as now, it was involved 
in theoretical, soul -destroying discussions; then, as now, 
it possessed neither a militant spirit nor courage, 
neither initiative nor real enthusiasm ". 
Given the real efforts of the BDF leaders in the pre-war period, this 
indictment was rather unjust; and yet, in relation to the 1920s it 
was not altogether without foundation. Indeed, Lida Gustava Heymann 
paid tribute to Luise Otto who, she believed, had had real aims and 
objectives which had been quietly ignored by the women's leaders from 
the end of the nineteenth century. For forty years, she claimed, the 
BDF had concentrated on securing for women a niche in social welfare 
activity and educating them for a trade or a profession; the undoubted 
practical value of this could not, she said, obscure the fact that it 
had only a very indirect bearing on the complete liberation of women, 
the aim of the radicals1. 
It is clear, then, that the differences between the liberal 
and the radical feminists were not merely minor ones of substance, but 
fundamental ones of spirit. The liberals aimed for equality of 
opportunity for women but accepted that women's physical strength, 
their biological role and their natural inclinations might mean that 
they would not in fact achieve positions fully equal with men's. As 
the radical Alice RUhle- Gerstel commented, in a spirit of criticism, 
"The Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein formulated the 
first point of its programme with a sarcasm obviously 
directed at the behaviour of many of its fellow women 
1. Lida Gustava Heymann, "Frauenbefreiung ", FiS, September /October 1932, 
pp. 5-7. 
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as follows: 'The Women's Movement proceeds in the framing 
of its demands from the fact of the fundamental physical 
and spiritual difference between the sexes '"1. 
The radicals, on the other hand, denied that there were any differences 
so significant as to make complete equality of the sexes in every 
aspect of life impossible. They took this principle to extremes that 
seemed to many highly absurd, most notably in the matter of labour 
protection for women; seeing it as a device to justify paying women 
at a lower rate than men, they came out against it altogether, joining 
the Open Door International for the Economic Emancipation of the Woman 
Worker, ,hose policy this was2. In this, they differed not only from 
conservatives and from the liberal women's movement, but also from 
both reformist and revolutionary socialists3. 
The radical feminists believed that their campaign was one 
on behalf of the entire female sex, whereas the liberals were interested 
only in the affairs of professional, vocational and clerical women 
workers. The failure of the middle -class and working -class women's 
representatives to make common cause in the 1890s had led in fact to 
a division of functions with the middle -class feminists nominally 
representing the female sex but actually not representing its large 
1. Rühle- Gerstel, op. cit., p. 131. 
2. Lida Gustava Heymann, "The Open Door Council ", FiS, May 1929, 
p. 1. 
3. Th8nnessen, op. cit., pp. 165 -66. 
Report in Jahrbuch. des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 
1930, p. 192. 
BA, R45 /vorl. 10, RGO Referenten Materialien, October 1932, "Die 
Arbeiterinnen in die Einheitsfrontaktion ", pp. 12 -13. 
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working -class element, whose interests were the concern of the socialist 
parties, led as they were by men. The radicals had hoped to cross the 
class barrier and show working -class women that male chauvinism was 
as strong in the SPD as in the middle -class parties, and that one did not 
need to look to the Moscow -dominated KPD to find representatives who 
wanted equality for all women, not just a privileged minorityl. The 
charge that the liberal feminists were not interested in the mass of 
German women but worked only for the benefit of a few selfish "female 
imitators of men" was also useful ammunition for the Nazis in their 
attacks on the "women's rightists "2. It was certainly true that most 
of the leading feminists were spinsters, and could therefore be 
accused of being out of touch with the needs of the vast number of 
ordinary German wives and mothers. The radicals, at least, showed 
signs of appreciating some of the pressing problems of human 
relationships by campaigning for the repeal of the abortion law and 
the free dissemination of contraceptive advice3, but the reticence 
preferred by the BDF women on such matters was epitomised by Gertrud 
Baumer's remark to a friend that "I really hate the word 'sexual "4. 
The differences between the radicals and the liberal feminists 
were accentuated by an additional complicating factor, the generation 
1. Rühle- Gerstel, op. cit., pp. 142-43. 
2. Rudolf Hess, quoted in VB, 27 May, 1936. 
3. Auguste Kirchhoff, "Siebenter Internationaler Kongress fair Geburten- 
regelung", FiS, November 1930, pp. 5-6. 
4. BA, Kl.Erw., 258 -(2), letter from Gertrud Bäumer to Marianne Weber, 
17 December, 1934. 
See also Evans, op. cit., p. 232. 
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problem. It was clear in the late 1920s and early 1930s that the 
BDF was not attracting young women, and this was a source of concern 
to the leadership. Naturally, some of the vitality had gone out of 
the movement once the aims of the pre -war campaign had been achieved; 
legal acceptance of women's suffrage, the admission of women to higher 
education and the professions, demonstrable improvement in senior 
schooling for girls, and the appointment of a small but significant 
number of women to prominent positions, meant that the big issues had 
been settled. The task now was one of comparative drudgery, the 
ironing out of the minutiae and the unspectacular working out of details 
to make the intentions expressed in the Constitution a reality. And 
economic and political circumstances ensured that issues which seemed 
more nationally pressing took precedence over this work, so that by 
1930 there was very little to show for what had been promised. 
This gave point to the radicals' charge that the Women's 
movement as it stood was becoming a meaningless anachronism, and that 
it could thus not expect to attract the youngl. This was felt to be 
even more the case since the same old "establishment" still ran the 
movement as had been running it for twenty years, and that without an 
infusion of new blood it had become complacent and ossified. But the 
majority of BDF members seemed in favour of the long -serving committee, 
since it was returned again and again2; both the reason for and the 
result of this was undoubtedly that potential young adherents 
1. Lida Gustava Heymann, " Frauenbefreiung", FiS, September /October 
1932, pp. 6 -7. 
R{hhle- Gerstel, op. cit., p. 140. 
2. Ibid., pp. 140 -41. 
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increasingly stayed away, in disgust. The radicals were pleased to 
publicise the BDF's "generation problem" in Die Frau im Staat, and 
Lida Gustava Heymann took obvious pleasure in advising the discontented 
young that the Open Door International was more their styled. But the 
radicals also faced a generation problem in the WILPF, where the 
younger women felt that the methods and ideals of the older leadership 
were now out of date, but where they again failed to oust the old guard 
- in spite of their claim that they were anxious to stand down - and so 
the system remained unchanged in this camp, too2. 
D. The End of the Women's Organisations under the Nazis 
No doubt division, discussion and disputes were considered 
healthy inside the democratic forms of the Weimar Republic. The 
stalemate within the BDF, particularly, could probably have been 
resolved either by a determined take -over bid by the young within it, 
or else by its being eclipsed by a new, vital movement composed of the 
disaffected young. In a way, of course, it could be said that this 
latter possibility did come about, with the attraction of even some 
feminists to what seemed to be a new and vital movement, National 
Socialism, although the majority of them were quite clearly against it. 
But, as Alice Rühle- Gerstel commented, "Women as a whole have no single 
representative "3, and the splits and divisions between and within the 
middle -class and socialist groups concerned with women's affairs were to 
1. Lida Gustava Heymann, op. cit., p. 7. 
2. "Die IX. Tagung des Deutschen Zweiges der Internationalen Frauenliga 
für Frieden und Freiheit ", FiS, November 1929, pp. 6 -7. 
3. Rühle-Gerstel, op. cit., p. 142. 
30. 
prove critical in undermining potentially effective opposition from 
women of all shades of feminist opinion, who could not, even in the 
face of a common danger, act in concert. 
And yet, it is clear that most groups in the feminist camp 
underestimated the Nazi threat in one way or another. Indeed, the 
radicals were well aware of what a Nazi accession to power would mean 
for their movement and their campaignl; but Lida Gustava Heymann, 
writing in autumn 1932, showed how unrealistic she was by claiming 
that Hitler's party did not spell a real danger, since the cause of 
feminism was going from strength to strength. In any case, she added, 
"Dictatorships never last long"2. A representative of the DVP, writing 
in the party's Women's Review early in 1932, was more pessimistic: 
"The women's movement finds itself at the present time in 
a crisis of a kind which it has never in all its history 
experienced.... The most threatening danger seems to lie 
in the political arena, since a movement with the great 
political momentum, which National Socialism currently has, 
has set itself decisively and unequivocally against the 
ideals and aims of the women's movement. The women's 
movement is portrayed in the party's press generally and 
without restraint as a manifestation of decadence "3. 
The BDF, however, demonstrated how little it comprehended the nature of 
Nazism as late as March 1933. Its questionnaire, sent to all political 
parties, asking how many women candidates were being presented by each4, 
1. Lida Gustava Heymann, "Nachkriegspsychose ", FIS, March 1931, pp. 1 -2. 
Grete Stoffel, "Die Arbeitslosigkeit und die Frauenarbeit ", FIS, 
August /September 1931, p. 5. 
2. Lida Gustava Heymann, "Frauenbefreiung ", FIS, September /October 1932, 
p. 6. 
3. BA, R4511/64, DVP Reichsgeschäftsstelle, Frauenrundschau 4 March, 
1932, "Nationalsozialisten und Frau ", p. 1141. 
4. Report in BF, March 1933. pp. 8 -9. 
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was clearly based on two assumptions, that elections still meant 
something in Germany, and that political parties still wielded 
influence and would continue to do so; within a few months, both 
these assumptions were to be proved invalid, and the women's 
movement, in all its branches, effectively destroyed. 
Even before all the parties were dissolved and the Nazis in 
unchallenged control of the state it was made clear that no branch 
of the women's movement was to be allowed to continue in existence. 
After all, every point on which the separate groups agreed was 
anathema to the NSDAP: pacifism, internationalism, feminism, 
individualism were the bogeys - along with the menace of "Bolshevism ", 
which for the Nazis covered the whole spectrum of left -wing thought 
- which they were sworn to destroy. The tragedy of the women's 
movement was, then, that its various warring factions could not 
temporarily sink their differences to present a united front to a party 
that was the enemy of all of them. The Nazis were able to pick off 
each group one by one, without any concerted protest. The entire 
process paralleled that taking place on the purely political front. 
Perhaps, given the skill, speed and good fortune of the Nazis even a 
united feminist movement could have achieved little; on the other hand, 
its chances of survival would no doubt have been considerably greater 
had there not been the disarray and the feeling of discouragement that 
was so obvious in feminist circles in the early 1930s. 
The women's organisations associated with the KPD and the SPD 
were the first to go, naturally succumbing when their respective party 
and trade union movement were banned. Those who were not arrested and 
who refused to emigrate were at least temporarily hamstrung, although a 
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left -wing underground organisation did develop quite rapidly. It 
was, however, a resistance movement of which some women - notably 
the lawyer, Hilde Benjamin (KPD), Joanna Kirchner (SPD)1, and Eva 
Schulze- Knabe'(KPD)2 - were members, and not at all a specifically 
women's movement. There was, after all, only the one issue at this 
time, the need to overthrow the Nazi regime. The radical feminists 
were considered by the Nazis to be less dangerous, not being associated 
with a large party machine, and so the Government contented itself with 
banning their publications and ridiculing their leaders in the Nazi 
Party's press3. But Nazi vindictiveness and greed were demonstrated 
when it was announced in February 1935 that 
"On the grounds of the regulations concerning the confiscation 
of property of Communists and enemies of the state and the 
people, the property of the journalists Dr. Anita Augspurg 
and Lida Gustava Heymann has been confiscated, to the benefit 
of the state of Bavaria".. 
This was the penalty to be paid by those denied the right to pursue 
their profession; they had seen their publications banned, their 
organisations dissolved, and in the end had seen no alternative to 
emigration, forfeiting in the process their personal possessions. 
With the left -wing organisations outlawed and their leaders 
disgraced, the conservatives, who had long hated the women's movement 
1. Erich Stockhorst, F[lnftausend KMDfe: Wer war was im Dritten Reich, 
Bruchsal, 1967, pp. 51 and 233. 
2. BDC, P262, Der Oberreichsanwalt beim Volksgerichtshof, "Anklageschrift ", 
2 December, 1941, pp. 37 -40. 
3. F. Hamm, "Lida Gustava Heymann 'verteidigt' die deutsche Frau ", VB, 
12 July, 1933. 
4. Report in FZ, 1 February, 1935. 
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in any of its manifestations, felt that their hour had come, and 
wholeheartedly pledged themselves to serve the new regimel. The Ring 
Nationaler Frauenbünde, an association of conservative women's 
organisations, wrote to Hitler in April 1933 welcoming the "considerable 
efforts of the National Government to give strong leadership ", and 
putting their organisation completely at his disposal2. Lammers 
replied that Hitler graciously acknowledged "the willingness of the 
nationalist women to collaborate with the state "3. But it was soon to 
become apparent that the leadership of women's organisations, as of all 
others in the Nazi state, would be in the hands of party members, and 
that even the most compliant of conservative groups could no longer 
hope to retain its own identity. 
A number of the conservative organisations hoped to save 
themselves by demonstrating their loyalty to the new regime in a 
concrete way; the Evangelical Women's Association, the National 
Association of German Housewives and the Bund Ktinigin Luise (Queen 
Luise League), among others, at once joined the new Nazi association 
of women's organisations, the Frauenfront4. The leader of the Bund 
Königin Luise, Frau von Hadeln, was rewarded with the post of deputy 
leader of the Frauenfront, whose leader was an enthusiastic young Nazi, 
Lydia Gottschewski5. But early in 1934 a strong propaganda action was 
1. See, e.g., Dora Hasselblatt (ed.), Wir Frauen und die Nationale 
Bewegung, Hamburg, 1933, which contains articles by non -Nazi women 
which are generally favourable towards Nazism. 
2. BA, R43II /427, letter of ? April, 1933 (exact date not given). 
3. Ibid., letter of 12 May, 1933. 
4. Clifford Kirkpatrick, Woman in Nazi Germany, London, 1939, P. 57. 
5. BDC, Akten des Obersten Parteigerichts, 2684/34, letter from Walter 
Buch to Gottfried Krummacher, 20 September, 1933. 
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launched to bring about the dissolution of the BEL; for example, 
in March 1934 the Party's press publicised the speech in which two 
of the BKL's former office- holders declared that they had resigned 
their posts because they had preferred to become ordinary members of 
the Nazis' women's organisation than to be officials of any other 
group'. Within a month of this incident, the BEL had dissolved itself, 
on 1 April, 19342, although Hitler had promised Frau von Hadeln his 
protection for her organisation, at the same time as he had made a 
similar promise to Seidte about the Stahlhelm3. Other groups lasted 
a little longer, but it was only a matter of time before a Nazi monopoly 
was enforced in this area, as in most others. At the end of October 
1935, the Deutscher Frauenbund, the DNVP's leading women's organisation, 
was dissolved; the Stahlhelmfrauenbund's turn came a week later; and in 
November 1936 the Flottenbund deutscher Frauen ceased to exist4. These 
organisations were allowed to survive as long because they were no 
threat to the Nazis, but their continued existence meant that there 
was diversity of a kind that the Nazis could not tolerate, and so they 
had, eventually, to be eliminated. 
Of the organisations to which the Nazis had an intrinsic 
objection the liberal ones were treated with the least severity. Indeed, 
their leaders suffered, in that they were promptly dismissed from 
1. "Tagung der NS- Frauenschaft ", VB, 7 March, 1934. 
2. BA, SlR.Sch., 230, Altona Gau -Verordnungsblatt 2/34, 1 March, 1934. 
3. BBC, op. cit. 
4. "5 Jahre Reichsfrauenführung", FK, January 1939, p. 4. 
35. 
positions they held in the public service, whether as civil servants, 
teachers, lawyers or lecturers, on grounds of "political unreliability "; 
a law of 7 April, 1933 permitted this, as it also made possible the 
dismissal of non -"Aryans" from the public service1. Thus, at a stroke, 
the Government purged vital areas of employment, particularly the 
highly sensitive teaching profession, which had been a stronghold of 
feminism2. It was no doubt a severe blow to many women, to all those 
who held less exalted positions than Gertrud Bäumer, who was one of the 
first to suffer, but positions which gave them considerable interest 
and satisfaction nevertheless3. But they were, within the limits of 
Goebbels's censors, allowed to continue publishing their writings, 
and were deprived of neither their personal freedom nor their property, 
in contrast with the radicals and socialists. 
In spite of the speed and ruthlessness with which the Nazis 
moved, the BDF's leaders still hoped that their organisations would 
be able to put up effective resistance to a complete takeover. But 
those which did make any show of resistance were summarily dissolved, 
so that Gertrud Bäumer and her associates quickly came to the conclusion 
that, for them and for the women they felt they still had a duty to 
represent, the most important thing was survival. Gertrud B5,umer 
1. "Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums ", RGB, 1933 I, 
7 April, 1933, pp. 175 -77. 
2. More will be said about the effects of Nazi legislation on women 
in professional positions in Chapter 5. 
3. Gertrud Bäumer wrote to Emmy Beckmann to commiserate with her after 
her own dismissal and then Emmy Beckmann's, from her position in 
the Hamburg education administration, agreeing with an earlier 
comment of the latter's that such a position was not just a job, 
but a source of interest and pleasure. Beckmann, op. cit., letter 
of 13 April, 1933, p. 49. 
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still believed, in April 1933, that if the middle -class women's 
organisations showed docility in joining the Frauenfront,, and 
sacrificed some of their leaders to whom the Nazis chiefly objected, 
they would be able to carry on at least some of their former work, 
having accepted the supreme leadership of the Nazi organisationl. 
This mistaken belief was compounded by another: she also felt that 
the Nazi women's organisation would now be cast in the role of defender 
of the rights and position of women, and that a new women's movement 
would develop as a reaction to the Nazis' promised restrictions on 
women in public life, the professions and employment. This would be 
something in which, she confided to her close friend Emmy Beckmann, 
she would like to be able to participate. She maintained her optimism 
on this account throughout all the vicissitudes of the summer of 
1933 
2 
, and even in May 1934 still believed that "the new women's 
movement is coming "3. 
But by this time the whole edifice of the movement built up 
over a period of almost seventy years had ceased to exist, and the 
continued publication of the chief magazine of the BDF, Gertrud Bäumer's 
Die Frau, was the only public reminder - apart from attacks on the 
1. Beckmann, op. cit., pp. 50 -51. 
2. Ibid. 
Ibid., letter from Gertrud Bäumer to Helene König, 29 July, 1933. 
BA, Kl.Erw., no. 296 -(1), letter from Gertrud Bäumer to Dorothee von 
Velsen, 23 October, 1933, p. 20. 
3. Beckmann, op. cit., letter from Gertrud B,umer to Helene König, 2 
May, 1934, p. 68. 
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"women's rightists" in the Nazi press - that it had ever existed. 
On 15 May, 1933, the leaders of the BDF had seen no alternative to 
the dissolution of their organisation; the taking over of many of 
its constituents by Nazi groups had left the BDF without a raison 
d'étre, and its leaders could only advise the remaining groups to 
accommodate themselves to the new order as they saw fitl. The tactic 
of co- operation with the new regime did help to save one of the 
feminists' most valued organisations, the Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund, 
an association of professional women, but only temporarily. Although, 
as Gertrud Baumer admitted in November 1934, it had declared 
itself ready to make any concession necessary for survival2, it was 
finally dissolved just over a year later3. By this time it was in any 
case redundant, since the Nazis had established their own Reichsbund 
deutscher Akademikerinnen, which was safely under the leadership of 
a trusted official of the Nazi Teachers' League, Friederike Matthias4. 
The dissolution of the various organisations, of a political, 
vocational, religious, charitable and purely social character, was one 
aspect of the change brought about in women's activities by the Nazi 
assumption of power and Gleichschaltung (co- ordination) in 1933. In 
1. Gertrud B unier, "'Das Haus ist zerfallen'", Die Frau, June 1933, 
p. 513. 
Evans, op. cit., pp. 339 -45, describes some of the events immediately 
preceding the dissolution of the BDF, although he does not give 
references for some of the points he makes. His outright 
condemnation of the leaders of the BDF for their attempt to survive 
by making concessions to the Nazis seems unduly harsh, given the 
difficulty of their situation. 
2. BA, Kl.Erw., no. 296 -(l), letter from Gertrud Baumer to Dorothee 
von Velsen, 15 November, 1934, p. 39. 
3. FK, 10c. cit. 
4. "Aus dem NSLB ", Die deutsche höhere Schule, 1935, no. 
10, p. 10. 
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addition, the establishment of a one -party State in July of that year 
meant the end of what political power and influence women had had since 
1918, however much it had been despised by the more militant feminists. 
The fundamental Nazi insistence that women should not be involved in 
politics and should not play a leading role in the party itself 
naturally brought an end to female representation in the Reichstag 
once the other parties had been either dissolved or outlawed. Thus, 
in a way, the situation could be said to have reverted to "normal ", 
since the only period in which women had been permitted to play 
a full part in politics had been one of scarcely more than a decade, 
and that decade or so had been a period of instability and frustration 
for the majority of Germans. How much women lost in 1933 is perhaps 
questionable, given the relegation of the Reichstag to purely formal 
activities; but, at the same time, it was clear that all positions of 
power in the State, as in the Nazi Party, were, and would remain, in 
the hands of men. Gertrud Bäumer had not been wrong when she had 
detected signs of feminism within the Nazis' own ranks, but she had 
failed to appreciate that the exponents of feminist ideas within the 
party would be eliminated as effectively from the public eye as those 
outside the party had been, and given no opportunity to build up a 
viable base of support. 
But if women were, once again, to be denied a share in the 
political affairs of the nation this did not mean that they were 
also - as some had feared and others had hoped - to be excluded from 
all other positions and functions outside the realm of home and 
family. In the major areas of employment, higher education and the 
professions, as will be shown, the wilder Nazi predictions that in 
the Third Reich there would be a sharp reduction in the number of 
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women admitted or allowed to continue in their position were not 
realised. Indeed there were some attempts to restrict women's 
activities in these areas, but as the 1930s progressed, with the 
build -up of an economy geared to the possibility of limited war, 
women were looked to increasingly to fill vacancies for which 
there was not an adequate supply of men, even in areas in which they 
had not formerly been well represented. This development, which was 
greatly intensified once Germany was at war, can no doubt be viewed 
as a retreat from policy which had been declared "fundamental ", even 
"immutable ". But simply to say that is to accept the superficial and 
to fail to appreciate the essentially long -term view the Nazis 
themselves had adopted. In the "thousand -year Reich" there had to 
be priorities, even among basic tenets of ideology, so that apparent 
inconsistencies emerge; in the long term, however, all the Nazis' 
principles were supposed to be compatible. The first priority was 
the securing for the "Aryan" race of an impregnable position in the 
world, before which all others, including those regarding the nature 
and function of women, had to give way. But it is clear that the 
Nazis did expect that, once they had achieved this position, their 
other policies, including the return of women to their "natural 
occupations ", could be implemented. 
In the meantime, there were indications during the 1930s of 
what this would mean. The insistence of the Nazis on the separation 
of the sexes allowed, for example, the creation of Nazi organisations 
for women which perhaps had little real power, but whose actual 
operation was in the hands of the women themselves, thus providing 
a limited amount of autonomy; this was permitted because the leadership 
of the organisations showed little inclination to step out of line. 
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There were developments within the realm of marriage and the family 
which were sometimes, in themselves, surprisingly close to what 
feminists and even socialists had called for in previous decades, 
although the Nazis introduced them for different motives: policy 
towards the unmarried mother and the reform of the divorce law are 
two examples of this. In other aspects, of course - notably the 
sensitive area of abortion - the Nazi view was diametrically 
opposed to what the radical feminists and the socialists had demanded. 
These similarities and differences were the result of a 
fundamental difference between the ideologies - using the term 
loosely - of Nazis on the one hand and liberals and socialists on the 
other. The latter believed that the good of the individual, within 
society, was intrinsically worth pursuing, and that the State should 
protect and further the interests of its citizens. The Nazis, on 
the other hand, put the good of the State before the interests 
of its citizens, so that the State's demands always took precedence 
and the desires and needs of its citizens were, if it were found to 
be necessary, sacrificed. Much of Nazi policy was conditioned by a 
revulsion against the "liberal individualism" of the Weimar Republic 
which, in the Nazi view, was one of the main causes of Germany's 
economic, political and social problems. The desire to make Germany 
great once more would therefore require the stamping out of all 
vestiges of this attitude. This motive is fundamental to an 
understanding of Government policy towards women, with its apparent 
volte -faces at times, throughout the Nazi period. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Marriage and Morals 
Introduction 
The one factor which has, above all, determined the role of 
women in society is their child -bearing function. The single or 
childless married woman has found her status and opportunities to a 
great extent conditioned - and at times restricted - by the fact 
that most women, a small minority of them unmarried, become mothers 
at some time, generally between the ages of twenty and forty. The 
unmarried mother has, of course, always faced special problems 
which have been more or less oppressive depending on the mores of 
the society in which she has lived; for example, in some German 
states after the carnage of the Thirty Years' War normally severe 
attitudes towards the unmarried mother were moderated, for reasons 
of population policy1. Married women with children have changed, or 
perhaps developed, their aspirations radically in the last century, 
chiefly as a result of the spread of contraceptive information; this 
has not, however, brought to an end the resort to the crudest and 
probably the oldest method of birth control, abortion. The aspirations 
of women, then, and their desire to control their reproductive 
capacity, clearly developed ahead of the dissemination of accurate 
contraceptive advice, if perhaps not ahead of the development of 
reliable contraceptives. 
Given the important place of reproduction in the life of women, 
it will be instructive to examine the central position of population 
1. "Population policy" is used in this thesis to denote a policy designed 
to encourage the raising of the birth rate; as such, it may be 
proposed or espoused by a government, a party, a group, or an 
individual. 
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problems in Germany in the 1930s, to consider the incentives to 
procreate and the availability of contraceptives and abortion, and 
to discuss the position of the unmarried mother. In addition, the 
status of women in marriage is directly relevant to this discussion, 
as also is the position of women when a divorce takes place. What 
emerges from studying this area is that while it held a constant 
fascination for all political parties, for the Churches, and for 
feminists of all shades, it was only at the two extremes, among 
Communists and Nazis, that there was - from their opposing points 
of view - an obsessive single -mindedness. 
To the German Communists in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
population policy was a nationalistic, capitalist irrelevance, another 
means of using the working class in a way which brought them only 
misery. The KPD therefore campaigned vigorously for the right of the 
individual to limit his - or, more important, her - reproductive 
capacity to any extent and by any means. The Nazi view was that the 
nation needed children, and so children must be provided; any incentive 
was justifiable, as also was the removal of all means of limiting 
reproduction. This last point immediately created some common ground 
between the Nazis and the Churches, and heightened the latter's 
already implacable antagonism towards the KPD, although later Nazi 
policies brought strong criticism from the Roman Catholic Church. 
But there were also similarities between the policies of Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Russia, from 1936 onwards, as the latter felt the need to 
encourage population growth on a rapid and massive scale in view of 
the high rate of mortality as a result of war, civil war, famine and 
disease, followed by the increasing international tension of the 1930s. 
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A. The Birth Rate and Population Policy 
As women began to reject in the later nineteenth century the 
inevitability of frequent child -bearing in marriage, this, combined 
with generally vague ideas about emancipation, led to a slowing down 
of the birth rate after the abnormally high level of the 1870s and, 
to a lesser extent, the 1880s and 1890s. Although an unprecedentedly 
large number of children was born in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, with the figure around the two million mark every 
year, the actual rate of births, in relation to the size of the 
population, was declining steadily, and began to decline sharply from 
early in that decade into the war years1. In addition to their own 
personal desire no longer to be cast in the role of child -bearing 
machine (Gebarmaschine), women had sometimes chosen, sometimes been 
compelled for financial reasons, to continue or to resume working 
outside the home after marriage, particularly from the 1870s. And 
there was a growing awareness that a few children could be afforded 
a better start in life, while a large family could mean long -term 
poverty and poor prospects for the children. The limitation of 
families was a deliberate choice, which the development of more 
1. The following table illustrates this development: 
Period 
Average no. of live 
births per year 
Live births per 1,000 
of the population 
1871 -80 1,674,843 39 
1881 -90 1,732,015 37 
1891 -1900 1,960,296 36 
1901 -10 1,997,364 33 
1911 -14 1,849,428 28 
Calculated from figures in St.J.; 1911, p. 22; 1933, p. 27; 1934 
p. 27. 
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reliable contraceptives in the later nineteenth century made a real 
possibility 
While there had been growing official concern at the decline 
in the birth rate before the Great War, there was much more willingness 
to discuss population policy, and sexual matters generally, in the 
more liberal atmosphere of the Weimar Republic. More than that, the 
huge losses in the war and at the peace settlement, as well as the 
disastrous slump in the war -time birth ratel, made the formulation of 
a positive population policy highly desirable, even, some thought, 
essential. The problem was heightened by the increase in the surplus 
of women in the population, from about 800,000 before the war to 
about 2.8 million after it, as a direct result of military casualties3; 
many potential mothers would not be able to find a husband, and 
while unmarried motherhood remained socially unacceptable this meant 
that the birth rate was likely to continue to decline. 
It was, in any case, precisely the more liberal climate which 
brought two basic elements into conflict: the general desire, on the 
part of conservatives, liberals and Social Democrats alike, to 
1. K. M. Bolte and Dieter Kappe, Struktur and Entwicklung der 
Bevf3lkerung, Opladen, 1964, pp. 30 -31. 
J. Peel, "The Manufacturing and Retailing of Contraceptives in 
England ", Population Studies, 1963 -64, p. 117. 
2. The birth rate dropped to around 14 live births per 1,000 
inhabitants in 1917 and 1918, i.e. to half of the already diminished 
pre -war level. Figures from St.J., 1933, p. 27. 
3. The population of Germany by sex in 1910 and in October 1919 (i.e. 










reverse the decline in the birth rate and encourage a much higher 
rate of population growth was not altogether compatible with the 
support of liberals and socialists for demands that the Draconian 
abortion law be mitigated, or even repealed, and that contraceptive 
advice be made freely available. The result of this conflict of 
interests was that the 1920s went by - with the birth rate declining 
steeply and steadily back to the war -time level after the transient 
post-war revival1 - without any serious attempt being made by 
governments to formulate a national population policy2. This made 
Weimar politicians an easy prey for the National Socialists, who 
claimed that they were standing idly by while the German nation died 
out. 
But there was a Reichstag Population Policy Committee, on which 
Gertrud Baumer was the DDP's representative3, and at last in January 
1930 Severing, as Reich Minister of the Interior, demonstrated his 
concern by calling a conference to discuss the problem and to try to 
find possible remedies. The result was a national Standing Committee 
on Population Policy, which at its meetings discussed proposals for 
tax incentives to encourage procreation, protection for the pregnant 
woman and special care for infants. The guiding principle was to be 
"protection and aid for women who want children ", so that the pro- 
natalist motive was encouraged but not aggressively propagated. 
1. The birth rate rose to between 20 and 25 for the years 1919 -25, but 
then dropped every year, to reach 15 in 1932. Figures from St.J., 
loc. cit. 
2. Bolte and Kappe, op. cit., p. 44. 
3. HA, reel 37, fol. 736, "Mitteilungen des Reichsfrauenausschusses 
der DDP ", no. 5, 11 August, 1929. 
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Clearly, this was a real attempt to resolve the conflict between 
the growing individual desire to limit families and the national 
need for more children. The formula was also sufficiently undefined 
so that the political and ideological differences between the groups 
favouring a population policy would not prevent the search for a 
solution1. 
The finding of a solution was becoming particularly urgent, 
since the renewed decline in the birth rate in the later 1920s had 
come at a time when the number of women of child -bearing age had 
actually been steadily increasing2. According to an official 
report, even worse was in store: it was estimated that there would 
be a continued rise in the number of marriages - and therefore, it 
was hoped, also in the number of births - until 1935, but there would 
then be a decline as the generation of the lean war -time years of 
birth reached the age at which they were most likely to marry and 
reproduce; thus, from the later 1930s an even sharper decline in the 
birth rate could be expected3. 
In the absence of a national population policy, the parties 
were active in devising their own policies. The women's committee of 
the DDP, for example, drew up a document which, it hoped, would form 
the basis for discussions in the party's local groups. The central 
point of concern was less the size than the quality of the population, 
quality in "biological, social and mental" terms, which was to be 
achieved by positive means including improved social welfare and the 
1. "Reichsausschuss für Bevölkerungsfragen ", AfB, 1931, pp. 62 -65. 
2. Information from figures in St.J., 1932, p. 29. 
3. Report in WuS, 1930, no. 24, p. 972. 
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encouragement of physical education in schools. Negative measures, 
such as the discouragement of certain categories of people from 
procreating, were not mentioned. The DDP women were characteristically 
moderate, favouring tax reform to encourage large families but 
opposing the more blatant artificial incentives - which the Nazis would 
offer - which might be striven for per se, without a genuine desire 
for more children1. 
Moderation was also shown by a writer in the DVP's Women's 
Review, who put Germany's declining birth rate in its European 
perspective: the other countries of northern Europe, as well as 
Switzerland and the United States, she pointed out, were experiencing 
a similar trend; and the decline was less disastrous than might at 
first appear, she continued, since it was partially offset by the lower 
mortality rate among infants and children in the 1920s, as a result 
of medical advance and improved hygiene2. Nevertheless, the low 
birth rates in the countries of northern and western Europe were a 
source of general anxiety, not least in Britain, particularly in 
relation to the rapidly growing populations of eastern European 
countries3. But it was only the Nazis in Germany who saw this as a 
1. BA, 845111/43, Reichsfrauenausschux der DDP, "Grundsatze einer 
deutschen Bevälkerungspolitik ", 23 April, 1930, pp. 52-54. 
2. BA, R4511/64, Frauenrundschau, 25 February, 1932, "Zerfall der 
Familie ? ", p. 1133. 
The decline in the incidence of infant mortality in Germany was as 
follows: in 1905, 20% of babies born alive died in infancy; in 
1913 the figure was 15 %; in 1930 it was 8.5%. The rate was always 
higher among illegitimate than among legitimate children. Figures 
from St.J.: 1934, p. 48; 1935, p. 56. 
3. "Internationaler Kongress fair Bevölkerungswissenschaft" Der 
offentliche Gesundheitsdienst, 5 December, 1935, pp. 645 -80. 
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real threat to the west's future, and to Germany, with her strategic 
position in the centre of Europe, particularly. 
Continuing concern about the birth rate contributed to the 
intensification of interest in the health and care of pregnant women 
and mothers in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The sickness 
insurance funds now provided hospital treatment and maternity benefit 
for women members and female dependants of members, and in 1925 the 
Central Union of German Sickness Insurance Funds opened a research 
institute for the study of women's diseases. This was in part a 
response to the increase in the number of women members of insurance 
funds in the 1920s, a reflection of women's regarding employment as 
a long -term rather than a temporary activity. The strain which 
full -time employment put on married women was reflected in the 
"remarkable increase in the frequency of illness during the years 
of sexual activity "1. This was a source of deep concern, as was the 
possible deleterious effect on young girls' reproductive capacity 
of employment in unhealthy occupations2. Standards of hygiene in 
childbirth were also criticised, and the more thorough training of 
doctors and midwives in the conduct of a confinement and post -natal 
care were warmly recommended3. But proposals that the Government 
itself make financial provision for expectant and nursing mothers 
1. Franz Goldmann and Alfred Grotjahn, "The German Sickness 
Insurance Funds ", ILO Studies and Reports, Series M, no. 8, 
Geneva, 1928, pp. 40 -42, 64. 
2. Hugo Sellheim in AfPr, 1931 -32, p. 189. 
3. "Bericht doer die 22. Tagung der deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Gynakologie, Frankfurt-am-Main, 27.- 30.V.1931 ", AfFr, 1931 -32, 
pp. 156 -57. 
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came to nothingl; the Government was in no mood to incur new 
commitments when it could barely meet existing ones in the depression. 
The Nazis, as strong pro -natalists, proceeded in this matter 
in more single- minded fashion. In June 1935 a law was prepared for 
the provision of improved maternity benefit and post -natal care; 
characteristically, it was to be the insurance funds, and not the 
State, which would shoulder the burden of extra expenditure2. In 
addition, the various midwives' organisations were centralised into 
one national association, and their education and professional status 
improved3. There was, similarly, the centralisation of all maternity 
advice centres into the "Mother and Child" branch of the Nazi welfare 
organisation, the NSV. Its bureaux provided care and assistance, in 
co- operation with the local health offices, and gave advice on, and 
even sometimes aid for, financial problems. Homes were provided 
for single women, "to serve the campaign against abortion ", and in 
1935 Frick, the Minister of the Interior, ordered that every pregnant 
woman should attend an advisory centre4, no doubt to prevent or detect 
any resort to abortion, and to try to ensure that every desirable 
pregnancy was noted and supervised. It was claimed in mid -1938 that 
1. BA, 82/18554, Reichstag motions of 22 November, 1930, and 15 October, 
1931. 
2. BA, R2/18554, letters from Seldte to Lammers, 8 June, 1935 and 
from Schwerin von Krosigk to Seldte, 20 June, 1935. 
3. BA, R36/1884, correspondence for 1934. 
Ibid., letters from the Governor of East Prussia to the Deutscher 
Gemeindetag, 3 March, 1937, and vice -versa, 11 March, 1937. 
4. Egon Parrensteiner, "Schwangerenflrsorge und Geburt", doctoral 
dissertation for Rostock University, 1939, p. 7. 
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the NSV had 25,000 advice centres in its "Mother and Child section" 
throughout the country, and that more than ten million women had so 
far attended them1. 
The Nazis liked to boast about their achievements in improving 
maternity services and child care; it cannot be disputed that they did 
indeed make progress in this field - for good, "Aryan" citizens who 
were sound in mind and body, and for them only. Anxiety at the 
rising number of premature births in the mid- 1930s, and the high rate 
of mortality connected with them suggested that the care afforded by 
the NSV was not fully adequate, and so the Hebammengesetz (Midwives' 
Law) was passed in 1938. This stated that "every German woman has 
the right to the assistance of a midwife ", and "every pregnant 
woman has the duty to call in a midwife promptly "3. Nazi anxiety 
about the well -being of women before and during childbirth was simply 
based on the needs of the State, as they saw them: healthy parents 
were more likely to have healthy children, and strong children would 
make healthy parents for the next generation. In this context woman 
was indeed, as one writer put it, "arbiter over the life and death of 
her nation "4. Further, she was seen not merely as a child- bearing 
machine - as the Nazis' opponents claimed - but as the "first educator 
1. BA, NSD17 /RAK, July 1938, "Deutschlands Kinderschutz vorbildlich:" 
pp. 1 -2. 
2. Josef Brunn- Schulte- Wissing, "Die Frühgeburten - ihr Lebensschicksal 
in den ersten zehn Tagen und ihre bev8lkerungspolitische Bedeutung ", 
doctoral dissertation for Rostock University, 1937, p. 13. 
Karl Heinz Grasshoff, "Das Schicksal der häuslichen Frühgeburten 
und ihre bev8lkerungspolitische Bedeutung ", doctoral dissertation 
for Rostock University, 1937, p. 9. 
3. "Hebammengesetz ", RGB, 1938 I, 21 December, 1938, pp. 1893 -96. 
4. Eva Kriner- Fischer, Die Frau als Richterin liber Leben und Tod 
ihres Volkes, Berlin, 1937, pp. 3, 12 -13. 
51. 
of the new generation "l, the person responsible for the healthy 
upbringing of her children, in both physical and moral terms, to be 
valuable citizens and parents2. This was perhaps a hazardous 
situation for a dictatorship to encourage; the Nazis had therefore 
to encourage women to bear children, and also to give them a feeling 
of self- importance which would breed gratitude towards the regime 
which had, apparently, upgraded the status of mothers in the family 
and in society. 
The first positive incentive to procreation came with the 
introduction of the Marriage Loan scheme, as part of the "Law to 
Reduce Unemployment" of 1 June, 1933. This provided that a couple 
intending to marry would be given a tax -free loan of up to RM 1,0003 
- in vouchers for household goods, not cash - to help them to set up 
house at this difficult time. Repayment was to be at the rate of 
if per month, and was to begin three months after the loan had been 
made. The money for the loans was to be raised from a tax on all 
single persons - except those with children - who were eligible to 
pay income tax, at a rate of between 2% and 5% of their income, 
according to its size4. Within three weeks it was further decreed 
1. Annemarie Bechem, "Die deutsche Mutter als Erzieherin ", NS- 
Frauenwarte, April 1937, pp. 695 -96. 
2. Erich Siegel, Die Deutsche Frau im Rasseerwachen, Munich, 1934, 
pp. 16 -17. 
3. BA, NSD17 /RAK, November 1936, Werner Htittig, "Massnahmen zur 
Steigerung der deutschen Bev8lkerungszahl", p. 3, states that the 
average amount of the loans made so far had been RM600. 
Bry, op. cit., pp. 457 -60, gives the average weekly earnings of 
women in 22 industries in 1936 as ranging between RM15 and R1á27 
per week; the average marriage loan therefore was equivalent to 
between about six and ten times the average monthly wage for these 
women, although it would be less attractive to, say, female bank 
employees, whose average monthly earnings in February 1934 were 
RM176, according to St.J., 1934, p. 278. 
4. "Gesetz zur Verminderung der Arbeitslosigkeit ", RGB, 1933 I, 
June, 1933, pp. 326 -29. 
52. 
that the birth of a child would lead to the cancellation of 25% of 
the loan repayments, and to a moratorium of one year on repayments 
after the birthl. Thus, the childless were to be penalised for 
not contributing to population growth, while loan- holders were to be 
encouraged to have a child as quickly as possible, and to follow 
that one with three more in a short space of time in order to have 
the maximum possible of the repayments cancelled. Dorothee von Velsen 
described in 1939 how a neighbour had said to her, in a broad accent, 
"so now I just need another baby and I shan't have to pay back any 
more "2. This was the conclusion the Government hoped its "Aryan ", 
healthy, "politically reliable" citizens would draw; those who did 
not fit this description were, naturally, excluded from this scheme 
for state -supported marriage and procreation3. 
The marriage -loan scheme was reasonably popular, although the 
majority of couples either did not fall into the relevant categories 
or did not make application for a loan. The fact that the wife was 
required to give up work4 was undoubtedly a deterrent to many. In 
the last four months of 1933, when the scheme was first operational, 
37% of the marriages contracted were loan- aided, with an above - 
average figure in Prussia and a lower than average figure in Bavaria, 
1. "Durchführungsverordnung über die Gewährung von Ehestandsdarlehen 
(ED- DVO) ", RGB, 1933 I, 20 June, 1933, p. 379. 
2. BA, K1.Erw., 296 -(1), letter from Dorothee von Velsen to Gertrud 
Bäumer, 10 March, 1939, P. 55. 
3. RGB, op. cit., p. 377. 
"2. DVO über die Gewährung von Ehestandsdarlehen", RGB, 1933 I, 
26 July, 1933, P. 540. 
4. "Gesetz zur Verminderung der Arbeitslosigkeit ", RGB, 1933 I, 1 
June, 1933, pp. 326 -27. 
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a relative position which continued for some years1. Part of the 
reason for this difference was probably the fact that in agricultural 
Bavaria working wives were not in the category where they could be 
replaced by paid labour, as in industry; it would not have been 
worthwhile for a small farmer to pay a wage to a male labourer, hired 
to replace his wife who had retired, in order to obtain a loan. The 
revoking of the prohibition on the employment of the wife in a loan- 
aided marriage in the autumn of 19372 resulted in a sharp rise in the 
number of applications for loans, in both absolute and relative terms, 
so that in 1939 42% of all marriages contracted were assisted by loans, 
the highest percentage since the scheme began3, and a marked revival 
from the nadir of 24 %, the figure for 19354. 
Two other factors helped to increase the popularity of the 
marriage -loan scheme in 1939: the relaxation of the restrictions 
on marriage at the end of Augusts and the outbreak of war immediately 
after together led to an increase in hastily- contracted marriages, 
for a large number of which loan applications were made6. The 
1. Information from St.J.: 1936, p. 42; 1937, P. 44; 1938, p. 48. 
2. "Drittes Gesetz zur tnderung des Gesetzes über die Förderung der 
Eheschliessungen ", RGB, 1937 I, 3 November, 1937, pp. 1158 -59. 
3. BA, NSD30/1836, Informationsdienst..., November 1938, "Ehestands - 
darlehen in der neuesten Statistik ". 
Report in VPuS, 1942, no. 2, p. 52. 
4. St.J., 1936, p. 42. 
5. "Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Verhtttung erbkranken 
Nachwuchses und des Ehegesundheitsgesetzes ", RGB, 1939 I, 31 
August, 1939, pp. 1560 -61. More will be said about this in section 
B of this chapter. 
6. Wu7, loc. cit. 
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outbreak of war also led to requests for a moratorium on loan 
repayments by conscripts, since the burden of making them was 
bearing heavily on those receiving only their army pay. To help to 
spin out the loan, it was also suggested that the stipulation that 
only new furniture could be bought with the loan vouchers be 
rescinded since, in any case, industry could not supply the demand 
and already had indefinite waiting lists of customers1. 
The national women's organisation, the Deutsches Frauenwerk 
(DFW) saw the marriage -loan scheme as a possible means of winning 
more recruits to the courses of instruction it provided in domestic 
science and child care from 19342, but it was not until March 1937 
that formal provision was made for this. Then, it was decreed that 
part of the marriage loan could be used to pay the fees for such a 
course3. One motive for this was the desire to educate women to 
economise at a time when Germany's resources - for domestic expenditure 
- were restricted4. As an added incentive to marriage -loan applicants 
to exercise this option, the Minister of Finance at the same time 
announced that the amount of the loan could be increased by RM 100 
to cover the fees for the course and still leave the full amount of a 
normal loan for household purchases5, an offer which received a warm 
1. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750356, BziL, 29 November, 1939. 
2. BA, NSD30/1836, Informationsdienst..., December 1938, "Mütter- 
schulung und Ehestandsdarlehen", p. 50. 
3. "7. DVO über die Gewährung von Ehestandsdarlehen ", RGB, 1937 I, 
10 March, 1937, p. 292. 
4. HA, reel 13, fol. 253, Reichsfrauenführung Abteilung Volkswirt- 
schaft /Hauswirtschaft, "Rundschreiben Fff 62/37 ", 4 July, 1937. 
5. IfZ, MA 388, frame 726438, Reich Ministry of Finance, order of 
29 September, 1937. 
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welcome in the section of the DFW which ran the courses'. 
The main purpose of the marriage loan scheme was, of course, 
the raising of the birth rate, and loud boasts were made about 
the success achieved in this direction. At the 1936 Party Rally 
Reinhardt, the Secretary of State whose brainchild the scheme was, 
announced that so far 620,000 marriages had been assisted by loans, 
and that already 425,000 children had been born to these marriages. 
Nevertheless, he went on to warn that these children were very 
largely the first -born in their family, and that at least another 
three children would have to follow each of them if the scheme was 
to be really worthwhile2. He still showed optimism in the following 
year when he claimed that now 550,000 children had been born to loan - 
aided marriages, which was, he said, proportionately twice as many as 
to the other marriages contracted during the same period3. But still 
in 1938 it was reported that up to June of that year almost one million 
loans had been made altogether, and 840,000 children born to achieve 
partial cancellation of them4. This was, indeed, a considerable 
rise in births compared with the previous year, but hardly an impressive 
figure considering that the scheme had been in operation for almost 
five years. 
Allowing for the natural time -lag of nine months between 
conception and birth, so that a proportion of the loans made by any 
1. HA, op. cit., Reichsfrauenführung Abteilung Reichsmütterdienst, 
"Rundschreiben FW 92/37 ", 6 October, 1937. More will be said 
about the DFW and the Reichsmtitterdienst in chapter 6. 
2. BA, NSD17 /RAK, November 1936, Werner Htittig, "Massnahmen zur 
Steigerung der deutschen Bevölkerungszahl ", p. 3. 
3. Ibid., July 1937, Fritz Reinhardt, "Deutschland treibt Familien- 
politik", p. 2. 
4. BA, NSD30/1836, Informationsdienst..., November 1938, "Ehestands - 
darlehen in der neuesten Statistik ", p. 14. 
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given time could not have been partially cancelled by a birth, the 
impression remains that, on average, only one child was being born to 
each couple who had received a loan; for most people, the incentive 
of partial cancellation of the loan for each child was clearly not 
sufficient to encourage large families quickly. The granting of a 
loan could not disguise the fact that children would be a long -term 
financial burden. The number of births to couples in receipt of loans 
did rise, as a proportion of all live births, from a modest 11% in 
1934 to 17.5% in 1937, and to 20.5% in 1939. In the first full year 
of the war, the figure rose even further, to 22°0. But with loan- 
aided marriages on the whole constituting over 30iä of all marriages 
from autumn 1933, and over 40% at the end of the decade, it is obvious 
that the marriage -loan scheme failed to have the sharp impact on the 
birth rate which had been anticipated when it was introduced in 1933. 
The marriage -loan scheme was only one tactic used to try to 
provide incentives to Germans to have large families. Other schemes 
were based on either direct cash benefits or the elevation of mothers 
to the status of national heroines, or a combination of both. It was 
reported in March 1934, for example, that the local authorities in 
Darmstadt were already making rent rebates to large families and were 
now proposing to issue cards to their 1,500 mothers with three or more 
children which would allow them to go to the theatre free of charge on 
certain evenings2. This set an example to other authorities, so that 
in Camburg, near Halle, it was announced that the twenty -four large 
1. Figures from St.J.: 1936, p. 42; 1938, p. 48; 1939/40, p. 53; 
1941/42, p. 75. 
2. "Theaterfreiplätze für kinderreiche Mütter ", FZ, 6 March, 1934. 
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families in the area would have to pay only half of the normal water 
rate; it was hoped, in addition, to charge them half price for the 
use of electricity1. On the other side, the V8 lkischer Beobachter 
announced that Honour Cards were to be presented to all mothers with 
at least three children under the age of ten. The cards were to carry 
on the reverse a request to all offices and shops to give the holder 
preferential treatment, while on the front there would be a picture of 
a mother surrounded by small children with the legend: "The most 
beautiful name the world over is Mother "2. 
The exhortation seems not to have had the desired effect, 
however, since there were complaints from parents that preferential 
treatment was often not being given to large families and to mothers 
with small children in shops and offices. The chief offenders seem 
to have been the Government's own departments, since it was claimed 
that parents were often told at Employment Exchanges or at welfare 
offices that having several children was not a satisfactory reason 
for receiving special treatment. The order therefore went out again 
that it was the duty of every civil servant who dealt with those in 
need of aid or advice to discriminate in favour of those with large 
families3. Three or four children were considered more or less 
sufficient for the term "large family ", although, it was constantly 
stressed, this sort of figure should in no way be considered an upper 
1. Report in FZ, 28 September, 1934. 
2. "Ehrenkarte für Mütter ", VB, 18 November, 1934. 
3. "Bevorzugte Behandlung Kinderreicher ", Fränkische Tageszeitun, 
5 November, 1934. 
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limit; after all, for every childless marriage the nation needed 
a family of six or more children by way of compensation, if the 
declining birth rate of the previous twenty years was to be 
reversed and made good. The Nazis' real aim was to achieve a 
return to the large family of the later nineteenth century, so that 
Germany could return to the prosperity and expansion which had 
accompanied the high birth rate of that periodi. 
The concessions made to large families, and especially to 
their mothers, by local authorities had the twin virtues of costing 
the central government nothing, while furthering its policy, and 
providing favourable propaganda. They could not, however, be a real 
substitute for direct governmental action in the Nazi State to 
achieve the desideratum of national uniformity. Accordingly, the 
first general measure came in September 1935, with the provision that 
large families should receive a bonus from the funds accumulated for 
the marriage -loan scheme, if they applied for it2. The conditions 
were that the family should have four or more children under sixteen 
living in the parental home and that - in addition to the now 
inevitable clauses pertaining to "racial health" and physical and mental 
fitness - the family be in financial straits3. It was claimed that up 
to the end of 1935 alone, as a result of Germany's stronger economic 
position, about 300,000 children benefited from the bonus, which 
1. "Aufruf des Ehrenführringes des Reichsbundes der Kinderreichen ", 
VB, 12 December, 1935. 
2. "Verordnung über die Gewährung von Kinderbeihilfen an kinder- 
reiche Familien ", RGB, 1935 I, 15 September, 1935, p. 1160. 
3. "Durchführungsbestimmungen zur Verordnung über die Gewährung von 
Kinderbeihilfen an kinderreiche Familien ", RGB, 1935 I, 26 September, 
1935, p. 1206. 
59. 
amounted to RM 100 for each child'. Then, in March 1936, it was 
announced that, instead, large families should be afforded recurrent 
State support2; and further benefits followed in the next few years3. 
The financial incentives had to be accompanied by a propaganda 
campaign to try to persuade women, particularly, that large families 
were not - as the liberals of the 1920s were alleged to have insisted 
- "stupid and needy "4, although the Nazis did have to admit, at least 
privately, that there were large families which were "anti -social" 
which, naturally enough, were not to be supported by the States. 
The propaganda aspects of the incentives to women to procreate 
particularly commended themselves to the Government since they were 
inexpensive . Accordingly, there was a campaign to elevate 
motherhood to a position of the highest esteem in the nation. The 
Nazis had already turned Mother's Day - a moveable feast generally held 
1. Wilfrid Bade, "Der Weg des Dritten Reiches ", Lübeck, 1936, P. 14. 
2. "Verordnung zur Anderung der Verordnung fiber die Gewahrung von 
Kinderbeihilfen an kinderreiche Familien ", RGB, 1936 I, 24 March, 
1936, p. 252. 
3. E.g., "Ausbildungsbeihilfen fUr Kinderreiche Familien ", Alfred 
Homeger, Die Neuordnun: des höheren Schulwesens im Dritten Reich, 
Berlin, 1943, p. F6. 
4. Report in NS- Frauenwarte, 1936 -37, p. 730. 
5. BDC, Slg.Sch., 212, Kreisleitung Marktheidenfeld- Karlstadt, 
"Rundschreiben an alle Ortsgruppenleiter der NSDAP ", 24 January, 
1941. 
6. Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than in the Nazis' 
taking over of the Reichsbund der Kinderreichen to act as a 
propaganda organisation. All "racially pure" parents of four 
children were encouraged to become full members, while those with 
three could have probationary status. But the RdK gave no aid 
to large families; these were merely to be gathered together as 
good examples for the rest of the nation to emulate. See BDC, 
Slg. Sch., 212, particularly, on this. Reasons of space prevent 
a fuller treatment of the RdK here, although it is mentioned 
briefly in section C of this chapter. 
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about May 10th - into a festival of national celebration of "how 
fine and noble it is to be a mother, and how wonderful a thing it is 
to have a mother ", as Frick sentimentally put it in his message for 
the appropriate day in 19351. Hitler made periodic references to the 
importance of motherhood in speeches which were designed to refute 
foreign propaganda about the "enslavement" of women in Nazi Germany 
as well as to encourage German women to fulfil their own instinctive 
desires, as well as the nation's needs, by having children. At the 
1935 Party Rally he made his famous remark "The woman, too, has her 
battlefield ", the battle being that of the birth- ratet, while two 
years later, again at Nuremberg, he spoke thus: 
"If to -day a female lawyer achieves great things 
and nearby there lives a mother with five, six, seven 
children, all of them healthy and well brought up, then I 
would say: from the point of view of the eternal benefit 
to our people the woman who has borne and brought up 
children and who has therefore given our nation life in the 
future, has achieved more and done more: "3 
This was, in fact, a two -pronged attack, since Hitler's opposition 
to the practice of law by women had only a month earlier been 
demonstrated in an order restricting it4. 
The Honour Cards issued in 1934 to prolific mothers were, it 
transpired, only the first step in providing symbols of the esteem in 
1. "Reichsminister Dr. Frick zum Muttertag am 12. Mai ", VB, 11 May, 
1935. 
2. Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden and Proklamationen, 1932 -45, Würzburg, 
1962, vol. 1, p. 531. 
3. BA, NSD17 /RAR, October 1936, "Der Führer Adolf Hitler über die 
Aufgaben der deutschen Frau ", p. 1. 
4. For a full discussion of this see chapter 5. 
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which the nation held its mothers. At the end of 1938 it was 
announced that on Mother's Day in 1939 three million prolific 
mothers of good "Aryan" stock would be presented with the new Honour 
Cross of the German Mother by Party notables. The legend on the 
reverse of the cross was to be: "The child ennobles the Mother: "1. 
Hess explained that mothers of good character who had at least four 
children were eligible for the cross, which would be awarded in three 
grades, according to the actual number of children2. How far this 
development prompted the institution of the Order of Glorious 
Motherhood in the Soviet Union in 1944 for particularly fecund women 
and, similarly, as one of a number of incentives at this time to 
encourage rapid population growth3, is uncertain, but the parallel 
is indeed striking. 
In their anxiety to promote procreation, and to avoid excessive 
Government expenditure in the process, the Nazis went to lengths which 
can only be considered absurd. Presenting an Honour Cross to prolific 
mothers was perhaps peculiar, but positively eccentric was the order 
that members of the Hitler Youth must salute women wearing the cross4. 
No doubt it was intended to impress on the young that these women were 
living examples of what they should themselves aim to achieve, in 
1. "Das Ehrenkreuz der Deutschen Mutter ", VB, 25 December, 1938. 
2. "Welche Mutter erhält das Ehrenkreuz ", VB, 27 December, 1938. 
BA, NSD3 /5, Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, vol. 1, "A. 
37/39 vom 15.2.39 - Verleihung des Ehrenkreuzes der deutschen 
Mutter. Merkblatt für die Auslese der Mutter, die...vorgeschlagen 
werden sollen ", p. 346. 
3. Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 371 -72. 
4. BA, NSD17 /RAK, June 1939, "Ehrenkreuz für kinderreiche deutsche 
Mütter ", p. 3. 
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addition to enhancing the national esteem for mothers in a demonstrable 
way. And certainly Himmler saw this kind of activity as both 
valuable and right. In August 1940 he told Kersten, his masseur: 
"After the war we'll have an entirely new system of 
honours and titles.... The Mothers' Cross is the best of 
all; one day it'll be the greatest honour in Greater 
Germany. Sentries will have to present arms to a woman 
with the Mothers' Cross in gold.... You'll find that a 
delegation of women with the Mothers' Cross will have 
precedence on parade over the FUhrer's bodyguard - and 
just consider the effect of that: "1 
Part of the motive for all this was, of course, the immediate need 
in war time to raise the spirits of German women when they had a 
husband or son at the front, in danger of losing his life. As he 
awarded a new batch of Honour Crosses in October 1939, Hess extolled 
the mothers, thanking them for giving Germany their children, 
paying special tribute to those who were mourning the death of a 
son in the field. His purpose was, however, to strengthen their will 
to accept whatever the Government might demand of them in the future, 
and it was to this end that his flattery and encouragement were 
primarily directed2. 
The measure of the success of all the encouragement and 
incentives given to promote procreation was to be found in the trend 
in the birth rate after 1933. At first, certainly, it seemed 
encouraging, with apparent endorsement of Nazi policies as early as 
possible, in 1934: the nadir of 59 live births per 1,000 women of 
child- bearing age in 1933 was followed by a dramatic rise to a 
1. Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs 1940 -1945, London, 1956, p. 54. 
2. BA, op. cit., October 1939, Rudolf Hess, "Das Mutterkreuz ist 
das Ehrenzeichen der Heimatfront der deutschen Frauen ", p. 4. 
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figure of 73 in 1934 and 77 in each of the following three years, and 
in 1938 -40 the figures were as high as 81, 85 and 84, respectively 
That this upward trend was achieved by persuading married couples to 
procreate is illustrated by the continuing decline in the incidence of 
illegitimate births, in the years 1933 -39, at any rate2. But the rise 
in the birth rate was, if encouraging, much less spectacular than the 
Nazis had hoped to achieve, and than their propaganda boasted. Indeed, 
in comparison with the abnormally low birth rate of the late 1920s 
and early 1930s the years after 1933 showed a marked improvement; but 
they failed to match even the 1922 figure of 90 births per 1,000 
women of child - bearing age, far less the 1910/11 rate of 128 which, 
coming at a time when the birth rate had already been steadily 
falling, must have been the minimum the Nazis hoped to achieve3. No 
doubt the imbalance between the sexes in the age -group most likely to 
provide parents contributed to the failure to achieve a better result; 
but with an increase in the marriage rate after 1933 it seems as if 
couples were deliberately choosing to have small families4. 
Indeed the 1934 -39 birth rate showed a marked improvement over 
that for the years 1929 -33; but the comparison between these two 
periods - which the Nazis liked to make - is hardly valid, given the 
economic recession in 1928 followed by the effects of the depression 
1. Figures from St.J.: 1932, p. 29; 1938, P 47; 1941/42, P. 77. 
2. This will be discussed in section D of this chapter. 
3. Figures from St.J., 1933, p. 32. 
4. The marriage rate rose from 7.9 marriages per 1,000 of the population 
in 1932 to 9.7 in 1933 and 11.2 in 1934. From 1935 -38 it fluctuated 
between 9.1 and 9.7, again reaching 11.2 in 1939. Figures from 
St.J.: 1934, P 27; 1937, P. 37; 1939/40, P. 42; 1941/42, p. 66. 
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from 1929. It is clear that the political stability which the 
Nazis brought, in spite of the repression, and the economic 
revival in the 1930s, although there was not actual prosperity, 
were factors which created a climate in which potential parents 
felt more secure, and therefore more inclined to bring children 
into the world. But the continued use of contraceptives and the 
continuing resort to abortion during the 1930s1 suggests that the 
encouragement and the incentives were not sufficient to persuade 
people to have several children. Women had increasingly become 
accustomed to being able to choose the size of their family, and 
were, on the whole, not convinced by propaganda designed to 
portray a lifetime devoted to child- bearing and rearing - probably 
covering the life of a woman from twenty to fifty -five, or from 
twenty -five to sixty - as idyllic. The discovery by women before 
the war, intensified by experience after it, that the female of the 
species, too, could have aspirations outside the home and family, 
could not be reversed. Even if women were not obliged to work and 
did not want to work after marriage and the birth of children, the 
sole alternative was not bringing up a large family, but rather having 
few children in a short space of time and enjoying a more independent 
social life outside the home, and more leisure generally2. 
1. This will be discussed in section C of this chapter. 
2. Hermann Ahrens, "Untersuchungen zur Soziologie der Familie in 
systematischer Absicht ", doctoral dissertation for Rostock 
University, 1931, pp. 88 -97. 
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B. Marriage and Divorce 
The Great War and its losses brought about a deep change in 
the social and economic position of women, which had a profound 
effect on the marriage relationship. There were other factors, too: 
the inflation, the greater employment of women, the liberal atmosphere 
which had led, in the first flush of enthusiasm, to licence, all had 
an impact on the attitudes with which people entered marriage, and 
made the provisions of the Civil Code look really out of date. 
Indeed, by no means everyone was persuaded that the new values were 
right; Schwabach wrote about the emancipated woman, but emphasised 
that this term was relevant only "in the context of middle -class 
society ", with little meaning for working -class women1. But if the 
"new morality ", vividly described by Stefan Zweig, touched only a 
small minority of the population, it was nevertheless important 
because of the reactions it generated. The experimenting with the 
marriage relationship, for example with trial marriage and companionate 
marriage, the higher rate of divorce in the post -war than in the pre- 
war years3, and the greater emphasis on sexual satisfaction for both 
1. E. E. Schwabach, Revolutionierung der Frau, Leipzig, 1928, p. 132. 
2. Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday, London, 1943, pp. 238 -39. 
3. The following table illustrates this point: 
Year No. of divorces No. per 100,000 inhabitants 
1913 17,835 26.6 
1920 36,542 59.1 
1923 33,939 55.0 
1929 39,424 61.6 
1932 42,202 65.o 
Figures from St.J.: 1924/25, p. 51; 1926, P. 37; 1934, p. 50. 
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partners, caused uneasiness among moderate feminists like Katharina 
von Kardorff1, while giving rise to nothing short of alarm in both 
Churches and among the basically conservative majority in the middle 
class. 
By 1930 many different groups believed marriage and family life 
to be in crisis. The conservatives saw them as under fire from the 
permissive society of the Republic; the Communists and radical 
feminists regarded the bourgeois conception of marriage as irreconcilable 
with both reality and social justice; the Nazis claimed that the 
"system" was destroying marriage and the family unit2. A more sober 
writer came firmly to the conclusion that the family as an institution 
was perfectly sound, although many families were struggling for 
existence in the depression3. In spite of the imbalance between the 
sexes, with war casualties depriving many young women of a partner, 
the marriage rate in the later 1920s was actually slightly higher than 
it had been just before the war, so that marriage seemed as popular 
as ever, even in the worst years of the depression4. 
In spite of the changes which had taken place in the position of 
women in and after the Great War, the legal basis of marriage described 
1. BA, Nachlass Katharina von Kardorff, no. 34a, "Papst contra Frau ? ", 
1931, p. 92. 
2. Käthe Braun -Prager, review of Rosa Mayreder, Die Krisis der Ehe, 
FiS, November 1929, p. 12. 
Karl Fiehler, "Sozialgesetzgebung ", Nationalsozialistisches 
Jahrbuch, 1927, pp. 122 -23. 
3. Anneliese Kasten, "Frau, Familie, Staat ", AfFr, 1932, no. 4, P. 280. 
4. In each of the last 
about 7.7 marriages 
31 a rate of 8 or 9 
the figure was 7.9. 
p. 30; 1932, p. 24; 
few years before the Great War there had been 
per 1,000 of the population; in the years 1927 - 
was consistently maintained, and even in 1932 
Figures from St.J.: 1920, p. 28; 1930, 
1936, p. 37. 
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in the Civil Code remained unaltered. Article 119 of the Weimar 
Constitution, which recognised that it should be brought up to date, 
remained a dead letter, in spite of resolutions that it should be 
implemented1. At a time when marriage was felt by many to be on the 
defensive, it is hardly surprising that there was reluctance to alter 
its traditional forms. Agitation for reform was carried on chiefly by 
the radical feminists; but it was Marie- Elisabeth Luders, a conservative 
in many respects, who sponsored a rather radical proposal for a 
change in the law of divorce as outlined in the Civil Code. There, the 
sexes were set on an equal footing, and various grounds for divorce, 
including adultery, bigamy, insanity and the rather vague category 
of "cruelty ", were specified2. Now, in the 1920s, Marie Elisabeth 
Lt&ders represented those who believed that the concept of "guilt" 
associated with these grounds should be abolished, and the 
"irretrievable breakdown" of a marriage made the sole ground for 
divorce3. But this, like other proposals for amendments to the 
Civil Code, came to nothing; in marriage, at any rate, the man 
retained the rights of decision and authority delegated to him in 
1896 until, in the Federal Republic, a new declaration of intent in 
the Basic Law was given substance by the Equal Rights Law of 18 June, 
19574. 
1. W. Knorr, "Die Frau im Recht ", FiS, October, 1931, pp. 5 -7. 
2. Greiff, op. cit., pp. 824 -39. See also Julius Hirschfeld, "The 
Law of Divorce in England and Germany ", Law Quarterly Review, 1897, 
PP. 396 -405. 
3. Puckett, op. cit., pp. 265 -66. 
4. Karl Lorenz, "Einftthrung ", Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Munich, 1970, 
p. 19. 
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The Nazis claimed to want to promote marriage and maintain 
the family, and it was to be expected that they would not aim to 
change the relative legal positions of men and women within them. 
But the encouragement they gave applied strictly to those whom 
they regarded as valuable citizens, from the points of view of race, 
heredity, health and politics. Hans Frank expressed his party's 
view thus: "There is no area of State policy which does not have 
its foundations in the realm of the family "1. This was what was 
felt to justify the intervention of the State in the marriage 
relationship: "marriage is not merely a private matter, but one which 
directly affects the fate of a nation at its very roots ", was how 
a female spokeswoman put it2. Here, then, is the motive behind 
a number of measures instituted by the Government which were 
euphemistically termed "laws for the protection of marriage "3. The 
first priority was to prevent marriages taking place between "Aryan" 
Germans and non -"Aryans ", especially Jews. Not everyone went as far 
as Hans Schemm, who claimed to have found scientific backing for the 
theory of Julius Streicher that intercourse with a Jew would poison 
the blood of an "Aryan" woman, so that she would not be able to bear 
"Aryan" children4. But the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 forbade 
not only the marriage of an "Aryan" with a Jew, but also sexual 
1. BA, R61/172, Hans Frank's speech to the Academy of German Law's 
Family Law Committee, December 1935 (exact date not given). 
2. Else Vorwerck, "Gedanken über die Ehe im nationalsozialistischen 
Staat ", NS- Frauenbuch, Munich, 1934, p. 146. 
3. BA, loc. cit. 
4. Report in Fränkische Tageszeitung, 30 January, 1935. 
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intercourse between them1. This opened the way for other measures, 
and for a general reappraisal of both the marriage and divorce laws, 
with a view to reforming them2. 
Heredity was felt to be as vital a factor as race, and so the 
"Marriage Health Law" was passed in October 1935 with the purpose 
of actually prohibiting a person from marrying under certain 
circumstances. These included illness which might affect either a 
potential spouse or any offspring; the illness could be physical, 
mental, or some other described in the "Law for the Prevention of 
Hereditarily Diseased Offspring" of July 1933. To ensure that the 
law was enforced, an engaged couple was obliged in future to obtain 
a certificate from the local health office affirming that both were, 
by the definition of the law, fit for marriage3. This involved a 
medical examination, whose certification had only six months' 
validity, so that if the marriage was delayed beyond that time a 
further examination was required4. Marriages contracted abroad in 
order to circumvent the law would be invalid, and the contracting of 
a marriage without a certificate was punishable with imprisonment for 
not less than three months, although the penalty would be imposed only 
if the marriage was declared null and void as the result of an eventual 
examinations. 
1. "Reichsb{trgergesetz" and "Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes 
und der deutschen Ehre ", RGB, 1935 I, 15 September, 1935, pp. 1146- 
47. 
2. "Vorschlage zur Eherechtsreform ", report in FZ, 12 January, 1935. 
3. "Gesetz zum Schutze der Gesundheit des deutschen Volkes 
(Ehegesundheitsgesetz) ", RGB, 1935 I, 18 October, 1935, p. 1246. 
4. "1. DVO zur Durchfiihrung des Ehegesundheitsgesetz ", RGB, 1935 I, 
29 November, 1935, pp. 1419 -20. 
5. "Eheverbote in gewissen Fallen ", VB, 20 October, 1935. 
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It became clear that the examination did not, however, always 
reveal hereditary defects, even when an SS doctor, trained in 
understanding the genealogical tables which applicants for marriage 
had to provide, carefully scrutinised the family history. Deep 
investigation showed that men and women whose forebears had suffered 
from such objectionable diseases as tuberculosis, alcoholism and 
even insanity were slipping through the examination, because the SS 
doctor, particularly in the cities, was not familiar with the applicants' 
case and family history1. The Party's Racial Policy Office launched 
a campaign to draw attention to its "Ten Commandments for Choosing a 
Spouse ", to try to alert the "racially and hereditarily healthy" to 
the dangers of choosing a partner who was not "equally valuable "; 
having outlined the qualifications required in this respect, the 
Commandments stipulated another, which would not necessarily be 
compatible with them - "marry only for love: "2. The motive here was 
the same as ever: a loving couple would be more likely to provide a 
stable home, and, so it was thought, many children. 
Not only were the Nazis anxious to prevent marriages which 
they did not feel to be in the interests of the State from taking 
place; they were also concerned to facilitate the dissolution of 
"unsuitable" marriages which had already been contracted. Hans Frank 
made it clear that his party did not take divorce lightly; equally, 
he was at pains to point out that it could not support a view which 
1. IfZ, MA 387, frames 5183 -85, "Ausbildungsbrief Nr. 3 des SS- 
Sanitátsamtes ", 31 May, 1937. 
2. IfZ, MA 47, frames 8005272 -73, "Zehn Leitsátze für die Gattenwahl ", 
Rassenpolitisches Amt, Gau Baden, reproduction of an article of 
June 1937 in the Festschrift für das R.d.K. 
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forbade the dissolution of a marriage which had patently broken 
down. The new divorce law, over whose constitution he was presiding, 
would be designed to reflect these views, he saidl. The present law 
was felt to be in such urgent need of reform that the Family Law 
Committee of the Academy of German Law had decided at its opening 
meeting in Munich in March 1934 to devote its energies towards a 
reframing of the divorce law, as its first priority2. The most 
difficult question here was whether guilt should continue to be 
apportioned to one or both parties in a divorce. The Committee was 
of the opinion that this practice sometimes created difficulties in 
the achieving of a divorce, even where the maintenance of the 
marriage was neither desired by the two partners nor to the benefit 
of the community3. The chief consideration here was that an 
estranged couple was unlikely to contribute to the birth -rate, while 
the dissolution of their marriage would enable each to enter into a new 
and more fruitful partnership4. 
The result of the exertions of the Family Law Committee was 
the Marriage Law of 1938, which incorporated the new divorce law. The 
existing restrictions on marriage were reiterated and augmented in 
minor matters; but the most interesting and sweeping provisions related 
1. BA, R61/172, loc. cit. 
2. BA, R61/173, Academy of German Law, "Vorschlag zur Neugestaltung 
des Deutschen Ehescheidungsrechtes ", August 1935. 
3. BA, R61/174, Academy of German Law, Family Law Committee, 
"Stellungnahme betreffend Neugestaltung des deutschen Ehescheidungs- 
rechtes", 29 September, 1936. 
4. Report in wuS, 1939, no. 23, p. 755. 
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to divorce. The clauses of the Civil Code concerning it were 
revoked and replaced by a new definition of grounds for divorce. 
These included the formalising of a practice already begun, by which 
a partner might sue for divorce if his or her spouse refused, without 
good cause, to allow the begetting or conceiving of offspring; in 
addition, a divorce might be granted if either partner resorted to 
illegal means to try to prevent a birth - a clear reference to 
abortion1. As early as December 1935, it had been reported that a 
county court had dissolved a marriage and named the wife as the guilty 
party because she had refused to have children. The explanation 
given was that she was directly contravening the current view of the 
nature of marriage2. The 1938 law was indeed intended to spell out 
the Nazi view of the nature of marriage, which, as in this case, 
included an indication of what constituted an unacceptable marriage. 
Adultery remained a ground for divorce; and premature 
infertility became one, provided that there were no "hereditarily 
healthy" children of the marriage. But the most interesting, and 
indeed revolutionary, provision was "paragraph 55 ", which stated that 
either partner might apply for a divorce if the couple had lived 
apart for three years and the marriage seemed to have broken down 
irretrievably3. This clause thus permitted the dissolution of a 
marriage without the apportioning of blame, and without the need for 
the existence - or manufacturing - of the traditional kind of "grounds ", 
as specified in the Civil Code. That this was seen chiefly as a means 
1. "Gesetz zur Vereinheitlichung des Rechts der Eheschliessung und 
der Ehescheidung im Lande osterreich und im übrigen Reichsgebiet ", 
RGB, 1938 I, vol. 2, 6 July, 1938, pp. 807 -22. 
2. Report in FZ, 1 December, 1935. 
3. RGB, op. cit., pp. 812 -13. 
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of enabling citizens to enter a new union, which would be more likely 
to provide the nation with children, does not detract from the fact 
that it permitted the dissolution of an irreparable marriage, in a 
manner which was at last regarded as humane and sensible in England 
and Wales (but not in Scotland) in 19691. 
Ironically, this new provision was very similar to what the 
Women's Movement had been campaigning for in the 1920s, but for 
rather different motives; then, the happiness of the individual was 
seen as a good reason for trying to revise the law2. In Nazi Germany, 
however, it was made clear that this policy was designed not so much to 
accommodate the private individual as to allow the interests of the 
nation to take precedence, by upholding "valuable" marriages and 
allowing the dissolution of those which had no value for the 
community3. But individuals did benefit: Erich Hilgenfeldt, leader 
of the NSV, had his marriage dissolved in 1940, under "paragraph 55 ", 
in order to remarry; his first marriage had long since broken down, 
his wife and he having separated in 1932 or 19334. 
The new divorce law was demonstrably popular among the German 
people: in 1939, the first full year of the law's operation, divorces 
reached the unprecedented height of almost 62,000, 21.6% of which were 
granted under "paragraph 55 ". The official view, which seems 
reasonable, was that a substantial number of people whose marriage had 
indeed broken down, but who had no grounds for divorce under the Civil 
1. J. L. Barton, "Questions on the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 ", Law 
Quarterly Review, 1970, p. 348. 
2. Puckett, loc. cit. 
3. Report in WuS, loc. cit. 
4. BDC, SS file on Erich Hilgenfeldt. Hilgenfeldt's association 
with the Nazi women's organisation will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Code, at once took advantage of this new provision; certainly, 
50% of the divorces granted under "paragraph 55" had been contracted 
twenty or more years earlier. In 1940 the number of divorces 
dropped to below 50,000, but still 15.558 were granted under "paragraph 
55 ", and almost half of these were marriages of long duration1. 
Clearly, the new measure would continue to relieve estranged couples 
of the legal ties of a marriage which had in reality ceased to exist. 
And, more important from the Government's point of view, it would also 
permit the regularising of relationships already entered into by 
nominally married persons, and therefore the legitimising of offspring 
of the new union. 
If "paragraph 55" seemed reasonable to many, there was doubt 
about another aspect of the new divorce law, that relating to the 
support of a divorced spouse. It was laid down that the "guilty" 
husband, in cases where guilt still applied, must support his former 
wife in the manner to which she had been accustomed, if she did not 
have sufficient income from property and could not reasonably be 
expected to earn her own living; equally, the "guilty" wife was 
obliged to pay maintenance to her former husband if he was unable 
to support himself. This was, in fact, almost an exact repetition 
of a paragraph in the Civil Code?. But the 1938 law went on to add 
that the new responsibilities of the partner liable to pay maintenance 
- if he entered a new marriage, especially - were to be taken into 
consideration when the amount of alimony was settled 
1. Report in 6VuS, 1942, no. 1, pp. 22-23. 
2. Greiff, op. cit., p. 839. 
3. RGB, op. cit., pp. 814-15. 
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This broad definition of responsibility led to demands for 
further clarification, and in 1939 Dr. Gärtner, the Minister of 
Justice, felt obliged to try to explain it. It was not intended - as 
some people claimed - he said, that a man declared "guilty" would no 
longer be required to support his former wife, simply because she 
was capable of working; after all, she might have children to look 
after. But beyond this all the Minister would say was that the 
condition of the labour market could influence a divorced wife's 
duty to take a jobl. Again, the needs of the State were to have full 
priority: by 1939 Germany needed to tap every available source of 
labour; and for pro -natalist reasons men were to be relieved of the 
need to pay maintenance, if possible, so that they would be enabled 
to enter a new marriage and start a new family. 
Nazi legislation affecting marriage and divorce led in the 
later 1930s to growing friction between the regime and the Catholic 
Church. The Vatican was quick to register its disapproval of the 
1938 law with the German Ambassador2, and, on the other side, Himmler 
repeatedly attacked the Church for its narrow -minded view of marriage 
and morality3. In reports by his secret service agents the Catholic 
Church was habitually referred to under the heading "opponents "4. 
Certainly, priests had spoken out against what they saw as a 
1. "Der Unterhalt geschiedener Frauen ", FZ, 14 May, 1939. 
2. BA, R4311/1523a, letter from the Foreign Office to Lammers, Kerrl, 
Gärtner et al., 31 July, 1938. 
3. IfZ, MA 387, frame 5194, "Verein 'Lebensborn'e.V. ", 31 May, 1937. 
Kersten, op. cit., pp. 154 -56, 176 -77. 
4. Heinz Boberach (ed.), Meldungen aus dem Reich, Munich, 1968, e.g. 
pp. 34, 47, 61, 87. 
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relaxing of moral standards, and early in 1940 the Catholic bishops 
in Germany criticised the relaxation of the lengthy procedure which 
had been developed to ensure that only the "suitable" married, on the 
grounds that people ought to spend time seriously considering the 
nature of marriage and preparing themselves for itl. To try to 
abolish the still -persisting influence of the Churches in family 
affairs, an enthusiastic Party worker put forward proposals for a 
compulsory Nazi marriage service2, which would also have the effect of 
giving the State even closer control over this vi-tal area. 
But in war -time some aspects of close control were to be 
sacrificed, if only on a temporary basis. At the end of August, with 
war imminent, a law was passed which removed the requirement that 
an intending couple submit to a medical examination to ascertain 
whether they were fit to marry3. This would facilitate marriage 
- and, it was hoped, procreation - by enabling conscripts to marry 
before going to the front, whereas the provisions of the Marriage 
Health Law would have forced many to wait, perhaps indefinitely. But 
the lifting of restrictions was found to be having undesirable side - 
effects, with "hereditarily unsound" persons taking advantage of the 
quicker procedure4. Himmler congratulated himself early in 1940 on 
the success of his "population propaganda" which, he claimed, was 
1. BA, 858/147, MadR, 15 January, 1940, "Gegner: Katholische 
Hirtenbrief über die Ehe ". 
2. BA, NS15 /15, cutting from FZ, 20 August, 1939, "Die Form der 
Trauung ", by Gauamtsleiter Staatsrat Dr. FMrg (Augsburg). 
3. "Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Verhütung erbkranken 
Nachwuchses und des Ehegesundheitsgesetzes", RGB, 1939 I, 31 August, 
1939, p. 1561. 
4. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750525, MadR, 27 December, 1939. 
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leading to the contracting of large numbers of marriages in war- 
time 
1 
. But how many of those marrying after August 1939 would have 
married in previous years if the new "race and heredity" legislation 
had not been in force was something he did not consider. Although 
the extent of this can only be surmised, it is reasonable to suppose 
that a backlog of unregistered marriages built up in the later 1930s 
which would be regularised at the first opportunity. In this area, as 
with the birth rate and birth control, the Nazis were attempting the 
near impossible, by trying to exert a decisive and overwhelming 
influence in the area most difficult to control - and where attempts 
at control are least defensible - namely the private life of the 
individual citizen. 
C. Abortion and Contraception 
Within the entire area of marriage, the family and the birth 
rate no question raised such passions nor was so violently contested 
as that of the law concerning abortion. Before the Great War the 
radical feminists had campaigned for the repeal of the harsh 
penalties laid down in the Criminal Code of the Empire for anyone 
attempting to procure or perform an abortion2. The SPD, too, had 
called for reform, and this remained party policy after the war3. 
Outflanking the SPD, and following the policy of Soviet Russia, where 
abortion had been legalised4, the KPD demanded that there be no 
1. BA, R58/147, MadR, 17 January, 1940. 
2. Evans, op. cit., pp. 192 -221, describes the radicals' campaign 
and the liberal feminists' opposition to it. 
3. Bolte and Kappe, loc. cit. 
4. Fannina Halle, Woman in Soviet Russia, London, 1933, pp. 38 -39. 
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restriction whatever in Germany, since it was a woman's right to 
decide whether and when she would have children. The KPD bitterly 
attacked the SPD for failing to legalise abortion while it was in 
government, but at the same time implicitly pointed to the chief 
reason for this failure by attacking the Churches and the Centre 
Party for their implacable opposition to toleration of abortion'. 
Indeed the SPD had soft- pedalled its policy of favouring a radical 
reform of the law, in its new -found respectability as a party of 
government; but given the pathological terror of its coalition 
partner, the Centre Party, of any relaxing of morals - and of the 
legalisation of abortion above all2 - this attitude was a prudent 
one if reform in any area was to be achieved. 
It is, in fact, remarkable that, given the Centre Party's 
implacable opposition to the legalisation of abortion, and its 
consistent tenure of office, the law was reformed in May 1926, with 
the Draconian Imperial penalties modified so that they bore less 
heavily on the woman seeking or undergoing an abortion, while still 
allowing the severe punishment of anyone discovered performing 
1. "Richtlinien der KPD zur Frage der Geburtenregelung ", document in 
AfB, 1931, pp. 60 -61. 
BA, R58/, RMdI /NsdL, "Private Wohlfahrt und Reformismus ", Rote 
Wohlfahrt publication, 21 September, 1932, p. 251. 
BA, R58 /(fol. 1), RMdI /NsdL, "Politische Resolution beschlossen 
auf dem Reichskultur- Kongress, Leipzig, 14. und 15.3.1931 ", 13 
April, 1931. 
2. Klaus Epstein, "The Zentrum Party in the Weimar Republic" (review 
article of Rudolf Horsey, Die deutsche Zentrumspartei 1917 -1923, 
Düsseldorf, 1966), Journal of Modern History, 1967, p. 162. 
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abortions for payment1. And in 1927, as the result of a test case, 
there was for the first time toleration of abortion on medical grounds 
where, especially, the health or life of the woman would be endangered 
if the pregnancy were allowed to run its course2. The compromise 
on abortion resulting from these decisions could go some way towards 
satisfying the reformers without driving the Churches, especially, 
into hysteria; but it was seen by both the KPD and the radical 
feminists as a feeble and inadequate outcome. 
Particularly in the depression years the KPD waged a massive 
campaign against "paragraph 218 ", chiefly through its auxiliary 
group the ARSO (Association of Social Policy Organisations), which 
operated both through its own national committee for population 
policy and in conjunction with affiliated groups working for sexual 
reform, for example the League for the Protection of Mothers and 
the Workers' Union for Birth Control3. There was, in addition, the 
Freethinkers' Society, another KPD auxiliary, whose main purpose was 
to combat the influence of the Churches, which were regarded as the 
chief defenders of "paragraph 218 ". This law was seen as an integral 
part of the enslavement of women within the capitalist system, of which 
1. Bolte and Kappe, loc. cit. 
Hans Harmsen, "Notes on Abortion and Birth- Control in Germany ", 
Population Studies, 1949 -50, p. 402. Paragraphs 219 and 220 
of the Criminal Code were repealed, leaving an altered paragraph 
218, which became the symbol as well as the reality of what those 
in favour of legalising abortion opposed. 
2. Bolte and Kappe, loc. cit. 
"Eugenische Indikation und Paragraph 218 ", FZ, 23 January, 1935. 
3. BA, R58/1148, RMdI /NsdL, 19 December, 1932, "Arso ". 
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the Churches were, rightly, held to be staunch supporters1. The 
KPD therefore tried to attract women to the working -class side in the 
class war by publicising its campaign against the abortion law, since, 
as the Central Information Office of the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior reported, 
"The sexual organisations affiliated to the ARSO, 
like all fringe groups of the KPD, have as their primary 
aim the recruiting and educating of new fighters for the 
proletarian revolution by exploiting their particular 
grievance or distress "2. 
The propaganda material of the KPD and the ARSO certainly gave 
the impression that more or less all working -class women were 
suffering untold distress as a result of the remaining restrictions 
on abortion3. Certainly, with anything between half a million and 
a million abortions performed in Germany annually4 the issue was one 
of national importance, the more so since the result of driving 
desperate women, more of them married than single, into the hands of 
back -street abortionists was that there were perhaps as many as 
1. BA, R58/1146, RNIdI/NsdL, n.d. ?April 1932. 
2. BA, R58/1148, loc. cit. 
3. Numerous examples of such propaganda material may be found in the 
BA, R58 files, e.g., R58/, RMdI /NsdL, " Proklamation zur kultur- 
ellen Befreiung des werktätigen Volkes", Kampfbereit, December 1931, 
p. 14, and 858/1148, RiidI /NsdL, 19 December, 1932, "Arso ". 
4. The estimates vary: D.P. Glass stated that 800,000 to 1 million 
was the most common estimate for the years after 1918 (Population 
Policies and Movements, London, 1940, p. 279); Dr. Clara Bender, 
in Archiv far Frauenkunde, 1932, p. 282, estimates an annual 
figure of 2 million to 1 million; 0. Jean Brandes, "The Effect of 
the War on the German family ", Social Forces, 1950/51, p. 166, n.3, 
reports the 1928 Congress of German Physicians at Eisenach as 
estimating that there were 500,000- 800,000 abortions each year. 
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100,000 cases of serious illness each year directly caused by 
abortion techniques1. And there was the additional hazard of 
prosecution. Die Frau im Staat, calling for the abolition of 
"paragraph 218 ", reported in autumn 1930 the case of a miner's wife 
who had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment for having 
performed abortions, although it was established that in 140 cases 
she had neither taken any payment nor once caused injury or illness2. 
She may well have been exceptional in not charging her clients; on 
the whole, abortions cost money, and a Breslau woman doctor went as 
far as to say in 1932 that the availability of abortion had become 
"purely a matter of cash "3. 
The tenacityand enthusiasm with which the Communists and 
radical feminists campaigned for "abortion on demand" did not mean that 
they were actually in favour of abortion. Both groups rather 
regarded it as a necessary evil, as an emergency measure which was 
less evil than forcing a woman to bring into the world a child who 
was not wanted and who probably could not be cared for adequately. 
The better solution, they felt, was an end to the existing restrictions 
1. Again, estimates vary: a book reviewer in FiS, May 1929, p. 11, 
puts the figure at somewhere between 61,000 and 100,000; Clara 
Bender, loc. cit., states that abortions led to 4,000 -5,000 deaths 
and at least 100,000 cases of serious illness each year. It is 
possible that a greater resort to abortion during the depression 
years partly explains this discrepancy. 
2. " Unsere Buchstaben- Justiz ", FiS, September /October 1930, pp. 16 -17. 
3. Clara Bender, loc. cit. 
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on the spread of contraceptive advicel. In post -war Germany this 
issue was contested almost as fiercely as was that of abortion law 
reform. Although birth -control organisations existed freely, some 
being commercial undertakings and some run on a charitable basis by 
voluntary organisations, while some of the sickness insurance funds 
provided contraceptive advice as part of their service2, there was 
a legal ban on the public advertisement of contraceptives, so that 
those most in need of help had only a limited chance of learning that 
it was available. To combat this, the KPD formed another auxiliary 
group alongside the ARSO, which they called the AMSO (Association of 
Marxist Social Workers), to agitate for freely available contraceptive 
advice. The main complaint of the AMSO was that the law was invoked 
only against the proletarian organisations for sexual reform, and in 
order to show its absurdity, the AMSO was, in January 1933, seriously 
considering bringing a complaint against the Berlin Police Sports 
Union's magazine, which habitually carried full and frank advertisements 
for contraceptives, and which had nevertheless not been prosecuted3. 
If the KPD and the radical feminists were in a minority in 
their open and wholehearted campaigns for the legalisation of abortion, 
they were in much larger company when it came to promoting the spread 
1. "Richtlinien der KPD zur Frage der Geburtenregelung ", document 
in AfB, 1931, pp. 57 -59. 
BA, R58/, propaganda leaflet of ?early January, 1933, gives the 
KPD slogan as "Nicht abtreiben, sondern verhüten:" 
Auguste Kirchhoff, "Siebenter internationaler Kongress für Geburt- 
enregelung", FiS, November 1930, p. 5. 
2. Glass, op. cit., pp. 276 -77. 
3. BA, R58/336, RMdII /NsdL, 6 January, 1933. 
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of contraceptive advice and general sexual enlightenment. There 
had already been birth -control organisations before the war, and their 
number increased very considerably after it. The most noticeable 
expansion was among those groups appealing to the working class, and 
in July 1928 a number of these joined together in the National 
Association for Birth Control and Sexual Hygiene. This was a non- 
profit- making organisation with 12,000 members; but although it 
addressed itself to working -class women and girls in the language 
of the political left, it deliberately kept itself politically neutral, 
so as to appeal to as wide a clientéle as possible. Activity in the 
field of birth control intensified greatly in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, particularly once the economic depression made freedom 
from an unwanted pregnancy an even greater need for many women. In 
1930, to meet the needs of the German capital, three prominent 
doctors founded the first marriage advisory centre in Berlin, and 
their example was followed elsewhere1. Finally, in January 1931 
representatives of the most important birth -control groups founded 
the German Central Office for Birth Control, as a non- political 
organisation to facilitate the exchange of information among the 
various groups, and to look at sexual matters in their social, legal, 
eugenic and ethical context; it was also intended to make contact 
with birth -control groups abroad2. 
1. Hans Lehfeldt, "Die Laienorganisationen Geburtenregelung ", 
AfB, 1932, pp. 62 -68. 
2. Report in AfB, 1931, p. 84. 
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The Churches were rightly seen by socialists, radicals and 
progressives as the chief bastions of resistance to the legalisation 
of abortion and the spread of contraceptive advice. The Evangelical 
Church was decisively in favour of large families and opposed to 
"any limiting of births on grounds of selfishness, convenience or 
pleasure"l; it regretted that the problems of the economic depression 
were having a destructive effect on family life in this context2. 
The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church was summed up in the Papal 
Encyclical "Casti Conubii" of 1930, in response to a situation which 
had, from the Church's point of view, rapidly deteriorated during the 
1920s. Abortion was anathema to Catholics, and on the question of 
contraception the Pope's words were, as Campbell says, "forceful and 
unambiguous ". This "shameful and intrinsically immoral...criminal 
abuse" was to be stamped out by a concerted campaign by Catholics 
everywhere3. To counter the advisory centres established by the 
groups in favour of birth control both Churches set up their own 
"Marriage Advisory Centres ", which merely gave clients the Christian 
view of marriage and sexual life, with no medical or physiological 
advice whatsoever4. 
1. The wording here is strikingly similar to that of a resolution 
adopted by the Anglican Church at the Lambeth Conference in 1930: 
"The Conference records its strong condemnation of the use of any 
methods of conception control from motives of selfishness, luxury, 
or mere convenience ". Quoted in Flann Campbell, "Birth Control 
and the Christian Churches ", Populations Studies, 1960, p. 136. 
2. "Aufruf des Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchenausschuss vom 25. Mai 
1932 ", document in AfB, 1932, pp. 95 -96. 
3. Campbell, op. cit., p. 138. 
4. Max Hodann, History of Modern Morals, London, 1937, pp. 167 -68. 
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The Churches were not the only pro -natalist groups, however. 
The concern about the declining birth rate of the immediately pre- 
war and then the war years had led to the founding of organisations to 
promote the idea that large families were not only a national 
necessity but positively desirable in themselves. In 1923 these groups 
amalgamated into the Reichsbund der Kinderreichen Deutschlands zum 
Schutz der Familie (RdK), with its headquarters in Berlin. It was 
estimated that a meeting of the association in 1927 in Bochum 
attracted some 5,000 participants1; but the pro -natalists did not 
command the organised support enjoyed by their opponents in the 
birth -control groups. These were said to have 70,000 members by 
1931 in the lay organisations, over and above those run by the medical 
profession2. And, certainly, the population as a whole demonstrated 
its preference, as the birth rate continued to decline. No doubt the 
depression had a considerable effect on people's desire for children; 
but if it was a matter of choice then it seems that the real reason 
for the trend as a whole was the much more widespread use of 
contraceptives as a result of the greater activity of the birth - 
control organisations in the later 1920s and early 1930s, and their 
greater success than the pro -natalist groups. 
This could be true only in a political climate which tolerated 
and encouraged freedom of choice, freedom of association. The 
1. David V. Glass, Population Policies and Movements, London, 1940, 
pp. 272 -74. 
2. Report in AfB, 1931, P. 84. 
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Communists may well have felt that they were discriminated against 
in the Weimar Republic, and indeed the confidential reports made 
on Communist activities under the last governments of the Republic 
suggest a degree of surveillance which many liberals would no doubt 
have thought offensive in a democracy1. The remnants of democracy 
and freedom were, however, eliminated in the early months of 1933, 
after the Nazi take -over, and the views of the Nazi Party on 
procreation, as on other subjects, became national policy. Hitler 
had written, "it must be considered as reprehensible conduct to 
refrain from giving healthy children to the nation ", which suggested 
that abortion would be stamped out, contraceptives banned, and the 
birth -control organisations declared illegal. On the other hand, 
Nazi theories about race and heredity meant that in certain cases 
methods of birth control would be positively encouraged. Again, 
Hitler had provided the guidelines: "...there is only one infamy, 
namely for parents that are ill or show hereditary defects to 
bring children into the world "2. To ensure that the fittest survived, 
only the fit should be allowed to procreate. For the first time, 
then, there was to be a State -directed population policy, with 
coercion and compulsion as the corollary of the incentives mentioned 
earlier. 
It was as typical of the Nazis to introduce their State - 
directed policy as it had been of the Weimar governments to shun 
such a course. But what was involved in the closing down of birth - 
control centres was not merely the new regime's population policy, 
1. The records of these reports are to be found in the BA, 
R58 files. 
2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Munich, 1936, p. 338. 
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but also its political aims, for a number of the organisations 
providing contraceptive advice and distributing propaganda about 
birth control were, of course, run by the KPD. The "Law for the 
Protection of the People and the State ", passed on 28 February, 1933, 
was used by police authorities in Dortmund, Hamburg and Liegnitz, for 
example, to ban birth- control organisations, on the grounds of their 
association with "Marxist groups ", while in the state of Thuringia 
every single birth-control organisation was compulsorily dissolved, 
on the same pretext1. Other groups survived longer, but were forced 
to conduct their activities in the greatest secrecy, which was bound 
to be counterproductive when their entire campaign depended on the 
spreading of propaganda. Even so, assiduous police activity often 
resulted in the detection of groups which had tried to disguise 
their purpose. In April 1933 it was reported that the organisation 
with the acceptable name of the League for the Protection of 
Mothers was indeed a welfare concern, but was, in addition, a front 
for illicit KPD meetings2. 
The League was also continuing to campaign, as effectively as 
possible under the circumstances, against "paragraph 218" and also 
against the prohibition of the birth -control organisations which, 
it claimed, was on the agenda for legislation, along with a measure 
to restrict the distribution of contraceptives to chemists; this 
last restriction would mean the end of free contraceptives and the 
putting of prices beyond the means of working -class women. Already, 
1. "Verbot der Laienorganisationen für Geburtenregelung ", AfB, 1933 -34, 
p. 55. 
2. BA, R58/, typewritten memo, 14 April, 1933. 
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as a sign of the new Government's earnest intent, the number of 
prosecutions for abortion was increasing. The League now called, 
desperately and belatedly, for a united front of all groups 
dedicated to sexual reform, to fight the menace of fascism and defend 
their organisations1. 
The League's fears were partly justified. Before the end of 
May 1933 a law was passed reintroducing paragraphs 219 and 220 of 
the Criminal Code in a new form, which specified a punishment of up 
to two years' imprisonment or a fine for anyone advertising or 
offering abortion facilities, unless there were permitted medical 
circumstances2. To try to ensure that members of the medical 
profession would not use their position to perform abortions freely, 
a campaign was launched to detect and dismiss those felt to be suspect. 
In Berlin, on the day after the law was passed, the Mayor reported 
to one of his chiefs of police that certain persons, including some 
doctors, had been dismissed from the city's employment because of 
their connection with the "Red Welfare" organisation of the KPD. The 
AMIGO was apparently managing to survive, although by now the authorities 
were keeping a close watch on its activities3. But it appears that, 
amazingly, a few of the birth control organisations managed to stay in 
existence; Hodann reported that in 1935 there were still Marxist groups 
1. BA, R58/, "Kampf gegen das drohende Verbot der Sexualorganisationen:" 
Die Warte, ?March /April 1933 (covering letter, as above, dated 
14 April, 1933). 
2. "Gesetz zur Anderung strafrechtlicher Vorschriften ", RGB, 1933 I, 
26 Ivïay, 1933, p. 296. 
3. BA, R58/, letter from the Mayor of Berlin to the head of a section 
of the Berlin police force, 27 May, 1933. 
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for sexual reform active in Germany, in spite of their being known 
to the Gestapo 
Meanwhile, it had become apparent that the new regime was 
prepared to tolerate and even approve abortion in certain cases. 
The Hereditary Health Court in Hamburg, in a test case in March 
1934, gave a judgment which declared abortion on grounds of racial 
health to be a non -punishable act. Reporting this, the Frankfurter 
Zeitung commented that the Court was deliberately making a 
fundamental decision of principle which it expected to serve as a 
precedent. The "medical indication" had already been made a ground 
for performing an abortion legally, in 1927; now the Nazis had 
introduced the "eugenic indication ", which permitted the termination 
of a pregnancy if the health of the nation was considered to be 
endangered by the birth of an "hereditarily unhealthy" child, on 
condition that the mother acquiesced2. This was a logical corollary 
to the Sterilisation Law of 14 July, 1933, and the same definition of 
"hereditary health" applied, namely the absence of mental illness and 
of certain kinds of physical illness or disability which might 
conceivably be heritable. Alcoholism was regarded as an "hereditary 
risk" also3, since it was claimed that women who were alcoholics 
generally gave birth to children who were mentally or physically 
retarded, or who became delinquents or prostitutes; it was also believed 
that the wife of an alcoholic who did not herself suffer from the 
1. Hodann, op. cit., pp. 165 -66. 
2. "Eugenische Indikation und Paragraph 218 ", FZ, 23 January, 1935. 
3. "Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses ", RGB, 1933 I, 14 
July, 1933, p. 529. 
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disease might bear maladjusted children1. 
The Frankfurter Zeitung guardedly observed that before 1933 
the Nazis had campaigned vigorously, and with some success, against 
those who had tried to have social grounds such as indigence made 
a legal ground for abortion, and had given people to understand that 
they would never permit abortion for frivolous reasons if they came 
to power. Now, however, they were permitting the termination of a 
pregnancy - while the life was still unviable - where a legally - 
approved application for sterilisation had been made on eugenic 
grounds, again with the approval of the woman concerned. The paper 
could only hint at the apparent inconsistency here, while approving 
this step in the direction of allowing a woman more control over her 
reproductive capacity, if only in strictly limited circumstances2. 
Professor D.V. Glass, hardly a reactionary and certainly not an 
admirer of the Nazis, also called this move "liberal "3, but this was 
before the Nazis' eugenics policies had been revealed in their full 
horror, during the war. An early sign of the direction these would 
later take came in 1938, when the announcement was made that Jews 
would not be liable to prosecution if they resorted to abortion, since 
this could only benefit the German people4. The same reasoning led 
Himmler to regard homosexuality as sabotage, and therefore to 
1. Gertrud Kaetzel, Volksgift und Frauenpflichten, Munich, undated, 
PP. 4 -10. 
2. "Die Eugenische Indikation ", FZ, 28 June, 1935. 
3. Glass, op. cit., p. 283. 
4. BA, NSD30 /vorl. 1836, Informationsdienst..., March 1939, "Anwendung 
nur auf das deutsche Volk ". 
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contemplate tolerating it in non -"Aryans" while meting out the most 
severe of penalties to homosexuals who were German citizens1. 
In general, however, the intention had been to eliminate 
abortion, so that "racially valuable" children were not lost to the 
nation in this way. But the tightening up of the law and the more 
rigorous prosecution of those performing and undergoing abortions 
by no means had the desired effect, as Himmler's staff was well 
aware2. In May 1937, an SS Medical Information Office letter stated 
that the number of abortions taking place annually "must still, 
incredibly, be estimated as high ", and that it must be reduced3. But 
in spite of the sanctions, the practice continued. Himmler's agents 
reported an increase in miscarriages in December 1939, which they 
attributed partly to the taking over of heavy work on the land by 
wives whose husbands had been called up, and partly to anxiety in 
women at the danger their husbands might be facing. But, in addition 
to this, they believed that some miscarriages were being induced 
deliberately. This was, they said, particularly noticeable in Danzig, 
where German troops had by this time been in occupation for the two or 
three months felt to be most likely to elapse between conception and 
the resort to abortion. But also in Karlsruhe a gynaecologist reported 
1. Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs, London, 1956, p. 57. 
2. IfZ, MA 306, frame 593008, letter from Wangemann, on Himmler's 
staff, to Himmler, 7 February, 1938. 
3. IfZ, MA 387, frames 5193 -94, "Verein 'Lebensborn' e.V. ", 31 
May, 1937. 
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that almost every week he had to deal with miscarriages which showed 
all the signs of having been caused by abortion techniques1. 
The war made the matter of population growth seem even 
more urgent, with the need to make good the losses in the field, and, 
so Hess and Himmler believed, to ensure that each soldier did his 
patriotic duty by fathering a child before he went to the front2. 
Thus, Himmler was deeply concerned when official statistics showed 
that there were still about 600,000 abortions being performed in 
Germany each year, a level comparable with that estimated for the 
years between 1918 and 19333. The sanctions and the heavy pro -natalist 
propaganda used as instruments of Nazi policy seem, therefore, to 
have had little or no effect in reducing, far less in eliminating, 
the practice of abortion, although the penalty of imprisonment was 
freely imposed on offenders4. Trying to persuade the army to support 
the anti -abortion campaign vigorously, Himmler wrote to Keitel 
that the prevention of the 600,000 annual abortions could in twenty 
years be providing two hundred more regiments for the army in each 
succeeding years. But at the same time it was still considered vital 
to prevent the birth of children who were deemed to be "unfit" by 
sanctioning abortion where at least one parent had an "hereditary 
defect ", and where - so Frick believed - racial grounds made the 
1. BA, R58/146, MadR, 13 December, 1939, "Zunahme der Fehlgeburten ". 
2. "Der Sieg der Frauen ", Das Schwarze Korps, 4 January, 1940. 
3. See note 2 on page 80. 
4. BA, R431I/1286a, letter from the Hanover Chief of Police to the 
Reich Chancellery, 13 March, 1941. 
5. IfZ, Fa 202, letter from Himmler to Keitel, undated, ?late July, 
1940. 
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continuation of the pregnancy undesirable1. 
The Nazis claimed to have closed down the former marriage 
advisory centres, which had in fact had as their chief function the 
giving of contraceptive advice2; they replaced them with their own 
bureaux for giving positive encouragement and advice about pregnancy 
and child care3. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there were no formal 
decrees against the production and sale of contraceptives before the 
war broke out; this was no doubt largely because the condom was 
regarded as a protective against the spread of venereal disease as 
well as against conception, and it was one of the Nazis' constant 
preoccupations that venereal disease could lead to sterility. Lenz, 
one of the Party's most prominent population pundits, estimated that 
more than 100,000 children were lost annually as a result of venereal 
disease, quite apart from the infected children born to diseased 
parents4. But although the spread of venereal disease in the peculiar 
situation of the war - particularly among teenage girls who hung around 
railway stations soliciting among soldiers5 - was a source of deep 
concern, the Himmler Police Ordinance of January 1941 categorically 
banned the production and distribution of contraceptives. This was 
1. IfZ, MA 47, letter from Frick to Reichsstatthalter, Land governments, 
health offices et al., 19 September, 1940. 
2. F. K. Scheumann in AfFr, 1931 -32, pp. 299 -300. 
3. Dr. Lippert, "Unterhaltszuschuss fair erbgesunde Kinder ", VB, 
3 March, 1934. 
4. August Mayer, Deutsche Mutter und deutscher Aufstieg, Munich, 1938, 
pp. 17 -18. 
5. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750184, BziL, 3 November, 1939. 
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part of a policy of repression in an atmosphere of growing hysteria 
about the desperate need for Germans to reproduce as the war took 
its toll of young lives. The final step in this policy was the 
introduction of the death penalty in 1943 for anyone found to have 
performed an abortionl. 
The chief result of Nazi attempts to stamp out abortion and 
at least limit contraception seems to have been to hinder the 
development of a liberal policy towards birth control in the Federal 
Republic; the Himmler Ordinance remained in force in most Lander 
until 1961, while the near -suppression of the former birth -control 
movement meant that a new campaign would have to start virtually 
from scratch, again in the face of strong opposition from the Churches2. 
Once again, the legal barrier is "paragraph 218 ", the 1926 abortion 
law3. With regard to the Third Reich, it is clear that the Nazi aim 
of completely eliminating abortion among the "racially and hereditarily 
valuable ", and of eliminating contraceptive practice as far as 
possible, was not realised. The measures the Nazis took were piece- 
meal, and the loop -holes they left seem unaccountable, in the light of 
1. Bolte and Kappe, op. cit., p. 45. 
Hans Harmsen, op. cit., p. 403, says that during the war the 
military authorities succeeded in exempting the condom from the 
Himmler Ordinance, to prevent the spread of venereal disease. 
2. D.V. Glass, "Family Planning Programmes in Western Europe ", 
Population Studies, 1966, p. 229. 
Bolte and Kappe, op. cit., p. 46. 
3. Hans Harmsen, op. cit., P. 402. 
"Abtreibung: Massenmord oder Privatsache ? ", Der Spiegel, 21 May, 
1973, pp. 38 -58. 
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their obsession with the population issue. The basic reason must 
be that the German people, in this matter as in so many others, did 
not make an open demonstration of their opposition, but rather 
continued to follow their own desires quietly, in deep secrecy if 
necessary. Even with a huge army of spies and informers, the Nazis 
found that they could not watch all of the people all of the time; 
they were not even able to stamp out the last vestiges of organised 
birth -control groups, although they came close to it. The long 
history of birth control in Germany, with the widespread resort to 
abortion if contraception had been unavailable, or had failed, 
could not be eliminated from popular consciousness by a few laws 
and even a mass of propaganda, so that in this area the Nazi aim 
of creating a fully totalitarian state which controlled every aspect 
of the life of its people came to nothing, as it was bound to. 
Repression could achieve only the driving of these practices 
underground, where popular demand ensured that, somehow, they were 
continued. 
D. The Unmarried Mother 
The national emergency occasioned by the outbreak of the Great 
War gave rise to a decision of the Reichstag on 4 April, 1914, that 
all mothers of children whose fathers were serving soldiers should 
receive financial support from the State, regardless of marital 
status1. In spite of campaigns, particularly by the radical feminists2, 
before the war for an end to the discrimination and disabilities 
1. P. Krische in AfFr, 1931 -32, pp. 72 -73. 
2. Evans, op. cit., pp. 174 -86 discusses the radicals' campaign. 
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suffered by unmarried mothers, this was the first relaxation of the 
harsh attitude which the State and society held towards those women 
who bore a child out of wedlock. After the war, the Weimar 
Constitution pronounced that illegitimate children should be the 
social equals of those born in wedlock; but it was clear from the 
legislation proposed in this area in the 1920s that the reformers were 
concerned only to remove the financial problems and the stigma which 
accompanied illegitimacy, and did not envisage any radical change in 
the position of the unmarried mother, who remained a social outcast. 
Any benefit which might accrue to her from reforms was purely 
incidental to what was felt to be best for the child1. If this was 
the view of the liberals in the Republic, the conservatives were 
even less inclined to help a fallen woman: the Evangelical Church, 
for example, firmly maintained its hard -line attitude against "any 
pre -marital or extra- marital sexual intercourse "2. The placing of 
legitimate and illegitimate children, of married and unmarried mothers, 
on an equal footing in the Soviet Union3 was seen as an example of 
the kind of evils that would result from any relaxation of moral 
standards. 
Throughout the Weimar period, then, the lot of the unmarried 
mother remained a hard one, particularly if she lived alone and was 
obliged to work; little progress was made in finding an effective way 
1. See, e.g., BA, 836/1438: parliamentary question no. 1706 by 
Marie Elisabeth Luders et al., 23 June, 1922; letter from Mohr - 
mann, of the Archiv Deutscher Berufsvormtinder e.V., to Oberbürg- 
ermeister Mitzlaff, 15 January, 1926; letter from Mende, of the 
Deutsches Archiv für Jugendwohlfahrt e.V., to the Deutscher 
Städtetag/ Preussischer Stddtetag, received 13 April, 1929. 
2. "Aufruf des Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchenausschuss vom 25. Mai 
1932 ", document in AfB, 1932, p. 96. 
3. Halle, op. cit., p. 106. 
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of making the father support his childl. In spite of this, the 
Civil Code still left the unmarried mother with no legal rights over 
her child. Goldmann and Grotjahn found that a large proportion of 
those in need of relief were unmarried mothers "who," they believed, 
"must be accepted in Germany because of the surplus of women over men ". 
They reported that in 1925 33% (133 out of 406) of the mothers insured 
with the sickness fund of the AEG in Berlin were unmarried, and that 
this proportion was matched in a number of the other funds 
2 
. This was, 
in fact, during the period when illegitimate births had been rising 
quite consistently, from 8.5% of all live births in 1905 to 11.4% in 
1920 and 12% in 1925; in addition, there had been a higher rate of 
births out of wedlock in the peculiar circumstances of the last year 
of the war, 1918, when a figure of 13% was reached for the only time 
between 1905 and 1939. From the mid -1920s the illegitimacy rate 
declined steadily, again dropping to the 1905 level in 1934, and then 
falling even further to remain at 7.7% or 7.8f for the rest of the 
1930s3. Thus, Nazi claims of restoring morality after the decadence 
of Weimar were belied by the downward trend in the illegitimacy figures 
from 1926; equally, allegations that the Nazis encouraged widespread 
procreation outside marriage to boost the birth rate are unfounded in 
1. Krische, op. cit., p. 72. 
2. Franz Goldmann and Alfred Grotjahn, op. cit., p. 69. 
3. Figures from St.J.: 1934, p. 27; 1937, p. 37; 1939/40, p. 42; 
1941/42, p. 66. Since there was a higher rate of dead births 
among illegitimate than legitimate children, the proportion of 
unmarried women who carried children was higher than the figures 
suggest; equally, the rate of infant mortality was higher among 
the illegitimate, and so a smaller proportion of women than that 
suggested by the figures had to bring up an illegitimate child. 
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the years 1933 -39, although the situation changed dramatically after 
the outbreak of the Second World Warl. 
At first, however, the Nazis did tend to associate unmarried 
motherhood with the licentiousness they claimed was propagated by 
the Marxists. An article in a Labour Front publication in August 1934 
was thoroughly censorious, claiming that women who had a child out 
of wedlock tended to be emotionally unstable, were often heavy drinkers, 
psychopaths, or mentally ill, and therefore would often produce 
children who could not, with their heredity, be considered of value to 
the nation. There was a particular risk, continued the article, with 
those women who had two or more children out of wedlock by different 
fathers. It was, in any case, a fundamental tenet of National 
Socialism that loose morals could not be tolerated, since they were 
a threat to the family, which was the base of society. Thus, 
concluded the article, the State and the nation might show compassion 
to those "racially valuable" women who, in a moment of weakness, 
conceived children out of wedlock, but they could not condone their 
irresponsible behaviour2. 
From the population point of view, the unmarried mother could 
well have been considered a wasted asset. Even although there were 
many more women than men in the population, the problem was that the 
unmarried mother would normally have only the one child, as Himmler 
realised, and so her maternal potential would not be fulfilled3. 
1. Official statistics, which had consistently given the illegitimate 
birth rate along with other population statistics since 1882, do 
not provide figures for the number or rate of illegitimate births 
in 1940, although they continue to give those for marriages, deaths, 
live births, etc. in St.J., 1941/42, p. 66. It is tempting to 
conclude that the figures were deliberately concealed because they 
were so high. 
2. "Klarheit: ", Der Deutsche, 11 August, 1934. 
3. IfZ, MA 387, frame 5194, "Verein '.Lebensborn' e.V. ", 31 May, 1937. 
99. 
There was some confusion in the ranks of the Nazi Party, with the 
scruples of the puritans obviously in conflict with the desire to have 
and to support "racially valuable" children; the result was that 
little of material value was done in the 1930s to solve the problems 
or raise the status of the unmarried mother. From 1933 she did receive 
tax relief on her earnings to help her to maintain her child, and when 
the tax levied on single persons to provide funds for the marriage - 
loan scheme was described it was shown not to apply to unmarried 
mothers'. This same ruling would, incidentally, apply to single women 
- like Lea Thimm, the women's representative in the Nazi doctors' 
organisation2 - who adopted children. No doubt to allay fears that 
immorality was being encouraged by these meagre concessions, it was 
explained that if the State afforded aid to the unmarried mother and 
her child this did not denote its approval of what she had done3. But 
in spite of the protests and the moral indignation exhibited in some 
publications on the subject, it was slowly becoming clear that official 
attitudes towards the unmarried mother were at last softening. 
The first tangible sign of the direction in which official 
policy was developing came in May 1937, with an order by the Minister 
of Justice that unmarried women could elect to be called "Frau" instead 
1. "Gesetz zur Verminderung der Arbeitslosigkeit ", RGB, 1933 I, 1 June, 
1933, p. 327. 
"Gesetz über die Einkommenbesteuerung für 1933 ", RGB, 1934 I, 21 
December, 1933, p. 3. 
2. BDC, Lea Thimm's Reichsärztekammer membership card, and answers to 
a questionnaire for the Journalists' Association, 10 January, 1934. 
3. Alice Rilke, "Die ehelose Mutter im nationalsozialistischen Staat ", 
VB, 30 August, 1934. 
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of "Fr.ulein ", with a special provision that unmarried mothers must 
be addressed as "Frau" in all official business if they chose this 
designationl. Ironically, this had been something the radical sexual 
reformers of the pre -war period had demanded2, and among even the 
moderate feminists it had for long been customary to use the designation 
" Frau" for mature women, regardless of marital status3. In this area, 
then, with the provision of a single title for all women, if they so 
chose, and the improvement in the status of unmarried mothers that 
this implied, the Nazis were in line with the progressives of the 
past whom they had so castigated, and with radical opinion that 
developed some thirty years later than their own policy. 
The Government found itself in a position where it would have 
to make a decision about the status of the unmarried mother, since 
the contentious issue of whether such a woman should be employed in 
the service of the State had not been settled in the Weimar period. 
In the summer of 1936 Frick called a meeting of interested parties to 
try to frame a policy on this matter, and to settle those cases 
currently under consideration4. One of these was a disagreement which 
had arisen between the Minister of Posts, who had fined a single woman 
1. BA, R22/41, order of the Minister of Justice, no. 2697, "Ftihrung 
der Bezeichnung 'Frau' durch unverheiratete weibliche Personen ", 
Reichshaushalts - und Besoldungsblatt no. 18, 21 June, 1937, p. 
201. 
2. Anthony, op. cit., pp. 108 -11 describes the campaign of the Bund 
für Mutterschutz to eliminate the title "Fráulein ", particularly 
to protect unmarried mothers. 
3. See, e.g., correspondence between Gertrud Baumer and the friends 
and acquaintances who were, like her, unmarried, in Beckmann, op. 
cit., and BA, Kl.Erw., no. 296 -(1). 
4. BA, R4311 /443, letter from Pfundtner to Lammers, 
12 August, 1936. 
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employee for having a child and who favoured severity because of 
the immoral act which had led to it, and Hess, who advocated leniency 
and was campaigning against the punishment of F`räulein Wagner, the 
lady in question. This case raised two issues, namely should a 
woman be punished for having an illegitimate child, and, if so, 
should the penalty be dismissal from or ineligibility for public 
employment1. 
A further meeting was called for the end of October 1936. Among 
those invited were Himmler and Hess - who attended in person, as an 
indication of their growing interest in this matter - and several 
Ministers, who sent representatives; but Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, the 
National Women's Leader, was not invited to discuss a matter which 
was, after all, of immediate interest to women2. No decision was 
reached, and the matter was left in the air while the general question 
of attitudes to unmarried motherhood, particularly with reference to 
its relevance for population policy, was discussed at length by a 
committee of Ministers, Gauleiters and population pundits3. As an 
interim measure, Hess, with the approval of Frick4, asked to be consulted 
in every case where proceedings were being contemplated against a 
woman official who had an illegitimate child, before a decision was 
1. Ibid., notes by Seel at the Ministry of the Interior, 15 August, 1936. 
2. BA, R4311 /443, circular from Pfundtner to nine Ministers and 
Secretaries of State, 13 October, 1936. 
3. BA, R4311 /1523, circular from Pfundtner to 18 leading people in 
Party and State, 31 May, 1937. 
4. BA, 84311/427, letter from Pfundtner to the 
Reich Ministers, 13 
December, 1938. 
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given, so that he might influence it if he chose1. Given the stand 
Hess had taken in the case of Frgulein Wagner, it was probable that 
he would generally intervene in favour of the woman concerned. 
It was by now becoming clear that Himmler, too, was emerging 
as a champion of the unmarried mother, because, he said, she should 
be given credit for contributing to the population. No doubt he 
realised that if there was a change in attitudes she might be 
encouraged to have more children, whether out of wedlock and supported 
by the State, or in marriage as she became a more acceptable partner. 
But Himmler was extremely sensitive to suggestions that he was 
positively in favour of unmarried motherhood, and was at pains to 
refute rumours and complaints that his Lebensborn (Fount of Life) 
Association was directed at encouraging conception and birth out of 
wedlock. At the same time, he was anxious to point out that greater 
tolerance 
"does not bring down the married mother to a certain 
level, but raises the unmarried mother to her proper place 
in the community, since she is, during and after her 
pregnancy, not a married or an unmarried woman, but a 
mother". 
The unmarried mother, said Himmler, was a particularly vulnerable 
member of society whose legal interests, for example, required 
special protection; therefore he had decided to assume legal guardianship 
of illegitimate children where this seemed necessary, and, of course, 
only in the cases of "racially and hereditarily valuable" children. 
On the same racial basis, the Lebensborn homes for expectant and nursing 
mothers also admitted married women2, and indeed one of their chief 
1. Ibid., letter from Gramsch, the Prussian Prime Minister, to the 
IMIinister of the Interior, 4 January, 1939. 
2. IfZ, op. cit., frames 5189 -95. 
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functions lay in assisting the wives of SS men whose financial 
position was precariousl. Even in May 1944 Himmler insisted that 
the ratio of legitimate to illegitimate babies born in the homes 
was "about 50 -50, more likely 60 -40 in favour of the legitimately 
born babies "2. 
The discussions which had been set in train by the meetings in 
1936 clearly inclined towards a more enlightened attitude towards 
the unmarried mother. One symptom of this was a report in late 1938 
of a recent spate of films released in the Rhineland which 
consistently featured the illegitimate child as a benefit to the 
nation from the population point of view. The Rheinisch- est- 
falische Zeitung, which carried the article, drily asked the film 
industry to bear in mind that it was also possible to bring children 
into the world after a marriage had taken place3. This episode was 
indeed an attempt to gauge the climate of opinion in the country, and 
to influence it away from the earlier view held widely within the 
Party itself that equality for the unmarried mother and her child 
would "degrade and undermine" marriage and family life4. But the 
1. IfZ, Fa 202, letter from an SS officer on behalf of the Governing 
Council of Lebensborn to SS officer Pohl, 21 June, 1938. 
2. R. Manvell and H. Fraenkel, Heinrich Himmler, London, 1965, 
pp. 93 -94. C.f. Richard Grunberger, "Lebensborn ", Bulletin of 
the Wiener Library, July 1962, p. 52, who states that between 
50A and 80¡ of the babies born in the homes were illegitimate. 
Kersten reports Himmler as saying in May 1943 that married women 
accounted for 50% of the confinements (op. cit., p. 180). 
3. "Das interessante uneheliche Kind ", Die Frau, December 1938, p. 162. 
4. See, e.g., Else Vorwerck, "Gedanken fiber die Ehe im national- 
sozialistischen Staat ", NS- Frauenbuch, Munich, 1934, pp. 147 -48. 
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difficulty of reaching agreement on a change of policy was such that 
in 1940 it still had to be admitted that, after seven years of Nazi 
rule, not the slightest change had been made in the legal position; 
the relevant clauses of the Civil Code still stood, although the 
SS, at least, clearly felt that they were out of date. Indeed there 
had been lengthy discussions, particularly within the Nazi Lawyers' 
Association, and several proposals had been made, but the very 
number and variety of these were felt to be an indication of how 
difficult a problem this was to solve'. 
A decision was reached, however, within the restricted area 
of the employment of an unmarried mother in the public service. 
Early in 1939 the Minister of Justice expressed the view that the 
bearing of an illegitimate child should not of itself ever be made 
a reason for dismissal, although he would be inclined to a stricter 
attitude if the circumstances leading to the pregnancy - for example, 
if intercourse had taken place on official premises - gave the 
impression that the woman had abused her position and was likely to 
bring, her office into disrepute2. Six months later, the National 
Institute for Youth Welfare wrote to Prick to press for tolerance in 
this matter. Its argument was that the current climate of opinion, and 
the Government's population policy, made it desirable that women to 
whom there was no objection other than that they had had a child out of 
wedlock should be accepted for public service positions, or retained in 
1. IfZ, Fa 202, letter from the staff of "Lebensborn" to Himmler's 
office, 15 February, 1940. 
2. BA, R431I /427, letter from Freisler to the Reich Ministries, 13 
January, 1939. 
105. 
employment if the birth took place after their appointmentl. On 
receipt of this letter, Frick issued a statement to the state 
governments in the sense of the MIinister of Justice's earlier remarks, 
asking that it be transmitted to the relevant authorities that the 
circumstances of a conception, rather than the fact of a woman 
official's having conceived, be the basis for any decision as to the 
advisability of employing or dismissing an unmarried mother2. 
This shift in official attitudes had taken place before Germany 
was at war; once there was the prospect of heavy carnage among the 
young men of the nation, the Government became obsessed with the 
problem of raising the birth rate, by any means. Hess brought the 
question of unmarried parenthood in this context into the open before 
the year 1939 was out. He sent Frick a copy of a long letter he 
had written to the pregnant fiance of a soldier killed in action, 
with a request for a prompt regulation of the legal position of 
women who found themselves in this position, and Frick complied by 
sending out urgent invitations to discuss the matter3. Already, 
however, Hess had taken the unilateral step of announcing that the 
NSDAP would be prepared to assume the guardianship of children 
whose fathers perished in the war, on the grounds that 
"considerations, which are justifiable in normal times, 
must for the present be overlooked.... What use is it if 
a nation is victorious, but through the sacrifices made for 
that victory it dies out ?" 
Thus, men and women - of pure racial descent - who created a new 
1. Ibid., letter from the Deutsches Institut für Jugendhilfe e.V. 
to the Ministry of the Interior, 11 July, 1939. 
2. Ibid., letter from Stuckart to the Land governments and the chief 
Government officials, 14 July, 1939. 
3. BA, R431I/1286, letter from Frick to Lammers, 24 December, 1939. 
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life were giving the nation in time of war the next most precious 
thing to their own life, and should be honoured accordingly. Hess 
added that he was convinced that the German people would come to share 
his point of view before long, and that it would in future be 
prepared to treat as equal with married mothers those 
"who, perhaps outside the bounds of bourgeois morality 
and custom, contribute to compensation for the blood 
sacrificed in the war...for...the life of the nation 
comes before all principles thought up by men, all 
conventions which carry the mark of recognised custom 
but not of morality, and before prejudice. The highest 
service a woman can render to the community is the gift 
of racially healthy children for the survival of the 
nation "l. 
Hess had managed to turn a message of comfort to a girl who 
found herself in the most distressing circumstances into barely - 
veiled encouragement for procreation outside marriage. His stand 
was welcomed by the SS weekly paper Das Schwarze Korps, which went 
on to agree that there must be a change in morals: in war, Himmler 
was quoted as saying, no soldier can go to the front, possibly to 
die, in peace of mind if he has not left heirs behind him. Therefore, 
the names "war -time father" and "war -time mother" would signify that 
in time of national emergency there were those who served their 
country not only in the field or in the factory, but by their 
contribution to the future of the nation by begetting and bearing 
children. Under these circumstances, girls who refused to serve their 
country by conceiving a child, out of wedlock if necessary, could be 
compared with army deserters, while those who did have illegitimate 
children could be secure in the knowledge that the State would welcome 
1. Ibid., letter from Hess to the fiancée of a dead soldier, undated 
(covering letter, above, dated 24 December, 1939). 
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and support them1. The entire tone of this article was nothing short 
of revolutionary, and the response to it vindicated those who had 
been on the side of caution in the matter of bringing in legislation 
to promote legal and social equality for the unmarried mother and 
her child. 
It was, for example, hardly surprising that the Roman Catholic 
Church spoke out very strongly against the new morality proposed 
by Hess and the SS. At the festival of - appropriately enough - the 
Holy Family in January 1940 the bishops' pastoral letter, which in 
recent years had concentrated on attacking the Sterilisation Law, 
criticised particularly Hess's much- publicised letter and Himmler's 
frequent utterances supporting extra -marital procreation. Cardinal 
Faulhaber, particularly, made it clear that the view of the Church 
on the sanctity of marriage and the sinfulness of unchastity remained 
what it had always been, and that the war could not alter it. The 
Church was so incensed that, as Himmler's agents reported, in some 
areas priests were telling their congregations that the war was God's 
punishment for the moral depravity currently encouraged by the nation's 
leadership2. 
Others were not so sweeping in their condemnation of the new 
morality; Gertrud Bäumer pointed out that the proposals now being made 
by Party leaders for some regularising of the position of illegitimate 
children were not dissimilar from those for which she and her associates 
1. "Der Sieg der Frauen ", Das Schwarze Korps, 4 January, 1940. 
2. BA, R58/147, MadR, 15 January, 1940. 
IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750508, MadR, 22 December, 1939, reports a 
Roman Catholic priest as saying publicly that Germany will lose 
the war if the current increase in immorality is not reversed. 
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had consistently campaigned, as a matter of common sense. But she 
also believed that there was a very sharp difference between 
fathering a child and regarding fatherhood as a continuing commitment 
within a family1. Her friend Dorothee von Velsen was quite horrified 
by the article in Das Schwarze Korps, and also frustrated by the need 
to keep her criticism private2. Gertrud Bäumer was, however, able to 
take some comfort from the fact that, although she could not publish 
her views, open opposition to the article had been voiced by the 
women in the leadership of the Nazi women's organisation, who had 
called SS officers to a meeting to face questions about it3. It is 
clear, however, that the Nazi women were in no position to challenge 
this change in policy, particularly since it was enunciated in time 
of national emergency. 
The SS was unrepentant, and its paper led demands for legal 
action in favour of those who were "considered up till now 'illegitimate". 
Financial aid for the unmarried mother was seen as a top priority, 
and the suggestion was made that the needy might be paid a monthly 
sum to enable them to support their child. In addition, there should, 
said Das Schwarze Korps, be full medical facilities for the confinement, 
a ban on the dismissal or demotion of the mother from work, and a 
prison sentence for any who besmirched the good name of an unmarried 
1. BA, Kl.Erw., no. 296 -(1), letter from Gertrud Baumer to Dorothee 
von Velsen, 4 April, 1940. 
2. Ibid., letter from Dorothee von Velsen to Gertrud Bäumer, 31 March, 
1940. 
3. Ibid., letter from Gertrud Bäumer to Dorothee von Velsen, 4 April, 
1940. 
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mother1. But this enlightened policy - adopted as it was for 
aggressive reasons - created financial problems which Himmler and 
his men had apparently not foreseen. In summer 1940 Himmler reported 
to Keitel that 
"as a result of extensive troop movements illegitimate 
pregnancies have reached an unprecedented height since 
the beginning of the war.... The fathers of 90¡0 of the 
illegitimate children born in the Lebensborn homes are 
serving soldiers ". 
Accordingly, the initial system, by which the homes had been financed 
by a levy on SS men and used specifically for their children2, was 
inadequate now that the homes had been opened to a far wider circle, 
and so Himmler now asked that Keitel try to interest the army in the 
work of Lebensborn and, more important, to put some of the funds at 
the disposal of the army towards the upkeep of the homes3. 
The Party responded to the new moral climate by awarding a 
cash grant to full -time single women employees who had a child on the 
same basis as to a married man who had a legitimate child4. And the 
Government agreed to provide money grants to unmarried mothers who 
were in need of support. But it operated in a rather half -hearted 
way, carefully vetting each case to ensure that the claimant was indeed 
in poor financial circumstances, and also of good character5. In the 
1. "Ein Frau hat das Wort ", Das Schwarze Korps, 11 April, 1940. 
2. IfZ, MA 387, frame 5189, "Verein 'Lebensborn' e.V. ", 31 May, 1937. 
3. IfZ, Fa 202, letter from Himmler to Keitel, undated, ?late July, 
1940. 
4. IfZ, MA 135, frames 136153 -54, letters from the Kreisleitung 
Erkelenz to its DAF and NSV officials, 3 February, 1941, and the 
Gauschatzmeister of Cologne to his Kreisleitungen, 30 January, 
1941. 
5. BA, R431I/1286a, letter from Erich, in the Chancellery, to the 
Gauleitung in South Hanover -Brunswick, 12 February, 1941. 
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case of one Helene Richter, however, a lump sum of RM 125 was 
recommended in spite of the fact that she had previously been 
jailed for assisting with abortions. It was said that her character 
was otherwise good and, at least as important, that she seemed to be 
thoroughly "politically reliable "1. But in approving this grant an 
official in the Chancellery wrote to Helene Richter to emphasise that 
grants could in fact be made only in exceptional cases 
"since the means for them are small. I therefore ask you 
not to acquaint others with the fact that you have been 
given aid, so as not to encourage the submitting of 
applications which are hopeless, and can result only in 
disappointmenti2 
The high idealism of the SS caused dismay among the bureaucrats who 
had to operate the system and who were well aware that the Government 
could not suddenly assume financial responsibility for the large 
numbers of children that Himmler, oblivious to the financial 
implications of his scheme, was encouraging. 
Himmler continued for the rest of the war to be obsessed by 
the problems of overcoming "middle -class convention" and "defying 
existing laws and explaining to my men that children are always a 
great blessing, legitimate or not ". He admitted to Kersten in 1943 
that he had already, discreetly, given notice that women anxious to 
have children could have'acially pure" men provided as "conception 
assistants "; only a few women had responded so far, but Himmler hoped 
to extend the scheme greatly after the war, even to make it compulsory, 
eventually, for women of good stock. Together with Bormann, he also 
1. Ibid., letter from the Hanover Chief of Police to the Chancellery, 
13 March, 1941. 
2. Ibid., letter from Meerwald, in the Chancellery, to Helene Richter, 
25 July, 1941. 
had plans for encouraging bigamy. His explanation was that 
"There is one purpose behind all these measures...to 
safeguard and improve the racial qualities of the Greater 
German Reich, so that it can accomplish its great tasks 
both in the centre of Europe and against the increasing 
avalanche of Asian peoples "1. 
Now, it cannot be disputed that a more enlightened attitude towards 
the unmarried mother and her child than that current in most parts 
of inter -war Europe was thoroughly desirable; but Himrnler's motives 
were completely indefensible. What he, Hess - before his "mission" 
to Scotland in 1941 - and Bormann proposed, besides, was nothing 
short of a revolution, which would drastically alter the nature, and 
perhaps even threaten the existence, of the family unit which the 
Nazis had originally pledged themselves to preserve and promote. 
The benefit which may have accrued to the unmarried mother - provided 
that she was "racially valuable" - was, as in the Weimar period, 
purely incidental, this time, however, not to the welfare of the 
child but to the naked power ambitions of the Nazi leadership. 
1. Kersten, op. cit., pp. 176 -82. 
Hans -Jürgen Lutzhöft, Der nordische Gedanke in Deutschland 
1920 -1940, Stuttgart, 1971, pp. 395 -96. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Employment of Women outside the Home 
Introduction 
A discussion of the employment of women in the 1930s must 
centre on Nazi policy. It has been generally accepted that the Nazis 
aimed to reduce, or even eliminate, the employment of women outside 
the home, particularly as a means of easing the unemployment problems 
Germany faced in the early 1930s; but the extent to which the Nazis 
actually pursued this goal, and the means they used, have barely been 
considered. Equally, it is now accepted that the Nazis were forced 
to try to encourage women to enter employment in the later 1930s, as 
the regime's power ambitions led to the development of an economy 
geared to the possibility of limited war; but while Dr. Mason has dealt 
with some aspects of this subjectl, there has been no thorough -going 
investigation of it. The aim of this chapter is to try to remedy 
these deficiencies, by setting the question of women's employment in 
its context after the Great War, by showing how Nazi attempts to reduce 
women's employment were largely based on false premises, and soon 
abandoned, by discussing the Nazis' organisation for supervising women 
workers and attending to their welfare - largely for reasons of 
population policy - and by considering the attempts of the Nazi 
Government to persuade, cajole or even coerce women into work once 
Germany was at war in the autumn of 1939. The signal failure of these 
attempts reinforces suggestions made by other writers2 that while the 
1. T. W. Mason, "National Socialist Policies towards the German 
Working Classes ", unpublished Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1971, 
pp. 614 -23, 648 -49. 
2. Ibid., pp. 590 -96, 605, 642. 
H. R. Trevor- Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, London, 1972 (9th 
revised printing), pp. 53 -54. 
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Nazi regime was indeed dictatorial, it was unable to force its 
will on the German people when there was confusion and disagreement 
within the upper echelons of Party and Government, and when there 
was deep- rooted opposition to its policies. 
A. The Employment of Women after the Great War 
The Great iar, with its heavy toll of male casualtiesl, and 
the inflation consequent upon the war, were important in increasing 
the scope and extent of women's employment outside the home beyond 
the considerable dimensions they had reached before 1914. It was, 
however, the rationalisation of industry and business, following the 
stabilisation of the currency in 1924, which had the most profound 
impact on this development: mechanisation, one of its major 
characteristics, led directly to a fundamental change in the demand 
for various types of labour. 'Tasks which had previously been 
performed by skilled workers - and this meant almost exclusively by 
men - could now be carried out much more efficiently by machines, 
for whose operation cheaper semi -skilled or even unskilled labour 
sufficed. It rapidly became apparent to employers that women were 
far preferable to men for this kind of work, for two reasons: first, 
and most obviously, women were cheaper to employ, with even skilled 
women paid at a lower rate than unskilled men; but at least as 
important was the discovery that women actually tended to be better 
machine operators than men. This was the case not only in wage -earning 
occupations; the real revolution was in white -collar jobs, where 
the increasing use of the typewriter and the calculating machine 
1. Figures illustrating the effect this had on the sex ratio in 
Germany after the Great War have been given on p. 44. 
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facilitated the replacement of men with skills which had formerly 
been essential by women whose dexterity and acceptance of monotonous 
work only enhanced their advantage, already strong from the financial 
point of view1. 
The 1925 census showed that about one -third of the 3.5 million 
employees in white- collar occupations were women2, which Kracauer 
attributed to the need for more women than formerly to support 
themselves after the war3. This view was confirmed by an inquiry 
carried out in 1929 which revealed that 93% of the sample of women 
interviewed were unmarried, and that their age distribution indicated 
that for many employment was not merely a temporary stage in their 
life but a career4. About a quarter of a million white -collar women 
workers were members of unions in the later 1920s5, and these led a 
campaign to try to achieve equal pay for women in clerical jobs °. 
In fact, women employees were paid on average between 10% and 15% 
less than men in the same grade of job; and on the whole women were 
1. Judith Grünfeld, "Frauenarbeit im Lichte der Rationalisierung ", Die 
Arbeit, 1931, no. 12, pp. 911 -13, 922. 
Ludwig Preller, Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, 
1949, pp. 115, 125, 136. 
2. Report in 
3. Siegfried 
by Verlag 
WuS, 1930, no. 13, P. 558. 
Kracauer, Die Angestellten, Frankfurt, 1930 (reprinted 
für Demoskopie, Allensbach and Bonn, 195)), p. 5. 
4. Report in FiS, January 1930, p. 10. 
5. Figures from St.J.: 1927, pp. 511 -12; 1928, pp. 592 -93. 
6. Maria Hellersberg, "Die soziale Not der weiblichen Angestellten ", 
speech made on 15 January, 1928, at a congress of women white - 
collar workers, printed as no. 43 of Schriftenreihe des Gewerk- 
schaftsbundes der Angestellten, Berlin, 1928, pp. 22 -23. 
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to be found in the lower- grade, poorly -paid positionsl. When the 
depression came, it hit white- collar workers as a group much less 
severely than it hit industrial workers, although there were many 
cases of individual hardship among them2. Men and women in offices 
and shops suffered to a similar extent: women accounted for 41.0 
of the unemployed in these positions in 19323, while the 1933 census 
showed that they constituted 42.2% of all employees in these areas4. 
In industry, the fields in which women had traditionally been 
chiefly employed were textiles and clothing, which together accounted 
for about half of all women in industry in the first quarter of 
the twentieth century. In 1925, over 1.5 million women, out of a 
total of 2.9 million in industry, were employed in these two areas. 
In third position came the food, drink and tobacco industries, with 
over 400,000 women between them5. But in the 1920s women were also 
beginning to figure in industries in which they had formerly been 
represented either negligibly or not at all; a case in point was the 
metal industry, where some works recorded the employment of women 
for the first time in the 1925 census return6. In the later 1920s 
1. Ibid. 
Kracauer, op. cit., p. 7. 
Herta Schmidt, "Die Berufsarbeit der Frau ", FiS, May 1931, p. 6. 
2. Kracauer, op. cit., pp. 38 -39, vividly describes some examples of 
this. 
3. Calculated from figures in St.J., 1933, p. 291. 
4. Figures from St.D.R., vol. 451, part 3, p. 40. 
5. Figures from St.J., 1933, p. 22. For comparison, the 1925 census 
also recorded that there were a million female domestic servants 
(op. cit., p. 23). 
6. A. Vallentin, "The Employment of Women Since the War ", ILR, vol. 
25, 1932, pp. 493 -94. 
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this trend greatly intensified, partly as a result of the 
rationalisation process generally, and partly because employers saw 
the employment of cheaper female labour as the only way of keeping 
down costs at a time when wages generally had risen, since the war. 
An additional factor was that women were therefore once more, as 
in war -time, being increasingly employed in work, particularly with 
heavy machinery, which was extremely unsuitable for them1. There was 
growing anxiety about this, particularly when young girls were involved, 
since it was becoming apparent that their physical development was 
suffering, so that their ability to bear healthy children was being 
diminished by work where there was extreme heat, dirt, dust, and by 
the need to stand continuously for hours to work a machine2. 
To try to combat the worst effects of industrial work on women 
and young people a piecemeal scheme of labour protection had been 
built up in the later 19th century. Article 157 of the Weimar 
Constitution had promised the introduction of a unified system of 
labour legislation to protect all workers as far as possible from 
danger and damaging conditions at work, but this was yet another pious 
hope which came to nothing in the political and economic difficulties 
of the 1920s. Women, however, benefited from a law, operative in 1927, 
which brought Germany into line with the Washington Convention of 1919 
in the matter of employing women before and after child- birth3. This 
provided for up to twelve weeks' leave around the confinement, during 
1. Judith Grünfeld, op. cit., pp. 912 -17. 
2. Ibid., p. 921. 
Hildegard Jungst, Die Jugendliche Fabrikarbeiterin, Paderborn, 1929, 
pp. 36 -38. 
3. "Arbeiterinnen- und Mutterschutz ", JADG, 1927, p. 204. 
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which time maternity benefit was payable by the sickness funds, 
dismissal was illegal, and on returning to work a nursing mother was 
to be allowed time for feeding her baby1. The Free Trade Unions 
admitted that this was a real improvement, but pointed out that it 
was only the first step towards a proper, comprehensive labour 
protection system2. The depression, however, put their demands 
beyond the realm of possibility in the short term, as they acknowledged 
at the end of 1930, accepting that it was hard enough for the 
exchequer to find money even to operate the 1927 law3. 
In spite of the economic difficulties, however, the Government 
continued to demonstrate interest in labour protection, with the 
reintroduction in 1930 of earlier measures, repealed during the war, 
to protect women working in glassworks, rolling -mills and foundries4. 
Medical investigations into the effects of certain industries on 
women's physiology - particularly from the gynaecological point of 
view - were carried out which showed, for example, that women working 
in tobacco factories were highly susceptible to nicotine poisoning 
which contributed to a high rate of miscarriages among them and infant 
mortality among their offsprings - a serious finding for a nation with 
1. Johannes Feig, "The New Labour Protection Bill ", ILR, vol. 15, 1927, 
p. 190. 
2. JADG, op. cit., pp. 205 -07. 
3. Report in JADG, 1930, p. 194. 
4. Ibid. 
"Verordnung über die Beschäftigung von Arbeitern unter achtzehn 
Jahren und von Arbeiterinnen in der Glasindustrie ", RGB, 1930 I, 
26 March 1930, p. 105. 
5. S. M. Klein in AfFr, 1931-32, pp. 34-43. 
M. Sserdjnkoff in AfFr, 1932, pp. 264-65. 
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a declining birth rate. Even in the textile industry, where large 
numbers of women had been employed for long enough, conditions were 
found to be poor, with inadequate lighting and ventilation in factories 
and an insufficiency of seating and toilet facilitiesl. Clearly, 
much was still left to be desired in German labour legislation, but 
equally clearly the growing interest in conditions at work suggested 
that further legislation would be contemplated in an improved economic 
situation. 
The two largest trade union groupings, the Free and the 
Christian unions, were unequivocally in favour of special protection 
for women at work2, no doubt at least partly because of the relative 
strength of their women's sections3. Although numbers - and women's 
share - dropped in the 1920s after a peak in 1920, when women's share 
in both combines was about one -fifth, the total membership revived 
modestly with the depression biting, so that in 1930 there were 
altogether 4.7 million members of the Free unions and three -quarters of 
a million in the Christian unions. But the decline of women's share to 
14% in both groups4 seemed to confirm the view that women were readier 
1. Annemarie Hermberg, "'Mein Arbeitstag - Mein Wochenend", Die 
Arbeit, 1931, no. 2, p. 168. 
2. JADG, 1927, op. cit., p. 205. 
IfZ, MA 422, frames 5- 455196 -97, letter from Mina Amann to the 
leaders of unions in the Christian Trade Union movement, 23 June, 
1931. 
3. Marguerite Thibert, "The Economic Depression and the Employment of 
Women ", ILR, vol. 27, 1933, p. 461, states that Germany had a much 
larger women's membership in the trade unions than many countries. 
4. Figures from St.J.: 1921/22, p. 458; 1923, p. 436; 1928, pp. 594 -95; 
1931, p. 558; 1932, p. 557. 
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to give up union membership in times of high unemployment1. The 
Free unions undertook a massive campaign, led by Gertrud Hanna, to 
attract more women2, and support for improved conditions at work was 
no doubt regarded as good propaganda for this purpose. 
But there were those who saw labour protection as a way of 
putting women at a disadvantage on the labour market, and who 
suspected - not without some justification - that the male -dominated 
trade unions promoted it for precisely this reason. In June 1929 the 
Open Door International for the Economic Emancipation of the Woman 
Worker was founded in Berlin, for the following purpose: 
"To secure that a woman shall be free to work and 
protected as a worker on the same terms as a man, and that 
legislation and regulations...shall be based upon the nature 
of the work and not upon the sex of the worker; and to secure 
for a woman, irrespective of marriage or childbirth, the 
right at all times to decide whether or not she shall engage 
in paid work, and to ensure that no legislation or regulations 
shall deprive her of this right"3. 
The aim of the Open Door, then, was to achieve complete, literal, 
and even absurd equality for women. Its chief supporters in Germany 
were to be found among the radical feminists4, who felt that special 
protection for women robbed them of the right to choose the kind of 
work they would dos. The trade unions were completely opposed to the 
1. Marguerite Thibert, op. cit., p. 462. 
2. "Frauenarbeit und Gewerkschaften ", Gewerkschaftszeitung, 11 January, 
1930, pp. 21 -22. 
3. Report of the Third Conference of the Open Door International, 
Prague, July 24 -28, 1933, p. 43. The ODI's headquarters were in 
London. 
4. Lida Gustava Heymann, "The Open Door Council ", FiS, May 1929, p. 1. 
5. Th8nnessen, op. cit., p. 166. 
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Open Door, regarding it on the one hand as an embarrassment and on 
the other as a threat to the development of further protective 
legislation, even if it could not undo what had already been achieved'. 
On the whole, the new organisation made little impact in Germany, 
seeming largely irrelevant in the economic crisis, but it did continue 
to hold international conferences during the 1930s, abroad2. 
The expansion of women's employment after the Great 'Jar would 
have been desirable if the German economy had also been expanding, 
as it had done before the war. But in a situation where it was jobs, 
and not labour, that were in short supply, a situation intensified 
by mechanisation on a large scale, the influx of an increased number 
of women onto the labour market was potentially serious. With 
recession setting in, in late 1927, to be compounded in 1930 by deep 
depression, it became a real problem. The reason for the increase 
in the female labour force was attributed by Agnes von Zahn -Harnack, 
President of the BDF, to technical improvements in the home and to 
smaller families, which had made the occupation of wife and mother a 
less full -time one than formerly3; but she can have been referring 
only to her own constituency, the middle class. It was a much more 
widely -held view that working -class women worked almost exclusively 
1. Report in JADG, 1930, p. 191. 
IfZ, loc. cit. 
2. After the Prague Conference in 1933, conferences were held in 
Copenhagen in 1935 and Cambridge in 1938. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Britain and Sweden were the chief centres of the 
movement's activity after 1933, the emigration of the chief German 
representatives bringing activity there to an end. 
See the reports of the Copenhagen and Cambridge Conferences. 
3. "Das Berufsschicksal der weiblichen Jugend ", BF, November 1931, p. 2. 
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out of necessity1. This double burden of a full -time job and a 
family to care for after work was oppressive to many, and led a 
commentator to remark: "The working -class wife is the tragic figure 
of our age "2. 
In addition to factors which forced or encouraged women to take 
a job in the 1920s, there was another reason for the vast increase in 
the number of women in employment, from 8.5 million in 1907 to 11.5 
million in 1925. In 1907, only about half of the very large number 
of Germans born since the founding of the Empire were of working age, 
while in 1925 almost all of those born in the decades of the high birth 
rate before the Great Wax were of working age. Even given the losses 
in the war, the number of men in employment had risen between 1907 
and 1925, although the overall result had been to increase women's share 
in the labour force by 2 %, to almost 36% of the totals. A change in the 
supply of labour would, however, become apparent, but not until about 
1935, when those born in the 1870s began to retire, to be only 
partially replaced by those born in the lean war and post -war years of 
1. Agnes Karbe, Die Frauenlohnfrage, Rostock, 1928, pp. 88, 130. 
Gertrud Hanna, "Vom Kampf gegen die verheirateten erwerbstätigen 
Frauen ", Die Arbeit, 1931, p. 259. 
Schwabach, op. cit., p. 95. 
2. Ibid., p. 132. 
3. Figures from St.J., 1930, p. 23. The 1907 figures are given in 
adjusted form, taking the loss of population in 1919 into account, 
to give comparability. 
A. Vallentin, op. cit., p. 492, comments on the relationship between 
the growth of the population and that of the labour force. 
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birth. 
For the time being, then, the absolute number of people of 
working age continued to grow. But, according to official estimates, 
the increase was greater among men than among women after 1925; in 
fact, in 1929 and 1930 the total number of women in the labour force 
actually declined, by 25,000 and 94,000 respectively, while men's 
numbers still increased, although at a slower rate. But the most 
significant feature was that the decline in women's numbers was due 
solely to a drop in the number of single women in the labour force, 
from 1927, while the number of married women showed a net rise 
every year, even in 1930, when there had been a reduction of 25,000 
in the total number of working people compared with 19291. These 
figures would not, of course, be known to the mass of the population, 
and even those writing about the employment situation in the early 
1930s generally based their comments on the results of the 1925 
census; nevertheless, the situation represented by these figures must 
have created the general impression that more and more married 
women were working, at a time of rising unemployment. 
As jobs became ever scarcer2, employers had the pick of the 
labour market, and often they chose to employ women, as cheaper 
labour, while men lost their jobs; the result was that in many cases 
a wife would have to work to support the family, on a wage lower than 
that previously earned by her husband, because she could find work and 
1. Report in WuS, loc. cit. 
2. Official statistics on those receiving unemployment benefit or 
emergency relief give total numbers of 1.06 million in October 
1929, 1.98 million in December 1929, and 2.66 million in 
February 1930. Figures from Vierteljahrshefte Mr Statistik des 
Deutschen Reiches, 1930, vol. 1, p. 141. 
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he could not1. In spite of the narrowing of the differential 
between men's and women's wages, as a result primarily of the war 
but also of the 1923 inflation2, women were left with take -home pay 
which was considerably lower than men's. Even in the textile 
industry, a female stronghold, where women tended to do the same kind 
of work as men, women spinners in 1930 still received only two -thirds 
of the hourly wage rate paid to men, although women weavers fared 
rather better, with 83% of men's rates3. This latter figure was, 
however, exceptionally high; across a broader spectrum of industry it 
was found, in 1928, that skilled and semi -skilled women - unfortunately 
usually classed together - earned about 63íá of a skilled man's wage, 
while unskilled women earned 52 %. Unskilled men, by contrast, 
earned 7870 of a skilled man's wage. In 1932, after the wage cuts 
introduced by the Government to try to combat the depression, the 
relative positions were broadly the same as in 19284. It was, 
therefore, still advantageous to an employer to take on a skilled 
woman, to whom he could pay a lower wage than that payable to an 
unskilled man. 
But their relative inexpensiveness was not the only reason 
for women's continuing to work as men were laid off. Even more 
important was the fact that women were chiefly to be found in those 
sectors of the economy which were less severely affected by the 
depression. Women were predominantly employed in the consumer goods 
1. Karbe, op. cit., p. 113. 
2. Bry, op. cit., p. 96. 
3. Calculated from figures in St.J., 1933, p. 272. 
4. Calculated from figures in "The General Level of Wages in Mines, 
Industries and Transport ", ILR, 1938, vol. 37, p. 105. 
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industries, which maintained a reasonable level of output during 
the crisis: although employment in relation to total labour capacity 
in this area dropped to 48`'jó throughout the second half of 1932, 
it remained above 60% most of the time in the food, textile and 
luxury industriesl, in which, together, women constituted almost 
half of the labour force. By contrast, women's share in industry 
as a whole was less than a quarter2. On the other hand, the 
production goods industries suffered much more, with employment in 
relation to total capacity as low as 35% throughout 1932. The area 
affected worst of all was the building trade, which could reach a 
figure of only 23% in summer 1932, with figures catastrophically low 
- at 12% at the start of 1932 and 14% at the start of 1933 - as its 
seasonal character compounded the effects of the crisis3. The 
building trade - accounting for 9A of all unemployment in 1932 - 
was almost exclusively a male preserve, employing women as less than 
2g of its labour force. The other area which was disastrously hit 
was the metal industry, in which women comprised less than 4% of the 
work force4. 
These details contributed to a picture where women, constituting 
35% of all working people in Germany, accounted for just under 20% 
of the unemployed in 1931 and 1932, the worst years of the crisis5. 
1. Figures from St.J., 1933, p. 309. 
2. The 1925 census showed that women's share in the three industries 
mentioned was 46%, while that in industry as a whole was 23dó. 
Figures calculated from information in St.J., 1930, p. 88. 
3. Figures from St.J., 1933, loc. cit. 
4. Calculated from figures in St.J., 1930, loc. cit. 
5. Figures from St.J., 1933, p. 291. 
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Even if it is accepted that some women who lost their jobs 
probably did not register as unemployed, it is nevertheless clear 
that women survived the economic crisis better than men, very 
largely because a reasonable level of demand was maintained in 
those industries in which they chiefly figured, while they were 
employed in relatively insignificant numbers in those industries which 
bore the major burden of the unemployment. But whatever the reason, 
the impression was growing that women, by occupying jobs, were 
keeping men out of work; the response to this was a growing campaign 
from the autumn of 1930 to replace women who had jobs by unemployed 
men. 
B. The Campaign against the Woman Worker, 1930 -34 
The 1925 census had shown that 68° of all employed women 
were single, widowed or divorced1; these would probably have to 
support themselves, and perhaps also dependants in addition - almost 
always on a lower income than men, as a radical feminist pointed 
out2. Nevertheless, in December 1930 the Economics Party proposed 
that the employment of women generally - and particularly of women 
holding what they termed "men's positions" - should be restricted, 
unless they had absolutely no other means of support. This clear 
attack on the wives and daughters of employed men reinforced an 
attack made by a right -wing white- collar union on the daughters of 
wealthy families who had a job and therefore "increased the misery of 
those who have no -one to provide for them "3. It was certainly true 
1. Calculated from figures in St.D.R., no. 451, part 3, p. 76. 
2. Herta Schmidt, loc. cit. 
3. Gertrud Hanna, op. cit., p. 260. 
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that girls from prosperous middle -class families were to be found 
in clerical jobs, working for pocket money rather than for 
subsistence', but they were only a tiny minority of employed women. 
However, those who attacked the employment of women in time of 
depression often did so for ideological reasons rather than because 
they believed that the removal of women from jobs would solve the 
unemployment problem. The Churches, with their view of the place of 
women in family life, were a case in point2. And the Nazis, in their 
anxiety about the birth rate, claimed that the present situation 
degraded women, prevented their devoting themselves to family life, 
and deprived "fathers of families" of the right to work3. 
If there were some generalised attacks on the employment of 
women as a group, the main burden of complaint was against the 
married woman who had a job, who, it was claimed, was giving some 
families an extra wage, over and above that earned by the actual 
breadwinner, the father, while in other families - as a consequence, 
it was implied - the breadwinner was without work. These women, the 
Doppelverdiener, were felt to be not only depriving able men of work, 
but were even threatening the very existence of whole families. It 
was thus against them that the full force of official concern and 
widespread unofficial propaganda ri e directed. 
1. Kracauer, op. cit., p. 65. 
2. Grete Stoffel, "Die Arbeitslosigkeit und die Frauenarbeit ", FiS, 
August /September 1931, p. 6. 
Leo Zodrow, "Die Doppelbelastung der Frau in Familie und 
Erwerbsberuf ", Stimmen der Zeit, vol. 171, 1962 -63, p. 376. 
3. Karl Fiehler, "Sozialgesetzgebung ", Nationalsozialistisches 
Jahrbuch, 1927, pp. 122 -23. 
Report in VB, 4 April, 1934. 
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Early in 1931, the Minister of Employment, Stegerwald, 
asked a commission to consider the possibility of legislation to 
restrict the Doppelverdiener; but it was on the basis of the 
commission's report that he decided against such a course. Instead, 
he instructed the Employment Exchanges that where they had to place 
applicants for jobs, they should take the social circumstances of 
candidates of equal suitability into account. In addition, he 
announced that he would write to employers to ask them to co- operate 
by making their choice of labour - for firing or hiring - at least 
partially dependent on whether the person involved was or would be 
bringing a second income into a home. Stegerwald was convinced that, 
for psychological reasons, the exchanges would have to be seen to be 
taking some action to restrict the employment of the Doppelverdiener1. 
It was clear that this measure was indeed directed primarily against 
married women, since the Minister added that it should not be applied 
to young people living with their parents, in case their long -term 
career prospects might suffer2. The Brüning Government, then, was 
anxious to take action, and to be seen to be taking action; but even 
in this emergency it was unwilling - or, perhaps, unable - to 
legislate. 
The attacks on employed married women were met by defence of her 
position from a number of quarters. Although many men trade unionists 
were prepared to join in the attacks, the large and influential 
socialist federation of unions, the ADGB (General German Trade Union 
Association) repeatedly reminded its members that its position was clear, 
1. Report in RAB, 1931 I, no. 15, 25 May, 1931, pp. 101 -02. 
2. Report in RAB, 1931 I, no. 18, 25 June, 1931, p. 137. 
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namely that it opposed the campaign against the employment of 
married women since it infringed their rights and would not achieve 
its aim - of eliminating unemployment - anywayl. By 1930, the 
ADGB had decided that the only way to prevent women from being given 
preference over men simply because they were cheaper to employ 
would be to launch a concerted attack to achieve better wages for 
women2. But this of itself would not solve the problems of families 
where the man's wage was so low that the wife had to work, to help 
to feed and clothe her children, not to buy them luxuries3. This 
situation, said the Communist Party, was a natural result of the 
capitalist system, where in a crisis the employers still managed to 
come out on top, by reducing wages and pocketing the amount they 
saved. :ibmen, "the weakest part of the proletariat ", were paid 
miserable wages because employers believed them to be more docile4. 
Alone of political parties the KPD unequivocally demanded the 
abolition of wage differentials altogether, and the upholding of 
a woman's right to work on equal terms with mend. 
The many women who jumped to the defence of their own- sex did 
1. Report in JADG, 1930, pp. 193 -94. 
2. Gewerkschaftszeitung, op. cit., p. 23. 
3. Judith Grlinfeld, op. cit., pp. 921 -24. 
Karbe, op. cit., pp. 88, 130, 136. 
4. BA, R451V/10, "Die Auswirkungen der Papennotverordnung für die 
Frauen", pp. 1 -2. 
5. BA, R2/18554, Reichstag motion no. 1201, 15 October, 1931, signed 
by Communist deputies. 
129. 
not, however, tend to argue that women should have equal rights 
with men in the employment market in time of depression; they 
concentrated on trying to disprove the case that the dismissal of 
the Doppelverdiener would solve the unemployment problem. Even the 
radical feminist Grete Stoffel affirmed the priority of men with 
families to support, although she did suggest that any "double 
earnings" rule should equally allow for the dismissal of the husband 
of a woman who owned a businessl. Gertrud Hanna, leader of the 
ADGB's women's section2, pointed out that the vast majority of 
wives listed in 1925 as employed were still working in 1931, in 
spite of the mounting campaign against them, because "it could not 
be otherwise ". Her analysis of the distribution of the 3.7 million 
married women listed as employed showed that by far the largest 
group, some 77% of the total, were classed as "assisting family 
members ", who worked full -time, but not for a fixed wage, in their 
husband's business; and three- quarters of these, or slightly more 
than two million, were engaged in agriculture. Gertrud Hanna claimed, 
rightly, that these women could only in very exceptional cases be 
replaced by unemployed men, who would have to be paid a fair wage; 
in addition, if these women were obliged to give up their job, many 
would have to dismiss paid help from the household, which would 
certainly be harmful to the labour market3. 
A few months later, Maria Hellersberg gave a similar analysis in 
1. Grete Stoffel, op. cit., p. 5. 
2. Gewerkschaftszeitung, op. cit., p. 22. 
3. Gertrud Hanna, op. cit., p. 254. 
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the relatively conservative magazine Die Bayerische Frau, and went 
on to point out that a further two categories of working married 
women could be eliminated from consideration as Doppelverdiener 
who could be dismissed. The 309,000 women with their own business 
could hardly be replaced by men, for obvious reasons, she said; 
presumably this was because their jobs would not have existed without 
them. In addition, the 44,000 married women in domestic service 
might be replaceable "in individual cases" by unemployed single 
women, but certainly not by men. That left the wage -earning, salary - 
earning and professional married women, and Maria Hellersberg 
whittled their numbers down to half a million by eliminating about 
276,000 women in the textile, clothing and food industries in areas 
where, she pointed out, only a very few men had ever been employed1. 
Marguerite Thibert subtracted another large group, arguing that 
children's nurses, dressmakers and milliners could hardly be replaced 
by unemployed men. The highest number of working married women who, 
she estimated, were in jobs which men could do equally well was 200,000, 
a figure already suggested by Else LClders in the Employment Ministry's 
official gazette2. And these 200,000 women could hardly, as 
Marguerite Thibert somewhat drily remarked, be replaced by the four 
million or more men who were unemployed in 1931 -323. 
Given the mounting opposition to the employment of married 
women, particularly, in the depression, it might have been expected 
1. Maria Hellersberg, "Die Berufsarbeit der Frau ", BF, February 1932, 
p. 2. Maria Hellersberg was a leading member of the white -collar 
union the Gewerkschaftsbund der Angestellten. 
2. Else Luders, "Die Erhaltung der Familie in der Gegenwart ", RAB, 
1931 II, no. 7, 5 March, 1931, p. 108. 
3. Marguerite Thibert, op. cit., p. 622. 
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that they would find it harder than men to obtain unemployment 
benefit. The institution of what amounted to a household means 
test before emergency relief would be granted, in 1ß301, was one way 
in which a wife - or a daughter, for that matter - could find her 
chances of receiving State support much reduced. But at the 
worst of the crisis women were still receiving benefit more or less 
to the same extent as men: in 1932, women's share among the recipients 
of the two main kinds of support, unemployment benefit and emergency 
relief, was 19.95 and 19.45 respectively, at a time when their 
proportion among the registered unemployed was 19.9%2. Thus it is 
clear that the number of unemployed women, including married women, 
who were found not to be in need of support was very small indeed, 
reinforcing claims made before and during the depression that most 
married women worked out of dire necessity. Not only, then, did 
women generally withstand the depression better than men; they also 
had an even chance with men of obtaining support from public funds. 
If this was because women's need was as great as men's, it was 
nevertheless hardly likely to mollify those who believed that there 
should be positive discrimination in favour of men. 
In fact men did benefit marginally more than women from the 
work creation programme begun tentatively by Bruning before his 
dismissal. The Labour Service, for which public funds were provided 
1. "Verordnung über die Krisenfürsorge für Arbeitslose ", RGB, 1930 
I, 11 October, 1930, pp. 463 -64. 
2. Calculated from figures in St.J., 1933, p. 299. 
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by a law passed in July 19311, was largely a male concern, with only 
5,000 of the 175,000 places available in January 1933 allotted to 
women2. But these numbers were minute compared with the problem the 
Labour Service was supposed to be helping to solve. Nevertheless, 
hardship was greatly eased in a few individual cases; for example, 
the DVP's Women's Review described in glowing terms how it had become 
possible to provide work for redundant women office workers by setting 
them to work mending clothes and cooking in return for Labour Service 
remuneration 3 . Much of the time women were used for similar domestic 
purposes; while the men were gathered together in camps to undertake 
work in agriculture or in public works schemes, in return for board, 
lodgings and pocket money4, the women were generally put to work cooking 
and cleaning for them5. On a smaller scale, the Red Cross in Bremen 
1. "Verordnung fiber die Förderung des freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst ", 
RGB, 1931 I, 23 July, 1931, pp. 398 -400. 
2. I'diaria Burgstaller, "Der Deutsche Frauenarbeitsdienst ", NS- Frauen- 
buch, Munich, 1934, p. 26. 
In fact, in January 1932 the Labour Service consisted of 14,000 
volunteers, constituting 0.2% of the total number of registered 
unemployed; in November 1932, 285,000 (5.0 of the registered 
unemployed) gave the best figure for the Labour Service before the 
Nazi takeover. Figures from St.J.: 1933, p. 306; 1934, p. 302. 
3. BA, R451I/64, DVP Reichsgeschäftsstelle, Frauenrundschau, 13 
January, 1932, "Erwerbslosenhilfe durch freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst", 
p. 1103. 
4. This is described in detail in Hans Freising, "Entstehung und 
Aufbau des Arbeitsdienstes im Deutschen Reich ", doctoral dissertation 
for Rostock University, 1937, pp. 21 -32. See also P. W. van den 
Nieuwenhuysen, De Nationaalsocialistische Arbeidsdienst, Louvain, 
1939, pp. 26 -27. 
5. Toni Saring, Die Deutsche Frauenarbeitsdienst, Berlin, 1934, pp. 74- 
75. 
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was paying subsistence wages to 25 unemployed girls, who were brought 
together to make and repair garments for needy citizens'. All these 
activities were completely voluntary; the Nazis attacked them because 
they favoured a compulsory system2, the Communists and radical 
feminists because they saw Labour Service as exploiting women and girls, 
particularly, and as a potential strike -breaking weapon3. But most 
other parties and groups - including the Churches - supported the 
Labour Service, in the hope of alleviating the misery of the unemployed4. 
It was partly the failure of the democratic parties and of 
the more authoritarian governments in the early 1930s to find a way 
out of the crisis into which Germany had sunk that provided the 
opportunity for Hitler to form a government at the end of January 1933. 
Thus he became responsible for solving the economic problems of 
the country. But, although it seemed as if some measure of success 
in this area would be essential if he was to retain power, and if he 
was to be able to pursue the aggressive foreign policy which was his 
basic aim, the introduction of a vigorous economic policy was not his 
first priority. He was determined to consolidate his political power 
1. IfZ, MA 422, frame 5- 455891, Deutscher Arbeitsdienst, "M dell im 
Arbeitsdienst ", April 1932. 
2. BA, Slg.Sch., 262, Reichsleitung "Rundschreiben Nr. 14a ", 5 October, 
1932. 
3. BA, R58/ , RMdI /NsdL, 17 March, 1932, "Kampf der Arbeitsdienst- 
pflicht", p. 20. 
BA, R451V /vorl. 10, RGO Reports, October 1932, "Frauen im 'frei- 
willigen' Arbeitsdienst ", p. 8. 
"Zwangsarbeit für Frauen ", FiS, December 1932, p. 6. 
4. Wolfgang Benz, "Vom freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst zur Arbeitsdienst- 
pflicht ", V;jfZ, 1968, pp. 323, 326 -27. 
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first and attempt to deal with economic problems once he felt 
politically secure. He was fortunate in two respects: from 
January into the summer there is a general seasonal improvement in 
unemployment figures; and, as was not yet fully apparent, the 
depression had reached its nadir before the end of 1932, and an upturn 
had begun before his Government took office. These two factors, 
combined with loud and optimistic propaganda, gave the impression that 
Hitler's Government was at last bringing recovery to Germany, when all 
it had done was to continue the piecemeal work -creation projects of 
the previous administrations. But at last on 1 June, 1933, the 
"Law for the Reduction of Unemployment" was passed; this included 
measures which seemed to reflect the Nazi view of the place of women in 
society 
It was a fundamental part of the Nazi Vieltanschauung that 
the man was the guardian of and provider for the home and family; an 
unemployed man, however, would be unlikely to be able to fulfil this 
function. If he were married, a man might be put in the degrading 
position of having his wife support him, and possibly a family in 
addition, on the meagre wage she could earn; if he were single, he 
could not afford to marry and have children2. Either way, severe 
unemployment was a major obstacle to a healthy rate of population 
growth. In addition, the increased employment of women, sometimes at 
1. "Gesetz zur Verminderung der Arbeitslosigkeit ", RGB, 1933 I, 1 
June, 1933, pp. 323 -27. 
2. Engelbert Huber, Das ist Nationalsozialismus, Stuttgart, pp. 123- 
24. 
Friedrich Lenz, "Arbeitslosigkeit und Rassenhygiene ", VB, 25/26 
June, 1933. 
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the expense of men, was driving women into occupations which, in the 
view of a Social Democrat like Judith Grünfeld, as well as in the 
Nazi view, were unsuitable for them1. To remedy these problems, 
women would have to be taken out of heavy industry, to protect them 
physiologically - or, as the Nazis preferred to say, "biologically" 
- since they were the actual or potential mothers of the nation2. 
For this reason, young girls were a source of particular concern, 
as they had been to doctors and factory social workers for some 
years3. The Nazis promoted the desirability of farm work and domestic 
service for girls because they hoped to provide cheap labour in areas 
which were now unpopular with women; but it was as high a consideration 
that this kind of work would be much less damaging to adolescent 
girls than work in a tobacco or chemicals factory. 
The Nazis' intention was not, as was often claimed4, to remove 
women completely from the labour market. They did aim to persuade 
married women to leave work, to devote their full attention to their 
family, or to start a family if they were childless or add to it if 
they had followed the post-war pattern of a one or two -child family. 
This would, they believed, create a situation in which single women 
could be found work in occupations suited to the female physique and 
the feminine nature. The number of these women, was, however, 
1. Judith Grünfeld, op. cit., pp. 913 -21. 
2. "Nachprüfung der industriellen Frauenarbeit ", VB, 7 February, 1934. 
3. See above p. 116. 
4. See e.g. Hilda Browning, Women under Fascism and Communism, London, 
1935, pp. 8 -9. M. Lode, "Women under Hitler's Yoke ", 
The 
Communist International, November 1938, pp. 42 -43. This article 
was kindly pointed out to me by Professor V. G. Kiernan. 
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expected to be greatly reduced by the fact that the job security 
afforded to men by the withdrawal of married women from work would 
enable and encourage more single men to marry'. But the Nazis did 
not oppose the employment of women root and branch; in fact, they 
firmly believed that women had an essential role to play in social 
work of every kind, particularly nursing, primary teaching and welfare 
services2. In addition, Hitler had recognised that women would continue 
to be the comrades of men in the factory and the office, so that it 
is clear that the Nazis did not aim to eliminate women from those 
white- collar and even manual jobs which caused no harm to the female 
frame. When there were enough jobs to go round, there would no 
longer be the unseemly rivalry for positions which had characterised 
the post -war period, and which disturbed the harmony of the nation3. 
It was this situation which the law of 1 June, 1933, set out to 
achieve. It provided, in the first place, considerable sums of money 
to be spent on public works, and, in addition, introduced some rather 
dubious expedients, including work -sharing and the use of manpower 
for work previously done by machines4. Then there were two provisions 
1. WuS, 1935, no. 13, special supplement "Beschäftigung, Arbeitszeit 
und Arbeitseinkommen ", p. 8, "Die Anteil der Frauenarbeit in der 
Industrie ". 
2. Paula Siber, Die Frauenfrage und ihre Lesung durch den National- 
sozialismus, Berlin, 1933, pp. 26 -27. 
3. Huber, op. cit., p. 123. 
4. RGB, op. cit., p. 323. 
See also Mason, op. cit., pp. 141, 148 -49, for a discussion of these 
expedients. 
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which specifically affected women: in the first place, a tax 
concession was announced for those who employed a female domestic 
servant1. This dealt with a genuine problem, since in the 
contracted economy there had been severe unemployment among domestic 
servants2. But there had also been a voluntary exodus of women from 
this kind of work since the war, in favour of jobs which were less 
restricting and better paid3, and it was to try to reverse this trend, 
since domestic work was deemed particularly suitable for women by the 
Nazis, that the measure was partly geared. Above all, perhaps, work 
done by maidservants was not, on the whole, work that a man would 
expect, or would be expected, to do, and so domestic service could 
próvide jobs for women without taking them away from men. 
The other section of the law which had special relevance to 
women was headed "Promotion of marriages ", and dealt chiefly with 
the marriage -loan scheme4. From the employment point of view, the 
important feature was that it was a condition of receiving a loan 
that the bride -to -be had held paid employment for at least six months 
out of the two years preceding the passage of the law - that is, in 
the depths of the crisis - and that she now undertake to relinquish 
her job on marriage; in addition, she was not to resume employment 
1. RGB, op. cit., p. 326. 
2. BA, Nachlass Gothein, Georg Gothein, "Streifleichter der Arbeits- 
losigkeit", Deutsche Wirtschafts- Zeitung, 15 October, 1931, p. 987. 
3. Otto Michalke, "Die Frauenarbeit ", Jahrblcher fair Nationalökonomie 
und Statistik, 1935, P. 437. 
4. For the population aspects of the marriage -loan scheme, see 
chapter 2, pp. 51 -56. 
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until the loan was repaid, unless her husband's income fell below a 
certain low level. In recognition of the essential part played in 
family concerns, particularly in agriculture, by wives as "assisting 
family members ", this category of employment was not counted as 
falling within the provisions of the law1; this meant, however, that 
families living on the land and depending on the labour of the wife 
would not benefit from the marriage -loan scheme, which was hardly in 
line with the Nazis' obsession with encouraging the growth of a 
healthy "peasant" class. But it was consistent with the Nazi view that 
agriculture, like domestic service, was a particularly suitable area 
of employment for women. 
The scope of the scheme was soon extended, to include those 
who had married in the year before the publication of the law, if 
the wife had been working for at least six months and was now prepared 
to retire. In addition, the period during which the wife had worked 
was now to fall between 1 June, 1928, and the date of the marriage, 
thus bringing in the entire period of the depression, and much of the 
recession before it2. Thus it was clear that the encouraging of 
married women to give up work was a major priority in this law, of 
perhaps less long -term significance than the population aims behind 
the marriage -loan scheme, but certainly of pressing importance in 
mid -1933. The general idea behind the scheme was not a new one; the 
giving of an attractive lump sum as severance payment to married 
women to give up work, particularly in the public service, had been 
1. RGB, op. cit., pp. 326-27. 
2. "Zweite Durchflihrungsverordnung liber die Gewahrung von Ehestands - 
darlehen", RGB, 1933 I, 26 July, 1933, P. 540. 
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suggested in the early 1920s, and such a sum had been prescribed in 
the law passed by the Bruning Government in 1932 to permit the 
dismissal of married women civil servants under certain conditions'. 
The marriage -loan scheme, however, had a much wider application, and 
was intended to serve several purposes at once - increasing the number 
of marriages, raising the birth rate, freeing jobs for men, giving 
orders to factories producing the household goods on which the loan 
had to be spent - and gave the impression of being an incentive 
rather than a bribe. 
Minor modifications were made to the marriage -loan laws during 
the remainder of 1933 and in 1934. It was, for example, stipulated 
that the Minister of Finance should be able in exceptional cases to 
authorise the granting of a loan even if the applicant had not 
complied with all the provisions of the original act; this provided 
the loop -hole which the Nazis so often allowed themselves in seemingly 
categorical regulations. At the same time, the loan scheme was made 
applicable in the case of "assisting family members ", where the wife 
who gave up work was replaced by someone to whom a full wage was paid2. 
This was sensible from the points of view of both employment and 
population policy, but it was unlikely that many people would be 
1. BA, R2/1291, letter from the Württemberg Minister of Finance to 
the Reich Minister of Finance, 31 March, 1923; letter from the 
Verein Deutscher Evangelischer Lehrerinnen to the Reich Minister of 
Finance, 7 June, 1923. 
"Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der weiblichen Beamten ", RGB, 
1932 I, 30 May, 1932, pp. 245 -46. This is dealt with in detail 
in chapter 5. 
2. "Dritte Durchführungsverordnung über die Gewahrung von Ehestands - 
darlehen", RGB, 1933 I, 22 August, 1933, p. 596. 
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affected, since it would almost always be more expensive to hire 
paid labour in place of a wife who did not receive a wage as such. 
But this measure was included no doubt merely to make it possible for 
the rural population, particularly, to be brought into the scheme 
somehow, and to find even a few positions for unemployed persons. It 
was not, however, stipulated that these persons must be male, so that 
there was the possibility of an unemployed woman benefiting from the 
withdrawal of a wife from work. The situation clearly was still 
desperate in winter 1933 -34, with another amendment stating that a 
husband had to be indigent, not merely poorly paid, before a wife 
in a loan -aided marriage was entitled to take a jobl. 
Explaining the marriage -loan scheme, the Völkischer Beobachter 
was completely open about the fact that "in the campaign against 
unemployment one of the most important tasks of our economic policy 
is to send women back to the home from the work -place ", adding the 
qualification "wherever that is suitable ". The paper went on to 
report what it saw as the shining example of the Reemtsma cigarette 
company which was supporting the purpose of the marriage -loan scheme 
by replacing the women who retired by men, and, in addition, was 
making the scheme even more attractive by giving every female employee 
who entered it a substantial cash payment. By November 1933 one hundred 
and twenty -two women workers had already benefited from this offer by 
giving up work to marry, and these had carried their celebrations to the 
incredible length of having a huge combined wedding ceremony: The 
Völkischer Beobachter found this entire episode thoroughly admirable, 
1. "Gesetz zur Ánderung des Gesetzes über die Förderung der Ehe- 
schliessungen", RGB, 1934 I, 28 March, 1934, p. 253. 
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and expressed the expectation that other employers would emulate 
Reemtsma before long1. This was precisely the kind of "spontaneous" 
activity which the Nazis encouraged, so that an objective which they 
saw as important could be achieved by money contributed privately, 
thus saving the Government expense. At any rate, it seems that by 
the end of 1934 some 360,000 women had given up work as a result of 
receiving a loan2, and if this was a reasonably pleasing outcome for 
the Government, it cannot be doubted that many women were glad to be 
able to give up their job, in return for official approval and 
financial benefit. 
The marriage -loan scheme could not, of course, bring about the 
elimination of all, or even most, married women from employment, 
since only those who had married since June 1932 were eligible for 
it. To deal with the remainder, it must have been eagerly anticipated 
by some, just as it was feared by others, that the Nazi -led Government 
would take the earliest opportunity to legislate against the 
Doppelverdiener, the Party having been active in the campaign against 
her before 1933. But the only measure passed in this area was the law 
of 30 June, 1933, which extended the Bruning law of 30 May, 1932, and 
thus allowed for the dismissal of married women from the civil service 
1. "Die Frau in den Haushalt, der Mann an die Arbeitsstätte ", V13, 1 
November, 1933. 
2. In the last four months of 1933, when the loan scheme was operative, 
141,559 loans were made; in 1934 the figure was 224,619. Only 
very few of these can have been made without the wife's having to 
leave work. Figures from St.J., 1936, p. 42. 
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on a larger scale1. 
Nevertheless, the general attitude of the Government to the 
Doppelverdiener was hostile, and this encouraged some employers and 
authorities to demonstrate their loyalty to the new regime by 
dismissing married women. The Government, however, soon discovered 
that these local initiatives were having undesirable effects; in the 
first place, they were causing considerable unrest among employees 
in the concerns affected, and, in addition, the result was by no 
means always in the interests of the families they were supposed to 
benefit. To try to clarify the position, the Minister of Employment 
issued instructions in November 1933 which explained that the 
campaign against the working married woman had so far shown that a 
lack of discrimination could be detrimental to productivity since 
"it is actually often the best and most industrious people who try, 
by bringing a second income into a home, and by extra effort, to 
provide a higher standard of living for themselves or a better education 
for their children ". Preventing those who were eager to work hard 
for certain objectives from doing so turned out, it was admitted, in 
many cases to be counter -productive, and so in future careful 
consideration would have to be given to each individual case2. 
Paced with the chance to take real action against the 
1. "Gesetz zur Anderung von Vorschriften auf dem Gebiet des allgemeinen 
Beamten -, des Besoldungs- und des Versorgungsrechts ", RGB, 1933 I, 
30 June, 1933, pp. 434 -35. This will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. 
2. Report in AfB, March 1934, pp. 125 -26. 
See also Mason, op. cit., pp. 146 and 146A. 
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Doppelverdiener, action which the last governments before Hitler's 
had been unwilling, but probably also impotent, to take, the Nazis 
discovered that what the apologists of the working married woman had 
maintained was true, namely that an intensive campaign against the 
employment of married women would not solve Germany's economic problems, 
and also that most of the married women who worked did so out of 
necessity. The term Duooelverdiener, which had been so widely used 
in the years 1930 -33, almost exclusively in a pejorative sense, is 
still to be found in use in 1934, but to a rapidly decreasing extent; 
after 1934, it was used only to describe something which had existed 
in the past. The Government might maintain that this was because the 
problem had been eliminated by decisive action; the reality was that 
the Government discovered that this problem was very largely a red 
herring. 
Although it had taken little direct action to remove women 
from the productive process, by 1935 the Government seemed, at first 
sight, to have achieved its aim of discriminating in favour of men. 
An official publication confidently asserted that, 
"since the assumption of power, women's employment has once 
again been reduced. The decisive factor in this has been 
above all the fundamental nature of National Socialist 
population policy ". 
In new appointments, continued the article, men had been given 
preference, while the Employment Exchanges had been particularly at 
pains to find work for family men, and then to help single men, to 
give them the chance to marry and start a family1. 
Other tactics included the banning of women from certain 
categories of heavy work, for example in any kind of work underground, 
1. WuS, loc. cit. 
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in mining, salt -works, and coking plants1, in rolling -mills 
or foundries2. If these were not areas in which women might be 
expected to be found, it was the employment of women for the first 
time in such concerns in the 1920s which had caused concern to 
Social Democrats3, for example, and which was justified only by the 
extremists of the Open Door International. In other industries, for 
example in brick -works, shoe -making, and certain areas of the glass 
industry, the introduction of equal pay for women was intended to 
discourage employers from taking on women, when men were actually 
better suited to the work4. But equal pay for women was not an end 
in itself, and it was introduced in only a small minority of cases 
where it was felt that women had been used as labour only because 
they could be paid at a lower rate than men. 
The result of these measures indeed appeared to be a reduction 
in the employment of women. Official figures showed that whereas 
in the first three months of 1933 women's proportion in the industrial 
labour force had been around 30%, there had been a decline to 25.5% 
for the last four months of 1934. But this was not a true reflection 
of the overall situation: it had to be admitted - albeit with a 
singular lack of emphasis - that in absolute terms the number of women 
in industry had actually risen by 300,000 in the same period, to a 
1. "Arbeitszeitordnung ", RGB, 1934 I, 26 July, 1934, pp. 807 -12. 
2. "Verordnung über den Schutz der jugendlichen Arbeiter und der 
Arbeiterinnen im Steinkohlenbergbau, in Walz- und Hammerwerken 
und in der Glasindustrie ", RGB, 1935 I, 12 March, 1935, p. 387. 
3. Judith Grünfeld, op. cit., p. 921. 
4. "The Law and Women's Work ", ILO Studies and Reports, Series I, no. 
4, P. 402. 
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total of 1.4 million1. Thus, far from achieving its stated aim of 
cutting drastically the size of the female labour force, the Nazi 
Government had not been able, apparently, to prevent there being a 
net rise in it. The reason behind this is obvious: the real remedy 
for the massive unemployment of the early 1930s was the creation of 
more jobs, not the provision of work for some people at the expense 
of others, nor widespread work -sharing, the expedients to which the 
Nazis turned at the start. 
Men had perhaps found job opportunities less available because 
of female competition, but the crucial factor in the depression was 
that it was the traditional strongholds of men's employment which had 
been most catastrophically hit by the crisis. To achieve a genuine 
improvement in men's employment prospects, these areas, in the 
production goods industries, had to be revived; and this process was 
also a vital part of Nazi aims in foreign policy, which would require 
not only a return to pre -depression capacity in heavy industry, but 
a considerable expansion of it beyond that. Thus, the decisive factor 
affecting women's proportion in the labour force was not the few 
measures designed to encourage them to leave work, to make way for men, 
but rather the entire direction of the Government's work- creation 
programme, whose purpose was to raise production in the capital goods 
1. NuS, loc. cit. 
By remarking that the effect of the Nazis' various measures was a 
"drastic reduction in the percentage of women employed ", without 
noting the rise in absolute terms of the number of women employed, 
and without taking into consideration the way in which men had fared 
worse in the depression than women, Mason (op. cit., p. 144) appears 
to miss the point at issue. 
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industries; this would have the effect of creating new jobs for men, 
and would therefore not work to the disadvantage of women. 
Women would continue to be employed in those consumer goods 
industries where they had traditionally had a substantial representation, 
although the restricting of domestic demand would prevent expansion of 
these on a scale comparable with the expansion urgently planned for 
the capital goods industries. But it is obvious that the return of 
men to employment would lead to a lowering of women's share in 
industry as a whole, restoring the balance which had been so distorted 
in women's favour by the unnatural circumstances of the depression. 
And yet, in the first two years of Nazi rule, women's unemployment 
was reduced at a rate similar to that of men's, so that by the end of 
May 1935 93% of available women employees had jobs, the comparable 
figure for men being 88%. It was estimated that, just as the progress 
made since the 1870s had depended on the participation of women in 
industry, so any further expansion of the economy would not be 
possible unless the remaining reserve of female labour was tapped, 
for industry and business as well as for agriculture and domestic 
service 
C. The Organisation and Welfare of the Woman Worker in the Third Reich 
Official recognition was given to the vital role of women in 
the economy in July 1934, when a Women's Section was established 
within the German Labour Front. In keeping with the Party's 
favoured policy of the personal union of leadership functions within 
a given areal, Ley appointed Gertrud Scholtz -Klink, the National 
1. Michalke, op. cit., pp. 439 -42. 
2. Friedrich Lampe, Die Amtstrauer der Partei, Stuttgart and Berlin, 
1941, pp. 107 -11. 
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Women's Leader in the Party, as head of this sectionl. The 
Government thus acknowledged that the millions of women in 
employment of various kinds were there to stay, and that, therefore, 
adequate attention would have to be paid to their special needs - in 
the national interest at least as much as for their own sake. 
Moreover, the creation of the Women's Section of the Labour Front 
was entirely in keeping with Nazi theory that the sexes had separate 
needs and separate functions, and should therefore be segregated for 
most purposes. That a similar process of creating separate sections 
for women in each of the professional associations was taking place 
at about this time2 suggests that acceptance of women in employment 
at all levels was reached at about the same time, and also that the 
consolidation of Nazi power was sufficiently advanced to permit the 
regime to embark on its long -term social policies by the summer of 
1934. 
The Women's Section of the Labour Front was not intended to be 
a women's organisation: the NS- Frauenschaft and the Deutsches 
Frauenwerk served that purpose, and it was made clear that no 
challenge to their monopoly position would be tolerated3. The Section 
was rather a department of the Labour Front, without members of its 
own, but responsible for the welfare - and indoctrination - of women 
1. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, "Einrichtung eines Frauenamtes in der DAF ", 
order by Robert Ley, 12 July, 1934. 
2. Details of this are given in chapter 5. 
3. For a fuller discussion of this, see chapter 6. 
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who were members of the Labour Front1. Thus, the Section was to 
forge the closest possible ties with the Frauenschaft, so that the 
same relationship existed between the two as existed between the 
Labour Front and the NSDAP. While working women were therefore to 
belong to an organisation which was under male leadership and the 
majority of whose members were men, they were to be constantly reminded 
that they were women first and employees second. Frau Scholtz -Klink 
believed that this policy could be effective only if the officials 
of the Women's Section were members of the Frauenschaft, and if the 
Frauenschaft had a share in the appointment of these officials. In 
addition, it seemed imperative that co- operation at the national 
level be complemented by a close relationship in Gau, Kreis and 
Ortsgruppe2. On the other hand, as Frau Scholtz-Klink's chief 
'spokeswoman on Labour Front affairs, Alice Rilke, pointed out, women 
should be represented in the full Labour Front organisation whenever 
matters concerning women were under discussion, again at the national 
and local levels, and women representatives were to visit factories 
and offices to see for themselves the conditions in which women worked3. 
The Women's Section of the Labour Front required a large staff, 
if it was to fulfil its responsibilities to the seven million women - 
all employed women apart from "assisting family members" - who came 
1. Alice Rilke, "Frauenerwerbst ,tigkeit im neuen Deutschland ", FK, 
January1937, p. 12. 
2. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, "Frauenamt der DAF und NS- Frauenschaft ", order 
by Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, no. 9/35, 17 August, 1935. 
3. Alice Rilke, op. cit., p. 11. 
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within its jurisdiction1. By 1938 it had indeed built up a formidable 
network, with 291 women - fifty -two of them full -time - in the Gau 
offices, 643 in the Kreis offices, and 9,073 in Ortsgruppe units. 
These were the administrators; in addition, there were 47,870 women 
representatives of the Section throughout the individual factories 
and businesses, and 1,000 factory social workers, including 200 
trainees; together, these last two figures constituted a four -fold 
increase over the pre -1933 figures2. Thus employment was provided for 
a number of women in an area approved by the Government, and a degree 
of control and surveillance was maintained over the female work -force. 
The factory social workers were expected to fulfil a wide 
variety of functions: they acted in an advisory capacity to the 
management and the Council of Trustees in the matter of the general 
welfare of employees; they were counsellors in disputes between 
individual workers and for those who had personal problems; and they 
were also to be consulted about the employment or dismissal of 
female employees. In particular, they had the task of supervising 
the maintenance of a high standard of hygiene in factories. To 
familiarise them with the position of working women, factory social 
workers were required to spend a period working on the shop -floor; 
this was in addition to their having obtained a qualification in 
social work, having performed Labour Service, and having attended a 
training camp run by the Women's Section. There was one further 
1. BA, op. cit., "Die Aufgaben des Frauenamtes der DAF ", Der 
Führerorden, 15 November, 1935. 
2. Ibid., "Reichsfrauenführung Jahresbericht 1938 ", p. VIII. 
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requirement: "Naturally ", stressed the official literature on the 
subject, "for such vital work a commitment to National Socialism...is 
essential ". Any possibility of organised unrest among women workers 
was eliminated by the device of appointing this "politically reliable" 
factory social worker - who was subordinate to the Women's Section and 
instructed to co- operate with management - to the post of shop 
steward, in which capacity she was supposed to act as sole representative 
of the female work -force in any dealings with the management, the 
Trustees of Labour, and the Women's Section of the Labour Front 
In addition to this vital function, as the Nazis saw it, of 
creating harmony between capital and labour - or, more accurately, 
a docile labour force - under the direction of the State, the Women's 
Section had four main tasks to fulfil. Frau Scholtz -Klink 
characterised these as social welfare for employed women, protection 
of their child -bearing capacity at work, the evolving of more 
comprehensive labour legislation, and the provision of courses in 
practical housekeeping for women and girls who had worked since 
leaving school, to give them basic knowledge of and experience in the 
running of a home2. This last task was seen as particularly important 
since the Nazis claimed that proficiency in domestic duties had been 
undervalued in the post -war period, with the result that women were 
finding themselves with a home to run and little idea of how to do it. 
As was often the case with their claims and boasts, there was a grain 
of truth in this. Accordingly, working women were encouraged to take 
1. Ibid., Der Führerorden, loc. cit. 
2. "Vier Jahre Einsatz für die schaffende deutsche Frau in Fabrik 
und Büro", VB, 14 May, 1937. 
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part in the courses in domestic science and child -care devised by the 
Frauenwerk. Although the fees for the course were waived for women 
who paid membership dues to the Labour Front, the women nevertheless 
had to attend the courses in their free time; it is therefore perhaps 
surprising that by 1937 as many as 600,000 working women were 
estimated to have attended a course'.- Although this figure represented 
rather less than 10S of working women, it seems reasonably 
successful, given that there was no real incentive and no coercion, 
but only a barrage of propaganda in favour of attendance at the 
courses. 
The three other major tasks of the Women's Section were 
broadly concerned with the health and welfare of the working woman. 
There was collaboration with the NSV to ensure that pregnant women 
were given adequate care at work and that a woman's financial position 
was secure around the time of her confinement. Naturally, the 
interests of individual women were here purely incidental to the top 
priority of ensuring that working women would bear healthy children. 
This preoccupation was also at the root of other measures which 
undoubtedly brought benefit to individuals; for example, women were 
encouraged to avail themselves of the recreational facilities of 
the Labour Front's "Strength through Joy" section2. Some women were 
afforded extra paid holidays because students, in vacation, and 
Frauenschaft members who were not themselves employed volunteered for 
1. BA, loc. cit., 
2. BA, loc. cit. 
"Frauencongress am Nürnberg: Frau Scholtz -Klink über die Frau im 
Beruf ", FZ, 15 September, 1935. 
Alice Rilke,loe. cit. 
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unpaid factory work for this purpose. In fact, between March 1935 
and the end of 1938 6001 women were replaced by 5063 volunteers, who 
provided 86,072 extra days of paid leave1. These rather unimpressive 
figures - less than 1% of working women benefited here - suggest 
that for once the Nazis were using the term "voluntary" correctly. 
Nevertheless, the venture was seen as a useful propaganda weapon, 
which was said to illustrate the new community spirit that had 
developed in Germany since 1933, after the deep divisions of the 1920s; 
and it had the additional virtue of costing the Government nothing. 
The Women's Section of the Labour Front claimed to be 
tackling the vexed problem of removing women from unsuitable, 
damaging work. Indeed, its representatives sent in reports about 
conditions at work, and would sometimes propose measures to remedy 
shortcomings. But this tended to reflect local problems which were 
difficult to cope with in a rational way by a strictly centralised 
organisation. There was, for example, a suggestion from a district 
welfare officer in Lahr, on the Rhine, that needy pregnant women 
workers in the local cigar factory should be given a supplement 
to help them to refrain from work until their child was six months 
old, for the sake of both mother and child2. 
But the Government preferred to concentrate on working out 
broad measures which would have a beneficial effect throughout the 
country, and it produced a fairly creditable list of laws to deal 
with some of the worst problems. As early as July 1934 a law 
1. BA, op. cit., "Reichsfrauenführung Jahresbericht 1938 ", p. VIII. 
2. BA, R2/18554, letter from Marie Stoess to the Ministry of Finance, 
27 September, 1935. 
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restricting the number of hours women might work, specifying the 
amount of overtime they might do under special circumstances, and 
completely banning night work for women in medium -sized and large 
concerns after 10 p.m., was passed'. 'omen were banned from the 
most arduous kinds of work in a variety of industries, laws being 
passed in 1937, for example, restricting their employment in 
pottery and confectionery manufacture to light work which would not 
impose an unhealthy strain on them. And plans were afoot to try 
to ensure that women did not do potentially damaging work in home 
industry2. Farther piecemeal legislation was enacted throughout the 
1930s3, but it was all regarded as an interim solution only, until 
the Government could achieve its aim of drawing up a comprehensive 
Maternity Protection Law4. This was finally done in war -time, when 
the need to bring as many women as possible into industry was already 
vitiating the effectiveness of existing legislations. The Maternity 
1. "Arbeitszeitordnung ", RGB, 1934 I, 26 July, 1934, pp. 807 -12. 
2. BA, R22/2073, Generalakten des Justizministeriums, "Neue 
Sozialgesetze in Vorbereitung", 3 June, 1937. 
3. For example, "Ausftihrungsverordnung zur Arbeitszeitordnung", 
RGB, 1938 I, 12 December, 1938, pp. 1800 -01. 
"Glashtittenverordnung ", RGB, 1938 I, 23 December, 1938, pp. 1961- 
65. 
"The Law and Women's Work ", ILO Studies and Reports, Series I, no. 
4, pp. 294 -96, lists a number of measures. 
4. BA, op. cit., letter from Weyer at the Ministry of Finance to the 
Reich Ministers etc., 17 November, 1938. 
5. "The Employment of Women Workers during the War ", ILR, 1939, vol. 
40, p. 802. 
Provision had been made in advance for the suspension of labour 
protection measures for women in the event of war, IfZ, MA 468, 
frame 5723, "Arbeitseinsatz im Kriege", 2 February, 1937. 
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Protection Law, which came into force on 1 July, 1942, in a modified 
form to meet the exigencies of war, was designed to protect not only 
pregnant women and nursing mothers, but all working women; the 




How much real influence the Women's Section of the Labour 
Front had is hard to judge. It would probably be fair to say that its 
effectiveness lay in the control it could exert over the female 
work -force, chiefly in the negative sense of preventing industrial 
unrest. Its influence in policy -making was, however, negligible. 
Indeed women benefited from protective legislation and from 
improved hygiene and welfare at work, but this happened because it 
was an integral part of the Government's population policy, not 
because of the success of pressure from representatives of the 
Women's Section. Their ineffectiveness is illustrated by their 
failure to achieve a narrowing of wage differentials between the 
sexes2, although from 1935 they claimed to be campaigning for equal 
pay for equal work3. Such equalisation of wages as there was came 
1. BA, op. cit., "Entwurf: Gesetz zum Schutze der arbeitenden 
Mutter (Mutterschutzgesetz) ", 1940 (exact date not given). A 
second draft was produced on 23 February, 1941, and the law 
finally passed on 17 May, 1942. 
Martha Moers, Der Fraueneinsatz in der Industrie, Berlin, 1943, 
P. 144. 
2. Bry, op. cit., pp. 100 -01, 247, shows that throughout the Nazi 
period wage differentials remained very much what they had been 
in the Weimar period. For these, see above, p. 123. 
"Indexziffern der Arbeitsverdienste", NuS, 1940, no. 18, p. 433, 
and St.J., 1941/42, p. 390, give illustrative figures. 
3. "Das Frauenamt der DAF ", Deutsches Frauenschaffen, 1938, p. 50. 
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about precisely to remove women from unsuitable employment l. With 
its desire to limit wage rises as far as possible, and with, in 
addition, the lower priority accorded to the consumer goods sector, 
in which women chiefly figured, the Government had no intention of 
restructuring wagest. It would, after all, be an expensive business, 
since not even a Nazi Government would have tried to lower men's 
wages to achieve equal pay, particularly in time of full employment, 
in the later 1930s. The only alternative was to raise women's wages, 
and the Government would not contemplate that. 
D. Attem.ts to Attract Female Labour before the Second World War 
When Hitler's Government actively began to prepare for the 
eventuality of war in the foreseeable future, in 1935 -36, there 
was a rapid transition from a programme of job creation to attempts 
to tap every possible source of labour, for it quickly became clear 
that the most pressing problem would be a shortage of labour where 
there had so recently been mass unemployment. Therefore the 
reintroduction of conscription and the stepping up of rearmament 
openly and on a massive scale from March 1935 were supplemented by 
the National Service Law of May 1935. This provided that in time of 
war there should be the conscription into war industry and essential 
services of all men aged between fifteen and sixty -five who were not 
called up for military service, and of all women in the same age - 
group who neither had children under fifteen to look after nor were 
pregnant. This was intended to be the legal basis for making every 
1. See above, p. 1.44. 
2. "Die Frauenlohn im Kriege ", F/, 20 March, 1940. 
156. 
effort to ensure that armaments and food supplies were produced on 
a large enough scale once vast numbers of men had been transferred 
from their civilian occupations into the armed forces1. 
The Government was well aware, however, that the provisions of 
the National Service Law would by no means solve all the problems 
caused by massive conscription into the armed forces. In a report 
made in February 1937, a senior civil servant named Nolte drew 
attention to the fact that in the Great War all belligerent countries 
had experienced a drop in productivity, Germany's being of the order 
of 20. This, he contended, was primarily because men who were 
accustomed to certain jobs had had to be replaced by people - 
often women - who were totally unfamiliar with them, and often quite 
unsuited to them. With women only marginally represented during the 
1930s in those industries vital to the waging of a war, Nolte predicted 
that Germany would experience similar difficulties in a future 
war, unless action was taken at once. Investigations were already 
under way, he said, to ascertain which industries would provide 
real employment possibilities for women once men had been withdrawn; 
this would be facilitated by the temporary lifting of restrictions 
on the employment of women in heavy industry, in cases where it seemed 
to be in the national interest. But Nolte also sounded a note of 
caution, pointing out that, as in the Great War, it would no doubt 
1. IfZ, op. cit., frame 5719, "Arbeitseinsatz im Kriege ", 2 February, 
1937. 
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emerge that many of the women available for work had little 
experience of employment, and would be unlikely to make a really 
valuable contribution to a war -effort'. It was largely with this 
problem in mind that the Government was to try its utmost, 
particularly from 1938, to persuade as many women as possible to 
enter employment, and particularly to find jobs in areas which had 
hitherto been exclusively or predominantly male preserves. 
One useful indicator of the employment situation was the attitude 
of the Government to the granting of marriage loans. The condition 
that the wife or fiancee must give up her job to be eligible for 
a loan had been applied strictly in time of high unemployment; but 
what would happen to this condition - claimed to be partly 
ideological - when the problem was one of full employment? Sure 
enough, the first slackening of the rule came in summer 1936, shortly 
before the formulation of the Four Year Plan: at the end of July 
the Finance Minister was empowered to allow the wife in a loan - 
aided marriage in exceptional cases to take a job even if her husband 
was not indigent2. Six months later, Reinhardt signed an order to 
the effect that the wives of men who were performing Labour Service 
or military service, or who were still studying, should count as 
exceptions automatically under the previous ruling3. 
This move was welcomed gleefully by the editors of Die frau, 
1. IfZ, op. cit., frames 5719 -23. 
2. "Sechste Durchführungsverordnung fiber die Gewährung von Ehe - 
standsdarlehen", RGB, 1936 I, 28 July, 1936, p. 576. 
3. "Wiederbeschäftigung von Empfängerinnen von Ehestandsdarlehen ", 
RAB, 1937 I, no. 4, 19 January, 1937, p. 24. 
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who insisted on seeing it purely in terms of a restoration of women's 
freedom to work, in certain cases, regardless of their marriage 
loan1. Reinhardt's purpose was far more pragmatic: in March 
1936 it had been ruled that the wives of men in the Labour Service 
or the armed forces were eligible for an allowance if they were 
unable to support themselves2; clearly, an anomaly existed whereby 
women in loan -aided marriages might be unable to support themselves 
because of a legal restriction, and not necessarily because of their 
family commitments. The Government might, then, be in the curious 
position of paying some women twice for not working, even if 
they were able and willing and, in 1936, at a time when there were 
job vacancies for them; Reinhardt's order thus saved the Government 
money on the one hand and provided labour on the other. 
But the real change came in November 1937, in a law made 
retroactive to 1 October, 1937, which amended all previous enactments 
on the subject of marriage loans. It reaffirmed the proviso that the 
future wife must have held a job for at least nine months out of 
the two years preceding the application for the loan. But no mention 
was made of the need for the wife to give up her job to be eligible 
for a loan3. The result was that it now became a condition of 
receiving a loan that the woman had worked for a substantial period 
1. "Frauenarbeit trotz Ehestandsdarlehen ", Die Frau, May 1937, p. 463. 
2. "Familienunterstützungsgesetz ", RGB, 1936 I, 30 Mlarch, 1936, 
p. 327. 
3. "Drittes Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes fiber die Förderung der 
Eheschliessungen", RGB, 1937 I, 3 November, 1937, pp. 1158 -59. 
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since autumn 1935, when the unemployment problem was practically 
solved. This was a neat way of completely reversing the purpose of 
the marriage -loan scheme at a time when labour was becoming scarce, 
for those seeking a loan would now have to ensure that the woman 
took up employment for nine months if she was not already working. 
The scheme had apparently served its initial purpose well enough; 
by the end of 1937 878,016 loans had been made', so that at least 
three -quarters of a million women must have given up work. But it 
cannot be doubted that a substantial number of these women would 
have married and given up work - to start a family - even if there 
had not been a marriage -loan scheme, so that its real effect is 
difficult to gauge. 
Even with the shortage of labour becoming a source of anxiety 
by the end of 1937, the Government was determined, so the 
V8lkischer Beobachter reported, not to permit young girls of fourteen 
or fifteen to go straight from school into a factory, for biological 
reasons2. Here, it seemed, the Nazis were not prepared to sacrifice 
a vital principle to growing necessity. There was, however, an 
ulterior motive. The municipal authorities in Hanover had already, 
in spring 1936, stipulated that in future girls would have to wait 
for a year after leaving school before they would be admitted to an 
apprenticeship in the area; further, preference was to be given at 
the end of that year to those girls who had in the interim engaged 
1. Calculated from figures in St.J.: 1936, p. 42; 1937, P. 44; 
1938, p. 48. 
2. "Mädel am Arbeitsplatz ", VB, 25 December, 1937. 
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in work within the broad category of domestic science'. Now, in 
December 1937, the Labour Front followed this example, advising 
young girls throughout the country to spend a year between school 
and first employment in work of a domestic nature, to safeguard 
their physical development at the crucial age of puberty, and to 
ensure that they had some experience of the tasks they would 
encounter when they married2. 
This still did not tell the whole story. The chief consideration 
was that the severe unemployment which there had been among domestic 
servants during the depression had now given way to a shortage which 
might be at least partly offset by encouraging young girls - the 
cheapest labour on the market - to spend a year in domestic service; 
if this became automatic, there would be a constant supply of labour 
in this area, even if the turnover was rather rapid. The problem 
had already been highlighted by Reinhardt's partially repealing one 
of his original measures designed to combat employment; the tax 
relief granted in June 1933 to those who employed a domestic 
servant was to be restricted to families with young children, who, 
for reasons of -population policy, would continue to receive the 
rebate. But there was now no reason to provide incentives for single 
people or childless couples to employ a domestic servant3. The other 
area which was losing labour in an alarming manner was agriculture; 
1. "Lehrstellen für Madchen erst ein Jahr nach Schulentlassung ", 
FZ, 6 May, 1936. 
2. VB, loe. cit. 
3. "Beschränkung der Steuerermässigun 
9 October, 1937. 
4. Mason, op. cit., discusses this; 
g für Hausangestellte ", FZ, 
see particularly pp. 651 -54. 
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this, like the loss to domestic service, was merely a continuation 
of a trend already strongly evident in the 1920s, but interrupted 
by the depressions. Already in May 1937 it had been announced that 
the employment exchange in the Magdeburg area would maintain a 
strict control in future to stem the flow of women from work on the 
land, where they were urgently needed, into serving in the town's cafes2. 
In industry, at any rate, women's representation was already 
increasing in the later 1930s, on a voluntary basis: while their 
share had dropped - although their absolute numbers had at the same 
time increased - from 29.3% of the industrial labour force in 1933 
to 24.7 in 1936, by June 1939, at a time of full male employment, 
it had again risen to 27.0%. In absolute terms, whereas in both 
the 1925 and 1933 censuses there had been shown to be almost 11.5 
million women in employment altogether, in mid-May 1939 the figure 
was 12.7 million; this meant that 37% of the German labour force 
was female even before the outbreak of war3. Thus, the available 
reserve of women had been partially used up before men were 
conscripted into the armed forces in large numbers4, at a time when 
the total number of women of working age was falling because of the 
trend in the birth rate earlier in the century. 
1. Michalke, op. cit., P. 437. See above, p. 137. 
2. "Weibliche Arbeitskräfte vom Lande (Magdeburg) ", FZ, 22 May, 1937. 
3. Figures from St.J.: 1933, P. 19; 1939/40, p. 386. And from 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1959, 
P. 9. 
4. Dietmar Petzina, "Die Mobilisierung deutscher Arbeitskräfte vor 
und während des Zweiten Weltkrieges ", VjhZ, 1970, p. 449, comments 
on this. 
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The increase in women's employment in 1939 was largely 
occasioned by the appearance of women in work in which they had, on 
the whole, not formerly been found, since the areas which had 
traditionally had a high proportion of women employees now had a 
low priority. In particular, women were being drawn into the 
transport services, whether as clerkesses or ticket -collectors in 
the railways administration or as conductresses on trams1. And in 
June 1939 it was reported that in Bremen, among other cities, women 
were now being employed to deliver the post2. Somewhat sanctimoniously, 
the V8lkischer Beobachter remarked in July 1939 on its pleasure at 
each manifestation of a changing attitude in those branches of 
employment where women had hitherto had to struggle against prejudice 
- prejudice, the paper failed to add, which it had formerly done its 
utmost to foster. The change in attitude, continued the homily, 
was for the first time apparent in banking and insurance, where it 
was now realised that women could be employed in order to release 
men to enter occupations which only they could do; the implication 
was that this meant chiefly active service3. 
If it was relatively easy to justify the admission of women to 
work which they had not been accustomed to perform, and to explain 
the positive enthusiasm now officially accorded to employed women, 
given the obvious shortage of labour, the encouragement now being 
1. "Die Reichsbahn stellt die Frau ein ", FZ, 7 April, 1939. 
Reports in FZ, 18 June, 1939 and 2 July, 1939. 
2. Report in FZ, 18 June, 1939. 
3. "Einsatzmöglichkeiten für die Frau ", VB, 19 July, 1939. 
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given to married women to take a job was a more sensitive matter. 
Der Angriff, however, characteristically adopted a direct approach, 
posing the question in January 1938: "Why are married women working ?" 
Its answer was equally frank, with the explanation that the chief 
factor of economic significance was the glaring shortage of labour, 
so that the old campaign against the Doppelverdiener was no longer 
of any relevance1. The steep drop in the birth rate from the war 
years up to the IOachtübernahme, explained Dr. Walter Stothfang, a 
high official in the Ministry of Employment, meant that there would 
soon be a severe drop in the number of workers available, so that 
women, both married and single, would have to be brought into 
employment in larger numbers than ever before2. 
The Völkischer Beobachter went even further, in October 1938, 
pointing out that the increase in women's employment had been so 
steep since 1936, and especially during 1938, that the only reserve 
of labour left, for further expansion of the economy, was among 
those married women who were not already employed. The nation now 
needed the service of middle -class wives, who might have a grown -up 
family or be childless, and whose day was not fully occupied, 
especially if they employed a domestic servant. Women would have to 
take an increasing share in industrial work, but, the paper was quick 
to add, this would be accompanied by increasing labour and maternity 
protection measures on grounds of population policy3. 
1. "Von uns notiert...: 'arum arbeitet die verheiratete Frau ?" 
Der Angriff, 26 January, 1938. 
2. Walter Stothfang, "Verstärkung der Frauenarbeit ", Der Angriff, 
26 August, 1938. 
3. "Die Frauenarbeit in der Gesamtwirtschaft ", VB, 22 October, 1938. 
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Alice Rilke, of the Uomen's Section of the Labour Front, 
was not, however, prepared to be quite so glib. She felt it a matter 
of deep concern that married women, and especially mothers, were being 
drawn into industrial work in ever -increasing numbers, and could 
see justification for it in the short term only, as a matter of 
urgent national necessity. It was not that she opposed the employment 
of women; rather, she believed that the long-term needs of the 
nation, namely the health of the next generation, necessitated a 
sensible division of labour between men and women, so that the 
"hundreds of thousands of women" still involved in work that was too 
heavy for their physical strength could change places with the 
equally large number of men who did relatively light work1. But 
this solution was rather too facile also, particularly when it was 
envisaged that in the event of war women would not merely augment the 
labour of men but in large measure have to replace it altogether. 
So great was the desire to attract married women into work 
that, in spite of the misgivings of many employers, half -day 
shift -work was recommended by the Government, for those women who 
were reluctant to commit themselves to full -time employment when they 
also had a family to look after. The first reports, in the spring of 
1939, on this experiment were generally favourable. The benefit felt 
by the women themselves was stressed: now they had the strength for 
their two tasks, at home and at work, now those who had changed from 
full -time to part -time employment were no longer permanently harassed, 
1. BA, NSD30/1836, Informationsdienst..., August 1939, Alice Rilke, 
"Die Frauenberufs- und Erwerbstatigkeit in der Betrachtung des 
medizinisch -bevölkerungspolitischen Schrifttums ", p. 190 (first 
published in January 1939). 
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claimed Dr. Ilse Buresch -Riebe in her report. In addition, she 
said, there was higher productivity among women working a five - 
hour day than among those who were reduced to exhaustion by the 
eight -hour day1. 
Seeing enormous possibilities in the half -day system, the 
sinister of Employment ordered investigations in the summer of 
1939 to try to find out how far it could be extended throughout the 
various branches of the economy2. The clothing industry in the 
neighbourhood of Manchen- Gladbach and Rheydt was one area in which 
it was claimed, in August 1939, that the experiment of a four-and- 
a-half hour day had proved a happy one3. It was not only in wage- 
earning occupations that married women were now found to be in 
demand; the authorities hoped to persuade married women with 
secretarial or clerical experience to return to work on at least a 
part -time basis, and were particularly anxious that those with 
training in welfare or social work would similarly respond4. 
Piecemeal local restrictions and official exhortations were 
not, however, a satisfactory way of ensuring that the labour 
required for the fulfilment of the Four Year Plan of September 1936 
was made available. There would therefore have to be a concerted 
1. BA, op. cit., Ilse Buresch- Riebe, "Erfahrungen bei der Beschäft- 
igung von Frauen in Halbtagsschicht ", p. 190, (first published 
in April 1939). 
2. "Die Halbtagsarbeit für verheiratete Frauen ", FZ, 9 July, 1939. 
3. "Die Beschäftigung verheirateter Frauen", FZ, 4 August, 1939. 
4. Report in Die Frau, June 1939, p. 499. 
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effort to mobilise every possible reserve of labour, either by 
persuading those who had chosen not to work to change their mind, or 
by imposing a degree of compulsion. It was perhaps characteristic 
of the Nazis that their policy should turn out to be something 
between these two possibilities - a mixture of considerable persuasion, 
limited coercion, and eventually also threats of rigorous compulsion. 
The genuine reluctance of a dictatorial regime to try to force its 
subjects to bow to its will was based on apprehension, even fear, 
and not respect; but the result was still the failure to achieve its 
aim of an adequate supply of labour, even in the early years of the 
Second World War, while women stayed at home, unwilling to work. 
E. Nazi Schemes of Compulsory Service for Girls 
One measure of compulsion which had been promised was that 
"all young Germans of both sexes" would be required to perform six 
months' Labour Service1. Brüning's emergency measure had been 
nationalised in 1933, but its function was intended to be more 
ideological and educational than economic, although in the first 
instance it proved useful for alleviating both the unemployment 
situation and the overcrowding of the universities2. While the Labour 
1. "Reichsarbeitsdienstgesetz ", RGB, 1935 I, 26 June, 1935, pp. 
769 -71. Unfortunately, limitations of space do not permit the 
more detailed discussion of the Labour Service which the 
availability of material makes possible. 
2. Benz, op. cit., pp. 333 -37; c.f. the propagandist picture in 
Freising, op. cit., pp. 42 -43. More will be said about the last 
point in. Chapter 4. 
167. 
Service became compulsory for men from October 1935, however, 
the Women's Labour Service continued as a separate and still 
voluntary exercise, with some 12,000 girls at a time working in 
domestic service or agriculture1. Although administrative changes 
were made, and target numbers raised repeatedly - to 25,000 in 
1937 -38, to 30,000 by April 1939 and to 50,000 a year later - 
the Women's Labour Service remained a much smaller concern than the 
men's2, and was not made compulsory until 4 September, 19393, when 
the outbreak of war meant that the girls would now have to replace 
the men rather than provide additional labour. Hierl, the Labour 
Service leader, had already made it clear, in a statement which 
Frick supported, that the purpose of the Labour Service for girls 
was above all to provide a pool of auxiliary workers for agriculture4. 
1. BA, Slg.Sch., 262, Karl Pollmann, "Die Reichsanstalt für Arbeits- 
vermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung und der Deutsche Frauen- 
arbeitsdienst", Deutscher Arbeitsdienst, Sonderausgabe: "Der 
Deutsche Frauenarbeitsdienst ", ? summer 1935, p. 3. 
2. "7. Verordnung zur Durchführung und Erganzung des Reichsarbeits- 
dienstgesetzes (Arbeitsdienst für die weibliche Jugend) ", RGB, 
1936 I, 15 August, 1936, p. 633. 
"Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Dauer der Dienst- 
zeit des Reichsarbeitsdienstes und die Starke des Reichsarbeits- 
dienstes für die weibliche Jugend ", RGB, 1936 I, 26 September, 
1936, p. 747. 
"Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Sommer- und 
Winterstärke des Reichsarbeitsdienstes und über die Starke des 
Arbeitsdienstes für die weibliche Jugend ", RGB, 1937 I, 24 
November, 1937, p. 1298. 
"Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Starke des Arbeits- 
dienstes für die weibliche Jugend ", RGB, 1938 I, 7 September, 
1938, p. 1157. 
3. "Verordnung über die Durchführung der Reichsarbeitsdienstpflicht 
für die weibliche Jugend ", RGB, 1939 I, 4 September, 1939, p. 1693. 
4. "Arbeitsdienstpflicht der weibliche Jugend und Hilfe in der 
Landwirtschaft ", VB, 2 July, 1936. 
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Thus, well before the outbreak of war the primacy of the "educational" 
function of the Labour Service was overridden by the desperate need 
to find labour for agriculture, at a time when the aim was autarchy1. 
The drawback about the Labour Service, as far as the Government 
was concerned, was that it cost money; girls, like boys, lived a 
communal life in a camp and wore a uniform, the funds for their 
subsistence and clothing coming from the Ministry of Finance. Krosigk 
was less than enthusiastic about the expansion of the Labour Service 
for this reason2. Göring, however, as Plenipotentiary for the 
Four Year Plan, devised a less expensive tactic which could be applied 
to a wider group than the 25,000 girls involved in Labour Service 
at any one time in 1937 -383. On 15 February, 1938, he announced 
that the Government reserved the right to require all unmarried girls 
under twenty -five to work for a year in domestic service or 
agriculture before they would be allowed to enter employment, because 
of the severe shortage of labour in these areas4. There was no attempt 
1. On the limitations on autarchy, see Berenice A. Carroll, Design 
for Total War, The Hague, 1968, p. 103. Chapter VII of this 
book is devoted to a discussion of the Four Year Plan. 
See also Dieter Petzina, Autarkiebolitik im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart, 
1968, pp. 197 -98. 
2. RGB, loc. cit. 
BA, R2/4525, letter from Krosigk to Frick, 14 October, 1938. 
3. Schoenbaum, op. cit., pp. 192 -93, completely confuses the Labour 
Service for girls with the introduction of this new " Pflichtjahr" 
(year of compulsory service) for girls. Mason, op. cit., p. 616, 
n.2, appears to do the same. 
4. "Anordnung zur Durchftihrung des Vierjahresplans über den verstärkten 
Einsatz von weiblichen Arbeitskra.ften in der Land- und Hauswirtschaft ", 
15 February, 1938, Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, no. 43, 21 February, 
1938. 
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to disguise the fact that this was a measure intended purely to 
fulfil the economic aims of State policy, although Dr. Timm, 
describing it in the Ministry of Employment's gazette, insisted 
that it had a deeper significance in that it directed girls into 
work which was particularly suitable for them in view of their 
future role as the wives and mothers of Germans1. 
The Minister responsible for the Employment Exchanges made 
immediate use of G8ring's enabling order: on 16 February he 
announced that it would apply to those girls who first came onto 
the labour market after 28 February, 1938; those who had already 
worked were not.to be included. In addition, in the first instance 
the order was to apply only to girls who wanted to work in the 
textile, clothing or tobacco industries, or in an office, the 
occupations in which women had traditionally been best represented; 
in the case of the industries mentioned, there was deliberate 
discrimination because these were the least important to the Nazi 
scheme of things. But the applicability of the order was very 
restricted at this time, particularly given the proviso that girls 
would be exempt who had performed Labour Service or some other form 
of agricultural or domestic work for at least a year; this was extended 
to include work which did not classify as full employment for the 
purposes of the labour book, performed in the family or with relatives 
1. Max Timm, "Das Pflichtjahr far Madchen ", RAB, 1938 II, no. 7, 
5 March, 1938, p. 75. I am most grateful to Dr. T. ;1. Mason for 
generously sending me a copy of this article. 
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of the girl, provided that there were four or more young children 
and that the girl was genuinely helping to look after them1. No 
doubt this provided a welcome loop -hole for some who dreaded being sent 
to work in a strange household. 
In order to try to ensure that there was the minimum of 
evasion of these new provisions, it was also announced that all school - 
leavers were to present themselves at their local employment exchange 
within two weeks of leaving school. Failure to comply would 
result in the imposition of a substantial fine on the legal guardian 
of a young person who defaulted2. It had been estimated that some 
140,000 girls, or 30;'0 of those due to leave school in March 1938, 
had affirmed that they had no desire to take a job or learn a trade, 
and would probably stay at home, at least at first3. No doubt the 
prospect of having to do the year of service before employment had 
confirmed this intention in many. But now all these girls had the 
duty to register at the employment exchange, so that they would either 
have to provide badly- needed labour in areas of paid employment where 
there was a shortage, or resign themselves to a year's work in 
agriculture or domestic service before taking a job in a less vital 
area of employment. 
The results were, however, disappointing, with most girls 
1. "Durchführungsanordnung zur Anordnung fiber den verstärkten Einsatz 
von weiblichen Arbeitskräften in der Land- und Hauswirtschaft ", 16 
February, 1938, Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, op. cit. 
2. "Anordnung über die Meldung Schulentlassener ", 1 March, 1938, 
Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, no. 51, 2 March, 1938. 
3. "Warum immer neue Forderungen an die Mädel ?" VB, 10 March, 1938. 
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clearly opting for paid employment of a kind which exempted them 
from the obligation to perform the year of service, so that at the 
end of 1938 a new order replaced the original one; this stipulated 
that all girls who aimed to enter manual or white- collar occupations 
of any kind would be obliged to engage in the compulsory year, if 
they had not already performed a year of service voluntarily. There 
was, however, a lengthy list of exempted occupations, including 
auxiliary nursing, welfare work and work with small children, as 
well as a provision that exceptions might also be made at the 
discretion of employment exchange officialsl. These loop -holes were, 
however, closed in summer 1939, when it was laid down that all girls 
under twenty -five were to engage in a year's service in domestic 
work or on the land, whether they aimed to take a job or not?. 
Even so, only 188,695 girls were certified to have performed 
their compulsory year in 1939 -40, although the figure for those 
starting on their year in 1940 was more promising, at 335,9723. The 
permitting of a number of exempted categories4 continued to ensure that 
the institution of the compulsory year was much less effective than 
its outward paraphernalia of orders and propaganda suggested. 
1. "Durchführungsverordnung zur Anordnung fiber den verstärkten Einsatz 
von weiblichen Arbeitskräften in der Land- und Hauswirtschaft" 
23 December, 1938, Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, no. 305, 31 December, 
1938. 
2. "Weibliches Pflichtjahr für alle ", Westdeutscher Beobachter, 12 
June, 1939. 
3. Figures from St.J., 1941/42, P. 420. 
4. E.g., "Anrechnung hauswirtschaftlicher Ausbildungen in staatlich 
anerkannten Lehranstalten auf das Pflichtjahr für Madchen ", RAB, 
1940 I, 15 March, 1940, p. 102, and "Pflichtjahr für Mädchen; 
hier: Befreiung durch Besuch der Berufsfachschule für Hotel - 
und Gaststättengehilfinnen in Heidelberg ", RAB, 1940 I, 25 April, 
1940, p. 184. 
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The result was to leave Germany still with insufficient 
labour in domestic service and agriculture, which testifies to 
the skill and ingenuity of girls and their parents in circumventing 
the new laws. There was also a conflict of interests between two 
Nazi policies here: the desire to direct unmarried girls under 
twenty -five into the Labour Service and into the year of service 
was matched by a preoccupation with encouraging early marriage. It 
is not inconceivable that the rise in the number of marriages 
towards the end of 1939 was partly occasioned by some girls' 
choosing to marry in haste rather than perform service of this kind. 
At any rate, in summer 1939 the employment exchanges were instructed 
to allow the employment of domestic servants in childless or small 
families only if demand had been met in large families; this order 
was apparently necessitated by the turning down of vacancies in 
large families by the girls themselves because there were jobs 
available which were more to their liking1. On the land, too, the 
situation was so serious that Frau Scholtz -Klink appealed to girls 
and women who were not employed to give up a few afternoons, a 
weekend, or longer if possible, to help out at harvest timet. 
In this increasingly serious situation Hitler's Government 
went to war, in September 1939; it at once announced that the girls' 
Labour Service was to be compulsory, and its numbers raised to 
100,000; this level was to be achieved by Hierl's conscripting all 
1. BA, NSD30 /vorl. 1836, Informationsdienst..., August 1939, 
"Hausgehilfinnen und Kinderreiche Familien ", p. 189. 
2. "Alle Kräfte werden gebraucht ", Westdeutscher Beobachter, 24 June, 
1939. 
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single girls aged 17 to 25 who were neither in full -time education 
or employment nor "assisting family members" working on the land1. 
An order by Stuckart, laying down the procedure for conscripting 
the first batch of girls, those born in 1920 and 1921, set the 
wheels in motion2. But in general the central organisation of the 
expanded girls' Labour Service seems to have been singularly 
unintelligent. Discontent was perhaps at its highest in Bavaria, 
where it was complained that girls already working on the land, 
including some performing their year of compulsory service, were 
being conscripted into the Labour Service. Even worse, girls in 
the compulsory year scheme were volunteering for Labour Service in 
the hope of reducing the total time they would have to spend in 
service altogether3; and ordinary farm -workers were incensed when they 
realised that the Labour Service girls worked a much shorter day 
than they4. 
As a matter of sheer inefficiency, the conscripting of girls 
familiar with office work of one kind into office work of another, 
to replace men called up for active service, was a source of 
incredulity as well as discontents. But the loudest complaints came 
1. "Verordnung über die Durchführung des Reichsarbeitsdienstpflicht 
für die weibliche Jugend ", RGB, 1939 I, 4 September, 1939, p. 1693. 
2. BA, Slg.Sch., 262, letter from Stuckart to Reich Ministers and 
the Reichsstatthalter, 27 September, 1939. 
3. Ibid., letters from the Bavarian Minister of the Interior to the 
Bavarian NSDAP Gau leadership, and from the Bavarian office of 
the Reichsnahrstand to the Bavarian Minister of the Interior, both 
dated 30 October, 1939. 
4. IfZ, MA 441/6, frames 2- 757123 -26, MadR, 13 July, 1942. 
5. IfZ, MA 441/5, frame 2- 755206, MadR, 10 November, 1941. 
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from rural areas, where the situation was such by 1941 that 
serious doubts were being raised about the value of continuing to 
use the Labour Service for work on the land1. Altogether, it is 
clear that attempts to use compulsion to make girls work in areas 
designated by the Government were uniformly unsuccessful; this 
was partly because of the failure to implement conscription 
rigorously, but it was also the result of the division of control 
among different agencies - GBring's office, the Ministry of 
Employment, the Labour Service - which led to duplication and 
contradiction instead of to co- ordination of the war- effort. 
F. The Failure of Attempts to Win Women for the afar Effort, 1939 -41 
The lesson which the Government chose to learn from the 
experience of the Great War was in some respects similar to that 
pinpointed by Nolte in 1937, namely that women would have to be 
brought into jobs normally done by men to release them for active 
service. Further, it was realised that "voluntary service is not 
enough "2. Accordingly, in summer 1938 a law was passed specifying 
the categories of persons liable for labour conscription, on the 
basis already provided by the National Service Law of May 1935. It 
affirmed that both men and women were to be brought into industries 
necessary for the waging of war and the maintaining of essential 
services. There was to be exemption for those women who had children 
under fifteen to look after, or-who were more than six months pregnant3. 
1. Ibid., frames 2- 755478 -79, MadR, 15 December, 1941. 
2. "Die Frau in der Landesverteidigung ", VB, 7 March, 1939. 
3. "Gesetz ilber Leistungen für Wehrzwecke", RGB, 1938 I, 13 July, 
1938, pp. 888 -89. 
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Although this enabling legislation had immediate application to 
large numbers of men, it was not yet applied to women, Advance 
warning was, however, given that women would be required to 
perform service not only in the Red Cross and in welfare activities, 
but actually in the armaments industry itself, in the event of wart. 
The creation of even a partial war economy - a Blitzkrieg 
economy, as Milward calls it2 - in the autumn of 1939 necessitated the 
rapid transfer of women into jobs vacated by men on their 
conscription into the armed forces, as had long been anticipated. 
This was facilitated by a contraction in the consumer goods industries 
in which women were chiefly employed3, so that those women who found 
themselves without a job were at once transferred to the now vacant 
places in what had been regarded as "typical men's occupations", in 
the vital war industries. It was believed that a short training 
course would be sufficient to enable women who were already 
accustomed to the routine of factory work to change from, for 
example, employment in a textile factory to work in a munitions 
factory4. In addition, it was felt that the change should be 
1. VB, loc. cit. 
2. Alan Milward, The German Economy at War, London, 1965, pp. 7 -10, 
explains this term. 
3. Mason, op. cit., pp. 601 -02, states that for reasons of popularity 
it was not possible for the Nazis to restrict home consumption, 
even in war -time, the result being that still by early 1940 no 
consumer goods factories had been closed. Nevertheless, the 
impression is that capacity was run down from September 1939; the 
reports of Himmler's agents cited in this section seem to bear 
this out. 
4. "Der Fraueneinsatz in der Kriegswirtschaft ", NS- Frauenwarte, May 
1940, inside of front cover and p. 417. 
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attractive for those women who now, for the first time, were given 
the chance to undertake skilled and specialised work and, therefore, 
to earn a higher wage than formerly1. The impression given was that 
the entire nation was acting in unison, and that the redeployment of 
labour into vital industries was going smoothly. As the Frauenschaft's 
magazine put it: "Women have taken over at once and in all areas 
of employment the positions of the men who are fighting for Germany, 
with a natural readiness. There exists nowhere a gap, for as soon as 
a man withdraws a reliable and eager woman moves into his job "2. 
It was only to be expected that in time of war articles 
relating to the vital subject of labour supply should be presented in 
a confident and optimistic manner. But it was soon apparent to the 
Government that the situation was in fact far from satisfactory. As 
Nolte had realised, women brought into unfamiliar work could not 
adequately replace men who had been used to it; as early as October 
1939, Himmler's agents were reporting that "especially in 
armaments factories productivity has declined considerably, most 
of all among the women "3. But unfamiliarity with the work was not 
the only reason for this; discontent at conditions of work soon 
became a major source of concern. As had been provided in the 
National Service Law, there had been in September 1939 the suspension 
of at least some of the restrictions which had formerly protected 
women from having to work long and unsocial hours, so that in munitions 
factories they were in some cases being required to work for between 
1. Walter Stothfang, Der Arbeitseinsatz im Kriege, Berlin, 1940, 
pp. 23 -25. 
2. "Frauenhände packen zu ", NS- Frauenwarte, October 1939, p. 210. 
3. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750111, BziL, 20 October, 1939. 
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10i and 13 hours per day, whether on day -shift or night -shift. 
This had dramatic results in a Kiel factory, where it was established 
that a series of explosions which had occurred in October 1939 had 
been due not to sabotage attempts - as had at first been suspected - 
but to the exhaustion and consequent inefficiency of the women workers. 
Only in a few places were eight -hour shifts now in force, 
and women workers showed their discontent with the long hours they 
were expected to work by reporting sick or taking days off when 
their applications for holidays were refused, because the managers 
of vital war industries were not permitted to grant them1. The main 
complaints made by the women were that they did not have enough time 
to clean the house, wash clothes, go shopping or visit relatives, 
and that even an eight -hour day was oppressive since many of them had 
to spend time travelling a long distance to work in addition. Mothers 
with children of school age found looking after them difficult enough.; 
those with infants were faced with the problem that there were very 
few créches. 
The medical profession voiced concern at the detrimental 
effect long shifts on a long -term basis might have on women's health 
and, especially, on their reproductive capacity, and suggestions 
were made that five -hour shifts should be introduced, carrying the 
earlier experiments with half -day working into war industry. Such a 
scheme would be beneficial from several points of view: it would 
protect women from overwork; it would give them time to attend to 
their domestic duties; and, it was hoped, it would encourage more 
women to volunteer for work, since the long hours had so far been a 
1. Ibid., frames 2- 750094 -95, BziL, 16 October, 1939. 
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considerable disincentive to potential workers1. But the very 
fact that relatively few women were prepared to volunteer for work 
meant that those who were working had to continue to work long hours, 
and this led to mounting discontent which resulted early in 1940 
in a decline in the number of women working2. 
This was precisely the opposite of what the Government had 
hoped to achieve, but in many respects it had only itself to blame. 
In spite of its own enabling legislation, it had failed even to try 
to implement conscription of female labour once the war had started. 
Thus, it had fallen back on propaganda to try to achieve its aim 
by attracting volunteers. But not only were hours and conditions of 
work sufficiently disadvantageous to discourage potential volunteers; 
wages, too, were thoroughly unattractive, so much so that those 
women who were working complained continually about them. Some 
women even felt moved to ask what had happened to the money firms 
saved by employing them instead of the men they had formerly had to 
pay at a significantly higher rate; others were simply aggrieved 
because they had been transferred from their peace -time jobs to 
war industry where they earned substantially less, because they were 
unfamiliar and therefore slow with the work, and remuneration was on 
a piece -work basis3. Managers of firms, as well as women workers, 
demanded a reform of the wage structure on the basis of equal pay for 
equal work, regardless of sex4, but the Government publicly announced 
1. Ibid., frames 2- 750490 -91, MadR, 18 December, 1939. 
2. BA, R18/3282, letter from Stuckart to Suren, 15 February, 1940. 
IfZ, op. cit., frames 2- 750862 -63, MadR, 19 February, 1940. 
3. Ibid., frames 2- 750440 -41, MadR, it December 1939. 
4. Ibid., frame 2- 750865, MadR, 19 February, 1940. 
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that it had no intention of undertaking fundamental reforms of this 
nature in war- timel, although the need to attract women workers was 
becoming vital. 
Even under these most unsatisfactory conditions it might have 
been expected that many married women would have had no choice but 
to work, for purely financial reasons; husbands were now at the front, 
no longer providing for their families. The Government had itself, 
however, provided the solution for many women; in a law introduced 
in March 1936, and extended in July 1939, it had been decreed that 
an allowance would be provided for the families of men serving 
their country in the armed forces. In fact, it had been made 
abundantly clear in 1939 that each person entitled to this allowance 
was nevertheless required to work for a living unless youth, old age, 
ill health or taxing family commitments made this undesirable. The 
provisions applying specifically to women clearly allowed for the 
exemption from this obligation of those who had the running of a 
household or the care of relatives to cope with, as well as of those 
whose employment would "endanger the stable upbringing of children "2. 
The intention here had been to avoid a situation where those 
who were, for one reason or another, unfit for work, and who had not 
had to work in peace -time, found that the source of their support had 
been removed and were now obliged, perhaps in distressing circumstances, 
1. "Die Frauenlohn im Kriege ", EZ, 20 March, 1940. 
2. " Paanilienunterstiltzungsgesetz ", RGB, 1936 I, 30 March, 1936, p. 327. 
"Verordnung zur Ergänzung und Durchführung des Familienunterstüt- 
zungsgesetzes", RGB, 1939 I, 11 July, 1939, pp. 1225 -32. 
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to go out to work in order to survive. This was a laudable enough 
purpose. But the actual result was that, as employment exchanges 
reported in February 1940, a great number of married women who had 
previously been employed had given up work now that they were 
receiving -their allowance as wives of enlisted ment. This, as 
Stuckart pointed out, was the case even with women who had worked 
before the wax, out of necessity; now, their allowance obviated this 
need. The Ministry of Employment was most anxious to find ways of 
arresting the resulting decline in the number of employed women2, and 
a meeting was arranged to discuss the matter on 22 February, 19403. 
Meanwhile, reports of a continuing drop in the number of 
employed women were still corning in, as more men were called up and 
more wives therefore became eligible for the allowance; in addition, 
working women who married serving soldiers also fell into this 
category. The main reason for the rising number of retirements was 
that a substantial part of a woman's earnings was counted against her 
allowance, and an amount accordingly deducted from the allowance4. 
Thus, in addition to the other, considerable disadvantages attaching 
to employment, there was a positive financial disincentive to deter 
those eligible to receive the allowance from going out to work. 
The failure to attract women into employment, and particularly 
into the war industries, led to demands for coercion and even compulsion. 
1. BA, R18/3282, letter from Beisiegel, at the Ministry of Employment, 
to Frick, 15 February, 1940. 
2. Ibid., letter from Stuckart to Suren, 15 February, 1940. 
3. Ibid., letter from Beisiegel to Frick, 15 February, 1940. 
4. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750864, riadR, 19 February, 1940. 
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The Mayor of Berlin complained in March 1940 that even childless 
wives of soldiers had given up work and were living on their 
allowance, and urged that the law be changed to prevent thisl. 
Seldte, as Minister of Employment, was anxious to do so, and he and 
Stuckart collaborated to produce a proposal for a bill to introduce 
the compulsory employment of women in the war effort. At the same 
time, discussions were taking place to frame legislation to compel 
women in receipt of the dependant's allowance to return to work if 
they did not fall into any of the exempted categories specified in 
the law of 11 July, 19392. But the Government saw legislation as a 
last resort and hoped that a propaganda campaign would still produce 
the desired result. 
The propaganda centred around the threat of introducing 
compulsion which, it was hoped, would persuade enough women that 
sooner or later they would be obliged to work, and that they might as 
well volunteer before they were conscripted. Not surprisingly, 
however, the threat had the opposite effect: the majority of women 
saw no point in volunteering at once if they were bound to be 
1. BA, op. cit., letter from the Mayor of Berlin to Krug von Nidda 
at the Ministry of the Interior, 26 March, 1940. 
2. Ibid., "Verordnung zur Durchführung der Verordnung über den 
verstärkten Einsatz von Frauen für Aufgaben der Reichsverteid- 
igung", May 1940 (exact date not given). 
Ibid., letter from Stuckart to the Ministerial Council for the 
Defence of the Nation, 9 May, 1940. 
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conscripted in any case1. Even Hitler's public references to the 
need to bring women into war work to back up the efforts of Germany's 
soldiers in the field2 brought no response; no doubt Germany's very 
success in the war in 1940 and 1941, and the triumphant propaganda 
about it at home, helped to convince many that their contribution 
was not needed, and that the war would soon be brought to a 
victorious conclusion. 
Not until 30 June, 1941, was an order issued instructing the 
authorities who paid the dependant's allowance to examine each 
case with a view to giving women the choice of returning to work - if 
there seemed no genuine obstacle to this - or forfeiting their 
allowance. By late September 1941 over 80,000 cases had been examined, 
over 40% of which had been judged justifiable. According to the 
National Statistical Office, only 17% of the total had so far taken 
a job, but only 293 women had positively refused to do so; the 
immediate reduction of their allowance had led fifty -two of them to 
change their mind. There was some caution about these figures, however, 
because they differed from those presented by the employment exchanges, 
which showed a higher number of those who had had their allowance 
1. "Der Fraueneinsatz in der Kriegswirtschaft ", NS- Frauenwarte, May 
1940, p. 417. 
Boberach, op. cit., no. 189, 26 May, 1941, pp. 146 -48. Boberach 
expresses the view that all the talk about and plans for the 
conscription of female labour, which had still, by May 1941, had 
no concrete results, were purely for propaganda purposes, to 
encourage volunteers (p. 147n.). The document cited suggests, 
however, that this tactic had precisely the opposite effect. 
2. Domarus, op. cit., quotes two major speeches in which Hitler 
appealed to German women in these terms, on 16 March, 1941 
(p. 1674), and on 4 May, 1941 (pp. 1707 -08). 
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reduced because of their refusal to work, and a lower number of 
those who returned to work1. 
The poor results of this measure left the issue of labour 
conscription open, until at a meeting on 7 November, 1941, Gering, 
the chairman, intimated that Hitler was now of the opinion that 
women who had so far refused to work would be workers of little 
value, and that in any case there were strong physiological grounds 
for objecting to women's doing strenuous work. The intention was 
therefore not any longer to try to increase women's employment 
by any means, but rather to reduce it when enough prisoners of 
war had been set to work2. This decision to abandon attempts to 
coerce women into war industry without actually imposing conscription 
came at a time when Hitler and his advisers still believed that 
Russia would be defeated by Blitzkrieg tactics and the partial war 
economy, although their confidence soon began to wane3. 
The effects of the decision were, in fact, chiefly bad for 
Germany: industry desperately needed extra labour; and the female 
workers it already had were now incensed by the unfairness, as they 
saw it, of their having been persuaded or even dragooned into work 
while those who had steadfastly refused to work in the face of strong 
pressure were now rewarded by being left alone. The circumstance of 
the working woman, which had caused so much discontent from the start 
1. BA, op. cit., letter from Sicha at the National Statistical Office 
to Krug von Nidda, 27 September, 1941. 
2. Ibid., letter from Jacobi to Suren (both at the Ministry of the 
Interior), 17 November, 1941. 
The number of prisoners of war working in Germany was 294,393 in 
February 1940; by December 1940 it had risen to 1,178,668. 
Figures from St.J., 194142, P. 424. POWs could clearly provide 
a substantial reserve of labour. 
3. Milward, op. cit., p. 45. 
Carroll, op. cit., pp. 229 -30. 
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of the war, had not been improved, and women with large families 
as well as a job were grossly overburdened while childless wives and 
single girls, who were making no contribution to the war -effort, 
could, for example, shop for scarce commodities at leisure1. There 
was also the social divisiveness - at a time when national unity 
was the aim - of the fact that middle -class women and girls had 
been slow to volunteer in the first place, and had been ready with 
reasons or plausible excuses for resisting propaganda and pressure 
directed at persuading them to work2. Stuckart, for one, had argued 
that conscription would have the benefit of being seen by the 
population as a whole to apply to those who had so far chosen to be 
unproductive in time of national emergency, regardless of their 
station in life3. His voice went unheeded; whether the reasons 
Hitler gave in November 1941 were the real ones for abandoning the 
idea of compulsion, or whether the Government was anxious not to lose 
face if a conscription order was widely evaded4, the result was that 
Germany was desperately short of labour for war industry, and that this 
was a major reason for her ultimate defeat. 
At first sight, Nazi policy towards the employment of women 
1. IfZ, MA 441/6, frames 7412 -14, MadR, 17 August, 1942. 
2. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750862, MadR, 19 February, 1940. 
Boberach, op. cit., p. 148. 
3. BA, op. cit., letter from Stuckart to the Ministerial Council 
for the Defence of the Nation, 9 May, 1940. 
4. It may be argued that the Nazis were wary of antagonising the 
middle class, or even that it was in the nature of fascism to 
discriminate in favour of it. These questions are too involved, 
and not sufficiently relevant, to merit discussion here. 
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appears to have experienced an ideological volte -face, with the 
crude, early demands for the return of women to the home being 
replaced by almost equally crude demands that women seek work to 
release men for the armed forces. But it is reasonably clear that 
the ultimate aim of Nazi policy towards women was to create a situation 
in which women could indeed return to the home once the German 
nation had achieved its "rightful" place in the world. While Michalke 
had dismissed as unrealistic those who hoped to eliminate female 
employment altogether, he warned that there might in the future recur 
a situation where jobs were scarce, so that there might well have to 
be restrictions on the employment of women who were not entirely 
dependent on their own income1. A writer in the Westdeutscher 
Beobachter also counselled moderation in 1935, proposing that those 
women who had been forced to work in the desperate situation of 
"Marxist- Centrist post -war Germany" should not be summarily thrown 
out of work. At the same time, however, he made it clear that a 
reduction in the number of women in employment was a definite long- 
term aim2. Even during the war, when the Government was still trying 
to break down the strong resistance on the part of many women towards 
going out to work, the debate about whether women should, in principle, 
be employed continued. While it was seen as a bitter necessity that 
almost 12 million women should be working in 1940, the long -term 
ideal was the creation of a situation where the German woman could be 
a full -time housewife3. 
1. Michalke, op. cit., pp. 443 -44. 
2. Leo Schäfer, "Grenzen der Arbeitsschlacht? Und die Frauen ?" 
Westdeutscher Beobachter, 30 June, 1935. 
3. Wiener Library Dossier, "Frauenarbeit ", FZ, 9 June, 1940. 
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This was indeed a departure from the liberal view that each 
individual should be given the chance to find his or her metier in the 
way and at the pace he or she chose. But it was entirely consistent 
with the Nazi view that the interests of the State must have top 
priority. In war -time particularly, however, it quickly became 
clear that there was some disagreement and even confusion in the top 
echelons of the Government and the Party as to what precisely were the 
interests of the State. Whereas in Britain there was no doubt that 
the top priority was the defeat of Nazi Germany, and that the 
compulsory direction of women between 18 and 50 into at least part- 
time work was essential for the war effort', in Germany it was hoped 
by many, and even believed by some, that such an expedient would not 
be necessary. 
The result was an absence of positive direction from the 
centre, so that local Labour Front representatives were to be found 
making "official" utterances which were often not only different from 
each other but even positively contradictory2. This vagueness was, 
as Mason rightly says3, the product of reluctance to antagonise the 
population by introducing unpopular policies. Perhaps even more 
fundamentally, it resulted from the division of opinion between the 
ideologues, who were determined to implement Party theory, even when 
it was totally impractical, and the mene- like Seldte and Stuckart - 
who had to make the system work. In the case of trying to compel 
1. Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein, Women's Two Roles, London, 1968, 
pp. 51 -53, gives a brief account of this. 
2. IfZ, MA 441,/6, frames 7414 -16, MadR, 17 August, 1942. 
3. Mason, op. cit., p. 605. 
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women into war work, this combination of fear of popular discontent 
and ideological stubbornness led to the abandoning, until 1943, of 
attempts to force women to provide the labour Germany vitally 
needed. The arbitrary decision of the Führer, a man whose views 
were increasingly removed from reality, was sufficient to ensure that 
the long -term Nazi obsession with protecting women "biologically" 
took precedence over the essential immediate aim of concentrating all 




Higher Education and Senior Schooling for Girls 
Introduction 
As a result of the progress made in opening the universities 
to women before the Great War and providing senior schooling to 
prepare women for higher education, the 1920s saw an improvement 
in educational and professional opportunities for women'. By the 
end of the decade, however, Germany was in the throes of economic 
disaster, and retrenchment in Government expenditure wherever possible 
had become necessary. Education, as a major State enterprise, was 
immediately affected. The results of this had direct and indirect 
effects on opportunities for women beyond the level of compulsory 
schooling, up to the age of 14; but it is important to realise that 
men, too, were affected, often in a similar way. This was true even 
under the Nazi Government, although Hitler had already made his 
Party's views on women's education clear: "future motherhood is to 
be the definite aim of female education "2. This suggested that the 
Nazis would aim to free women from what they regarded as the masculine 
elements of education, the intellectual ones, to which they were not 
suited3. On this basis, it has been generally assumed - often wrongly - 
that in the Third Reich girls were denied an academic education at 
1. On the limitations to progress in achieving professional positions 
for women, see Michael Kater, "Krisis des Frauenstudiums in der 
Weimarer Republik ", Vierteljahrschrift ftlr Sozial - und Wirtschafts- 
geschichte, 1972, pp. 217 -18. 
2. Hitler, op. cit., pp. 459 -60. 
3. F. Hiller, "Mädchenerziehung ", F. Hiller (ed.), Deutsche Erziehung 
im neuen Staat, Langensalza, 1934, p. 350. 
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school and severely discriminated against in universities and 
colleges'. It is therefore the aim of this chapter to show that 
many of the early educational policies attributed to the Nazi 
Government were prefigured in measures of the last Weimar Governments, 
measures dictated by economic necessity, and that the policies 
actually initiated by the Nazi Government were similarly moulded by 
necessity, with the result that dogma and ideology had, with changing 
circumstances in the 1930s, to be set aside on a number of occasions. 
In addition, it will be shown that reactionary and philistine 
attitudes were by no means the prerogative of the NSDAP alone, but 
that there was, even among the better educated, the feeling that, 
far from too little progress having been achieved in making higher 
education available to a wider range of people, there had been too 
much change, particularly in the field of education for women. 
A. The Depression and Opposition to Higher Education for Girls; in 
pa:rticularL the Nazi View 
The chief problem in higher education in 1930 was that there 
were far too many students in universities and colleges for many of 
them to have a chance of finding a professional or managerial position 
1. Examples of this are to be found in: 
Otto B. Roegele, "Student im Dritten Reich ", Otto B. Roegele (ed.) 
Die Deutsche Universität im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1966, pp. 161- 
62. 
Rolf Eilers, Die nationalsozialistische Schulpolitik, Cologne 
and Opladen, 1963, pp. 18 -21. 
Karl Bracher, "Die Ideologische Gleichschaltung ", K. D. Bracher, 
W. Sauer, G. Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung 
Cologne and Opladen, 1960, p. 322. 
Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich, London, 
1971, pp. 260 -61, 285 -86. 
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at the end of their studies, in the shrunken market of the depression 
years. This was at the very time when women's representation in 
the universities was stronger than it had ever been: in the summer 
semester of 1931, 19,394 girls constituted 18.7% of the record total 
of 103,912 students, and in the following semester women even 
increased their share to 18.9 %, the strongest point of their 
representation before the Second World iVarl. This trend received a 
not unmixed reception: many people remained unconvinced of either 
the necessity or the desirability of admitting women to academic 
study2. A former Baden Minister of Education, Professor Willy 
Hellpach, conceded that a small number of women should continue to 
attend universities, but asserted that only a tiny fraction of them 
would give value for the money spent on them, since the majority would 
marry without even starting a career. While he deplored the 
stultifying education which had formerly been all that was available 
to girls in the nineteenth century, he nevertheless described the 
female nature as "always more intuitive and irrational. Therefore," 
he added, "academic schooling in languages and mathematics should 
be restricted to factual matter "3. 
Others were less moderate: male students, particularly, 
claimed that not only were academic standards falling because of the 
presence of girls in universities in ever -increasing numbers, but, in 
addition, that the long- standing tradition of "student comradeship" 
1. Calculated from figures in St.J., 1932, pp. 426 -27. 
2. For detailed examples of this, see Michael Kater, op. cit., pp. 219- 
29. 
3. Willy Hellpach, Die Wesensgestalt der deutschen Schule, Leipzig, 
1926, pp. 151 -53. 
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was being destroyed. Replying to comments of this kind, a writer 
in Die Frau im Staat asserted that women were clearly performing a 
real service if they were destroying the exclusive, beer -swilling 
male corporations. She also claimed that there was an element in 
the male student body which was trying to disguise its own inadequacies 
by launching an all -out attack on women with the aim of driving them 
out of the universities1. Certainly, the reaction against the 
overcrowding of the universities, aimed at students in ;eneral, and 
not at girls in particular, caused alarm among the men, to the extent 
that one male students' magazine suggested that girls should be 
denied full rights of matriculation, and should confine themselves 
to "their characteristic occupations "2. It was abundantly clear that 
this meant running a home and bearing children. 
The first restriction imposed in higher education did in fact 
affect girls specifically. In 1929, the Prussian authorities 
issued an order limiting the number of girls who would be admitted 
to train as technical teachers, since it was becoming difficult to find 
places for those already qualified. At the same time, it was 
announced that the number of female students of physical education 
would also be reduced3. This was not, however, deliberate 
discrimination against girls, but an ad hoc measure to try to relieve 
the pressure of student numbers where it was felt to be urgent, and 
where it could most easily be effected. As the situation worsened, 
the Prussian Government saw fit to close the physical education college 
1. E. Knowles, "Ketzer_ische Gedanken fiber die Invasion der studierenden 
Frau ", FiS, April 1930, p. 9. 
2. "Die Lage der Frau in den geistigen Berufen ", BF, July /August, 1932, 
p. 2. 
3. HA, reel 37, fol. 736, "Mitteilungen des Reichsfrauenausschusses 
der DDP ", 15 December, 1929. 
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at Spandau, for members of both sexes, in spite of protests from 
DVP deputies in the Landtag1. 
At the national level, there was widespread concern about the 
creation of an "academic proletariat" of jobless graduates; Das 
Deutsche Studentenwerk, the organisation through which grants were 
paid to able but needy students, strongly criticised the admission of 
an indiscriminate flood of young people into higher education2. In 
the Government itself, there were discussions held from 1930 onwards 
at the Reich Ministry of the Interior aimed at finding ways to reduce 
the pressure on senior schools as well as colleges. The chief 
conclusion arrived at by the experts consulted by Dr. Wirth, the 
Minister, was that there would have to be a rigorous selection process 
for applicants for higher education. It was suggested that the 
voluntary Labour Service, created primarily for the unemployed in 
July 1931, should be particularly recommended to school -leavers, since 
many of them would be obliged to find jobs of a practical nature, given 
the saturation of the professional market3. 
There was, however, one favourable factor, which ought to have 
allayed the authorities' fears to some degree, but does not appear to 
have done so. This was the decline, in the years 1928 -33, in the 
number of senior school pupils which was the result not of a rigorous 
selection process but of the fact that those children born in the years 
of the low war -time birth rate were reaching senior school age at this 
1. BA, R451I/64, DVP Reichsgeschäftsstelle, Januar -April 1932, report 
of 23 January, 1932. 
2. E. '7. Eschmann (ed.), Wo findet die deutsche Jugend neuen Lebensraum ?, 
Berlin and Leipzig, 1932, p. v. 
3. Christoph Fuhr, "Schulpolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Reich und 
Ländern ", supplement to Das Parlament, 17 October, 1970, pp. 28 -29. 
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time. Numbers in girls' senior schools actually suffered a smaller 
decline than those in boys' schools, since there was at this time a 
higher proportion of girls aiming for senior schooling and higher 
education than previously. But, even so, the girls' private schools 
experienced heavy losses, with the increasing tendency for girls, like 
boys, to attend the State schools, whose educational standards were 
higher 
Particularly noticeable was the trend towards a greater degree 
of coeducation, for purely practical reasons, since small senior 
classes, and even schools, for girls could be disbanded, and 
expenditure on salaries and the maintenance of buildings saved. In 
some states, coeducation was increased to such an extent that girls 
formed a very significant proportion of pupils at schools which were 
primarily intended for boys. In Thuringia, an extreme case, there 
were in 1933 more girls attending boys' schools than girls' schools, 
while in the ten smaller North German states 25% of all girls 
receiving senior schooling were at boys' schools2. Throughout the 
country as a whole, however, the proportion was smaller, with 35,600 
girls at boys' schools in 1931 -32 constituting 6.7% of the total; this 
was a slight increase over the 1926 -27 figures of 28,800 and 5.2%. 
The general result of these figures was to increase the total number 
of girls receiving senior schooling, to 283,000, so that in 1931 -32, 
when the total number of senior school pupils had actually dropped - 
and numbers at girls' schools, too, had dropped - the total number of 
1. "Reichsschulstatistik 1931/32", St.D.R., vol. 438, 1933, pp. 6, 21, 
27, 30, 35. 
2. Ludwig Wülker, "Die offentliche höhere Madchenschulen der nord- 
deutschen Lander im Philologenjahrbuch von 1933 ", D. Mad., April 
1934, pp. 84 -86. 
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girls at senior schools had increased from the 1926 -27 figure of 
278,000. The proportion of girls to boys in senior schools was 
accordingly raised from 53.2 to 57.1 per 1001. 
This development in no way signified an official decision in 
favour of coeducation in principle; its merits were vigorously debated 
throughout the 7eimar era, with the Social Democrats and Communists 
advocating it and the Roman Catholic Church its strongest opponent. 
It had been accepted as a necessary and temporary measure before the 
First World -far in those areas where the only girls' senior school 
was the Höhere T8chterschule, but anxiety increased among those who 
opposed it in principle as the number of girls at boys' schools grew 
rather than diminished in the 1920s. Even the relatively enlightened 
Prussian Education Ministry admitted to being "seriously opposed to 
coeducation for reasons based on developmental psychology and 
educational sociology.... Coeducation, or rather coinstruction, as 
a makeshift is in a different position "2. In Bavaria, the power of 
the Catholic Church and the Bavarian People's Party meant that 
coeducation could barely be considered a live issue, while at the 
national level the Centre Party was able to block any move against 
segregation of the sexes. The radical Alice Rfhle- Gerstel regretted 
that the "tentative experiments" in coeducation had not succeeded in 
converting its opponents during the 1920s, and observed that in village 
schools, where small numbers made coeducation a necessity, boys and 
girls still sat at opposite sides of the classroom3. 
1. St.D.R., op. cit., p. 31. 
2. I. L. Kandel and Thomas Alexander (trans.), The Reorganisation of 
Education in Prussia: Based on Official Documents and Publications, 
New York, 1927, pp. 102 -03. 
3. Mathilde Drees, "Das Madchenbildungswesen ", Zentralinstitut fair 
Erziehung und Unterricht (ed.), Die Reichsschulkonferenz in ihren 
Ergebnissen, Leipzig, 1921, pp. 69 -73. 
Rtihle-Gerstel, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 
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On the two issues that worried the conservatives and the 
clericalists most, the "inflation" of student numbers in the later 
1920s and early 1930s and doctrinal opposition to coeducation, the 
National Socialist Party took a similar, if more militant, stand. 
The Nazis had always criticised the overvaluing of purely academic 
study, and their strong anti- intellectualism1 was complemented by 
their insistence on the merits of more practical occupations. 
Indeed, one of the demands of Point 20 of their Party Programme of 
1920 was that teaching curricula be brought into line with the 
requirements of day -to -day living2. mein Kampf's version was that the 
first emphasis should be laid on physical training, with spiritual 
nourishment taking second place and the study of academic subjects 
only a poor third. In this respect, at least, girls' education was 
to be governed by the same principles as boys'3. But the fundamental 
Nazi dogma of the basic differences between the sexes - and therefore 
the need for their "separate development" - invested the Party's 
official line on the question of girls' education, at every level. 
In this area, as in many others, much of Nazi thought was 
based on a revulsion against the developments of the post -war years. 
The Party's attitudes were neither original nor revolutionary; rather, 
1. Hitler's speech at the first congress of the Labour Front, 10 
May, 1933, found in Domarus, op. cit., vol. I, p. 268. 
Bernhard Rust, "Das Preussische Kultusministerium seit der nat- 
ionale Erhebung ", Hiller, op. cit., pp. 39 -40. 
Nieuwenhuysen, op. cit., p. 44. 
2. Found in Walter Hofer, Der Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt am Main, 
1957, p. 30. 
3. Hitler, loc. cit. 
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they were a conglomeration and extension of the old conservative 
ideas prevalent at the end of the nineteenth century, when women were 
agitating for admission to the universities, still apparent after the 
First World War, and by no means dead in 1930. The Nazi objection to 
attempts to give girls the same kind of education as boys, on the 
grounds that girls and boys were fundamentally different mentally as 
well as physically, was only a restatement of a view current at the 
turn of the twentieth century1. Similarly old -fashioned was the 
Nazis' recurring assertion that women were subjective, whereas men 
were objective, women were emotional and sentimental, whereas men 
were creative and calculating; for these reasons, women were 
considered basically unsuited to academic study2. The emphasis on 
the formal and abstract, to the neglect of women's natural disposition 
towards the actual and practical, had led, the Nazis claimed, to a 
corruption of girls' education during the years of the Weimar 
Republic. Even worse, all girls who valued their essential womanliness 
had been regarded as exceptions, and the natural calling of woman, 
that of housewife and mother, had been devalued3. 
1. Arthur Kirchhoff (ed.), Die Akademische Frau, Berlin, 1897, p. xi. 
James E. Russell, German Higher Schools, New York, 1907, pp. 131, 
420. 
2. Hans -Joachim von Schumann, Die nationalsozialistische Erziehung 
im Rahmen amtlicher Bestimmungen, Langensalza, n.d. ( ?1934), pp. 39- 
40. 
Marie Schorn, "Frauenstudium in der Zukunft ", A. Reber -Gruber (ed.), 
Weibliche Erziehung im NSLB, Leipzig and Berlin, 1934, p. 16. 
3. "Die Geschlechter im Dritten Reich ", Frankische Tageszeitung, 17 
April, 1934. 
;iayer, op. cit., pp. 30-32. 
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As was generally the case, there was a grain of truth in the 
picture drawn by the NSDAP; great stress had, after all, been laid on 
the importance of giving girls the chance of an academic education 
similar to that available to boys, although only a very small - if 
increasing - minority of schoolgirls would have the desire or the 
ability to benefit from it. And in spite of official recognition, 
at least in Prussia, of the vital place of women "in the family, in 
a vocation, or in some other place in the interests of general welfare "1, 
the academic senior schools had made no provision for training in 
homecraft in their time -table, with the small exception of a little 
instruction in needlework in the Lyzeum2. Domestic science instruction 
had been available to those who specifically were not pursuing an 
academic career, but the Prauenschule3 had certainly not been regarded 
as the equal of the other types of senior school. Conceding these 
points does not, however, detract from the fact that the Nazis 
greatly exaggerated and distorted the situation, as yet another stick 
with which to beat the Republican politicians from the vantage -point 
of opposition, and as a means of discrediting them once the Party 
had achieved power. 
In extravagant language, the Nazis attacked the "Jewish - 
intellectual" concept of the highly- educated woman, and what they 
called the "liberal- democratic -marxist" practice of encouraging women 
1. 1Candel and Alexander, op. cit., P. 541. 
2. Thomas Alexander and Beryl Parker, The New Education in the 
German Republic, London, 1930, pp. 256 -57, 275 -76. 
3. The Frauenschule was the name given to a stream in the girls' 
senior school which gave instruction in domestic science, cooking, 
child -care, hygiene, et al.. Op. cit., p. 277. 
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to achieve the same aims as men, when their beings were different 
and complementary'. Girls had often appeared inferior because they 
were being judged by the same criteria as boys, criteria which were 
not relevant to the female nature2. Emphasis on practical education, 
related to the needs of living, meant, therefore, that girls' 
education must differ from boys', to correspond with the different 
roles they were intended by nature to play. The result was that even 
in subjects studied by both sexes, girls' education would be slanted 
differently from boys'. For this reason, coeducation could have no 
place in Nazi policy, since it allowed the development of neither a 
real man nor a true woman3. 
In the Third Reich, the new course in girls' education was to 
be one in which a transformation of purpose would take place both in 
school and after it. While training for the future wives and mothers 
of Germans should be provided, the need, it was felt, was less for 
mechanical instruction in the arts of housekeeping and child -care - 
although these subjects would definitely have their place - than for 
education to an awareness of the girls' responsibility for the stability 
of society and to the future generation of Germans4. Individualism, 
1. Hitler's speech to the Frauenschaft at the Nuremberg Congress of 
1934, found in Domarus, op. cit., p. 451. 
Rudolf Hess, "Die Aufgaben der deutschen Frau ", VB, 27 May, 1936. 
2. Schumann, loc. cit. 
Hiller, op. cit., p. 350. 
3. Schumann, loc. cit. 
Johannes Büttner, (ed.), Der :leg zum Nationalsozialistischen Reich, 
Berlin, 1943, p. 858. 
4. Hiller, op. cit., p. 351. 
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which she Nazis saw as the scourge of Germany in the 1920s, was 
to be completely discouraged, and service - in the family, in the 
community, at work, even in public life - was to be the main theme 
of education. In announcing this, Hedwig FBrster, the adviser on 
girls' schooling in the Prussian Ministry of Education, stressed 
that there would be a sharp reduction in the academic content of 
girls' senior schooling, and a corresponding increase in the time 
allotted to those subjects which would guide girls into occupations 
of a practical or an artistic nature, particularly into the field of 
social welfarel. Emphasis was to be laid on the study of German 
history and culture, as well as on health, family affairs and 
physical exercise. Since motherhood was regarded as the primary 
function of women, girls should be educated for occupations to which 
their maternal instincts were relevant. It was conceded that medicine, 
social work and teaching in girls' or primary schools should be 
numbered among these vocations, and therefore it was also admitted 
that academic study would have its place in the education of some 
girls, and that the universities should not be closed to them2. 
These ideas were the basic ones which the Nazis set out to put 
into practice from 1933. But the eclectic nature of National Socialism 
meant that it attracted large numbers of people who held differing 
views on specific subjects. There were those, for example, who espoused 
the hard -line extremism of Professor J. W. Mannhardt, epitomised in 
1. Hedwig Pörster, "Die künftige Gestaltung des M dchenschulwesens ", 
FZ, 8 July, 1933. 
2. BA, R431I /427, letter from Prick to Reich Ministers and State 
Governments, 5 October, 1933. 
Paula Siber, Die Frauenfrage und ihre Lösung durch den National- 
sozialismus, Berlin, 1933, p. 30. 
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the following passage: 
"It is established that study cannot offer women 
a suitable general education. Women will in future be 
employed much less in occupations requiring a period of study.... 
Therefore the senior schools will not need to prepare 
girls for the universities. Girls' senior schools will 
have other tasks and aims: the special womanly abilities, 
on which woman herself brought discredit because of the 
desire for 'equality' with men "1. 
Those who felt that this point of view was perhaps too rigid 
contended that women might perform adequately, and even well, 
exceptionally, in many academic subjects, but drew the line at the 
suggestion that girls might study mathematics and the deductive 
sciences successfully, since women were intuitive by nature rather 
than rational2. Protests, such as that made in 1934 by Dr. Heinrich 
Voigts, himself a teacher, that a mathematical training could at 
least help women to carry out their household management with greater 
efficiency3, failed to shake this prejudice4. The once reasonably 
favourable position of women in mathematics and science departments 
in the universities began to deteriorate after 1933. This was the 
result of a deliberate policy, by which men were given preference in 
positions which required a scientific or mathematical training, as 
a matter of principle, so that poor employment prospects acted as a 
disincentive to girls who might have studied these subjects, although 
1. J. W. Mannhardt, Hochschulrevolution, Hamburg, 1933, p. 72. 
2. Fränkische Tageszeitung, op. cit. 
3. Heinrich Voigts, "Der mathematische Unterricht in der M,dchenschule 
des völkischen Staates ", D.Mád., February 1934, p. 27. 
4. An example of the persistence of this prejudice is to be found in 
Anna Kottenhoff, "Vom Wesen und von der Verantwortung des geistig- 
en Frauenschaffens ", FK, January 1939, P. 4. 
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the door was by no means closed to such study1. 
Most of the protests against the new guide -lines announced 
for girls' education came, as might have been expected, from 
women. The less predictable feature of this was that they came from 
women sympathetic to the Nazis. Certainly, potential political 
opposition had been quickly and successfully silenced, while 
"unreliable" individuals were neutralised by being banned from 
publishing books and articles2. But in the first year of Nazi rule 
a number of pamphlets appeared, which, while carefully stating support 
for the new order, criticised the attacks which had been made on the 
fitness of women for academic study. Gertrud Baumgart claimed that 
there was a "very strong current running against intellectual women 
in the universities ". She cited as the reason for this the 
indiscriminate admission of school -leavers of both sexes who were ill - 
suited to university study. Her solution was a more rigorous selection 
process for all students, not just for women. Gertrud Baumgart 
demanded the education of women to national and social responsibility, 
and asserted that this implied both physical and intellectual training, 
and the admission of women to the universities and to the professions3. 
A similar demand for equal treatment for aspiring students of 
both sexes came from Irmgard Reichenau, in an open letter to Adolf Hitler. 
She argued that the division between the sexes was narrower than that 
1. Luise Raulf, "Frau und Naturwissenschaft ", _Hi, November 1937, p. 13. 
2. "1. Verordnung zur Durchführung des Reichskulturkammergesetzes ", 
RGB, 1933 I, 1 November, 1933, pp. 797 -98. 
George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture, London, 1966, p. 135. 
3. Gertrud Baumgart, Frauenbewegung Gestern und Heute, Heidelberg, 1933, 
pp. 17 and 31. 
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between the talented and the less gifted, whether they were men 
or women. In true Nazi fashion she deplored "over- intellectuality ", 
which, she claimed, however, was more likely to be found in men than 
in women1. Another writer, Dorothea Klaje-Wenzel, was specifically 
concerned about the prospects for women who wanted to study medicine, 
and expressed the fear that there would be an attempt to bar women from 
medical faculties2. But one of the leading figures in the Nazi 
women's organisation in the early days of power, Paula Siber, was 
quick to point out that all branches of university study were indeed 
open to women, and cited medicine as one which could be considered 
particularly suitable for them3. 
The extent to which National Socialist ideas bore a variety 
of interpretations is well illustrated in an exchange in a student 
magazine in 1935. In one edition, a male student leader asserted 
categorically that the universities should be largely a male preserve, 
with women admitted as guests in those instances where the "special 
womanly occupations" necessitated a measure of academic training. He 
admitted that the surplus of women in the population might mean that 
some women would have to do men's jobs, but denied that a place should 
be made for them in academic occupations4. This point of view is 
hardly distinguishable from that expressed before the Machtübernahme 
by men who feared female competition for scarce professional positions. 
1. Irmgard Reichenau, "Die begabte Frau ", Irmgard Reichenau (ed.), 
Deutsche Frauen an Adolf Hitler, Leipzig, 1934, pp. 24-25. 
2. Dorothea Klaje- Wenzel, Die Frau in der Volksgemeinschaft, Leipzig, 
1934, p. 36. 
3. Siber, loc. cit. 
4. Otto Schuster in Wissen und Dienst, 1935, no. 1, p. 13. 
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It was hotly contested in the following edition of the magazine by 
a girl student who agreed that clarification of the status of women 
vis -a -vis higher education was needed, but claimed that both male 
and female students should be able to serve the Volk, together and 
not in opposition to each other. Her spirited defence of the right 
of women to study was, however, somewhat different from the uninhibited 
retaliation women had made in the face of male attacks before 1933: 
it was necessarily accompanied by pious affirmations of unswerving 
loyalty to Hitler, of the ideal of motherhood as woman's goal, and of 
opposition to any idea of "emancipation "l. 
It is clear that the conflict between men and women over the 
right of women to study in universities was generated by the prospect, 
in the early 1930s, of a limitation of student numbers in the face of 
graduate unemployment, and was not the result of the policies of 
the Nazi Government. Nazi beliefs about the nature and role of women, 
which were constantly being reiterated, did, however, give the 
impression that the Government was unequivocally on the side of the 
men, and that if -there were too many students women would be the first 
to be excluded. But in the Nazi State theory and practice were by no 
means always synonymous, as became increasingly more apparent as the 
1930s progressed and circumstances changed. 
B. Nazi Policies in the field of Higher Education for Girls 
The first problem facing the new Government in education was 
one of sheer numbers, and so little time was wasted in beginning an 
offensive against university "inflation ". Kálin,,ïinister responsible 
for the Employment Exchanges, vas, however, only continuing a process 
1. Edith Runge in Wissen und Dienst, 1935, no. 2, pp. 39 -40. 
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he had begun under the previous regime when he predicted a crisis in 
the professional labour market in the next four or five years; this 
was the result, he said, of the trebling of student numbers since 1914. 
He repeated the conclusion drawn by the committee which had been 
looking at the problem since 1930, that in future many school -leavers 
would have to find their niche in positions which did not require 
academic study, even if they were qualified for university entrance1. 
Two days later, still less than three weeks after the Machtübernahme, 
it was announced that each applicant for higher education was to be 
vetted by an examination board, and those regarded as least suitable 
were to be advised against proceeding to a college. Those who did not 
heed such advice were to be observed closely during their first 
three semesters so that an assessment of their suitability could better 
be made2. As yet, then, there was no question either of outright 
coercion being used, or of girls being treated differently from boys. 
It became clear, however, that the selection process was designed 
to serve a purpose additional to that of cutting down numbers: 
"suitability" was to be gauged partly by a character reference, so 
that those considered politically or socially undesirable by the 
Government could be prevented from entering the universities3. 
Apart from this last discrimination, the policy followed here 
was largely that envisaged under the Weimar governments; but the 
important thing is that action was at last being taken, action which 
1. BA, R36/1929, "Gesichtspunkte für die Berufsberatung der Abitur- 
ienten in der Krise ", letter of 16 February, 1933. 
2. BA, R4311/936, "Ein Sieb für das Studium ", cutting from Vossische 
Zeitung, 18 February, 1933. 
3. Joachim Haupt, Neuordnunim Schulwesen und Hochschulwesen, Berlin, 
1933, p. 9. 
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had been lacking because of the absence both of a central agency 
to direct education and of strong and stable government. The German 
universities were administered by the government of the state to 
which they belonged, so a unified policy had been difficult to 
achieve1. But Frick, the new Reich Minister of the Interior, 
overrode the difficulties and achieved agreement on united action on 
the matter of selecting university entrants by the Education Ministers 
of each Land, in February 19332. As part of the new Government's 
policy of centralisation, Frick assumed responsibility for educational 
matters at the national level; the creation of a section in his 
Ministry specifically to deal with education signalled the end of the 
autonomy enjoyed in this area by the Lander3. Finally, a Reich 
Ministry of Education was created by an order of President Hindenburg 
on 1 May, 1934, and ten days later Bernhard Rust, Prussian Education 
Minister, was appointed Reich Minister, on Hitler's nomination4. 
Henceforth, the Minister merely transmitted orders to the 
Reichsstatthalter, and, while the implementing of the orders was in 
the hands of the Lander, they could no longer have any real independence 
in educational affairs - especially important at the school]evel - 
and their room for unilateral manoeuvre was increasingly diminished5. 
1. Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst publication, German 
Universities - a Manual for Foreign Scholars and Students, Berlin, 
1932, p. 7. 
2. BA, loc. cit. 
3. Eilers, op. cit., p. 54. 
4. Schumann, op. cit., p. 43. 
W. Bade, Der Weg des Dritten Reiches, Lübeck, 1935, vol. 3, p. 36. 
5. Eilers, op. cit., pp. 55 -57. 
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The tactics of exhortation and counsel employed to try to 
reduce student numbers in the first instance were apparently not 
sufficient, for it was found necessary to issue on 25 April, 1933, 
a national law "to combat the surplus in German schools and colleges ". 
This ordered that, apart from the statutory minimum attendance 
requirements, the number of pupils and students was to be so regulated 
as to safeguard basic educational standards and to provide an adequate 
number of candidates for the professions. The governments of the 
Lander were to be responsible for deciding what numbers their senior 
schools and colleges could accommodate. But it was definitely 
stipulated that non- "Aryans" were to enjoy no higher representation 
in these institutions than they did in the total populationl. This 
was the first statutory discrimination in education against a specific 
group, and while it is in no way to be condoned, it could hardly have 
been unexpected, given the Nazis' fantastic and fanatical racial 
beliefs. 
The law of 25 April equally failed to have the desired effect, 
so that Frick felt it necessary to order a much more explicit 
restriction, on 28 December, 1933. The new order fixed a definite 
quota for the total number of new students to be admitted to 
universities and colleges each year: of the 15,000 to be allowed to 
matriculate for the first time each Land was to be allotted a detailed 
number which it might not exceed, and the choice was to be made on the 
basis of the mental and physical maturity, the strength of character, 
and the political reliability of the candidates. For the first time, 
1. "Gesetz gegen die fberfiillung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen ", 
RGB, 1933 I, 25 April, 1933, p. 225. 
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girls were singled out for particular restriction, since it was 
stipulated that in no case were their numbers to exceed 10% of the 
quota allowed for each Land. School- leavers who were not admitted to 
colleges were advised to take up an occupation of a practical naturel, 
in keeping with Nazi theory as expressed in Point 20 of the Party 
Programme. In the case of girls, this invariably meant domestic 
service or work on a farm. 
The restrictions imposed on entry to higher education have 
generally been regarded a manifestation of the philistinism and 
evil -mindedness of the Nazis. Certainly, the singling out of non - 
"Aryans" and political opponents for limitation in the first instance 
may be seen at least partly in this light. But apart from this, the 
fixing of some kind of quota was but a logical conclusion to the 
economic depression and its effects on the employability of graduates; 
it was also the continuation, in a much more effective way, of a policy 
already embarked on before the Machtübernahme, and one which had 
found vocal supporters among people of differing political 
persuasions. And if a special restriction on the intake of girl 
students seemed to be a manifestation of the Nazi view of women's role, 
it must be remembered that there had already, in 1929, been a 
measure directed specifically at restricting girl entrants to colleges 
of physical education. As was almost invariably the case, the Nazis 
could lay no claim to originality. 
They did, however, use the occasion for a propaganda exercise: 
Dr. Pfundtner, Prick's Secretary of State, said in a broadcast two 
1. BA, R4311/ß36, "Zahlenmüssige Begrenzung des Zuganges zu den 
Hochschulen ", Wolff's Telegraphisches Büro, 28 December, 1933. 
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weeks after the order that a restriction on numbers had been 
necessary for a sound reconstitution of the universities after the 
unhealthy "liberalism" of the previous regime. The burden of his 
message was that the overestimation of intellectual pursuits and the 
undervaluing of practical work were mistakes which must be rectified. 
In order to console those who might now feel deprived of the chance 
of advancement, he stressed that the National Socialist revolution 
had shown that men without an academic education could rise to 
occupy the highest positions in the State1. 
Even before the statutory limitation was in force the number 
of new entrants to all colleges had actually been dropping, after 
reaching an abnormally high point of almost 30,000 in 1931; the 
1933 figure was lower than this by one -third, at less than 21,000. 
Once the restriction applied, the total intake for 1934 was again 
lower by one- third, at under 14,000, well below the quota. But the 
aim of restricting girls to 10ó of all new entrants was not realised; 
although a proportionately smaller number of girls was admitted in 
1934 than in 1933, the figure for 1934 was still as high as 12.5ö2. 
It was in fact the very success of the quota law which led Rust 
to rescind what he termed an "only temporary measure" in February 
1935, when it had been in force for little more than a year and 
effective for only the 1934 intake of students3. Application of the 
law was not, however, the only reason for the reduction by one -third 
1. "Die Begrenzung des Zuzugs zu den Hochschulen: Rundfunkvortrag 
des Staatssekretärs Pfundtner ", VB, 12 January, 1934. 
2. Deutsche Hochschulstatistik, Berlin, 1934/35, pp *4- *5. 
3. Report in `I'S, 1935, vol. 15, no. 9, p. 334. 
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of the total number of students in the three- and -a -half years after 
1931, when student numbers had indeed been abnormally highl. Part 
of the cause was that the smaller numbers of children born during the 
First World War were now reaching university age. In addition, 
matriculation had generally been delayed, rather than averted, by the 
introduction of compulsory Labour Service for all school -leavers 
wishing to proceed to higher education; thus, potential new students 
for the summer semester of 1934 did not in fact matriculate for the 
first time until winter 1934 -352. The reintroduction of conscription 
in March 1935 also affected student numbers: the withdrawal of 
young men to perform military service before admission to university 
was an important factor in the decline to 57,000 in the number of 
students in summer 1935; this was the lowest figure there had been 
since 1916, in war -time. That this was largely due to a reduction in 
the number of male students can be seen from the fact that in 1935 
the proportion of girls in the student body had once again risen to 
almost 1770 . 
While the Technical Universities, which specialised in the 
applied sciences and engineering, and in which the number of girl 
students was always very small, followed a pattern roughly similar 
to that of the conventional universities, the teacher -training colleges 
showed a different trend. In 1935 these Hochschule fflr 
1. Conclusion drawn from figures given in St.J.: 1932, pp. 426 -27; 
1933, pp. 522 -23; 1934, PP. 534 -35; 1935, PP. 520 -21. 
2. BA, 84311 /936, "Das DiensthalbjAhr der Studenten", cutting from 
Vossische Zeitung, 9 March, 1934. 
3. Calculated from figures in St:J., 1936, pp. 544 -45 
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Lehrerbildung1 had a record number of students, but the lowest -ever 
percentage of girls among them, at 12%; this was in contrast to a 
share of over 30 only two- and -a -half years earlier But a 
reduction of these dimensions was not, apparently, considered 
sufficient, since in April 1936 Rust placed a firm restriction on 
the number of girls to be admitted to teacher -training; colleges. He 
explained that there were already more than enough women senior school 
teachers, and, in addition, a large number of students preparing 
for this career. In order, therefore, to arrest the flow of girls 
into teaching, none was to be admitted to a Prussian college in the 
winter semester of 1936 -37. The combining of the Prussian with the 
Reich Education Ministry at the beginning of 19353 made it unlikely 
that this order would not also apply to the small number of teacher - 
training colleges outside Prussia. In order to avoid circumvention 
of the order by school -leavers, it was also stipulated that no girl 
who was aiming to teach would be admitted directly to a university; 
she must first spend two semesters at a teacher -training college. 
Rust conceded that this restriction might be lifted for the summer 
semester of 1937, but only to an extent compatible with the demands 
1. The Prussian Education Minister, Rust, issued orders on 20 April 
and 6 May,'1933, to the effect that the classically- derived name 
Pädagogische Akademie should be replaced by the truly Germanic 
Hochschule ftir Lehrerbildung, as part of the campaign to stamp 
out internationalism and make students more nationally conscious. 
This is described in Schumann, op. cit., p. 21, and Haupt, op. 
cit., pp. 22 -23. The orders affected most colleges, since in 
1933 eight of the ten teacher- training colleges in Germany were 
in Prussia (St.J., 1934, p. 538). 
2. Calculated from figures given in St.J.: 1936, pp. 547 -48; 1933, 
pp. 526 -27. 
3. Eilers, op. cit., p. 55. 
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of the labour market. Girls who would be obliged by this measure 
to wait for a year before applying. for a college place were advised 
to perform Labour Service and, if possible, also to engage in some 
form of domestic service or work on a farm1. 
This last exhortation should not lead to the impression that 
the entire measure was designed to prevent girls from receiving 
higher education and preparing themselves for a career outside the 
home. The Nazis always hoped, of course, that all girls would have 
some experience of household tasks before they married, and that all 
young people training for non -manual careers would have practical 
experience of physical work; these aims could well be fulfilled in 
this enforced period of waiting between school and college, which 
was very necessary in view of the surplus of teachers over available 
teaching positions. The limitation in this case did, however, apply 
only to girls, which was in line with Nazi Party policy that men 
should have preference in career opportunities to enable them to marry 
and support a family as early as possible. But the admission of 
girls was only to be delayed, and not prevented, since teaching was 
one of the occupations regarded as suitable for women in Nazi theory. 
Rust's restriction of April 1936 was, in fact, singularly 
ineffective: in the winter semester of 1936 -37 there was actually an 
increase in the number of girls attending teacher -training colleges, 
to the extent that there were almost twice as many as there had been 
even in the peak year of 1931. Over one -third of these 1500 girls 
attended the two- year -old college in Hanover, which was exclusively 
1. "Studium der Abiturientinnen, die Studienrätinnen oder Volks- 
schullehrerinnen werden wollen ", DWEuV, 1936, no. 288, 8 April, 
1936, p. 209. 
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for girl students, while another 188 were at the new, all- female 
college at Schneidemühl1. Particularly in view of the fact that both 
these colleges were in Prussia, it is clear that, for some reason, 
the Minister's order was not being enforced, in spite of the stress 
he had laid on its necessity. And yet, this does not seem to have 
been because Rust had changed his mind, because in April 1937 he 
tried another tactic: he decreed that in future the admission of 
girls to teacher -training colleges should take place only once a 
year, in autumn, instead of twice a year, as had formerly been the 
case. He also made it clear that while 1937 school -leavers were 
permitted to apply for a place in 1937, preference would be given to 
those who had left school in earlier years; and if there were places 
available for 1937 school -leavers, preference would be given to 
members of the Bund deutscher M del (League of German Girls)2. The 
difference between this order and the one of a year earlier was that 
the former's provisions applied in a corresponding way to intending 
male students, whereas the 1936 decree had applied specifically to 
girls; it is thus quite clear that in this branch of higher education 
the Nazi Government did not relentlessly discriminate against girls. 
Anxiety about the number of entrants to teacher -training colleges 
took a different form from 1937. Rust himself opened a new college 
in Koblenz, exclusively for girl students, with words about "the 
special mission of women teachers" in November of that year3. The 
1. Conclusions drawn from figures given in St.J., 1937, p. 582. 
2. "Aufnahme an den preussischen Hochschulen für Lehrerbildung, Herbst 
1937 ", D'WiiuV, 1937, no. 255, 21 April, 1937, pp. 241 -42. 
3. BA, R431Ij938b, "Rust eröffnet Hochschule für Lehrerinnenbildung, 
Koblenz ", Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, no. 1532, 10 November, 1937. 
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changed circumstances of the employment market had led to a change of 
attitude, although - in spite of attempts to prevent this - the number 
of students of both sexes training for the teaching profession had 
continued to rise sharply. The reason was that even before the war 
withdrew men from work into the armed forces, it had become apparent 
that there would soon be a shortage of teachers. Here, as in many other 
occupations, the only reserve of labour was among women. Therefore 
in order to encourage recruitment to the profession, it was announced 
at the end of 1939 that the number of special courses designed to 
prepare girls with only an elementary school education for entry 
to teacher -training colleges would be doubled, from 80 to 1601. 
Involvement in the Second World !:Jar made serious a shortage of trained 
teachers which had thus even previously been a source of concern. 
The Nazis' wholesale departure from their earlier policy of 
trying to restrict the entry of girls into teaching resulted in girls' 
constituting 42 of the colleges' student population in summer 1939, 
still in peace -time. But even this unprecedentedly high share was 
more than doubled once the war was under way, so that in summer 1940 
the figure was 80. And, unlike the universities, the colleges had 
not suffered a severe drop in absolute numbers: the 1940 figure was 
significantly larger than that of the year of the Hochschulinflation, 
19312. The Government had really only continued the policies of the 
later Weimar period in imposing - or, at least, trying to impose - 
a limit on entry to over -full occupations and to the courses preparatory 
1. "Aufbaulehrgänge für Mtdchen von der Volksschule zur Akademie für 
Lehrerbildung ", Die Frau, December 1939, p. 84. 
2. Calculated from figures given in St.J.: 1939/40, p. 620; 1941/42, 
p. 645. 
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to these occupations. Practical considerations were equally at 
work in the volte -face which resulted in positive encouragement to 
girls to prepare themselves for a teaching career, given the 
increasing shortage of male candidates. 
But doctrine was not to be abandoned altogether, especially 
when it could be reconciled with necessity; thus, retreat from one 
point of earlier Nazi policy, for practical reasons, was matched by 
insistence on the implementation of another. In January 1937 
compulsory domestic science and needlework, to the extent of four 
hours each week in the first four semesters, were prescribed for all 
girl students at teacher -training colleges who planned to teach in 
senior schools. This was absolutely consistent with the Nazi aim of 
ensuring that all girls received a "womanly" education. But it should 
not be seen as an attempt to guide girls towards housekeeping rather 
than a profession. That it was an integral part of the anti - 
intellectualism of the Nazis and their emphasis on the virtues of 
practical skills is shown by another clause in the same order: this 
decreed compulsory courses in technical subjects for the male students 
at the same hours as the girls had their homecraft courses'. This 
provision does, however, underline the.Nazis' insistence on the separate 
functions of the sexes. But there was only a degree of actual 
segregation in the colleges, in spite of the Nazis' opposition to 
coeducation. Of the twenty -eight teacher -training colleges, exactly 
half were for students of both sexes, while eleven admitted only men, 
and three were exclusively for women2. 
1. IfZ, MA 1163, frame 95585, "Entwurf einer Reichsregelung der 
Ausbildung fttr das Lehramt an h8heren Schulen ", 16 January, 1937. 
2. Homeyer, op. cit., p. K4. 
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The change in official policy, as exemplified by the new 
attitude to teacher -training candidates, became increasingly 
apparent and urgent from 1936 onwards. Early in 1937, Rust announced 
that in future school- leavers were to be encouraged to enter the 
universities in greater numbers, now that the Hochschulinflation 
was at an end, particularly in order to study scientific and technical 
subjects. The Four Year Plan, announced in September 1936, required 
a large number of chemists and engineers, and the general expansion 
which would result from it would mean a demand also for experts in 
every other discipline. In view of the urgency of the matter, Rust 
declared that senior schooling was to be shortened by one year1. 
It was quickly made clear that the new policies were not to be 
restricted to men. Even a few days before the Four Year Plan had been 
announced, the Thursday women's section of the Party's official 
newspaper, the VBlkischer Beobachter, was entirely devoted to the 
justification of both an academic education and professional 
employment for women, insofar, it was emphasised as these would benefit 
the community. Parents were urged to make sacrifices, if necessary, 
to give a talented daughter the chance of higher education, so that 
the nation might benefit from her particular abilities. The idea of 
studying for one's own satisfaction was obviously still regarded as 
egotistic and decadent. The final judgment was: "It is wrong if 
to -day a gifted and capable girl takes the attitude that there is no 
point in studying because she will not find employment "2. 
1. BA, R431I/938b, "Die Inflation auf den Hochschulen beendet ", 
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, no. 74, 18 January, 1937. 
2. "Die Akademikerin von heute" and ""Was Zahlen lehren ", VB, 4 
September, 1936. 
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The new course was dutifully supported by the representatives 
of the women's organisations, in the same way that the old ideas 
had been when they were in vogue. Trude Btirkner, national leader 
of the Bund deutscher Madel, expressed the view that girls of 
ability who wanted to enter a profession ought to attend a university, 
since antagonism to the universities was "not in accordance with the 
attitude of the BDW'1. 
But in spite of official exhortations, student numbers continued 
to decline in the mid -to -late 1930s, and the _proportion of girls 
in the student body alsó declined, until the outbreak of the Second 
World War. From a share of over 18% in the summer semester of 1933, 
girls' representation in the universities dropped to less than 15% 
in the winter semester of 1937 -38, but revived to its highest point 
yet in autumn 1939, at 20¡2. This was, of course, at a time when the 
total number of students was greatly reduced by the removal of a large 
number of male students who, it was felt, could better serve their 
country in the armed forces in war -time. In the following terms3 student 
1. Report in Die Frau, April 1937, p. 402. 
2. Calculated from figures given in St.J.: 1934, pp. 534 -35; 1938, 
p. 602; 1939/40, p. 615. 
3. The traditional unit of the Semester, or Halb;jahr, as the Nazis 
preferred to say, was abandoned in the autumn of 1939, and the 
Trimester was introduced as the division of the academic year, to 
allow greater flexibility in war -time, and particularly to condense 
the period required for the completion of a degree, by cutting down 
the long summer vacation. This was envisaged as purely a war -time 
expedient which would lapse with the conclusion of peace. An 
account of this is given in Hans Huber, Erziehung and Wissenschaft 
im Kriege, Berlin, 1940, pp. 18 -20. Huber was a senior civil 
servant in the Reich Ministry of Education. In fact, the semester 
was reinstated still during the war, in 1941 (IfZ, MA 441/6, frame 
2- 757139, "Zur Lage an den deutschen Hochschulen im SS 1942 ", MadR, 
16 July, 1942). 
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numbers rose again slightly, and the now favourable position of 
women improved even further, so that in the third term of 1940 
they comprised almost 30% of all students in German universities1. 
Averaged figures, however, disguise the fact that girls' 
representation varied from university to university, and from subject 
to subject. Of the individual universities, two which were medium - 
sized, Marburg and Heidelberg, had a consistently high proportion of 
girl students, at over 20% for much of the 1930s. The general 
decline in representation, which was most marked between autumn 1936 
and spring 1938, affected the larger universities of Berlin and 
Bonn and the medium -sized ones of Jena and Monster most, leaving 
girls at this time with a smaller share than they had enjoyed ten 
years earlier. 7alile all the other universities showed a more 
favourable female representation 'throughout, it was at 7illrzburg 
alone that the percentage of girls in the student body remained 
above the high level of 1930 throughout the 1930s2. 
Girls were traditionally best represented in arts subjects, 
and from 1931 they occupied more than one -third of all places in 
arts faculties. In absolute terms, however, the number of girls 
studying medicine overtook that in arts, although their share of 
places in medical faculties remained for the most part around one - 
fifth. This trend certainly rendered groundless early fears that 
the Nazis would ban, or at least strongly discourage, the admission 
1. Calculated from figures given in St.J., 1941/42 
2. Conclusions drawn from figures given in St.J.: 
1931, p, 430; 1932, p. 426; 1933, P. 522; 1934, 
p. 522; 1936, p. 544 -46; 1937, P. 582; 1938, P- 
PP. 615 -16; 1941/42, pp. 640 -41. 
, P. 640. 
1926, p. 401; 
P. 534; 1935, 
602; 1:-39/40, 
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of women to the study of medicine. The other subject which showed 
a consistently high percentage of girl students was pharmacy, where 
they constituted between 20$ and 30% of the total number of students 
throughout the 1930s, reaching the uniquely high figure of 52% in 
1940: in no other subject did girls enjoy anything approaching 
this share at this timet. 
In contrast to the consistently strong position of women in 
arts, medicine and pharmacy, the favourable representation enjoyed 
by girl students in the sciences in the early 1930s was not maintained. 
From 25% in physics and mathematics in 1931, their share fell to the 
low level of 7ó in the winter semester of 1937 -38; in absolute terms, 
this meant a drop from almost 2,800 to a mere 99. The number of 
girl students in chemistry had always been much smaller than that in 
maths. and physics; at the beginning of the 1930s, their numbers 
were consistently around 500, in percentual terms between 15g and 17% 
of the total. A less spectacular, but still significant, drop in 
their numbers brought their share in 1937 -38 to 8%, representing 
208 girls2. This development was, of course, the result of deliberate 
Government policy in the early years of Nazi rule. But by the time 
it became really effective, its consequences were giving rise to 
anxiety, in view of the need for skilled scientific and technical 
personnel which became pressing in the later 1930s. In November 1937 
a writer in a women's magazine observed in an article entitled 
"Woman and Science" that the number of girl students in scientific 
1. Calculations made from figures given in St.J.: 1932, pp. 426 -27; 
1933, pp. 522 -23; 1934, PP- 534 -35; 1935, pp. 520 -21; 1936, 
PP- 544 -45; 1937, pp. 580 -81; 1941/42, p. 644. 
2. Ibid. 
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subjects had "fallen alarmingly ". She expressed the fervent 
hope that girls who had the ability and the application would turn 
to these subjects, since their contribution "to the serious and 
important work of scientific investigation is essential to- day "1. 
As the number of girl students in science faculties had 
been reduced as a result of Government policy, so the reversal of 
that policy led to a revival of girls' fortunes in this area. The 
position reached in the winter of 1937 -38 was, as it transpired, 
their nadir, and the improvement in their representation from then on 
was given added impetus by the outbreak of war in September 1939, 
which led to even higher demands on scientists simultaneous with 
the withdrawal of men from civilian occupations into the armed forces. 
By 1940, girl chémistry students once more numbered over 500, with a 
share of 14%. At the same time, the number of girls studying maths. 
and physics rose to only 133, but these constituted 17% of all the 
students in this field, a very high proportion for subjects once 
specifically pronounced unsuitable for girls2. As a writer in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung put it: 
"The technical and scientific occupations, which were long 
regarded as a male preserve, are now once again open to 
women as chemists, physicists, engineers, biologists, on 
account of the shortage of male candidates "3. 
The fortunes of girl students in both law and economics followed, 
a trend similar to that observed in the sciences. In the law faculties, 
their numbers declined steadily and sharply from over 1,000 in 1932 
1. Luise Raulf, loc. cit. 
2. Calculated from figures given in St.J., 1941/42, p. 643. 
3. Margaret Esch, "Die Aussichten des Frauenstudiums ", FZ, 19 March, 
1939 
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until in winter 1937 -38 there were a mere 59 girlsl. This was not 
caused wholly by Hitler's pronouncement that women should no longer 
be employed as judges and barristers, which came in 19362; but his 
view would doubtless ensure that the downward trend in girls' numbers 
continued. In economics, the decline was less sharp, but equally 
steady: while over 1,000 girls had been studying economics in 
summer 1931, by 1937 -38 there were only 1943. Again, the Nazis might 
have congratulated themselves on the effectiveness of their initial 
policy by the end of 1937, had circumstances not changed and the need 
for skilled personnel required to administer the new policies of the 
Four Year Plan paralleled the need for scientists to operate it. The 
value of women economists was explained and stressed in the various 
publications directed specifically at women4, and the number of girls 
in economics departments began to revives. 
In 1937, too, there was growing concern about the decline in 
the number of girl law students. Dr. Eben- Servaes, the legal expert 
in the National Women's Leadership and leader of the Nazi Association 
of Women Lawyers, sent a circular to her representatives in each Gau 
in August 1937, asking how many girl law students there were in the 
area and how far advanced their studies were, with a view to trying 
1. Calculations made from figures given in St.J.: 1932, pp. 426 -27; 
1933, Pp. 522 -23; 1941/42, p. 643. 
2. BA, R431I /427, letter from Bormann to Frank, 24 August, 1936. This 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
3. Calculations made from figures given in St.J., loc. cit. 
4. See, e.g., "Was Zahlen lehren ", in the supplement "Die deutsche 
Frau ", VB, 4 September, 1936; Harilese Cremer, "Mitarbeit der 
Frau in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft ", i+'K, November 1937, p. 11. 
5. Conclusion drawn from figures given in St.J., 1941/42, p. 643. 
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to improve recruitment to law faculties. She explained that 
although Hitler's ban on women lawyers' being admitted to practice 
in the courts had closed this avenue to female graduates, there 
were many other areas in which their participation would be 
increasingly necessary1. Girls' numbers in law faculties did revive 
from about this time2, but not, apparently, enough, since a legal 
expert in the Party's section for academic affairs urged in August 
1939 that "each girl with university entrance qualifications ought 
to consider whether she is suited to a legal career, rather than 
just medicine or teaching "3. This was the situation even before 
the outbreak of the Second World War; in the autumn of 1939, with 
young men called up for active service, the shortage of law graduates 
began to be acute4. 
It is clear, then, that the reasons for encouraging girls 
to take up academic study in fields once pronounced unsuitable for 
them were purely practical. Equally practical reasons, however, 
lay behind the continuing discouragement, from 1936 onwards, of 
students from studying dentistry. The Ministry of the Interior 
announced on 3 August, 1936, that, until further notice, new students 
would not be allowed to sit the necessary State examinations because 
there was a large surplus of dentists. This decision was slightly 
mitigated after an agreement between the Ministers of Education and 
1. HA, Reel 13, folder 253, "Rundschreiben Nr. FW 76/37 ", from Ilse 
Eben -Servaes to her representatives in the Gaue, 12 August, 1937. 
2. Conclusion drawn from figures given in St.J., loc. cit. 
3. IfZ, MA 205, NSDAP /HA- Wissenschaft, Dr. W. Donke, "Der Rechts- 
wahrer", cutting from Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 August, 1939. 
4. IfZ, MA 441/1, frames 2- 750072/4, BziL, 13 October and 10 November, 
1939. 
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the Interior, by which there would be a quota agreed between Frick 
and the leader of the dentists' organisation instead of a total ban 
on new entrants. Pfundtner, Prick's Secretary of State, still found 
it necessary to give in addition the warning that prospects in the 
profession remained poor and precarious'. This concern about entry 
to dental faculties and to the profession itself was directed at men 
and women alike, without differentiation between them. 
Girls had only ever formed a small minority in the Technical 
Universities, with an attendance figure of above 900 between 1931 
and 1933, which dropped to 213 by winter 1937 -38, while the number 
of male students declined much less drastically. Although these 
institutions prepared students precisely for those occupations 
deemed vital for the operation of the Four Year Plan, it was not until 
after the start of the war that the number of girl students revived 
significantly, passing the 800 mark at the end of 19402. This figure 
gave them a share of 9%, twice as high as the peak of their 
representation during the years of the Hochschulinflation. Even 
allowing for the withdrawal of a substantial number of male students 
for war service, it is therefore evident that girls were responding 
to the encouragement given to them from 1936 onwards to engage in the 
study of scientific and technical subjects. 
It was in fact only the increased attendance of girls at the 
universities that kept student numbers from falling to negligible 
1. "Aufhebung der Sperre des Neuzugangs zum zahnärztlichen Studium 
und zum Dentistenberuf ", DVEuV 1937, no. 200, 22 March -, 1937, 
p. 187. 
2. Calculated from figures given in St.J.: 1932, p. 429; 1933, p. 525; 
1938, p. 602; 1941/42, p. 641. 
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proportions during the war. Young men did continue to study when 
they were on leave from their units, but in summer 1942 it was 
reported that the return of many of them to the army was followed 
by an actual rise in numbers at some universities, because of the 
large intake of girls. In Berlin at this time, girls' numbers had 
increased by 20A, compared with the winter semester of 1941 -42, and 
for the first time they actually constituted a majority of the 
students in three faculties there. At Freiburg, there were 
altogether more girls than men at this time. Medicine and the arts 
subjects continued to be the fields most favoured, but the sciences 
also benefited, so that at Freiburg, Gottingen, Halle, Berlin and 
Würzburg there were more girls than boys studying science. This 
general development was considered desirable, since the exodus of men 
from the professions and academic training had left a great shortage 
of recruits in these fields, which would have to be made good by 
admitting women1. 
Even if there had been no Four Year Plan and no Second World 
War, girl students and graduates would have been essential to the 
Nazi order; a system based on élitism requires a corps of leaders. 
Rust acknowledged this when he expressed the desire to found universities 
in Germany on the model of Oxford and Cambridge, which provided the 
leading element in British public life2. The network of organisations 
which the Nazis built up to some extent before, and much more 
intensively after, the Machtübernahme needed leaders who were 
intelligent and educated, as well as devoted Party hacks. And this 
1. IfZ, 
Mil 441/6, frames 2- 757139 -41, op. cit. 
2. "Rede des Preussischen Kultusministers Rust bei der Einweihung der 
landgebundenen Hochschule für Lehrerbildung in Lauenberg, 24. Juni 
1933 ", Hiller, op. cit., p. 43. 
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applied to women as well as men, given the Nazis' view that the 
functions of the sexes should be kept separate. The initial 
experience in 1933 of having a man in direct charge of the women's 
organisations had been a singularly unhappy one, and after this the 
day -to -day running of them had been left in the hands of the 
women themselves, even if ultimate authority rested with the Party's 
male leadership1. Thus, trained personnel was required for the 
Frauenwerk, the Women's Section of the Labour Front, the BdM, the 
Women's Labour Service and the NSV; there was even a place for 
women in research institutes2. An example of this last category 
was Hildegard Behr, who received her doctorate in February 1937 and 
went on to become a research worker in a genealogical records office3. 
The leader of the Nazi student organisation, Dr. Scheel, boasted 
that the new Germany had opened up employment prospects for women 
in a wide variety of fields requiring an academic education, without 
departing from the Nazi principle of guiding women into jobs 
suited to the female nature4. There was some justification for this 
claim, although it became increasingly clear in the 1930s that the 
concept of work suitable for women was -rather elastic. 
The Nazis were well aware that the existence of an academic 
elite whose members were destined to occupy the leading positions 
might lead to the formation of a compact group within the community 
which would constitute an obstacle to national unity and to complete 
1. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
2. Gustav Adolf Scheel, "Aufgaben und Erziehungsform des deutschen 
Studententums ", Deutscher Hochschulfahrer, 1938, p. 12. 
3. BDC, Hildegard Behr, "Lebenslauf, 27. November 1937 ". 
4. Gustav Adolf Scheel, loc. cit. 
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control by the Party. Male students were brought into close contact 
with contemporaries from all walks of life once military service was 
introduced in 1935. In addition, from 1933 the Labour Service, 
which had formerly been purely voluntary, became compulsory for male 
students1. Then in March 1934 an order was issued which stipulated 
that all school- leavers of both sexes who sought admission to higher 
education must first perform six months' Labour Service2. This 
requirement fulfilled three important functions. In the first place, 
it was an effective way of reducing student numbers immediately, in 
1934, when this aim was a top priority. In addition, those young 
people endowed with intellectual gifts were to be educated to respect 
the value of manual work, and therefore to respect those of their 
fellow -citizens who performed it. Finally, a cheap reserve of labour 
was automatically permanently available for those jobs - particularly 
on the land- which were regarded as vital but which were unattractive 
to those seeking long -term employment. If the nature of the work 
performed by boys and girls tended to differ, the general principles 
behind the student Labour Service applied to both equally, so that the 
complaint could not be made that girls were being discriminated against 
by being excluded, no& that they were being privileged by being admitted 
to study straight from school3. 
The urgent desire to increase student numbers in the later 1930s 
was clearly in conflict with the equally urgent desire to maintain a 
1. Otto B. Roegele, op. cit., p. 153. 
2. BA, R431I /936, "Das Diensthalbjahr der Studenten ", cutting from 
Vossische Zeitung, 9 March, 1934. 
3. It is unfortunately not possible to give a detailed description of 
the nature of the girls' Labour Service - in spite of the availability 
of material - because of limitations of space. 
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a reserve of cheap labour for agriculture. The universities, at 
any rate, were determined that they should have priority, and once 
the war had begun and student numbers dropped sharply they 
encouraged girls to believe that the Labour Service requirement no 
longer applied. This led to some confusion, and gave rise to queries 
about whether it was still in force1. Hierl was already in the 
process of modifying the scheme so that in 1940 the period of service 
would be tailored - in fact, reduced from twenty -six weeks to twenty- 
two - to allow intending students to fit it in between leaving school 
in spring and starting at university at the beginning of the autumn 
term. When this change was announced, it was stressed that performance 
of Labour Service remained a qualification for entry to university2. 
The Government thus endeavoured to have the best of both worlds, 
namely a substantial period of Labour Service rendered by each 
aspiring student and as many recruits as possible provided for 
university study. This manoeuvre signalled the final retreat - long 
overdue - from the policy of using compulsory Labour Service as an 
instrument for limiting student numbers. 
Fear of academic 'elitism, one of the motives behind the 
student Labour Service, did not prevent the continued existence, and 
indeed the growth, of student oremisations, since these were now 
designed rather to involve the students as a group in the life of the 
1. BA, R36/1928, letter from the Oberbürgermeister of Herford to the 
Deutscher Gemeindetag, 8 February, 1940. 
2. IfZ, NA 205, NSDAP /Hauptamt Wissenschaft, "Der Arbeitsdienst der 
Studierenden ", cutting from Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 
February, 1940. 
Homeyer, op. cit., p. E9. 
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community than to be exclusive. Matriculation automatically made 
each student a member of the Deutsche Studentenschaft (National 
Union of Students), in which the Nazis had had a majority since 
19311. The various associations and clubs, which had been 
exclusively, and often unattractively, male bastions were obliged 
to dissolve by 19352, to be replaced by a single body, the Nazi 
Students' Association ( NSDStB), whose local branches were responsible 
for the "political education" - that is, indoctrination - of students3. 
Party membership was a condition of entry to the NSDStB4, and from 
1936 NSDStB members had also to belong to one of the Party's special 
organisations. For girls, this meant joining either the BdM or the 
NS- Frauenscha.ft5. 
In keeping with the Nazi desire to separate the sexes for 
most purposes, a special section for girls, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
der nationalsozialistischen Studentinnen (ANSt), had been created in 
1927 within the NSDStB°. Its aim, according to Scheel, was "to 
involve the girl student in the work of the university in a manner 
1. Report in Deutscher Hochschulführer, 1939, p. 87. 
2. BA, R4311/938, "Gemeinschaft studentischer Verbände ", Deutsches 
Nachrichtenbüro, no. 157, 29 January, 1935, and "Auflösung 
studentischer Verbände ", Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, no. 1599, 21 
October, 1935. 
3. BA, Slg.Sch., 279 -1, letter from Lammers to Derichsweiler, 1 July, 
1935. 
4. Ibid., "Die Neuorganisation des NSDStB", n.d. ( ?late 1932). 
5. Ibid., letter from the Reich Student Leader to all offices of the 
NSDStB, 22 April, 1936. 
6. Anna Kottenhoff, "Aufgaben und Ziele der Studentinnenarbeit ", 
Deutsches Frauenschaffen, 1938, p. 81. 
228. 
compatible with.her womanliness "1. Membership of the ANSt was 
theoretically voluntary, but the conclusion of an agreement between 
it and the BdM, to the effect that all members of the latter who were 
students must join the ANSI, achieved the aim of winning a large 
membership. At a time when student numbers were being restricted, a 
girl who joined the BdM had a better chance of being admitted, and so 
a large number of female students automatically became members of 
the ANSI. It was estimated that in 1936 65% of all girl students 
were members, and that the figure rose to 75% in the following year. 
This meant that the majority of girl students were obliged to 
participate in their first three semesters in group discussions for 
the purpose of "education to comradeship ", another euphemism for 
political indoctrination2. 
The ANSt was only a small part of the organised activity 
available to - and to some extent compulsory for - girl students. 
Like their male counterparts, they were obliged to participate in 
sporting activities in their first three semesters, in keeping with 
Hitler's demand in Mein Kampf3. The Frauendienst (Women's Service), 
too, was compulsory, for the first six semesters. This involved 
training in air -raid protection, first aid and signals - areas with 
ominously martial connotations4. Then it was recommended that in their 
1. Gustav Adolf Scheel, Die Reichsstudentenfihrung, Berlin, 1938, p. 28. 
2. Anna Kottenhoff, op. cit., p. 83. 
3. "Hochschulsportordnung ", DWEuV 1935, 30 October, 1934, no. 4, pp. 6 -10. 
4. Mathilde Betz, "Einsatz der Studentinnen im Frauendienst ", Deutsches 
Frauenschaffen, 1939, p. 103. 
Gisela Rothe, "Die Studentin im Frauendienst ", VB, 18 October, 1934. 
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spare time - if, it is tempting to suggest, they had any left - 
girl students should help out in the welfare and charitable 
organisations, the NSV and the Winterhilfswerk (Winter Relief Scheme), 
thus performing useful community service, and at the same time 
associating with women and girls from all walks of life. To 
demonstrate even further their consciousness of belonging to a 
- national community which superseded all divisions of class or 
occupation, the girls were encouraged to perform "voluntary" stints of 
work in factories or on the land, in vacation, to allow women workers 
an extra paid holiday, and it is clear that a small minority of 
idealistic girls responded enthusiastically1. This was not the end 
of the extra -mural activity expected of girl students: they were 
urged to interest themselves in the work of the Nazi women's 
organisation, to maintain contact with German students abroad, and 
to attend meetings to which women who did not have a university 
education were invited, to give them an idea of what girl students 
did in their work and in their organisations2. 
The creation of a great variety of activities and organisations 
for girl students confirms that what the.Nazis opposed was not the 
existence of universities and the presence of women in them - as had 
1. Lieselotte Machwirth, "Politische Erziehung durch den ANSt ", VB 
11 December, 1935. 
2. "Zur Zusammenarbeit der nationalsozialistischen Studentinnen ", 
Die Frau, April 1935, pp. 437 -38. 
"Was eine Studentin erzahlt ", VB, 4 September, 1936. 
Inge Wolff, "Hochschulgemeinschaft deutscher Frauen ", FK, November 
1937, inside of front cover. 
Limitations of space prevent a fuller discussion of the activities 
mentioned in this paragraph. 
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at least partly seemed to be the case in 1933 - but rather academic 
freedom and independent- minded intellectuals. The overriding Nazi 
aim was to stamp out the last vestiges of "liberal" and "internationalist" 
culture, and to replace it with a truly German, National Socialist 
approach to learning. As Scheel proclaimed at the 1937 Party 
Congress, "We do not want a scholarly National Socialism, but a 
National Socialist scholarship "1. Scheel was clearly oblivious to 
the fact that this aim was bound to be a contradiction in terms. 
As far as girls were concerned, the ANSt leader in 1935, 
Lieselotte Machwirth, explained that there had never been opposition 
in Nazi ranks to the girl student per se. The Party had indeed 
deplored the attendance at university of girls from wealthy 
backgrounds, who were attracted by student social life but not by 
academic study; equally abhorrent to the Party was the feminist blue- 
stocking, whose raison d'étre was to outshine her male colleagues, 
by any means2. It was these "undesirables ", along with those 
disqualified for racial or political reasons, who had had to be 
removed from the universities; once this was achieved, there was a 
warm welcome for the girl student who worked alongside her male 
counterpart as "the comrade...in the common task of achieving a 
National Socialist reconstruction of the university "3. 
This welcome was emphasised when in 1938 the thirtieth 
1. Quoted in Otto B. Roegele, op. cit., p. 146. 
2. Lieselotte Machwirth, op. cit. 
3. 'Ali Michaelis, "Studentinnen an der Arbeit ", DS, July 1936, 
p. 326, used these words; others expressed similar sentiments, 
e.g. Scheel, loc. cit., Anna Kottenhoff, "Das Studium als 
völkischer Einsatz ", Deutsches Frauenschaffen, 1939, pp. 97 -103. 
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anniversary of the admission of women to Prussian universities was 
made an occasion for celebration. Tribute was paid to the tenacity 
of those, particularly Luise Otto and Helene Lange, who had 
struggled so long for this aim, without, it was stressed, sacrificing 
their humanity and womanliness. Ironically, these were the very 
women who had founded and built up the omen's Movement which the Nazis 
had attacked so often both before and after 1933. To try to resolve 
the implicit contradiction, the Nazis claimed that the Women's 
Movement, worthy in its initial phase, had fallen under the influence 
of "Jewish women's rights' advocates" and a "liberal -individualistic 
leadership" during the Weimar Republic. Fortunately, the story 
continued, the situation had been saved by the Nazis, and the 
coisequent reorientation of the universities had been towards the 
"only valid standpoint: the good of the community ". The result 
was that the girl student now found support instead of hostility 
among the female population as a whole, and played a valuable part 
in the cultural life of the nation1. The emphasis placed on these 
last points was doubtless aimed at reassuring girls and their 
parents that university study was not only acceptable but actually 
highly desirable for those girls who had academic ability; this 
reassurance was essential if the desired increase in student numbers 
in the later 1930s was to be achieved, after the doubts sown by the 
Government itself in earlier years about the validity of intellectual 
pursuits. 
From the very start, then, considerable interest was taken in 
1. Else Boger - Eichler, "Rtickblick auf die Entwicklung des Frauenstudiums 
in Deutschland ", Fit, July 1938, p. 3. 
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girl students by the Nazi Party. The first objectives with 
regard to them applied equally to male students, however; these were 
the elimination of those unacceptable to the Party for any reason 
from higher education, and the reduction of student numbers at a time 
when they were inflated out of all proportion to the employment 
opportunities available to graduates. Other restrictions 
necessitated by this situation generally applied to students of both 
sexes in equal measure, although there were some exceptions. But 
the fundamental point is that girls continued to be admitted to 
higher education. in relatively large numbers. Given this, the 
Nazis' chief aim was to ensure that those admitted were made aware 
of the responsibility they owed the nation. Then, while girl students 
were to be the comrades of their male colleagues, they were also 
to be closely involved in those activities in which German women 
from all sections of society took part, to remind them that what 
distinguished them above all else was not their intellect but their 
gender - or, as the Nazis preferred to say, their "womanliness ". As 
the unemployment situation eased, however, and the shortage of 
skilled personnel became apparent and then acate, the idea which 
had found currency in earlier Nazi theory - that high intelligence 
and womanliness were incompatible - was categorically denied. 
C. Girls' Senior Schooling in the Third Reich 
;bile they were prepared to retreat some distance from 
earlier theory, the Nazis never departed from their insistence on the 
importance of the traditional "womanly" occupations and the necessity 
of training girls for these. The em phasis was therefore to be 
shifted from the Weimar practice of giving domestic science instruction 
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only to those girls who were clearly not academically talented to 
a system where all girls were given a grounding in the tasks 
involved in running a home, and where the academically- inclined were 
treated as the exceptions they undoubtedly were. The official view 
was as follows: 
"The great majority of German girls find the fulfilment 
of their lives as housewives and mothers, in the family. The 
variety of tasks which they must perform demands a fundamental 
training in all branches of domestic science.... The vital 
work of domestic science demands the education of women whose 
attitudes, ability and knowledge correspond with the needs of 
German life in the family and in work. Work in a household 
is so varied and wide that only a thorough training in 
fundamentals can lead to the essential raising of standards "1. 
Hedwig Forster, a school- teacher who became an adviser in the Reich 
Ministry of Education, expressed a similar sentiment: 
"Only a very small proportion of our girls is ever 
really suited to purely academic study in a university.... 
Immeasurably greater is the number of those who later as 
wives and mothers, and also as career women, must and want to 
play a leading part in the special areas of women's work 
and women's culture "2. 
These views were not so very different from those expressed by the 
Prussian Ministry of Education in the 1920s3; the difference was that 
the Nazi Government was determined to ensure that all girls received 
a basic minimum of training in homecraft and child -care as an integral, 
indeed a vitally important, part of their normal schooling. 
There was already considerable provision for this kind of 
1. "Einrichtung von Haushaltungsschulen (Berufsfachschulen) ", DWEuV 
1939, no. 85, 1 February, 1939, pp. 86 -87. 
"Einrichtung von Frauenfachschulen", DVEuV 1939, no. 87, 1 
February, 1939, pp. 95 -96. 
2. Hedwig Forster, "Die Frauenschulen ", DMad, 1934, no. 7, p. 317. 
3. "Einjahrige Frauenschulen", BF, July /August, 1932, p. 5. 
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education in the elementary and middle schools, as well as in a 
variety of vocational schools, although this did not deter the Nazis 
from castigating the Weimar "system" both before and after 1933 for 
neglecting domestic science training. It was, however, true that 
few such facilities were available in the senior schools; this was 
a situation which the Nazis were pledged to alter radically. The 
easiest way to do this was to increase the number of Frauenschulen, 
which constituted the separate branch of senior schooling devoted to 
intensive domestic science education, and to integrate them fully 
into the senior school system; this would enhance their status 
in relation to the academic senior schools, and would facilitate 
a degree of uniformity which had been lacking because of the 
differences in the development of the Frauenschule in the separate 
I,änderl. 
In the Nazis' first few years of power, much was achieved in 
terms of upgrading the standard and status of the Frauenschule. One - 
year courses were provided to give a general education to girls who 
were leaving senior school before taking the Abitur (university 
qualifying examination), while three -year courses were designed 
to train girls for a variety of occupations particularly suitable for 
women and not requiring a university degree; these included teaching 
in primary, technical, art and music schools, youth leadership, and 
the obvious careers directly connected with domestic science. From 
Easter 1935 the three -year courses included, besides their normal 
1. Homeyer, op. cit., p. Aló. 
"Bekanntmachung von 3.7.35 ", Amtsblatt des Bayerischen Staats- 
ministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, no. IX 27 409, p. 211. 
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theoretical and practical training in domestic science, subjects 
specifically geared to the Nazi Weltanschauung: racial "science ", 
nordic culture, the history of the German peasantry and the 
development of National Socialism were compulsory for all1. The 
rationalisation of the Frauenschule courses was, as it turned out, 
only an interim measure; the final aim was to incorporate them fully 
into the girls' senior school system. This was finally achieved when 
the entire system was reformed, by an order published in January 1938. 
Given the Nazis' outspoken opposition to the entire education 
system of the post -war years, it might have been expected that they 
would concentrate on framing and effecting reforms to suit their 
purposes as quickly as possible after taking power; if the 
consolidation of _- -olitical power, the alleviating of economic problems 
and rearmament were the top priorities, the education of the young 
was nevertheless a vital area for a regime which would not tolerate 
dissidence. From 1933 -37, however, the Government contented itself 
with a large number of piecemeal measures designed to modify the 
existing system immediately, until their comprehensive reform had 
been fully worked out. Several of the interim measures reflected the 
Nazi view that education should prepare German girls for their role 
as wives and '.-others. For example, among' the qualifications girls 
required for admission to a Prussian teacher -training college, as 
announced in January 1935, was evidence of proficiency in domestic 
science, needlework, sport and music2. For the senior schools, it 
was decreed at Easter 1935 that the time -table for each class must 
1. "Ziel und Aufgaben der 3- jghrigen Frauenschule ", DhAd, 1934, no. 
8, P. 337. 
2. "Bessere Berufsaussichten far Volksschullehrer ", VB, 4 January, 
1935. 
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include two hours of needlework every week. This was to be at the 
expense of one hour each of English and mathematics, or French, if 
mathematics had already been reduced by an hour to accommodate 
biology'. With the Nazis' obsession about all matters of race and 
heredity, it is not surprising that biology was made compulsory for 
all school -children. As Friederike Matthias, the national 
spokeswoman on girls' senior schooling, put it: "There is an 
obvious need for a basic knowledge of biology in girls' senior schools, 
for the cultivation, development and preservation of our race "2. 
Fräulein Matthias was also of the opinion that the need to 
include more gymnastics, biology, needlework and German in the girls' 
curriculum would mean a corresponding reduction in the time given to 
science, mathematics and foreign languages3. But by October 1935 
Rust obviously felt that such a development was - however desirable - 
not practicable, since he announced that the increased demands of 
academic work in the higher grades of girls' senior schools meant 
that in future there would be no room for homecraft in their time- table. 
To compensate for this volte -face, Rust added that it was still felt 
that no girl should leave a senior school without knowledge of, and 
proficiency in, basic domestic science.. Therefore the family of a 
girl in this position, especially the mother, should - as he claimed 
had been the case in former times - educate the daughter systematically 
in all important household tasks. This was the only apparent 
1. "Nadelarbeitsunterricht in Lyzeen ", DWEuV 1935, no. 198, 3 April, 
1935, p.. 143. 
2. Friederike Matthias, "Grundsätzliches zur Reform der höheren 
Mädchenschule ", Reber- Gruber, op. cit., p. 30. 
3. Ibid. 
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alternative to keeping girls at school for an extra year - to be 
devoted to domestic science - which would be contrary to the Nazi 
desire to take every chance to encourage early marriage and 
motherhood. Rust claimed that academically gifted pupils should have 
no difficulty in coping with household instruction in addition to 
their normal school work, and that any problems which might arise 
could be solved by co- operation between parents and school. To 
ensure compliance with his order, he ordered that from Easter 1937 
girls should be admitted to the upper classes of senior schools only 
if they could provide evidence of familiarity with the simplest 
household tasks 
From the start, the Nazi Government had felt that the 
precondition of effective reform was the elimination from the senior 
schools of those they considered unsuited to an academic education. 
Already before 1933 there had been talk of limiting entry to senior 
schools as well as universities2, and the Nazis had included the 
senior schools in their law of 25 April, 1933, to combat the 
Hochschulinflation3. As they had succeeded in reducing student numbers 
- further than they wished, in the event - so they also achieved a 
reduction in the number of senior school pupils, by a number of tactics. 
The low -tear -time birth -rate continued, of course, to affect senior 
school numbers until 1937, and was a major factor in the drop in the 
senior school population by 100,000 in the years 1931 -34, out of a 
1. "Aufnahme in die wissenschaftlichen Oberstufen der höheren Mäd- 
chenanstalten", DWEuV 1935, no. 582, 11 October, 1935: p. 478. 
2. Christoph F(lhr, op. cit., pp. 28 -29. 
3. "Gesetz gegen die i?berft{llung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen ", 
RGB, 1933 I, 25 April, 1933, p. 225. 
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total of over three- quarters of a million in 1931 
1 
The failure of 
the birth-rate in the post -war years to match the pre -war figures com- 
pounded this. 
At first, however, the losses were sustained equally by both 
sexes, so that the girls' share remained around 37% in the first 
half of the decade. Then the girls sustained a slight loss 
percentually, to leave them with a share of 34.5i4 in 11382. The 
reason was the all -out campaign launched by the Nazis against private 
schools, particularly the Roman Catholic schools of Bavaria, which 
challenged the Government's authority in the vital area of educating 
the young3. Certainly, the boys' private schools suffered from 
this campaign, but the numbers involved were much less significant 
since there had always been far more private schools for girls. In 
the State senior schools girls' representation had, by 1938, returned 
to as high a point as it had achieved in 1931 and 1932, after a 
slight fluctuation in the middle of the decade, while their absolute 
numbers, also, were higher than they had been since 19324. 
The slightly more favourable position of girls in senior schools 
in relation to boys in 1938 was the direct result of an order issued 
late in 1936 which shortened boys' senior schooling by one year, 
because of "the operation of the Four Year Plan as well as the 
1. Conclusions drawn from figures in Deutsche Schulerziehunp, 1940, 
p. 117. 
2. Ibid. 
3. A brief account of this campaign is to be found in Filers, op. cit., 
PP. 85 -97. 
4. Deutsche Schulerziehung, loc. cit. 
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recruitment needs of the army "1. The withdrawal of some 20,000 
boys at the end of their twelfth school year, instead of at the end 
of the thirteenth, in 1937 and 1938 had a small, but noticeable, 
effect on girls' share in the senior schools2, and created an 
anomalous situation where for almost two years girls were actually 
receiving more education, of a kind at times designated unsuitable 
for them, than were boys. Rust was aware of the implicit contradiction 
here, and was quick to point out that this measure was merely a 
temporary expedient which would have to suffice until the promised 
thoroughgoing reform of the senior schools was prepared3. 
The temporary nature of this arrangement was underlined by an 
announcement made by Trude Bürkner in February 1937, to the effect that 
a reform of the school system was imminent which would relieve girls 
of the obligation to undergo the kind of education to which they 
were not suited. This did not mean, she emphasised, that girls' 
education would be reduced to the notorious "3 K's ", as foreigners 
claimed; the Government was well aware that that would be totally 
insufficient. The schools were rather to prepare girls to be fitting 
comrades for their future husbands, by giving them some training in 
politics, economics and culture4. In other words, the most important 
element in girls' schooling, as in boys', was to be instruction in the 
National Socialist view of nationally significant issues, and, indeed, 
of life as a whole. 
1. IfZ, MA 387, frame 725473, letter from Hess to the SS leadership, 
12 December, 1936. 
2. Deutsche Schulerziehung, loc. cit. 
3. BA, R431I/938b, report from Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, no. 474, 19 
April, 1937. 
4. "Die Erziehung der Mádchen im BD ", FZ, 20 February, 1937. 
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At last, on 29 January, 1938, Rust published his Neuordnunp 
des h8heren Schulwesens, the reform of the senior schools. In it, 
the first point of substance was: "For important reasons of 
population policy I have shortened the nine -year period of senior 
schooling to eight years"". This, then, formalised the provision 
already made for reducing boys' schooling, and at last brought girls 
into line with it, although they did not have military service to 
perform. A substitute was, however, quickly produced, in the form of 
G8ring's project of a year of compulsory service on the land or in 
domestic work for girls seeking employment for the first time, from 
March 19382. 
The Government's order of priorities was thus made perfectly 
clear: while the desire to encourage early marriage, to promote 
population growth, was rivalled by the urgent need for cheap labour 
on the land and in domestic service, these two aims could be largely 
reconciled by relegating education to third place. Naturally, it was 
denied that this was what was happening: enshrined in Rust's act was 
the remark that the shortening of schooling must not result in a 
lowering of standards, and that the Abitur, in its traditional form, 
would remain the goal of senior schooling. There was also the 
warning that those who were unable or unwilling to meet the new 
requirements would have to be removed from the senior schools. The new 
provisions were not felt to be too harsh, since, it was stressed, in 
the Nazi State the school was only one branch of the educational system3; 
1. "Neuordnung des h8heren Schulwesens ", DWEuV 1938, 29 January, 1938, 
p. 46. 
2. This has been discussed in Chapter 3, pp. 168 -70. 
3. DWEuV, op. cit., pp 46, 48. 
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in the case of girls, the other branches were the BdM and the Labour 
Servicel. These agencies could work in harmony, it was felt, since they 
were all ultimately under the same leadership, all working in 
complementary ways towards the same goals. 
In the new plan for the senior schools the eight -year course 
was to be a unified whole. Therefore the so- called "mittlere Reife", 
an intermediate certificate instituted before the First World War and 
obtainable by those wishing to leave with a qualification after seven 
years, was to lapse. The senior pupils were to continue to be 
scrutinised closely, with a view to eliminating those who had not the 
ability to make a success of the full course. It was stressed that in 
structure and aims, schools for boys and schools for girls were to 
be the same2. But the plans for the curricula for the senior schools, 
which accompanied the new order, showed that in content the education 
given to the two sexes was to differ considerably, chiefly to the 
effect of weakening the academic constitution of the girls' time- tables. 
This was, of course, only what had been promised, to a greater or 
lesser degree since 1933. 
Girls' education, stressed Rust, should not be merely a poor 
imitation of boys', which was what post -war developments had made it. 
The Nazi theory of the separate functions of the sexes meant that 
"the natural difference between the sexes makes itself apparent even 
in childhood...so that the schooling of girls to an awareness of their 
responsibility to the nation and the State must develop from its own 
special roots "3. The result was that the complicated and cumbersome 
1. Grete Brenner, "Fragen der höheren P;Rdchenbildung in Deutschland ", 
FK, April 1939, p. 6. 
2. Ibid. 
3. DWEuV, op. cit., p. 51. 
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multiform system of schooling, with its variations in the separate 
States, was dismantled, and a national senior school structure 
established in which there was a basic type of girls' school which 
was markedly different from the corresponding basic type of boys' 
school. 
After four years at the Volksschule (elementary school) - or 
three for talented pupils, to achieve a further shortening of 
schooling if possible - boys proceeded to the first five years of the 
senior school, which were the same for all; they then had the choice 
of languages or science as their speciality for the last three years, 
which meant that there was more time for concentration on the chosen 
field, but that there was also still some instruction in the other. 
Biology was not included in the scientific option since it was 
already compulsory. There was, naturally, a strong emphasis also on 
German and History, but it remained possible for boys to study the 
classics in an institution which continued to be called the Gymnasium. 
True to their antipathy to the influence of a foreign culture, the 
Nazis made it plain that this form of senior school was to cater only 
for a small minority of the school populationl. 
The girls followed the same pattern as the boys, with three 
or four Volksschule years followed by five general senior school years, 
before specialisation in one of two courses. In the general years, the 
girls' schooling was substantially the same as the boys', with one 
significant exception: four hours of Latin each week in the third, 
fourth and fifth years of the boys' schools were matched by compulsory 
needlework and a little extra music for the girls. With Latin still 
a requirement for some university courses, this omission in the girls' 
curriculum could work to their disadvantage at the higher levels of 
1. Ibid. 
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education. The decisive difference between boys' and girls' 
schooling came, however, in the last three years. The two options 
open to the girls were the language stream and the homecraft 
stream, so- called because the difference between them was that in 
the former no domestic science, besides needlework, was taught, while 
in the latter there was compulsory English for two hours a w eek, 
but the chance to learn no other foreign language. More positively, 
the language course allowed girls to choose two foreign languages - 
one of which might be Latin - in addition to compulsory English, while 
the domestic science course gave instruction in all areas of activity 
involving nursing, social work, work with young children, and 
household tasks. Both streams included instruction in science and 
mathematics to an extent that was greater than that provided for boys 
in the language stream, but significantly smaller than that for boys 
specialising in science in the boys' schools1. This meant that no 
provision was made in the girls' schools for those who wished to 
specialise in science and mathematics, which would again put them 
at an immediate disadvantage in the universities. This measure had 
doubtless been attractive at a time - when reform of senior schooling 
was first projected - when there was graduate unemployment; but by 
the time it was promulgated, even before it became effective, it was 
out -of -date and potentially disastrous. 
The homecraft course was hailed as an educational form which 
would be the only one of its kind in the world. It was made clear 
that it was not intended for "less gifted" pupils who were unable to 
cope with the academic course, since its scope was very wide and would 
make considerable demands on the participants. Not only were the girls 
1. Ibid., pp. 54-56. 
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to receive instruction in the theoretical aspects of everything that 
"the State must expect from the National Socialist woman in the family 
and in the community "; there was also to be a strong element of 
practical work performed outside the school, in créches and kindergartens, 
on farms and in families. With this stream an integral part of the 
girls' senior school system, there was no longer the need for the 
separate institution of the Frauenschule, but the name was to be 
retained for this course as a matter of convenience. The wide choice 
of occupations for which this course would qualify girls was emphasised, 
the only ones not included being those for which a further period of 
study in a university or college was requiredl. 
Even if the curricula proposed for girls can be seen to contain 
features disadvantageous to girls aiming to proceed to higher education, 
the formalising of the structure of the girls' schools signified 
official recognition of the need to provide courses with a high 
academic content for a considerable number of girls, and not just for 
a minority of unusual cases. This was precisely what the hard- liners 
in the Party had hoped to eliminate, on ideological grounds, but which 
had proved necessary in the light of the country's need for skilled 
personnel in all branches of administration, welfare and professional 
life. 
As usual, the new measure was accompanied by explanations and 
justifications in the press. The V231kischer Beobachter reported in 
March 1938 that many people were asking the question: "Why prepare 
girls for a career which they will just give up when they marry ?" 
Although the Party had done much to encourage this old- fashioned idea, 
its official newspaper now -remarked that neither parents nor children 
seemed to have given any thought to the possibility that some girls 
1. Grete Brenner, op. cit., pp. 6 -7. 
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would not marry. It was not, stressed the TJ ölkischer Beobachter, 
that girls should fail to prepare themselves for the tasks they 
would face if they did become wives and mothers; now, however, the 
old bourgeois days were past when girls were expected to sit at home 
waiting for a husband. The need was for girls who, whether they 
were to marry or not, were prepared to play their part in the service 
of their country, namely by training for an occupation, especially 
in those areas where the growing shortage of labour was most acute1. 
Similar propaganda appeared in girls' and women's magazines, but it 
was obviously felt that exhortation would not be sufficient to 
prevent a number of girls from choosing- to remain idle when they 
left school instead of training for an occupation: for this reason, 
the year of compulsory domestic or farm service, introduced by Gering 
in February 1938, was at first restricted to those girls who had 
never been employed, while signing on at an Employment Exchange 
became compulsory for all school-leavers 
2 
. But those girls 
proceeding to courses in higher education were exempt from these 
provisions, since intending students were obliged to perform Labour 
Service before commencing their studies, and they were not, in any 
case, proposing to remain idle. 
One of the points made firmly in the Neuordnung des höheren 
Schulwesens was that "coeducation contradicts the National Socialist 
conception of education "3. With attempts at progress towards a 
coeducational system of senior schooling consistently frustrated before 
1. "Warum immer neue Forderungen an die Madel?", VB, 10 March, 1938. 
2. "Einführung des weiblichen Pflichtjahrs ", VB, 22 February, 1938. 
See above, Chapter 3, p. 170. 
3. DWEuV, op. cit., p. 46. 
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the Machtübernahme, it must have been expected that an unequivocal 
policy of segregation would be enforced after it, given the strength 
of Nazi opposition to coeducation as a logical part of the 
Party's belief that the sexes were different in nature and had 
separate functions to perform. Certainly, some of the States showed 
willingness to put segregationist theories into practice: Saxony 
passed a law on 9 October, 1933, which stated that, other than in 
exceptional cases, girls must attend only girls' schools'. 
The Prussian Ministry of Education followed suit on 12 February, 
1934, with an order that 
"as a matter of principle girls are not to be ahwitted 
to boys' schools if there is in the district a middle 
school or a girls' senior school at which girls can receive 
an education more suited to their nature ". 
Exceptions to this harsh ruling, which implied that middle schooling 
was adequate for the needs of the female sex, required the personal 
permission of the Minister; but it was at least conceded that girls 
already attending boys' schools should be allowed to complete their 
education unaffected by the new order2. The Minister evidently 
realised that it would be far easier to allow this than to try to 
force the 12,872 girls attending boys' schools in Prussia to change. 
These girls constituted almost 5j of all pupils in boys' schools, 
and about 5% of all girls receiving senior schooling, so that while 
their numbers were relatively small, they were by no means negligible3. 
1. "Aufhebung der Gesetze über die Gemeinschaftserziehung an höheren 
Schulen (usw)", Sachsisches Gesetzblatt, 1933, order of 9 October, 
1933, pp. 175 -76. 
2. "Erlass des Ministers für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung 
vom 12.2.1934 ", DMd, 15 May, 1934, p. 144. 
3. Report in Mad, 15 February, 1934, p. 48. 
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It should, however, have been an easy matter for a totalitarian 
Government to prevent girls from being admitted to boys' schools in 
the future. 
But in spite of the Government's open opposition to coeducation, 
especially at the senior level of schooling, and its measures 
designed to eliminate it, it continued throughout the 1930s. The 
35,628 girls at boys' senior schools throughout the country in 1931 
constituted 6.3% of the pupils at boys' schools. Although their 
actual numbers declined to 31,102 in 1935, their percentual share 
in fact rose fractionally, to 6.4%; and two years later, in 1937, an 
increased absolute number of 33,752 gave them a share of 6.8'L, 
which, if only a marginal rise, was a rise nevertheless1. Therefore 
it is clear that attendance by girls at boys' senior schools was 
not being phased out in the way envisaged by the Government, and that, 
contrary to Rust's orders - which applied to the whole of Germany 
once he became Reich Minister of Education in 1934 - girls were 
continuing to be admitted to these schools. 
In the 1938 reform, then, the Government was reiterating 
opposition to coeducation which had already been expressed on 
several occasions, but which had not been backed up by effective 
action. The Neuordnung des höheren Schulwesens did, however, concede 
that there might still occasionally be special circumstances in which 
girls could be admitted to boys' schools, although on no account 
were boys to attend girls' senior schools2. The number of boys 
1. Deutsche Schulerziehung, loc. cit. 
2. Dti"dEu.V, loc. cit. 
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likely to be affected by this ruling was, in fact, minimal: in 1931 
there were 849, constituting the tiny fraction of 0.3% of the total 
number of pupils in girls' senior schools; in 1937, the numbers had 
in fact risen to 1313 and the proportion to 0.6%, but as such the 
problem remained insignificanti. In the order it was stressed that 
the differences between the two sexes necessitated forms of schooling 
in which the emphases would be different, with the stipulation that 
in those cases where girls did attend boys' schools provision should 
be made for their "special needs ", which were not described2. This 
proviso was enlarged six months later in another measure which laid 
down that separate toilet facilities and a needlework room were to 
be made available for girls in those boys' schools where there was 
consistently a large number of girls3. Such a provision in an 
official order was an admission that coeducation had not been, and was 
not being, stamped out, although in theory it was anathema. An order 
of 18 January, 1939, even urged that, if there was a large enough 
number of girls at a boys' school, a domestic science class should be 
formed, so that attendance at a boys' senior school would not deprive 
them of some elements of a "womanly" education4. 
One reason for girls, or their parents, flying in the face 
of stated Government policy here was undoubtedly that there was a 
growing fear before 1938 that even talented girls would be handicapped 
1. Deutsche Schulerziehung, loc. cit. 
2. D!filEuV, loc. cit. 
3. "Mad.chen an Jungenschulen", DWEuV 1938, 27 August, 1938, no. 477, 
pp. 429-30. 
4. "Mádchen an Jungenschulen ", DWEuV 1939, 18 January, 1939, no. 46, 
pp. 56 -57. 
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by attending girls' schools in which, it had been predicted, the 
academic content would be reduced in favour of domestic science. 
And after the publication of the 1938 reform, it was clear that girls 
would have a better chance of achieving university entrance in the 
boys' schools, which provided more teaching of science and Latin 
than the girls' schools. In order to try to block one loophole, 
the Government ordered in August 1938 that girls in the lower grades 
of boys' schools should not be given Latin lessons, in line with the 
absence of Latin in the first five years at girls' schools. This 
meant that girls hoping to proceed to the higher grades of the boys' 
schools would have to make up what they had missed in the way of 
Latin classes by means of private tuitionl. But the exigencies of war 
rendered the provision of any special teaching for girls at boys' 
schools impracticable, and the announcement abolishing this in 
January 1940 also stated that girls were to be allowed to study 
Latin on the sane terms as boys, and to be educated in classes with 
boys in all subjects except sport2. 
It appears, then, that in spite of the fact that segregation 
of the sexes was a firm tenet of Nazi policy and although the Nazis 
were indisputably in control of the Government of Germany from 1933, 
a measure of coeducation continued throughout the 1930s, to be 
finally accepted as necessary in war -time. There can be little 
doubt that the war -time expedients were envisaged as being purely 
1. DWEuV 1938, loc. cit. 
2. "Sonderunterricht für MAdchen, die Oberschulen für Jungén besuchen, 
DVEuV 1940, 12 January, 1940, no. 53, p 76. 
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temporary, but what is amazing is that coeducation had not been 
stamped out long before the war. After all, the Nazis did not have 
to face the problems of the 1920s, when the political parties were 
deeply split on this issue, and when there was no central agency for 
the administration of education. In addition, large -scale dismissals 
of teachers and administrators for political reasonsI meant that much 
potential opposition to Nazi policies at the local level was removed 
at the start. Therefore it must be concluded that, in spite of the 
constant reiteration of their complete opposition to coeducation, the 
Nazis themselves failed to enforce their policy in such a way that it 
was effective. The result was a continuation of the stalemate of the 
1920s, which prevented progress towards a system in which schools were 
open to boys and girls equally. Thus, if a number of girls did 
attend boys' senior schools, this did not alter the fact that these 
remained schools which were primarily intended for boys, and that 
there were other institutions intended specifically for girls. 
The Neuordnung des h8heren Schulwesens was scheduled to take 
effect from the autumn of 1938, although it was accepted that there 
would have to be at least a short transition period. This meant that 
in the first year some allowances, and the provision of extra tuition 
in certain subjects, if necessary, would be made for the senior pupils, 
who would be the most affected by the change- over2. But already 
during this first year, even before Germany was at war, it was clear 
that the new system would present difficulties. The propagation of 
the homecraft stream in the girls' schools was not consistent with the 
1. This is discussed in Chapter 5. 




the need to encourage more girls to aim for university study, which 
was apparent even before 1938. The result was that as early as 
January 1939 Rust issued an order to the effect that girls who were 
awarded the certificate of the homecraft stream and who wished to 
proceed to university would have to sit a further examination in 
history, mathematics, physics and two languages to be eligible for 
admissionl. 
This topsy -turvy arrangement was the outcome of the stubborn 
insistence of the Minister of Education, and of Party ideologues 
who did not have to operate practical policies, that girls should 
be encouraged to choose a "womanly" education instead of an academic 
one, even when events were already proving them wrong. The final 
contortion was to come in August 1939, when it was ordered that, as 
from Easter 1941, the certificate of the domestic science course would 
entitle girls to enter university in the same way as the certificate 
of the language course, although the farmer's academic content was 
significantly weaker than the latter's2. Given this contradictory 
and capricious attitude by the Government to girls' education, and 
also, by implication, to the standards of university study, it is 
hardly surprising that there were complaints voiced in 1942 about 
irresponsible behaviour on the part of many girl students, since the 
new entrance requirements !meant that many would be very ill -equipped 
indeed to cope with academic study which had been designed to cater for 
students who had been far more adequately prepared for it. This was a 
very serious state of affairs indeed at a time when girls were forming 
1. "Berechtigung der Reifezeugnisse 
hauswirtschaftliche Form ", DV1EuV 
2. "Berechtigung der Reifezeugnisse 
hauswirtschaftliche Form ", DWEuV 
P. 463. 
der Oberschule für Madchen, 
1939, 24 January, 1939, no. 77, p. 80. 
der Oberschule für Mädchen, 
1939, 23 August, 1939, no. 467, 
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a high proportion of the student bodyl. 
This, then, was the Nazi answer to the "mistaken development" 
of education during the Weimar years. Their stated aim at the start 
had been "to reduce the number of senior pupils and students to 
the extent that basic education is afforded and the needs of the 
professions are satisfied "2. Certainly, it had been sensible, even 
necessary - doctrinal reasons apart - to proceed in the matter of 
restricting or delaying university entrance at a time of severe graduate 
unemployment, a policy advocated by the last democratic Governments 
but, because of their inherent difficulties, unimplemented by them. 
It was probably a combination of ideological absurdity, ¿iven the 
Party's basic anti -intellectualism, and administrative inefficiency, 
given the mediocrity of its leading figures, that led to this policy's 
being pushed far beyond the desirable limit until it was realised that 
the process would have to be not only halted but even reversed. 
As far as girls' education was concerned, it was desirable that 
more attention should indeed be paid to domestic science, which was 
too often despised in intellectual circles and given no place in the 
academic senior schools. But the switch from overemphasising academic 
talents to overemphasising "womanly" education and the virtues of 
motherhood was a grotesque overcompensation, and bore no relation 41 
to the actual needs of the German economy as the 1930s wore on, so 
that there was to be a consistent shortage of qualified personnel to 
the end of the decade and, to the nation's disadvantage, during the 
war years. This was still true after the volte -face in autumn 1936, 
1. IfZ, I4A 441/6, frame 2- 757141, op. cit. 
2. "Rechtsentwicklung ", Jahrbuch des Deutschen Rechts, 1934, p. 24. 
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when official pronouncements began to stress the importance 
of encouraging academically talented girls to go to university, 
because even at this time the school system was being prepared to 
divert girls from academic study. 
Even so, Hitler must have been greatly removed from reality 
to be able to say, in 1942, that "girls...have received education in 
accordance with the principles of National Socialism "1. Certainly, 
girls had been constantly bombarded with Nazi propaganda about the 
role of women in society. But this could not change the situation 
that the Nazis themselves created. For, in the end, it was their own 
policies, the expansionist ones which were inevitably given precedence 
over the enforcement of the Party's educational and social policies 
with regard to women, which rendered impossible the already difficult 
task of implementing points of doctrine once considered immutable. 
1. Hitler's Table Talk 1941 -44, London, 1953, no. 223, 20 iay, 1942 
(Midday), p. 491. 
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CHAPTER FIVE1 
Women and the Professions 
Introduction 
There is probably no area which has proved to be a more 
sensitive indicator of a society's attitude to the status of 
women than the professions - that is, those occupations for whose 
exercise a degree or a diploma is required. The first prerequisite 
for admission to the professions is, of course, the availability of 
opportunities for higher education; thus, prospects for women in 
the professions in Germany after the Great War should have been 
bright, with girls admitted to every German university before the 
war and the rapidly increasing number of girl students in the 1920s. 
But, at the same time, women had been admitted to full membership of 
the civil service and the legal and medical professions, as well as 
to university lectureships, only after the war; and married women 
had then been admitted to professional positions for the first time. 
The tradition of male dominance in the professions and prejudice 
against women achieving positions of responsibility and influence 
persisted throughout the 1920s into the 1930s, while the straitened 
economic situation which dogged Germany during the Weimar years 
restricted the room for manoeuvre available to those who would have 
been pleased to promote the interests of the extremely small minority 
of women who aspired to a professional career. The depression also 
gave the National Socialists the excuse to try to put theory into 
practice by circumscribing the activities of professional women, as of 
employed women as a whole. But, again similar to the situation in the 
1. An earlier draft of this chapter was published as: Jill McIntyre, 
"Women and the Professions in Germany, 1930 -1940 ", Anthony 
Nicholls and Erich Matthias (ed.), German Democracy and the Triumph 
of H___ itler, London, 1971, pp. 175 -213. 
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employment market generally, the theory soon proved impractical, 
and the policies which had priority in the Nazi State necessitated 
warm encouragment to women to enter professional occupations. 
Some progress was, however, made in the 1920s, including 
the achievement of equal pay for women in the public service - whether 
as teachers, lawyers, doctors, lecturers or civil servants - as a 
result of Article 128 of the Weimar Constitution. This was in line 
with practice after the war in the majority of European countries 
although it was not until 1955 that equal pay for women in the 
civil service and the teaching profession was introduced in Great 
Britain2. But the obstacles to full acceptance of women in the 
professions remained formidable. Speaking of the Federal Republic 
in the early 1960s, one campaigner of the 1920s could still complain 
of prejudice against the employment of women on university staffs and 
as senior civil servants3. And an official report published in 1961 
asserted: 
"That up to now women have had so small a share in the 
qualified professions is in singular contrast to the fact 
that they have exactly the same right to high- school and 
university education as men, and that the percentage of 
girl students is high.... Observations indicate that, in 
spite of the legally -embedded equality of rights, women 
in professional employment have in no way the same chances as 
men "4. 
1. Vera Douie (ed.), The Professional Position of Women: 
Survey immediately preceding World War II, London, 1947, pp. 
20 -38. 
a World 
2. Keesing's ContemjDorary Archives, vol. X, 1955-56, "Equal Pay for 
Women in the Non -industrial Civil Service and for Women Teachers ", 
25 January, 1955, p. 14165. 
30 Marie- Elisabeth Luders, "Aus der 
1919 -33 ", Ernst Deuerlein (ed.), 
Protokolle und Darstellungen zur 
Vertretung des deutschen Volkes, 
Frauenarbeit des 
Der Reichstag. Aufsätze 
Geschichte der parlamentischen 
1871 -1933 ", Bonn, 1963, 113. 
4. "The Position of Women ", Germany Reports (Bundesrepublik publication), 
Bonn, 1961, p. 679. 
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These words might well have been written thirty years earlier, to 
describe the situation that obtained in the Germany of the Weimar 
Republic, and to imply the disillusionment felt by those who had 
imagined that legal equality would necessarily bring a striking 
degree of progress in its train° 
A. Progress and Pre,iudiee in the Weimar Republic 
There were two main strands in the development of women's 
position in the professions after the Great War. The first 
concerned the female sex as a whole, and was conditioned by factors 
such as the relatively recent admission of women to the universities, 
the losses sustained by men during the war1, and general attitudes 
to the equality of opportunity for women written into the Weimar 
Constitution. The other element was the more specific one of the 
employment of married women, which became a contentious issue across 
the occupational spectrum after the war2, but nowhere more so than 
in the professions. Those who had opposed the admission of women 
to the professions on the grounds that they 
nor physically suited to such demanding and 
reluctantly prepared in the 1920s to accept 
number of dedicated career -women - who were 
to meet the demands of the feminist lobby. 
were neither intellectually 
responsible work , were 
the appointment of a select 
by definition unmarried . 
But there remained many 
1. For example, on 17 June, 1918, The Times reported that "during the 
war 14,722 German teachers have been killed or are missing ". 
2. This is discussed in Chapter 3, pp. 126 -31. 
3. Kirchhoff, loc. cit. 
Russell, loc. cito 
Report by Maximilian Harden in Die Zukunft, 24 August, 1918, pp. 
224 -32. 
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men, and also women, who were opposed in principle to the employment 
of married women in professional positions, not least because of the 
decline in the birth rate after the war. Studies of the birth rate 
among married women graduates which appeared during the 1920s 
provided little consolation for those who supported unconditionally 
a woman2s right to work: it was shown that, on average, the 
families of women in professional positions were marginally larger 
than those of men in similar jobs, but that both these groups had 
a lower birth rate than any other section of the community1. The 
dropping birth rate, therefore, continued to be used as ammunition 
against the professional Doppelverdiener. 
While the campaign against the married woman in a professional 
job gathered increasing momentum, as positions became ever more 
scarce in the later 1920s, it seemed as if the position of women 
generally in the professions was becoming more secure. The early 
governments of the Republic, and Hermann Miller's government in 
1928 -30, were generally well- disposed towards the cause of women's 
advancement, although those of the more economically stable middle 
years, when the Social Democrats were out of office and the Centre 
Party was dominant, were not inclined to accelerate the progress 
initially made. Still, if there was no woman Cabinet Minister in 
Germany during the 1920s and 1930s, the same was true of other 
European countries, with the exceptions of Britain and the Soviet 
Union. And women were appointed to senior positions at both the 
national and Land level2. These were, of course, outstanding 
exceptions, and while a number of other women were appointed to minor 
1. Agnes Martens -Edelmann, "Frauenstudium, Ehe und Mutterschaft ", Die 
Frau, November 1936, pp. 84-89. 
2. The detail of this is given in Chapter 1, pp. 23 -24. 
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official positions, it is important to emphasise that there was 
only ever a tiny handful at the top. Nevertheless, given the barriers 
of prejudice which women had to face in winning full admission to 
professional positions, the steady progress achieved in the 1920s, 
particularly in teaching and medicine - no doubt partly because of 
male casualties in the war - was considered reasonable by the moderate 
feminists, even if it was deemed totally inadequate by the radical 
feminists and excessive by conservatives. 
With the removal of all obstacles to the practice of medicine 
by women, they became active in all areas of the profession after 
1918, in ever- increasing numbers1. By May 1927 there were 1,757 
women doctors who constituted 4% of the total number, and by the 
end of 1930 the figures had risen to 2,648 and 5.6 %2. At the same 
time, the number of women teachers increased, as also did their 
proportion to men in the profession: in the primary schools their 
share rose to 25% in 1927, compared with the pre-war figure of 21 %; 
in the middle schools the rise was from 32% to 50%; and in the girls' 
senior schools they continued to constitute about three -quarters of 
the total number3. Women were also admitted to the staffs of 
universities and colleges, and in the summer of 1927 there were thirty - 
one women lecturers in the universities, who formed the tiny proportion 
of 0.0 of the total number4. The increasing number of girl students 
1. Mathilde Kelchner, Die Frau und der weibliche Arzt, Leipzig, 1934, 
p. 14. 
2. St.J.: 1928, p. 486; 1931, P. 406. 
3. Ibid.: 1914, Pp. 322 -24; 1924/25, PP. 355 -57. 
4. Ibid., 1928, p. 512. 
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throughout the 1920s, however, suggested that there would be more 
women appointed to university lectureships in the relatively 
near future. Probably the biggest breakthrough for women in the 
professions came, however, in October 1922, when three women were 
admitted as junior barristers to a Berlin court, thus entering one 
of the most sacrosanct of male preserves. But although their numbers 
had increased to twenty -five by September 1930, women made little 
progress beyond the lower levels of the legal professionl. 
Like their male colleagues, professional women joined together 
in organisations. Some became members of groups which had male 
members, such as the Institut far Soziale Arbeit,, but the large number 
of professional organisations exclusively for women testifies to an 
alignment chiefly by sex, and therefore to the maintenance of a degree 
of solidarity among the feminists who had campaigned before the war 
for the admission of women without discrimination to the professions, 
This point was reinforced by the association of the women's 
professional organisations with the other women's clubs - whether of 
a vocational, a social or a charitable nature - in the annual Women's 
Congress2. 
The strongest and most senior of the women's professional groups 
was the Allgemeiner Deutscher Lehrerinnenverein (General Union of 
German Women Teachers), which had been founded by Helene Lange in 1890. 
By 1930, it had more than 40,000 members, from a variety of localities, 
denominations and types of school3. Just as the majority of the pre -war 
1. "10 Jahre weibliche Richter ", Die Frau, January 1933, p. 249. 
2. BA, Nachlass Katharina von Kardorff, no. 28, p. 9, "Der XI. Frauen - 
congress in Berlin, 17.- 22.6.1929: Ehrenbeirat der Verbände ". 
3. Puckett, op. cit., p. 178. 
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women's organisations had become corporate members of the BDF, so 
the organisations of women doctors, teachers, civil servants, 
lecturers and students had their own federation, or " Dachorganisation", 
namely the Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund1. There were also separate 
groups which remained outside this combine, chiefly the denominational 
teaching associations like the Verein Deutscher Evangelischer 
Lehrerinnen2, and the Verein katholischer Lehrerinnen3. The identity 
of the women's professional organisations was often asserted in the 
publication of an independent journal; for example, the magazine 
of the women doctors, Die Arztin, paralleled the men's Der Arzt4. A 
late -comer to the field of women's professional groups was the 
Vereinigung Deutscher Hochschuldozentinnen, founded in 1927 by 
Professor Rhoda Erdmann, for the small but growing number of women 
lecturers in universities and colleges5. 
But if progress was being made and if professional women were 
demonstrating their new self -assurance in their organisational 
activity, there was still much left to be desired, as a DVP member, 
Martha Schwarz, pointed out in 1932. In a report on women civil 
servants in the Prussian Ministry of Education in 1931 - choosing the 
area in which women were professionally best represented and the Land 
"which has been governed for over seven years by the parties 
allegedly well- disposed towards women's interests, the SPD and the 
1. Clifford Kirkpatrick, Woman in Nazi Germany, London, 1939, p. 50. 
2. BA, R2/1291, letter from the committee of the VDEL to the Reich 
Minister of Finance, 7 June, 1923. 
3. Eilers, op. cit., p. 76n. 
4. Report in FiS, May 1929, p. 4. 
5. "Die deutsche Frau in Lehre und Forschung ", FK, February 1938, p. 3. 
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Democrats" - she showed that women were still very under- represented; 
of forty -five senior officials in the Ministry, only three were 
female. In the local educational authorities of Prussia the story 
was much the same, or, in some cases, worse. Martha Schwarz found 
it particularly objectionable that only sixty -seven of the 346 heads 
of girls' senior schools were women, although she added that women 
should be promoted only if they met the necessary requirements. 
Equally, she added that it was not her view that large numbers of 
women should suddenly be found high -ranking positions. Nevertheless, 
the sad truth seemed to be that the left -wing government which had 
taken office in Prussia in 1925 had failed to improve on the position 
it inherited, in the gradual manner favoured by the moderate 
feminists1. 
The governments of the Reich and the Lander found themselves 
faced with two conflicting demands: Article 128 of the 1919 
Constitution stated specifically that 
"All citizens without distinction are eligible for public 
office in accordance with the laws and according to their 
abilities and achievements. All discriminations against 
women in the civil service are abolished ". 
But, at the same time, there was a desperate need to cut public 
spending and, therefore, to reduce the number of civil servants - 
whether they were administrators, teachers, doctors or lawyers. The 
least painful way to achieve this seemed to be to try to persuade 
married women in the public service to resign, and as an emergency 
measure - which eventually turned out to be a useful precedent - the 
Reich Minister of Finance announced that married women civil servants 
1. BA, 84511/64, M. Schwarz, "Frauen in der preussischen Unterrichts- 
verwaltung", Frauenrundschau, 11 February, 1932. 
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in the postal and transport services would receive a lump -sum 
payment if they resigned during the chaotic financial year 1922 -231. 
But if the national government had agonised over this decision, some 
of the Land governments had no compunction whatsoever in blatantly 
ignoring the provisions of Article 128; it was left to the courts to 
reverse measures enacted to discriminate against married women 
teachers in both Bavaria and Wurttemberg . 
Opposition to married women gainfully employed outside the 
home concentrated on women in professional jobs for two reasons: 
firstly, it was regretted but recognised that many working -class women 
were forced to earn -a wage to supplement their husband's income if 
the family was to be supported; secondly, it was conceded that many 
married women, particularly in agriculture, in the textile trade and 
in some clerical jobs, were doing work that would not normally be done 
by men, but it was claimed that professional women could easily be 
replaced by men, and might well be preventing a suitably -qualified man 
from finding a post. In some cases, complaints were made about the 
employment of married women by single women who felt that they should 
have priority. In June 1923 the committee of the Union of German 
Evangelical Women Teachers wrote to the Minister of Finance asking him 
to provide a sum of money as severance pay to encourage married women 
to retire from the profession since, said their President, many would 
do so if they could afford to. She regretted that the provision making 
dismissal obligatory on marriage for women teachers had been revoked, 
1. BA, R2/1291, letter from the Württemberg Minister of Finance to 
the Reich Minister of Finance, 31 March, 1923, 
2, Auguste Steiner, "Zur Berufsarbeit der verheirateten Frau ", BF, 
February 1933, p. 6. 
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and complained that, for one thing, married women could not devote 
the necessary energy and attention to their job, and, for another, 
that there was hardship among single women who were qualified 
teachers but could not find a position while married women worked1. 
This was no isolated instance: in March 1923, Christine Teusch, 
a Centre Party Reichstag deputy, had asked the Minister of Finance 
to authorise the payment of a sum of money to married women who 
retired from a professional post; but the Minister had regretfully 
refused because, he said, the money was not available2. 
Even in difficult times, the goodwill of the more liberal 
Reich Governments was not in doubt. As early as 1920, guidelines 
were drawn up for regulations to define the status of married women 
in the public service, to bring the Civil Code into line with the 
Constitution3. By 1929, however, this had still not been achieved4, 
and, although he regarded the matter as one of major importance, 
Severing - as Reich Minister of the Interior - was obliged to admit 
in September 1929 that the majority necessary to pass such a measure 
in the Reichstag could not be constructed. Instead, he planned to 
incorporate it into his projected comprehensive civil service law5. 
1. BA, R2/1291, letter from the committee of the VDEL to the Reich 
Minister of Finance, 7 June, 1923. 
2. Ibid., letter from the Reich Minister of Finance to Frau 
May 1923 (exact date not given). 
3. Ibid., letter from the Reich Minister of the Interior to 
Secretary in the Chancellery, 10 July, 1923. 
4. Ibid., letter from Severing to the other Reich Ministers et al., 
12 July, 1929. 
5. Ibid., letter from Severing to the other Reich Ministers et al., 




But Müller's Government had demonstrated its good faith by 
instructing Hilferding - the Reich Minister of Finance - to make 
proposals for increasing the number of places available for women 
administrators in the Reich Ministries in his budget plans for 1929. 
The aim was to open an avenue to promotion for women clerical workers 
who had obtained a qualification which made them eligible for the 
higher civil servicel. This measure was duly accepted by the 
Reichstag as a part of the 1929 budget2. 
But even as the Government was making this demonstration of 
goodwill, the economic situation was worsening, and with it prospects 
for all aspiring professional people. Already in the autumn of 
1929 the Reich Ministries were again searching for ways of reducing 
staff, to save money, and were increasingly coming to the conclusion 
that this could be most conveniently achieved by offering married 
women the financial incentive of severance pay if they resigned 
voluntarily3. In the teaching profession, the situation was grim, 
with 29,000 qualified teachers without jobs in Prussia alone4, and 
by the time the economic crisis hit Germany there were far more 
applicants for professional positions of every kind than there were 
jobs available5. The outlook continued to grow only blacker in 1930 
1. Ibid., letter from Hilferding to the State Secretary in the Chancellery, 
19 November, 1928. 
2. Ibid., notice issued by section IB of the Reich Ministry of Finance, 
undated (? end of March, 1929). 
3. Ibid., letter from the Minister of Transport, Dr. Rocholl, to the 
German Railways Corporation, 5 October, 1929. 
4. Christoph Führ, op. cit., p. 29. 
5. Georg Gothein, "Die wirtschaftlichen Aussichten für Industrie und 
Mittelstand ", Deutsche Handels -warte, 1929, no. 4, p. 90, found in 
BA, Nachlass Gothein, no. 79. 
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and 1931, as the Government's need to retrench grew more urgent, and 
as the number of students - who would soon join the queue for 
professional jobs - rose to record proportionsl. A speaker at the 
1932 conference of the Bavarian Union of Women's Associations claimed 
that women were being even worse hit by the deteriorating situation than 
men2, and indeed in the teaching profession it seemed as if this was 
true: while there were 15,000 male candidates waiting for vacancies 
among 13,600 male teachers with permanent jobs in Prussia in 1931, 
there were as many as 7,500 qualified women teachers waiting for 
vacancies among the mere 1,900 permanent female members of school 
staffs3. 
The deepening of the economic crisis led to an intensification 
of the attacks already being made on the Doppelverdiener, especially 
in the professions. In response to this tendency, a Government 
Commission, appointed in 1931 to investigate ways of solving - or at 
least mitigating - the unemployment problem, particularly recommended 
a much wider resort to the practice of offering "compensation" to 
those professional married women who retired from the public service. 
Reporting this, the radical feminist Grete Stoffel observed that 
"There does not yet exist a law which entitles or obliges the State or 
a private employer to dismiss female civil servants or clerical workers 
just because they are married ". But, she predicted pessimistically, 
it seemed likely that a measure on these lines would form a part of 
the new law being contemplated on the basis of the Commission's report4. 
1. See above, Chapter 4, p. 190. 
2. Report in BF, July /August 1932, p. 2. 
3. Report in BF, February 1932, p. 6. 
4. Grete Stoffel, "Die Arbeitslosigkeit und die Frauenarbeit ", FiS, 
August /September 1931, p. 5. 
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The feminists were convinced that the Government's attitude 
towards the employment of women, and particularly women in 
professional positions, was at best negative, and probably hostilel. 
But the Bruning Government was actually extremely unwilling to 
discriminate against any group, including married women, and it was 
with reluctance that, at the end of 1931, with the situation still 
worsening, it sounded out the Reichstag to find if support could be 
secured for a bill which would permit the dismissal of married women 
civil servants. The response was positive2. As the Government 
prepared its bill, feminists of all shades of opinion began a 
campaign to oppose it. Indeed, they had a degree of reason on their 
side: the figures that were bandied about - based on the 1925 census - 
showed that the furore concerned at most 7,000 out of a total of 
3,700,000 employed married women; thus the retirement of even all 
married women civil servants would make a negligible contribution to 
solving the unemployment problem, even if it provided jobs for a few 
more male graduates3. 
If the feminists found this gesture by the Government alarming, 
they were even more concerned by the way that the campaign against 
the Doppelverdiener seemed to be broadening into an attack on the 
general position of women in employment, particularly in responsible, 
1. "Die Lage der Frau in den geistigen Berufen ", BF, July /August 1932, 
p. 2. 
__.. 
2. BA, R451I/64, Lotte Garnich, "Krise und Frauenberufsarbeit ", 
Frauenrundschau, 4 February, 1932, pp. 1115 -17. 
3. Ibid. 
Grete Stoffel, loc. cit. 
Maria Hellersberg, "Die Berufsarbeit der Frau ", BF, February 1932, 
pp. 1 -2. 
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well -paid positions. One example of this was a proposal made in 
the Prussian Landtag by the Centre Party - with the support of 
leading Catholic women - that employed single as well as married 
women should be replaced by men1. Further, the increasing strength 
of the National Socialists, evidenced in the Reichstag elections 
of 1930, and then 1932, gave rise to fears that the situation could 
become very much worse than it seemed already to be. Lida Gustava 
Heymann warned that in the Third Reich women would be forced to 
revert to their role in Imperial days, which she characterised as 
that of child- bearing machine and maidservant of men, with all 
political rights revoked2. A more prosaic, but equally grim, picture 
was painted by a DVP supporter, who predicted that under the Nazis 
women would lose not only their political rights but also the right 
to work in the public service. She was able to support her gloomy 
forecast with references to Mein Kampf, the Nazi Party Programme, and 
speeches by Nazis, including Alfred Rosenberg and Hermann Esser3. 
Nazi propaganda indeed justified fears of this nature, but, as 
was to become increasingly apparent, Nazi propaganda did not always 
represent the Party's ideas faithfully. In fact, the Nazis 
recognised that many women were obliged to earn a living, often against 
their will4, These, at least - including perhaps some of the 128,000 
1. Grete Stoffel, loc. cit. 
2. Lida Gustava Heymann, "Nachkriegspsychose ", FiS, March 1931, pp. 1 -2. 
3. BA, op. cit., Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, "Die Stellung des National- 
sozialismus zur Frau ", Frauenrundschau, 6 April, 1932, p. 1169. 
4. Alice Rilke, "Die erwerbstatige Frau im Dritten Reich ", NS- Frauen- 
buch, Munich, 1934, p. 65. 
Angela Meister, "Die deutsche Industriearbeiterin ", Munich University 
dissertation, 1938, pp. 26 -27. 
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professional women1 - could be lured back into the home by family 
allowances and the marriage -loan scheme. But it would be much more 
difficult to persuade those women in the professions who looked on 
their job as an absorbing career that their true vocation lay within 
the sphere of the home and children, to the exclusion of all else. 
They would therefore have to be coerced into accepting their "natural 
calling ", in which they would find true happiness. So ran the theory2. 
It was recognised, however, that not all women would marry - something 
which was obvious, in view of the fact that there were two million 
more women than men in Germany throughout the inter -war period - and 
so those who did not would have to find employment in occupations 
concerned with women, children and domestic matters. In this way, 
they would at least be able to fulfil their maternal instincts at 
second hand3. The nation would thus benefit, too, from the best use 
of their womanly talents: "Helfen, Heilen, Erziehen" (helping, 
healing, training) were women's functions, allotted to her by nature4, 
The Nazis, therefore, perhaps unintentionally, implicitly recognised 
the need for women in the medical and teaching professions and also in 
10 St.D.R., vol. 451, section 3, p. 49. 
2. "Die Geschlechter im Dritten Reich ", F`rankische Tageszeitung, 17 
April, 1934. 
3. Siber, op. cit., pp. 26 -27. 
Lydia Gottschewski, Männerbund und Frauenfrage, Munich, 1934, p. 71. 
An account of the role played by Paula Siber and Lydia Gottschewski 
in the Nazi women's organisation is given in chapter 6. 
4. Report in VB, 17 March, 1934. 
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skilled social work of all kinds1. 
To this extent, there was to be little for the Nazis to 
change. The results of the census conducted in May 1933 showed 
that half of all professional women were engaged in teaching at 
various levels, with another 10% involved in occupations connected 
with health and welfare. The other most significant employer of 
women in the professional grade was the Ministry of Posts, with 
almost 34,000, or more than a quarter of all women in this category. 
This group might well be a target for Nazi discriminatory measures; 
and there could be little doubt that the Nazis would view with 
greatest disfavour the 10,000 women employed as officials at the 
national and local level2. In both absolute and relative terms, the 
number of married women in this group was snail: a mere 4,000 
professional married women in 1933 constituted less than 4% of the 
total category; by contrast, more than one -third of all employed 
women were married, with the result that almost one -third of all 
married women were employed3. Thus, any campaign against this section 
of working women could, even at its most effective, have only very 
marginal results for the labour market as a whole. 
Some of the Nazis' work was, however, done for them before they 
came to power, as the reduction in the number of married women in the 
professions from up to 7,000 in 1925 to 4,000 in 1933 - the census 
1. G. Vogel, Die deutsche Frau. III: im Weltkrieg und im Dritten 
Reich, Breslau, 1936, p. 6. 
Elfriede Eggener, "Die organische Eingliederung der Frau in den 
nationalsozialistischen Staat ", Leipzig University dissertation, 
1938, pp. 37 and 47, 
2. St.D.R., op. cit., p. 37. 
3. Ibid., p. 76. 
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coming before Nazi legislation in this matter - shows. Although 
it had shown some reluctance to yield to the demand to single out the 
Doppelverdiener for dismissal to ease the critical situation in the 
civil service and the professions, the Bruning Government at last 
followed up the rather tentative moves it had made in this direction 
with a bill designed, euphemistically, to define "the legal status 
of women civil servants "; it was hardly in the spirit Severing had 
envisaged for his projected bill, although, ironically, it bore a 
similar title1. Now, in May 1932, Groener, as Reich Minister of 
the Interior, introduced a measure which provided that married 
women employed in responsible positions by the State would not only 
always, understandably, be permitted to resign at their own request, 
but might also be dismissed without such a request, if "their 
financial maintenance seemed from the size of the income in their 
family to be guaranteed in the long term ". The banks and the 
railway authorities were empowered to adopt a similar regulation. 
Three months' notice had to be given, and reasonable compensation 
paid; but this severance payment cancelled all existing pension 
rights. A provision was included to allow for the possible re- 
employment of a woman who left her job as a result of this measure, 
if there was a dramatic change for the worse in her financial situation2. 
But this promise could not disguise the stark fact that the Constitution 
was, in the context of equal rights for women in the public service, 
a dead letter. 
1. BA, R2/1291, letter from Severing to the Reich Ministers, 12 July, 
1929. 
2. "Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der weiblichen Beamten ", RGB, 
1932 I, 30 May, 1932, pp. 245 -46. 
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The law clearly found favour in some quarters; the Minister 
of Posts lost no time in conferring with the Minister of the Interior 
about the possibility of applying it to his sphere of control, and 
on 7 June, 1932, issued his own version of it. This provided for 
the more positive approach of circulating all married women 
officials in the postal service with a written enquiry as to whether 
they wished to submit their resignation. Those who did not resign 
were to be required to declare the income of their family as a 
whole and the occupation of their husband, so that the arbitration 
committee established by the Minister could decide if these women 
really needed their income; if not, they were to be dismissed, although, 
again more positively, the order of dismissal was to be revoked if 
their financial position ceased to be secure'. The Minister of the 
Interior approved of these regulations to the extent that he 
recommended the adoption of them by the Reich agencies which had not 
yet proposed such a measure, to achieve national uniformity2. 
The reaction among the feminists was, naturally, one of 
opposition, but they were by no means united. A stinging attack on 
the law of 30 May came from Dr. glare Schoedon in the radical feminist 
magazine Die Frau im Staat. In an article entitled "Sic transit gloria..." 
she claimed that Article 128 of the Constitution had been torn to 
shreds and that a married woman no longer had any right to 
independence, so dependent had she now been made on the ability and the 
desire of her husband to support her. Dr. Schoedon poured burning 
scorn on the clauses which were designed to mitigate the measure, and 
1. BA, R431I/427, "Ausfahrungsanweisungen der DRP ", 7 June, 1932. 
2. Ibid., letter from Freiherr von Gayl to the Reich Ministers and 
authorities, 15 June, 1932. 
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then turned on those who had passed it into law, the men and 
women of the political parties in the Reichstag. The Centre 
Party had been the bill's sponsor, and its view that the place of 
a married woman was in the family and not in employment was 
faithfully reflected in the measure, wrote Klare Schoedon; the 
views of the Nationalist Party were sufficiently similar to the 
Centre's in this area to guarantee the bill its support. Only 
the Communists were prepared to vote against it, insisting in 
debate that it amounted to an outright denial of equal rights for 
women; their declared adherence to this last principle did not 
deter the Social Democrats from voting for the bill, as did the 
Nazis - understandably enough, given their view that the ideal 
place for women was in the homel. 
Apart from the Communists, only one party did not support 
the bill, and that was the tiny Staatspartei, the former DDP; its 
members, including Gertrud Ammer - who ought to have been leading 
a parliamentary campaign against the bill, given her position in the 
women's movement - merely abstained. Indeed, Gertrud Bäumer spoke 
against the measure in debate, prophetically calling it "a 
dangerous precedent ", but it was her docility, and that of the other 
women deputies, in the name of Party solidarity, which disgusted 
K1Kre Schoedon most of all, particularly the way in which Helene 
Weber of the Centre Party - herself a high- ranking civil servant in 
the Prussian Ministry of Welfare2 - had spoken in favour of the measure. 
The other source of deep concern to K1'dre Schoedon was the fact that 
1. Kláre Schoedon, "Sic transit gloria... ", FiS, July 1932, pp. 5-7. 
2. Horkenbach, op. cit., p. 766. 
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the dismissal of the eight or nine hundred women who might be 
affected by the law would do more to damage the rights of women than 




But there were clearly enough women, both in and outside 
the Reichstag, who were prepared to accept this measure to ensure 
that there would be no concerted opposition from the ranks even of 
interested women. Marie- Elisabeth Luders, who was a Staatspartei 
deputy at the time, has since written that a hard campaign was 
fought in the Reichstag against the law, but that some of the women's 
professional organisations approved of this "arbitrary measure "2. 
Certainly, those affiliated to the Churches - the stand taken by the 
Union of Evangelical Women Teachers in 1923 against the employment of 
married women is worth remembering here3 - did much to bear out 
Klare Schoedon's fear that the measure would succeed in setting 
the unmarried against the married woman civil servant4. 
The law did, in any case, have one redeeming feature. As a 
result of a campaign waged by the Union of Women Post and Telegraph 
Officials, it was written into the law that a married woman who had to 
retire because of "secure" financial circumstances would be re- employed 
"if at all possible" if her husband ceased to be able to provide for 
her. This, claimed Dr. Auguste Steiner, was an improvement on the 
1. Klare Schoedon, op. cit., pp. 6 -7. 
2. Marie- Elisabeth Luders, op. cit., p. 122. 
3. See above, p. 262. 
BA, 82/1291, letter from the VDEL to the Reich Minister of Finance, 
7 June, 1923. 
4. Klare Schoedon, op. cit., p. 6. 
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situation which had obtained for a year, in which married women 
were the last candidates to be considered for a job, regardless of 
their circumstances. In addition, she said, there were women in 
responsible positions who were pleased enough to give up work in 
return for a lump -sum payment, particularly young women who planned 
to marry, and for whom the cash payment would be more useful than the 
future prospect of a steady income. But none of this, said Dr. 
Steiner, could really justify the attack on women's rights which the 
law signified, and it was on these grounds that both the BDF and the 
Union of Civil Servants condemned it1. 
B. Purge and Co- ordination, 1913 -34 
If things had looked bad for those who favoured equality of 
opportunity for women in 1932, the appointment of Adolf Hitler as 
Chancellor on 30 January, 1933, added the new dimension that many had 
feared. The Nazis' strong anti -intellectualism had repercussions 
for professional people as well as for students and academically 
gifted schoolchildren. They accused highly- educated men and women 
of a selfish individualism which was antithetical to the Party's 
principle of "Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz", the subordination of self- 
interest to the general good2. The Party's suspicion of intellectuals 
is illustrated by the tight control which it maintained over the 
professions. Of the eighteen "works communities" of the German Labour 
Front, into which all workers of hand and brain were drawn in the summer 
of 1933, only number thirteen, that of the liberal professions, was 
1. Auguste Steiner, op. cit., pp. 4 -6. 
2. Point 24 of the Nazi Party Programme, found in Hofer, op. cit., 
pp. 30 -31. 
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under the direct supervision of Robert Ley, the leader of the 
Labour Front1. In addition, the individual groups of doctors, 
engineers, teachers, civil servants, lawyers, lecturers and students 
came under the control of offices created specially for them within the 
organisation of the NSDAP itself; in this way, they were, again, 
directly subordinate to Ley, this time in his capacity as Chief - 
under Hitler - of the Party Organisation2. In this respect, the 
professions were unique among all occupational groups3. 
The Nazis moved with breath -taking speed: within a month of the 
Machtübernahme Gertrud Baumer lost the job she had held in the 
Ministry of the Interior for almost fourteen years, and other women 
in the higher civil service were quickly dismissed as well4. Since 
there was as yet no legislation to provide for such action, the 
message Gertrud Bäumer received, quite without warning, on 27 
February, 1933, was that she was being granted "leave of absence 
until further notice" by the new Minister, Wilhelm Frick. After 
enquiring the reason for this, she was told that her policies in 
respect of both youth and women's affairs "are contrary to the attitude 
of the Minister and make collaboration impossible ". Gertrud Bäumer 
wryly commented in a letter to a friend that Frick's knowledge of her 
policies was restricted to the distorted way they were described in 
his own Party's propaganda5. She was finally given notice of dismissal 
1. Taylor Cole, "The Evolution of the German Labour Front ", Political 
Science Quarterly, 1937, Pp. 540 -41. 
2. Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, Munich, 1938, p. 154. 
3. Wolfgang Schafer, NSDAP. Entwicklun und Struktur der Staatsartei 
des Dritten Reiches, Hanover, 1956, p. 57. 
4o Beckmann, op. cit., letter to Emmy Beckmann, 13 April, 1933, p. 50. 
5. BA, K1.Erw., no. 296 -(1), letter from Gertrud Baumer to Dorothee von 
Velsen, 7 March, 1933. 
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- along with a number of other officials - on 12 April, as a result 
of a law passed five days earlierl; paragraph four of this provided 
for the removal from the publie service of those whom the Nazis 
felt to be "politically unreliable "2. To add insult to injury, 
Gertrud Bäumer's pension was made as small as possible, with her 
pre -war service as a school -teacher left out of the reckoning3. She 
did, however, derive some grim humour from the information that not 
one but two men had been brought in to replace her at the Ministry of 
the Interior, "since no -one has a grasp of all the business involved "4. 
Gertrud Bäumer was convinced that the dismissal on political 
grounds of herself and of other women in responsible positions was a 
deliberate act of discrimination against "women as such ". But the 
only other individual case she mentioned in her letter on this subject 
to her close friend, Emmy Beckmann, besides her own, was that of a 
Dr. Blochmann who was dismissed on grounds of "racial undesirability ", 
since her mother was Jewish5. In the case of school -teachers, it is 
clear that members of both sexes were being affected in a similar 
way by the provisions of the law of 7 April, although proportionately 
the women tended to fare worse. In Prussia in 1933, twenty -two of the 
261 men who were headmasters of girls' senior schools lost their jobs, 
while twenty -three of the sixty -eight headmistresses suffered the same 
fate. But, in most cases, these men and women were re- employed as 
senior teachers. Of the teachers themselves, if of the men and 4.5% 
1. Beckmann, loc. cit. 
2. "Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums ", RGB, 1933 I, 
7 April, 1933, pp. 175 -77. 
3. Beckmann, op. cit., letter to Emmy Beckmann, 30 June, 1933, p. 53. 
4. Ibid., letter to Emmy Beckmann, 13 April, 1933, p. 50. 
5. Beckmann, op. cit., letter to Emmy Beckmann, 13 April, 1933, pp. 50- 
51. 
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of the women in established positions were dismissed; it was 
estimated that at least two -thirds of the women were non -"Aryan ". 
And almost all of the seventy -nine probationary women teachers who 
were dismissed were found to be non -"Aryan ", too. The other 
major group of women who gave up teaching at this time were 
described as being those who had come into the schools at the time 
of the reform of girls' senior schooling, in 1908, and who were 
now due to retire because of their age. It was, no doubt, very 
convenient indeed to have categories of women teachers who could be 
dismissed on unconventional, if now legal, grounds, since there was 
still the problem of a surplus of candidates for their jobs. During 
1933 - no doubt largely as a result of the dismissals - the situation 
improved so far that of the 1,320 candidates available at the start of 
the year, only one -third were still without a position twelve months 
laterl. 
There were protests against the dismissal of both men and 
women as a result of provisions in the law of 7 April, but often 
these led to the dismissal of the person making the protest. Such 
was the case with Professor Anna Siemsen of the University of Jena, 
who made a courageous attack on the authorities for the dismissal of 
a valued male colleague2. No doubt her membership of the SPD - for 
which Party she was a Reichstag deputy from 1928 to 1930 - set the 
seal on her own dismissal, after which she emigrated to Switzerland30 
1. Ludwig Walker, op. cit., pp. 83 -85. 
2. Kurt Grossmann, "Der Fall Anna Siemsen ", FiS, March 1933, pp. 7 8. 
3. Wilhelm Kosch, Biographisches Staatshandbuch, 1963, vol. 2, 
p. 1110. 
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There could be little surprise that the Berlin lawyer, Hilde 
Benjamin, was banned from the practice of law: in addition to 
having been a member of the defence team in the trial of the 
murderer of the Nazi hero, Horst Wessel, she was a card- carrying 
Communist; now she joined in the work of the Communist underground1. 
Other women immediately found disfavour with the Government 
because of their outspoken pacifism and internationalism during 
the 1920s, and lost their jobs, often under one of the clauses of the 
law of 7 April. Women like Alice Salomon - immediately unacceptable, 
as a Jewess - who had had a distinguished career in social and 
educational work2, and Minna Specht, a teacher who had turned her attention 
to radical, experimental education after the war3, had acquired 
an international reputation, but now saw no alternative to 
emigration. Marie Elisabeth Luders, distinguished as a politician 
as well as in her professional activity in social work and education, 
stayed on in Germany, like Gertrud Bäumer, in relative obscurity, 
eventually forbidden to publish her writings, as well as being 
deprived of her job4. But these women suffered because of their 
politics - in the broadest sense of the word - rather than because of 
their sex; the large number of women who continued to hold 
professional posts, and to be newly appointed to them, in and after 
1933 confirms that the reasons the Nazis gave for the dismissals were 
the true ones, 
1. Erich Stockhorst, Ffinftausend Köpfe., Baden, 1967, p. 51. 
2. Kosch, op. cit., p. 1060. 
3. Internationales Jahrbuch für Geschichtsunterricht, 1961/62, p. 3. 
4. Kosch, op. cit., p. 792. 
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However, since a substantial number of the women who had 
been admitted to the professions and found a position in public 
life under the Weimar Republic had also - as is understandable in 
pioneers - been at least moderate feminists, and often belonged to 
a liberal or socialist political party, the proportion of women who 
lost their places in these areas for "political" reasons was high in 
relation to their representation as a whole. The resulting 
depletion of women's numbers was regretted not only by feminists and 
progressives: misgivings, and even protests, were voiced by women 
also from among the ranks of the Nazis' own supporters. Sophie 
Rogge - Börner, who was not actually a Party member, but who 
passionately sympathised with the v8lkisch elements in its ideology1, 
wrote a heartfelt plea to Hitler in February 1933 for the inclusion 
of the best people in the leadership of the country, regardless of 
sex. She claimed, in the light of the previous couple of years' 
experience, that the State and various official bodies were working 
to deny women what she saw as their rightful place in the professions2. 
Her outspokenness brought her into trouble with the Gestapo in 1934, 
and eventually, in May 1937, a ban was placed on the publication of 
her monthly magazines Die Deutsche Kämpferin, on the grounds that 
she was publishing articles which were so critical of the regime that 
they were considered abroad to be examples of opposition to National 
Socialism within Germany3. 
1. BDC, no. 280, report in Ahnenerbe, 18 August, 1938. 
2. Sophie Rogge- Börner, "Deutsche Frauen an Adolf Hitler ", Reichenau, 
op. cit., p. 8. 
3. BDC, loc. cit. 
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Less impulsive than Sophie Rogge- B8rner, the conservative 
Rini; Nationaler Frauen was anxious to demonstrate its approval of 
the elimination of dissidents from prominent positions. But, in a 
letter written to Hitler in April 1933, the leadership of the Ring 
expressed concern that those women who were deservedly being dismissed 
for "political unreliability" were too often being replaced not by 
women of the right political persuasion but by ment. Such protests 
were no surprise to Gertrud Baumer, who firmly believed that the 
women in the Party, also, would have to take up the struggle for 
the rights of women, particularly in the teaching profession2. She 
based her hopes in this respect largely on Gertrud Baumgart's book 
Frauenbewegung Gestern and Heute, which was a moderately feminist 
tract - coming out strongly in favour of equality of opportunity for 
women in the professions3 - written by a woman who had joined the 
NSDAP in 19324. But Gertrud Baumer underestimated the ruthlessness 
with which the Nazis would subdue any "women's rights" campaign in 
their own ranks. 
As Gertrud Baumer had feared, the law of 30 May, 1932, formed 
a convenient precedent for measures directed against professional 
women. The Nazi Government followed it on 30 June, 1933, with a law 
dealing with civil servants generally, but affecting women particularly. 
Section three of the law consisted of amendments to the 1932 act, all 
1. BA, 84311/427, letter from the committee of the Ring Nationaler 
Frauen to Hitler, April 1933 (exact date not given). 
2. Beckmann, loc. cit. 
3. Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 17 and 31. 
4. BDC, Gertrud Bawngart's Party Membership Card. 
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of which constituted a worsening of the situation for married 
women in the service of the State. In the first place, dismissal was 
to be unconditional for those women whose husbands were also in 
the service of the State, since it was assumed that this meant that 
"their financial maintenance seemed from the size of the income in 
their family to be guaranteed in the long term ", as the condition 
for dismissal was termed in this act, as in the previous one. 
Another modification was that the period between notice of dismissal 
and the termination of employment was reduced from three months 
to one month; at the same time, the maximum possible severance 
pay for long service was lowered from sixteen times the salary paid 
to the woman in her last month of employment to twelve times that 
sum, although the amounts for shorter periods of service were not 
changed. The paragraph allowing for re- employment of women 
dismissed remained, surprisingly, intact, but since the 1932 law had 
specified that this would occur "if at all possible ", it would be 
easy for a Government to ignore the provision de facto altogether. 
And now dismissal and - in theory, at least - reinstatement were to 
be at the discretion of the Government alone, whose decisions were 
made binding on the courts, instead of being in the hands of the 
committee of arbitration set up under the 1932 act1. 
One of the saving graces of the 1932 act had been that it 
applied only to women employed in the service of the State at the 
national level, in the Reich Ministries and public corporations. 
This immediately exempted school- teachers, who were under the 
1. "Gesetz zur Anderung von Vorschriften auf dem Gebiet des allgemeinen 
Beamten -, des Besoldungs- und des Versorgungsrechts ", RGB, 1933 
I, 30 June, 1933, Section III, "Rechtstellung der weiblichen 
Beamten ", p. 435. 
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the jurisdiction of the individual states in the absence of a Reich 
Ministry of Education, although it took in some lawyers, doctors, and 
university staff. Now, however, in June 1933, the Government 
widened the scope of their act very considerably to include any 
married woman employed in the public service at state and local level 
also. Exceptions to the rule of dismissal on the grounds of 
financial security were still to be permitted in individual cases, if 
the Minister of the Interior approved; but the tone of the law as a 
whole suggested that such exceptions would be rare. Finally, in this 
section, a small sub -paragraph was inserted which was of major 
importance: it provided for the possibility of "departure from 
the provisions of Article 128, paragraph 2, of the Constitution ", 
and thus allowed, once again, for women in the public service to 
be remunerated at a different - in fact, a lower b rate from men in 
a similar position1. 
To add to the provisions concerning married women, and to this 
blatant discriminatory measure against women as such, there was 
another clause in the act unfavourable to women. It was decreed that 
women could not be appointed to public service positions - in the 
civil service or in the professions - on a permanent basis until they 
reached the age of thirty- five2. Commenting on this point, the 
Frankfurter Zeitun - which had managed to retain some of its character 
1. Ibid., pp. 434 -35. 
20 Ibid., Section II, "Die Begründung des Beamtenverhaltnisses ", p, 434. 
This part of the act also stipulated that only persons who were 
prepared "to support the national state at all times and without 
reservation" could be employed by the State, and barred non -"Aryans" 
and their spouses from the public service. 
283. 
and independence1 - observed that 
"the labour market and family policy considerations 
which are involved in this temporary postponement of 
fitness of a woman for such a position in the public 
service are clear ". 
The paper also implied - it could safely do no more - that the new 
law, although clearly based on the law of 30 May, 1932, had extended 
its scope far beyond the intentions of its creators2. Some 
authorities, at any rate, saw fit to implement the new law promptly: 
the zealous officials of Hamburg, for example, dismissed 103 
permanent and sixty -eight probationary married women teachers only 
a month after the passage of the law3. 
Most of the provisions in the law of 30 June applied 
specifically to married women, but the clauses affecting remuneration 
and appointment on a permanent basis caused considerable 
apprehension among female civil servants and teachers, especially, 
that there was to be a systematic campaign to drive women out of 
professional positions altogether. The new measures seemed to 
reinforce the propaganda put out by the Nazis, both before and during 
1933, about the Party's view of the role of women. Frick now found 
himself in the position of having to allay the fears which his own 
Party had consciously generated by publishing a letter which he sent 
to each of the Reich Ministers, to the governments of the Lander, 
and to the Reichsstatthalter4. In it, he observed that a number of 
1. F. B. Aikin- Sneath, "The Press in Modern Germany", German Life and 
Letters, London, 1937, p. 58. 
2. "Das Beamtenrecht der Frau ", FZ, 18 July, 1933. 
3. Report in FZ, 4 August, 1933. 
4. "Die Beschaftigung weiblicher Beamten und Lehrer: Eine grunds- 
ätzliche Stellungnahme des Reichsinnenministers ", VB, 13 October, 
1933. 
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authorities had proceeded with far more vigour than was necessary 
in the matter of dismissing women from posts or demoting them, in 
the belief that this was in accordance with National Socialist 
policy. Prick went on to say in the strongest terms that the law 
of the land did not provide for a general campaign against women 
in the public service, whether as civil servants or teachers; rather, 
the law of 7 April applied to men as well as women. As for the 
law of 30 June, he said, it seemed that he had to repeat that its 
section covering the dismissal of married women should be applied only 
to married women, and that these must have their financial 
maintenance guaranteed "in the long term "; he had received a number 
of complaints that this law was being applied more freely than was 
legally permitted, which he regretted. But Prick did mention that 
in his view if there were two candidates for office, one male and 
one female, the man should be given preference, although he also felt 
that women ought to be appointed to positions to which they were 
specially suited, namely those connected with youth welfare and 
some areas of education1. 
Although Frick demonstrated relative moderation here, it 
became apparent that much of the damage had already been done. 
Women had not been well represented in the higher grades of the 
professions before 1933, but now those who had been employed at this 
level were no longer to be found there; this was very largely, of 
course, the result of the law of 7 April. But the women who were 
dismissed from high -level positions were not, on the whole, replaced 
by other women. This was the case with those women who had been 
employed as higher officials in the appropriate ministries of the 
1. BA, 84311/427, letter from Frick to the Reich Ministers, Land 
governments and Reichsstatthalter, 5 October, 1933. 
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Reich, Prussian and Saxon governments before 1933, as advisers in 
matters of female and child labour; their dismissal from positions 
which came within the scope of the welfare activities deemed suitable 
for women was not followed by the appointment of more women1. However, 
of the four women who had been senior industrial welfare superintendents 
before 1933, three were retained in office, along with a number 
of their more junior colleagues2. 
In the schools, however, it was claimed that women were being 
driven out of their jobs - particularly in the senior schools - in 
favour of male teachers. Hamburg was regarded as a particular 
offender, since in addition to dismissing its married women teachers 
it was also forcing unmarried women into premature retirement at 
the age of fifty -two3. On a larger scale, Rust, the Prussian Minister 
of Education, announced in April 1934 that the present ratio of 
male to female teachers in girls' senior schools of 3:5.3 should 
be adjusted to 3:2 by filling vacancies with men. War- wounded male 
teachers were to be given priority, except in subjects like biology 
and gymnastics, which should continue to be taught only by women4. 
Two Nazi principles were obviously in conflict here: the Party 
emphatically rejected any kind of coeducation and insisted on the 
separate functions of the sexes, which would logically mean that 
girls should be taught exclusively by women; but it also asserted that 
1. Else Luders, "Weibliche Aufsicht in Fabriken ", Die deutsche 
K,mpferin, August 1935, p. 183. 
2. Ibid., p. 182. 
3. "MAdchenbildungs- und Lehrerinnenfragen in der Pädagogischen Presse ", 
Die Frau, June 1934, P. 571. 
4. Report in FZ, 9 April, 1934. 
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men should be given preference in job opportunities, particularly 
in the professions. In this instance, the practical advantage 
attached to the second of these - that of providing employment for those 
male teachers who could not find a job in a boys' school - was 
regarded as the overriding consideration. 
Effective protests on a corporate basis against moves to 
discriminate against women in the professions were hardly possible, 
since the Nazis almost at once took the astute step of "reforming" 
the professional organisations. In April 1933 Gertrud Bäumer 
wrote to Emmy Beckmann, President of the Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Lehrerinnenverein, with the advice that the organisation should join 
the Nazi Teachers' League, without protest and if necessary under 
different leadership, in order at least to continue in existence1. 
But a month later she once more wrote to Emmy Beckmann, this 
time to ask her to write an article about the ADLV for Die Frau,as 
an epitaph2. Official pressure on the membership of the ADLV had 
led to its leadership dissolving the organisation early in May 1933; 
its last act was to recommend its members to join the NS- Lehrerbund 
(Nazi Teachers' League), an organisation for men and women teachers 
alike3. The control of the Party over the teaching profession seemed 
undisputed when in January 1934 Hans Schemm, Bavarian Minister of 
Education and leader of the NSLB, announced that 90% of all German 
teachers were members of his organisation4. As far as the women 
1. Beckmann, op. cit., letter to Emmy Beckmann, 13 April, 1933, p. 50. 
2. Ibid., letter to Emmy Beckmann, 11 May, 1933, p. 52. 
3. Gertrud Blamer, "Das Haus ist zerfallen ", Die Frau, June 1933, 
p. 513. 
4. Die Frau, June 1934, op. cit., p. 570. 
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were concerned, they lost not only their organisation but also 
their magazine, which was first taken over by a Nazi teacher, 
Hedwig F8rster, and then replaced by a new publication under the 
editorship of Auguste Reber- Gruber, an official of the NSLB1. 
A few groups did manage to survive, at least for a time, 
while the Gleichschaltuna (co- ordination) of the professional 
organisations proceeded apace. But these were special cases; for 
example, the Union of Catholic Women Teachers (VkdL) was protected 
by the Concordat of 20 July, 1933, between the Nazi Government and 
the Vatican. Frick confirmed this both in a broadcast and in the 
press in October 1933, leaving the VkdL to draw the conclusion that 
its "continued existence is assured, and the orders for the dissolution 
of the 'old associations' do not apply to the VkdL "2. But, even so, 
this group's days were numbered: it was finally dissolved in 
October 19373, when relations between the Catholic Church and the 
Nazi regime were becoming increasingly strained. One of the feminists' 
valued organisations, the Deutscher Akkademikerinnenbund, was allowed 
to continue in existence, too, largely because it had sacrificed its 
leader, Marie- Elisabeth Lüders4, and shown complete willingness to 
co- operate with the new orders. But, as always, the Nazis could not 
tolerate for long the survival of any group which was not of their own 
1. Ibid., p. 571. 
2. Report in DMäd, 15 February, 1934, p. 48. 
3. Report in FZ, 20 October, 1937. 
4. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp. 50 and 55. 
5. BA, K1.Erw., 296 -(1), letter from Gertrud Böumer to Dorothee von 
Velsen, 15 November, 1934. 
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creation, and in December 1935 the Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund 
was dissolved to allow the Nazis' own Reichsbund deutscher 
Akademikerinnen a monopoly1. 
The old multiplicity of organisations within each profession 
was superseded by a monolithic body under strict Party control. In 
addition to the NS- Lehrerbund (NSLB) for teachers there was the 
NSD- Dozentenbund for university lecturers, Hans Frank's Bund 
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Juristen for lawyers2, the 
Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten (RDB) for administrators - replacing 
the nine hundred groups which had existed formerly3 - and the Reichs- 
árztekammer (Reich Chamber of Doctors) for the medical profession4. 
The lines were now firmly drawn between the individual professions, 
organised on a national basis, with men and women belonging to the 
same associations. This contrasted noticeably with previous practice, 
and was hardly in line with the Nazis' basic policy of keeping the 
sexes in separate groups. But it was completely consistent with the 
Nazi view that political leadership was the concern of men alone - and 
there was no attempt to disguise the fact that these new professional 
groupings were political formations - and it was also in keeping with 
the Nazi idea of the "community ", whether that of the nation as a 
whole or that of a section of its. However, since women were in a 
1. "F8nf Jahre Reichsfrauenfiihrung", FK, February 1939, P. 4. 
2. This changed its name to the more Germanic NS- Rechtswahrerbund 
(NSRB) in April 1936 (Meyers Lexikon, vol. 8, Leipzig, 1940, 
col. 150). 
3. Hermann Neef, Das Beamtenor:anisationswesen im nationalsozialist - 
ischen Staat, Berlin, 1935, PP. 4-5, 11 -12. 
4. "Reichsarzteordnung ", RGB, 1935 I, 13 December, 1935, PP. 1433 -44. 
5. Auguste Reber -Gruber, "Die Stellung der Frau im NSLB ", Reber -Gruber, 
op. cit., p. 4, explains and justifies the new order in the NSLB 
to women teachers. 
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minority in all professions, and in a small minority in the 
administration and the legal profession, their chances of 
influencing the running of these organisations - insofar as this 
was possible in the Nazi State - were minimal. 
Recognition was quickly given, however, to the fact that there 
were areas within each of the professions which were of particular 
concern to women. Early in 1934, the organisation of the teaching 
profession, the one in which women were best represented, took 
steps to cater for the large areas in which women were 
principally involved by appointing women "advisers ". Thus, Auguste 
Reber -Gruber became the representative of women teachers within the 
NSLB, while Hedwig F5rster was appointed leader of the section for 
girls' schooling in the NSLB1. Both were teachers, and both had 
joined the NSDAP before the Machtiibernahme2. Dr. Reber -Gruber's 
position developed into one of considerable scope, so that her 
responsibilities were divided into seven sub -sections each of which 
was led by a reliable woman Party member; for example, Elise Lenz 
was put in charge of the affairs of women teachers in the elementary 
schools, while Friederike Matthias was responsible for the interests 
of women teachers in the girls' senior schools . In addition to these 
appointments at the national level of the NSLB, a start was made at 
giving women representation in the area NSLB groups by appointing 
women "advisers" in each Gau and even at the more local level of the 
1. Die Frau, June 1934, op. cit., p. 571. 
2. BDC, File on Auguste Reber -Gruber, and Hedwig F8rster's Party 
membership card. 
3. BA, Slg. Sch. 230, "Angeschlossene Berufsverb1nde ", undated, ?1938. 
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Kreis; these women had the dual function of representing women 
teachers° interests in the NSLB as a whole, and of keeping 
Auguste Reber -Gruber in touch with the affairs of women teachers at 
the local level 
The Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten, in similar fashion, 
established a Women's Section to deal with matters specifically 
concerning female civil servants and to forge close links 
between 
them and the Deutsches Frauenwerk. The leader of this new 
office, 
Dora Hein, was a civil servant and long -standing Party member. 
She 
took up her duties on 1 October, 19342, and at the 
same time was 
appointed to a position in the national office of 
the DFW, to 
ensure that the co- operation desired was achieved. 
In addition, it 
was recommended that, where necessary, "a suitable female 
Party 
member" should be appointed as an assistant responsible 
for women's 
affairs in the local branches of the RDB3. The 
legal profession, 
too, had its woman representative: Ilse Eben- Servaes, 
a solicitor 
who had joined the Party soon after the Machtübernahme, 
became the 
delegate in charge of legal matters of special interest 
to women 
lawyers within the Nazi lawyers' organisation. 
Her appointment to 
positions in the Party Leadership and the National 
Women's Leadership4 
ensured that, once again, there would be close contact 
between the 
women in a profession and the mass of German 
women as represented by 
1. Auguste Reber -Gruber, op. cit., pp. 10 -11, 
2. BDC, Party Census of 1939 and a personal statement 
by Dora Hein, 
28 July, 1939. 
3. "Eine Frauenabteilung beim Reichsbund der 
Deutschen Beamten ", Die 
Frau, November 1934, p. 120. 
4. BDC, answers to a questionnaire for 
the NSDAP Reichsleit, 2 
October, 1939. 
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the women's organisations. 
The appointment of these women to positions in the 
professional organisations signified the acceptance by the Nazis of 
women in professional occupations. It was made clear that women 
in the professions were, however, to regard themselves as women first 
and then as civil servants or doctors or teachers. To emphasise 
this, separate groups of women in each profession were eventually 
created, which were affiliated to the DFW as corporate members as 
well as being an integral part of the national professional 
organisations. More than merely tolerating the presence of women 
in these occupations, the Nazi leadership even appointed married 
women - Auguste Reber- Gruber and Ilse Eben Servaes, for example - 
to their representative positions, in direct contrast to their 
loud objections to and measures against the professional 
Doppelverdiener. There was even for a time a National Association 
of Married Women Teachers affiliated to the DFW1. Thus it appears 
that the Nazis' fundamental objection was indeed to "politically 
unreliable" women, while sound Party members were not denied 
advancement purely because they were women. This applied, of course, 
to the Party's organisations, but to neither the higher échelons of 
the Party itself nor the Government, since it was firmly insisted that 
women should play no part in "political" affairs2. In keeping with the 
demand that the sexes should be treated as separate groups, women 
could hold key positions only in the women's section of a national 
1. BA, loc. cit. 
2. Hitler's description of his constant opposition to women in politics 
is to be found in Hitler's Table Talk, London, 1953, no. 126, 
26 January, 1942 (Evening), pp. 251-52. 
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organisation, or, in special cases - like Ilse Eben- Servaes - as 
isolated female representatives in such an organisation, which 
was firmly under male leadership. 
Throughout 1934 teachers continued to be dismissed from their 
positions or demoted as a result of the operation of the law of 
7 April, 1933. Both men and women suffered in this process of 
"purification" of the profession. At the same time, however, there 
were a few cases of women being promoted to responsible positions: 
Hedwig Förster was certainly "reliable" enough to deserve a post 
as headmistress of a senior school, and no doubt the others who 
were similarly favoured were equally considered suitable on political 
grounds. Here, at least, were some examples of dismissed women being 
replaced by other women1. Also in 1934, Frick expressed grave concern 
at the reduction that had taken place in the number of qualified 
women welfare workers. Naturally, he said, 
"this profession, too, must be purged of those elements 
whose character prevents their performing service to the 
national State. But it is not the intention of the 
National Socialist State to remove all female civil 
servants and employees from the service of the State on 
account of their sex, as a matter of principle.... 
Often the decrease in the number of women welfare workers 
is the result of a false application of the principles 
concerning the Doppelverdienere2. 
Moves were made, also, to allay the fears which had arisen 
about the prospects for women doctors. It was reported in the 
Völkischer Beobachter early in 1934 that there were still persistent 
1. Reports in DMäd., 15 February, 1934, p. 48; 15 May, 1934, P. 144; 
15 August, 1934, p. 240. Promotions and dismissals or demotions 
were reported on the same page in each issue. 
2. "'Weibliche Beamte in der Wohlfahrtspflege teilweise unentbehrlich", 
Der Deutsche, 5 January, 1934. 
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rumours that women were to be barred from panel practice and 
probably also from studying medicine at university. To dispel these, 
the leader of the doctors' organisation, Dr. Wagner, had issued a 
statement to the effect that it was intended to admit to panel 
practice doctors of either sex in the lower income bracket; it was 
claimed that this meant that there was to be no special regulation 
concerning women, but since the income involved was to be that of the 
doctor together with that of his or her spouse, the result was 
bound to be that more men than women would be eligible. In addition, 
preference was to be given to those doctors who were married, in 
particular those with families, without reference to sex. Thus, 
concluded Dr. Wagner, "there can be no talk of any plan to throw 
women out of the medical profession "1. By making this statement, 
he was in fact clarifying a situation which had been in doubt largely 
as a result of his own earlier threats to ban women from panel practice 
and to restrict their activity within the profession2. 
C. Consolidation and the Conflict between Doctrine and Necessity, 
1934 -40 
The number of women doctors, and their share of places in 
the profession, increased steadily throughout the 1930s, from 
2,455 (5 %) at the beginning of 1930 to 2,814 (6%) at the beginning 
of 1934, and to 3,650 (7.6%) at the beginning of 19393. By 1936, 
almost half of all employed women doctors were engaged in panel 
1. "Keine Ausschaltung der Frauen von der arztlichen Tätigkeit ", VB, 
7 February, 1934. 
2. Kelchner, op. cit., p. 42. 
3. St.J.: 1932, P. 404; 1936, p. 510; 1939/40, p. 586. 
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practice. In addition, 42% of all women doctors were married, and of 
these 70% were mothers1. At least in the medical profession, Nazi 
fears that women would selfishly sacrifice motherhood for a career 
were proved groundless. Women doctors assumed great importance in 
the network of organisations built up by the Party to try to 
involve women and girls directly in the life of the community. The 
women's Labour Service, the BdM, and educational and welfare 
services were among those areas in which expert medical advice was 
required2, and the desire to keep the sexes separate in their 
organisational activities meant that this advice, and treatment, would 
have to be provided by women. The Nazi leadership accepted women 
in this field without feeling that their campaign against 
intellectual women was in any way compromised, since they argued 
that medicine was essentially a practical occupation3. 
Teaching was another of the professions to which women were, 
in the Nazi view, more or less suited. The continuing surplus in 
the profession, however, led to attempts to arrest the steady flow 
of girls into courses to prepare them for it, even as late as 1936, 
In the following year, however, this policy was reversed, and 
increasing encouragement was given to girls to train as teachers4. 
Given this degree of policy change, and the removal of a number of 
women from teaching on political or racial grounds, it is perhaps 
surprising that the proportion of women in the profession remained 
1. "Zahl und Familienstand der Arztinnen ", Die Frau, January 1936, 
pp. 238 -39. 
2. Report in Die Frau, April 1937, p. 402. 
3. "Was Zahlen lehren ", VB, 4 September, 1936. 
4. See above, chapter 4, pp. 210 -13. 
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fairly stable throughout the 1930s. It was understandable that 
their numbers increased, if only marginally, on the staffs of the 
elementary schools, since work with young children was particularly 
approved of for women by the Government. In the middle schools, 
concerned with children between ten and sixteen years of age, 
women's share among the teachers fell during the decade by about 5/. 
But in the senior schools their proportion declined by a mere 2% 
between 1931 and 1939 which was remarkable in view of the setting of 
the 3:2 ratio in favour of male teachers for the girls' senior 
schools in Prussia in 1934. As it was, women remained very much in 
the majority on the staffs of German girls' senior schools, with a 
share of 68% in 19391. 
The Nazis were well aware that teachers were in a very 
influential position vis -k -vis young people, and were therefore 
determined to involve teachers in the work of the Party and its 
organisations, to ensure that their influence was exerted to propagate 
the National Socialist Weltanschauung. Auguste Reber -Gruber pointed 
out that the proportion of women teachers among holders of the Party's 
Gold Badge was high, and expressed the opinion that all women teachers 
ought to be members of the NS- Frauenschaft. Many women teachers were, 
she claimed, already heavily involved in the work of the women's 
organisations, in the Labour Service, and in the provision of evening 
classes2. Equally, women teachers should accept and welcome the work 
of the Bund deutscher Nadel, which had great educational value in the 
1. St.J.: 1932, pp. 424 -25; 1937, PP. 574 -76; 1939/40, 611 -14. 
2. Article by Auguste Reber -Gruber in Die Deutsche Höhere Schule, 
1935, no. 14, PP. 483 -84. 
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realm of character development. Dr. Reber -Gruber issued a warning 
in this connection, saying that "Whoever opposes the work of 
Adolf Hitler's young people...has absolutely no right to be a 
teacher in the Third Reich "1 
Lip- service to Nazi demands of this kind was not sufficient. 
A Party official in Trier reported in 1935 that one woman teacher 
in the area 
"has been a member of the NS- Frauenschaft since 1 July 
1934. She does not buy our newspapers and has a very 
close association with the clergy. As it was reported 
to me in confidence, she is anything but a National 
Socialist. Her entire attitude to us at present can 
only be considered a facade in order to maintain her 
position "20 
On the other hand, zealous Party workers were noticed and praised, 
and even sometimes rewarded. For example, an official of the Nazi 
Teachers' League, Friederike Matthias, was given a senior position 
in the Kiel educational administration in 1935 because she had 
dissolved a teachers' organisation in autumn 1933, and enrolled its 
members in the Nazi Teachers' League; in addition, she had won for the 
Reichsbund deutscher Akademikerinnen a respected position in the 
international association of professional women, without departing 
from National Socialist principles3. 
The favourable position of women in the teaching and medical 
professions was not maintained in the academic life, although, as 
1. Op. cit., pp. 480 -82. 
2. F. J. Hegen, Nationalsozialismus im Alltag, Boppard, 1967, 
"Beurteilung einer Lehrerin durch einen Ortsgruppenleiter in Trier 
vom 7. Januar 1935 ", no. 130, p. 256. 
3. "Aus dem NSLB ", Die deutsche hohere Schule, 1935, no. 10, p. 10. 
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Gertrud Baumer - hardly an apologist for the Nazi regime - pointed 
out in 1939, a number of women were appointed to university staffs 
after 19331. Women had, in fact, never constituted more than about 
one per cent of university staff members, a level which they reached 
in winter 1930 -31; after the purge of 1933, their numbers were 
reduced in winter 1934 -35 to 28 (0.5%) from an unprecedentedly high 
figure of 74 in 1932 -33. New appointments did, however, bring their 
numbers up to 46 (0.8%) by 1936. In the technical universities, where 
there were very few women lecturers, the same pattern emerged, so that 
in winter 1935 -36 eight women lecturers constituted 0.5% of the 
total number. The teacher- training colleges experienced a different 
trend, with a continuous drop in the female share of their staffs 
from 20% in 1931 to below 4% in 1934 -35, and to less than 2% in 1935- 
362. The heavy losses sustained by female academics after 1933 were 
largely attributed in the Nazi press - and by Gertrud Baumer, too3 - 
to the purges sanctioned by the law of 7 April, 1933. The losses 
included the two women who in 1930 had been full professors in 
universities; one of these, Margarete von Wrangell, a botanist, had 
died in 1932, but Mathilde Vaerting had been dismissed from the 
University of Jena "on political grounds "4. But in spite of the Nazi 
view that some subjects were much less suitable for women to study and 
1. Gertrud Baumer, "Zur Berufsgeschichte der deutschen Akademikerin ", 
Die Frau, June 1939, p. 453. 
2. Figures from St.J.: 1932, p. 431; 1933, pp. 524 -27; 1935, P. 525; 
1936, pp. 548 -49. 
3. Gertrud Baumer, loc. cit. 
4. "Die deutsche Frau in Lehre und Forschung", FK, February 1938, 
pp. 2 -3. 
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teach than others - the "rational" ones, particularly mathematics 
and the sciences being deemed the least suitable - women continued 
to be represented, albeit in very small numbers, in a wide variety of 
disciplines; in 1936 they were actually better represented in the 
medical and science faculties than in Arts1. 
The professional occupations to which women were most suited 
were, in the Nazi view, those which had a direct practical application. 
This was what justified the large numbers of women in the teaching 
profession,- and also those in medicine. In 1935, a contributor to 
the official magazine of the NS- Frauenschaft, NS- Frauenwarte, asserted 
that architecture was indeed a practical subject, because the design of 
buildings was something which very greatly impinged on one's daily 
life. Thus, she continued, women's role in the home and her 
appreciation of the merits and limitations of a house from an 
altogether practical point of view made her particularly suited to 
be an architect2. It was to be another three years before original 
Nazi policy, strictly interpreted, was to be departed from sufficiently 
to allow an official spokesman to suggest that engineering was another 
practical occupation which was eminently suitable for women3. The 
changes in the economic situation and the professional market in these 
crucial years, and the course of German foreign policy by the latter 
date of 1938, made such a suggestion acceptable in a way that it was 
1. "Dozentinnen an den deutschen Hochschulen ", Die Frau,, November 
1936, pp. 432 -33. 
2. Irmgard Depres, reported in the feature "Frau und Beruf ", Die 
Frau, March 1935, p. 382. 
3. "Warum nicht: 'Fräulein Ingenieur' ? ", Die Frau, November 1938, 
PP. 94 -95. 
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not in 1935 or even 1936. 
When they referred to the practical occupations to which 
women were most suited, the Nazis invariably - in 1939 as in 
1930 or 1933 - meant social work of any kind. This was largely 
because it was absolutely compatible with their theories about the 
nature and abilities of women. But it was a view that was 
increasingly justified by the growing need among the organisations, 
particularly those involving women and children, for the advice and 
practical assistance which only a trained social worker could give1. 
The operation of the women's section of the Labour Front, for 
example, required a considerable number of factory social workers and 
inspectors, as well as experts in its numerous advisory centres 
throughout the country2. There were many other areas in which social 
workers were required, especially in the Party's welfare organisation, 
the NSV, in the women's Labour Service, as medical social workers, 
in youth welfare, and, above all, among families, whether those in 
urban areas or those who had settled on the land3. Once the Second 
World War had begun, however, priority was given to the recruitment of 
factory welfare workers, even, if necessary, from among those women who 
had entered other branches of welfare work, since there was a serious 
and growing shortage of social workers in industry which was 
particularly undesirable at a time when women were increasingly being 
encouraged to replace male industrial workers who had joined the armed 
1. For an account of the Nazi view of the place of women in social work, 
see Hildegard Villnov, "Die Frau in der sozialen Arbeit ", NS- 
Frauenbuch, Munich, 1934, pp. 70 -73. 
2. "Aus der Arbeit des Frauenamtes der Deutschen Arbeitsfront ", Die 
Frau, May 1939, p. 442. See also Chapter 3, p. 149. 
3. Hildegard Villnov, op. cit., pp. 71 -72. 
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forces1. 
Another area of the broad social work category that was of 
particular importance once the war broke out was nursing. Before 
1933, the bulk of sick nursing had been conducted by charitable 
organisations run by the Churches, with nuns playing a central 
role2; there had also been the women's section of the Red Cross, 
which had played an important part in the work of nursing during 
the First World War3, and forihis reason was not favoured by those 
pacifist radicals who believed that the Red Cross was an instrument 
of war- mongers4. In 1934, the nursing corps of the Red Cross came 
under the leadership of Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, and was closely 
involved in the work of the NSV5. But the decline in the number of 
nursing nuns, as part of the general decline in recruitment to convents 
due to "the change in ideology ", led to a serious shortage of 
nurses in the mid- 1930s6. In addition, the Nazis aimed to create 
a corps of nurses which would be absolutely committed to National 
Socialism, and not under the control of a rival ideological interest 
group like the Roman Catholic Church, which had challenged official 
policy by forbidding its own nurses to take part in "certain 
operations ", notably sterilisation7. 
1. "Vermittlung von Volkspflegerinnen in soziale Betriebsarbeit ", RAB, 
1940 I, 16 February, 1940, p. 101. 
2. "Der Nachswuchs an Krankenschwestern ", FZ, 10 January, 1938. 
3. "Die Frau im Roten Kreuz ", FZ, 12 November, 1936. 
4. "Die Welt wird schöner mit jedem Tag ", FiS, May 1929, P. 4. 
5. FZ, loc. cit. 
6. FZ, 10 January, 1938, op. cit. 
7. "Vereidigung von NS- Schwestern ", FZ, 6 October, 1936. 
301. 
To meet their need for more nurses in a "politically reliable" 
organisation, the Nazis founded their own group, the NS- Schwesternschaft, 
commonly known as the "Brown Sisters ", in 19361. Its leader was 
the organisational chief of the NSV, Erich Hilgenfeldt, and he 
appointed two women, Hildegard Rancke and Margarete Liesegang, as 
his chief assistants in the running of the corps, after consulting 
Dr. Wagner of the doctors' organisation2. But they soon found 
that a secular organisation had a problem that the Catholic nursing 
orders could not have: Hilgenfeldt estimated at the beginning of 
1938 that the "Brown Sisters" were losing members through marriage 
and consequent retirement at a rate of 35% per year3. Attempts 
were made to attract a wider group of girls into nursing by 
announcing, in July 1937, that a domestic science course could be 
counted as a part of the training for the profession4, and publicity 
was given in the press to the activities of the NS- Schwesternschaft, 
which took on a martial tone with the personal oath of allegiance to 
Hitler administered to each recruits. But the membership of the 
"Brown Sisters" in January 1938 looked very meagre at 6,000, 
especially beside an announcement that the estimated shortage of 
nurses necessitated the recruitment of 30,000 more women6. 
1. Ibid. 
2. HA, Reel 13, folder 254, report in "Partei- Archiv ", November 1936. 
3. FZ, 10 January, 1938, op. cit. 
4. HA, Reel 13, folder 253, Reiehsfrauenftihrung, "Rundschreiben reu 
Nr. 66/37 ", 12 July, 1937. 
5. "'Wo wir stehen, steht die Treue: "', Fränkische Tageszeitung, 20 
February, 1937. 
6. FZ, loc. cit. 
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During the Second World War, the position was so serious that girl 
medical students had to be compulsorily drafted into nursing for 
spells of three months eachl. 
The area of the professions in which women were least well 
represented before 1933 was law. Throughout the Weimar years, 
women were excluded from the judiciary in Roman Catholic Bavaria2, 
and although elsewhere in Germany women were eligible for appointment 
as judges, no woman judge was given a place in the Supreme Court 
of Justice before the 1950s3. Even as late as 1930, there was still 
no female public prosecutor in the relatively liberal state of 
Prussia4. That Germany was not particularly backward in this context 
may be illustrated by an article, commenting on the British situation, 
carried by The Times on the first day of 1973, more than fifty years 
after all judicial offices were opened to women5: 
"About 6 per cent of barristers are women; MZrs. Justice 
Lane is still the only woman among 70 High Court judges; 
there are no women at the Court of Appeal nor have any 
Law Ladies joined the Law Lords...." . 
Nevertheless, the figures in the 1933 census in Germany seemed to show 
that women's representation in the legal profession was very meagre 
indeed: out of 10,441 judges and public prosecutors thirty -six were 
1. Ilse McKee, To- Morrow the World, London, 1960, p. 99. 
2. Report in BF, July /August, 1932, p. 2. 
3. Johannes Feest, "Die Bundesrichter ", W. Zapf (ed.), Beitr'dge zur 
Analyse der deutschen Oberschicht, Tffbingen, 1964, p. 152. 
4. "10 Jahre weibliche Richter ", Die Frau, January 1933, P. 249. 
5. Douie, op. cit., p. 64. 
6. Ruth Miller, "Women in law: a question of changing society's views 
of women's role and the profession's needs ", The Times, 1 January, 
1973. 
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women, and only 282 of the 18,766 solicitors were women1. The 
presence of over 1,000 girl law students in the universities at 
the same time2, however, suggested that there would soon be a marked 
increase in the number of women practising law, if no obstacle were 
put in their way. 
After the Nazi take -over there were, however, to be changes 
which affected the legal profession as a whole, and ones which 
particularly affected women lawyers. For a start, Hitler's deep 
antagonism towards the judiciary, coupled with his desire to make 
it politically docile, led to its being purged and also to a restriction 
of its sphere of competence3. The desirability of having women as 
judges, counsel or lawyers was the subject of discussions at 
Government level for some time. In August 1936, after a meeting in 
the Ministry of Justice at which the question had still not been 
resolved, Hess took it upon himself to ask Hitler's opinion, since 
"the Party also has a special interest in this matter ". This settled 
the question, since Hitler firmly pronounced that women should be 
neither judges nor counsel, and that women law graduates would in 
future be able to find State employment only in administrative 
positions. The possibility of women continuing to become lawyers in 
private practice was not ruled out by this judgment4. 
Hitler's decision was accepted as definitive by the Government, 
although it raised many problems for his Ministers. At least those 
1. "Berufszählung von 1933 ", St.J., 1938, p. 32. 
2. St.J., 1932, pp. 426 -27. 
3. Hubert Schorn, Der Richter im Dritten Reich, Frankfurt, 1959, 
pp. 11 -14, 83 -84. 
4. BA, 84311/427, letter from Bormann to Gtirtner, 24 August, 1936. 
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women who were already employed as fully -established lawyers and 
judges were not to be affected by the ruling, but there remained 
in addition a considerable number of junior barristers and 
trainee solicitors who were now obliged to alter their career 
aspirations and for whom suitable alternative employment would have 
to be found. Bormann expressed the hope that they would all be 
found places in administration, and left the arranging of this to 
the Ministry of Justicel. Freisler, acting for Gartner in this 
matter, expressed very great concern about the prospects for these 
women, many of whom, he pointed out, had spent large sums of money 
on their training, had pursued their studies with dedication and 
diligence, and who often had dependent relatives to support. 
Freisler wrote to the various Reich and Prussian Ministers to the 
effect that the Ministry of Justice had managed to find places for 
a number of the women concerned, as had Frau Scholtz-Klink's office, 
but there remained a number for whom, he hoped, his colleagues in the 
other Ministries would be able to find employment commensurate with 
their qualifications and ability, preferably on a permanent basis2. 
While Freisler's concern in this case does him credit, it is 
remarkable that it was possible for Hitler to cause so much difficulty 
for his Government by an arbitrary statement of opinion which his 
Ministers did not consider opposing. This was, of course, at least 
partly an ideological question, with Party doctrine opposed to the 
appearance of women lawyers in courts concerned with criminal cases; 
the functions of a sentencing judge who represented the authority 
1. BA, R43II /427, letter from Bormann to Gartner, 24 August, 1936. 
2. Ibid., letter from Freisler to the Reich and Prussian Ministers, with 
the exception of the Chancellery and Hess, 16 January, 1937. 
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of the State were clearly ones to be exercised by men alone1, in the 
same way that representation in political life was reserved for men. 
The role of the women's organisations in this case went beyond 
finding places for some of the women lawyers on their staffs; it was, 
in addition, Frau Scholtz-Klink's duty to explain and to justify 
to the women of the nation this measure which seemed to discriminate 
against those of their sex who had chosen a legal career. Frau 
Scholtz -Klink delegated this task to, appropriately, her own legal 
adviser in the National Women's Leadership, Dr. Ilse Eben- Servaes, 
who had a lucrative legal practice of her own2. Ironically, it was 
in 1936, the year of Hitler's order, that both she and Frau Scholtz- 
Klink were accorded the honour of being admitted to membership of the 
Academy of German Law3. Dr. Eben- Servaes quickly produced an 
article for the January 1ß37 edition of the news -letter of the 
National Women's Leadership, in which she explained in detail the 
opportunities which remained open for women with legal training; 
these were to be found in the women's organisations, the welfare 
service, in marriage and family law, in the Party's courses in 
political education, and in all cases in which women or children might 
need legal guidance. Dr. Eben- Servaes emphasised that the female 
lawyer's ability was not in doubt, but that she would nevertheless be 
of greatest service to the community in those areas especially 
1. Elfriede Eggener, "Die Aufgabe der Rechtswahrerin ", FK, July 1939, 
P. 5. 
2. BDC, answers to a questionnaire for the NSDAP Reichsleitung. Letters 
of 7 and 22 January, 1942, reveal that she continued her private 
legal practice in the face of rules banning outside employment for 
members of the Party Leadership. 
3. HA, Reel 13, folder 254, "Partei - Archiv ", November 1936. 
BA, R61/168, letter from Ilse Eben -Servaes to Herr Loyal at the 
Akademie far Deutsches Recht, 12 December, 1938. 
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concerned with women's affairs, leaving fields of less immediate 
relevance to women to her male colleagues1. 
Dr. Eben- Servaes was particularly anxious that Hitler's 
ruling should not discourage girls from studying law; neither, she 
stressed, should the unfortunate fact that a number of the older 
women lawyers now faced some hardship, given that there was in fact 
a surplus of male lawyers in the older age -group, act as a disincentive. 
By way of positive encouragement, she pointed out, in August 1937: 
"it is estimated that in two or three years' time there will be a 
severe shortage of male lawyers, which will presumably work to the 
advantage of the woman lawyer ". It had already, she continued, been 
possible to absorb more or less all of the junior women lawyers into 
the economic system or into the administration of the Frauenwerk, 
andihis latter area of the women's organisations would, she 
predicted, have a positive need for even more law graduates, as it 
expanded2. Her views were borne out when, after just two years, Dr. 
Donke of the Party's section for academic affairs announced that 
"the sharp decline in the number of young women lawyers is particularly 
undesirable... ", since the tasks for which women were especially 
suited, in the welfare services and in women's and youth organisations, 
had proliferated rapidly. Dr. Donke went as far as to express the 
opinion that if, as was being planned, a special kind of court was to 
be established to deal with legal problems arising from family life, 
it might even be desirable to bring women back into court work, since 
1. Ilse Eben -Servaes, "Die Frau als Rechtswahrerin ", Nachrichtendienst 
der Reichsfrauenfiihrerin, January 1937, pp. 6 -7. This article was 
also published in FK, January 1937, p. 13. 
2. HA, Reel 13, folder 253, "Rundschreiben Nr. FW 76/37", from Ilse 
Eben -Servaes to her representatives in the Gaue, 12 August, 1937. 
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they had a particularly valuable contribution to make in this areal. 
The restriction placed on women lawyers in 1936 was actually 
an exception to the trend of policy towards women in the professions 
in that year, which paralleled the change in official utterances 
about and attitudes to girl students. The reason behind this was 
perfectly clear: by 1936 it had become apparent that, with a few 
exceptions, such as dentistry2, the surpluses there had been in all 
professions in the early 1930s had been eliminated, and that there 
would very soon even be a serious shortage of candidates for some, 
if not all, of them. The demands of the Four Year Plan - conceived 
in August 1936 - for skilled and qualified personnel from all 
professions çuickly made themselves apparent, and, in the ensuing 
anxiety on the part of the Government to provide staff - on a scale 
which they had shortsightedly failed to predict when drawing up the 
new industrial policy - the appeal for more recruits for the 
professions was directed specifically at women as well as men. 
"To- day ", asserted a writer in the V8lkischer Beobachter, "we can 
no longer do without the woman doctor, lawyer, economist and teacher 
in our professional life "3. 
To reinforce the new attitude towards professional women, the 
National Women's Leadership began to increase its contacts with them 
and interest in their activities. In June 1936, an agreement was 
reached between Frau Scholtz -Klink's office and the NSLB for close 
collaboration on matters of mutual interest, while a section to deal 
1. IfZ, MA 205, NSDAP/HA-Wissenschaft, Dr. W. Donke, "Der Rechtswahrer ", 
cutting from Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 August, 1939. 
2. "Aufhebung der Sperre des Neuzugangs zum zahnärztlichen Studium 
und zum Dentistenberuf ", DWEuV 1937, no. 200, 22 March, 1937, 
p. 187. 
3. "Die Akademikerin von heute ", VB, 4 September, 1936. 
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with "academic questions" was established in the Reichsfrauenftihrunp 
on 1 July, 1936. From about this time, Frau Scholtz -Klink made a 
practice of addressing meetings of girl students and women lecturers', 
groups to whom she had formerly paid little or no attention. Some 
kind of justification for this initial neglect of academically - 
talented women by the Nazi women's organisation, and the vivid 
contrast with it of the concern which began to be shown for them from 
1936, was felt to be necessary; but the version put out in the DFW's 
magazine rather lacked conviction. It admitted that it was difficult 
to explain why professional women and particularly women lecturers in 
universities and colleges, had not been welcomed into the work of 
the women's organisations from the very start; the reason. was, 
however - so the official account ran - that "the new tasks flor these 
wome7 could be undertaken for the first time only after they had 
developed organically from the practical work "2. The significance 
of this was that intellectual women as a group had had no 
opportunity to influence and shape the development of the women's 
work of the nation in the first years after 1933, and so the pattern 
had been designed by women who were regarded as being more 
genuinely representative of the mass of women in the nation, and 
who, more important, were unquestioningly loyal to the NSDAP. 
But even as the demands upon human resources being made by 
the Four Year Plan became apparent, influential members of both 
Party and Government continued to be exercised by the question of the 
1. "Ffnf Jahre Reichsfrauenftihrung ", FK, February 1939, PP. 4 -5. 
2. "Der Aufruf der Reichsfrauenftihrerin an die Dozentinnen ", FK, 
February 1938, p. 3. 
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place of women in professional life. Those who though that Frick's 
assertion that there was not to be a general campaign against 
women in the professions, made in 1933, had settled the matter may 
have begun to have doubts after Hitler's restriction on entry to 
the practice of law by women in 1936. The new and comprehensive 
law relating to the civil service which was published in January 
1937 had little to say about women; it merely reiterated the 
1933 provisions for the possibility of dismissing a married woman 
official either at her own request or if her financial position 
would be secure without her own salary1. Five months later, an 
amendment was introduced to exempt the large number of employees 
of the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs from it as a group, and to 
allow for the re- employment of women whose financial position had 
changed for the worse to a significant extent after leaving work2. 
This tinkering with the law, along with the absence of any clear 
guidelines for the employment of women in official positions 
generally, can only have increased the uncertainty that already 
existed. 
As had been the case with the debate about the place of 
women in the legal profession, so here again it was Hess's office 
which brought the matter to Hitler's personal attention. Sommer 
wrote to Lammers in May 1937 asking for a reply to a question he 
had asked some time before, without receiving an answer, namely, did 
Hitler think that women ought still to be appointed to senior 
positions in the civil service?3. Clearly, the Party's central office 
1. "Deutsches Beamtengesetz ", RGB, 1937 I, 26 January, 1937, p. 51. 
2. "Verordnung zur Durchftihrung des Deutschen Beamtengesetzes ", RGB 
1937 I, 29 June, 1937, p. 676. 
3. BA, R4311/427, letter from Sommer to Lammers, 4 May, 1937. 
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in Munich, under the leadership of Hess, with Bormann as his 
deputy, was determined to try to hold the National Socialist 
Government to original Party doctrine now that it was in power, 
irrespective of the needs of the economy or of the staffing 
requirements of the professions; the holding of high office in the 
State was, according to Nazi ideology, a singularly masculine 
function. In this case as in the one affecting the legal profession, 
Hitler responded, in his role as leader of the Party, that, as a 
matter of principle, he wished to see only men appointed to posts 
in the higher civil service, although he added that exceptions 
might be made for individual women in positions connected with the 
administration of the welfare servicesl. 
Once again it fell to the Ministry of the Interior to moderate 
the Party's policy in favour of women, as it had done in 1933. This 
time, Pfundtner, writing on behalf of Frick, proposed that the 
fields of education and health, as well as social welfare, be 
designated areas in which women could be appointed to high -ranking 
official positions2, and Lammers incorporated them into his statement 
of the final decision, which he then communicated to Hess's office in 
July 19373. A month later, Pfundtner informed the other Reich 
Ministries of the ruling in a confidential circular4. Such was the 
secrecy involved that a member of Frick's staff felt it necessary to 
1. Ibid., letter from Lammers to Hess's office, 8 June, 1937. 
2. Ibid., letter from Pfundtner, 18 June, 1937. 
3. Ibid., letter from Lammers to Hess's office, 25 July, 1937. 
4. Ibid., letter from Pfundtner to the Reich Ministries, 24 August, 1937. 
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ask Lammers if there was any objection to the content of the new 
order's being intimated to Frau Scholtz- Klinkt, who, as the chief 
representative of the women of the nation, should presumably have been 
considered an interested party. Lammers replied at the end of 
January 1938 that there was no objection to Frau Scholtz -Klink's being 
informed about the order2, but the fact that she had not been 
automatically included in the original, confidential list throws light 
on how little real influence she had, even in matters of special 
concern to women, in spite of her title. 
As it happened, representations on behalf of the Reichsfrauen- 
fljhrerin were not, in this case, necessary, since she revealed in a 
letter to Bormann that she had known for some time about the order 
issued by Frick which "forbids the employment of women in the higher 
civil service ", as she rather wrongly put it. Hess apparently had 
explained fully the circumstances of the decision to her, at her own 
request, and so she was well aware that there were cases in which 
exceptions to the ruling would be allowed. The purpose of her letter 
to Bormann was to press for an exception to be made in the case of a 
talented woman astronomer, Dr. Margarete Gässow, who had been proposed 
by her male superior for promotion to a permanent, senior position 
in the Berlin Observatory. Frau Scholtz -Klink approached Bormann on 
this occasion after the nomination of Dr. Gtissow had been rejected 
by Rust, as Minister of Education, because she was a woman and therefore 
not eligible for promotion to a post of this kind, according to the 
1. Ibid., letter from Dr. Schätze to Lammers, 17 December, 1937. 
2. Ibid., letter from Lammers to the Minister of the Interior, 31 
January, 1938. 
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order of 24 August, 19371. 
For the most part, Frau Scholtz -Klink was thoroughly docile, 
accepting Party edicts and faithfully explaining and justifying them 
to the women whose leader she was; this had been true even when 
Hitler's decision against admitting women to legal practice in the 
courts had been announced. Now, however, in the case of Margarete 
Gtissow, she made a rare and rebellious outburst against a situation 
where "a woman cannot obtain a position because she is a woman, 
although she is, by reason of her ability and achievements, suited to 
it ". Frau Scholtz -Klink asserted that the man who had been suggested 
by Rust as an alternative candidate for the post had been rejected by 
Dr. Guthnick, the head of the Observatory, because "his accomplishments 
bore no relation to Dr. Gtissow's "; in addition, five astronomers 
besides Dr. Guthnick supported Dr. Güssow's candidature. The Reichs- 
frauenfIhrerin openly poured scorn on the way that a gifted woman 
with an international reputation was being denied the opportunity to 
realise her full potential, but at the same time voiced deep anxiety 
about what she saw as an alarming precedent. She referred also to 
the "growing tendency to deny gifted and able women the chance of 
advancement ", which had convinced her that it was now necessary "to 
put this matter, too, to the FUhrer, from the women's point of view, 
so that there can be a fundamental clarification of it ". In 
particular, the question of the position of women on university staffs 
was one which she would have liked to broach to Hitler; but the problem 
was that the Reichsfrauenftlhrerin was never given the chance to discuss 
matters with Hitler - which is amazing, if her title was supposed to 
1. Ibid., letter from Frau Scholtz -Klink to Bormann, 24 January, 1938. 
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mean anything - and so she had to depend on Bormann to represent her 
views to him1. 
Given Bormann's adherence to Party ideology, as Hess's second - 
in- command at the Brown House, it was unlikely that Frau Scholtz -Klink 
would find in him her champion to represent the women's cause to 
Hitler. As it turned out, Bormann was laid low by influenza in 
January 1938, and so he passed Frau Scholtz -Klink's letter on to 
Lammers, with the request that he edit it, submit it to Hitler, and 
find out his decision. There was, apparently, no need to express a 
point of view; Hitler's opinion was what counted2. It was three 
weeks before Bormann received his answer, and then it came in the 
bald statement that there was no objection to Dr. Güssow's appointment, 
with no explanation of the decision given, and no mention made of the 
more general points Frau Scholtz -Klink had raised3; these had, 
presumably, been eliminated in the process of editing the letter. 
Although she succeeded in her campaign on this occasion, Frau 
Scholtz -Klink had had to take a firm stand, and the broader issues 
were no nearer to being clarified. If there was such difficulty in 
achieving promotion for Margarete Güssow, there can have been little 
chance for those who were less assiduous in showing an acceptable 
degree of enthusiasm for the regime and its affiliates. Margarete 
Güssow was a member of the Party, having joined it on 1 April, 1933, 
and the NS- Frauenschaft in November 1935. She was also a member of 
the National Physical Education Association, the NS- Volkswohlfahrt, 
1. Ibid., letter from Frau Scholtz -Klink to Bormann, 24 January, 1938. 
2. Ibid., letter from Bormann to Lammers, 29 January, 1938. 
3. Ibid., letter from Lammers to Bormann, 21 February, 1938. 
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and other, smaller groups1. Thus, she was classed as "politically 
reliable ". In spite of the difficulties surrounding her new 
appointment, she was given pride of place in the DFW's magazine in 
February 1939, as an example of what women who were both talented 
and reliable could achieve. In the article, all that was said about 
the actual appointment was that Hitler personally had been responsible 
for it2; it was very clear that German women were not supposed to know 
how limited their opportunities had become in some areas of the 
professions, at the whim of Hitler and his small inner circle of 
senior Ministers and Party bosses. 
But the article on Margarete Gitssow, which included an 
interview with her, seems to have been less a device on Frau Scholtz- 
Klink's part for deluding German women than a part of a campaign 
which she had begun to wage unilaterally, as leader of the nation's 
women. The Government had announced a pressing need for professional 
people in 1936, and Frau Scholtz -Klink took this at face value 
and accepted that - as had been said - it applied to women as well 
as men. In any case, she had a growing need for talented and 
highly educated women in her own organisations. Well aware of the 
dangers of giving these women power and influence, she aimed to 
utilise their abilities, but at the same time to tie them into the 
women's organisations in such a way that it was clear that they were 
a valuable part of them, but only one among others equally valuable. 
She had begun this process of "underpinning our practical work with a 
theoretical basis ", as she and her advisers liked to saya, in 1936 
1. BDC, File on Margarete Gtissow. 
2. Report in FK, February 1939, p. 2. 
3. "Der Aufruf der Reichsfrauenfiihrerin an die Dozentinnen ", FK, 
February 1938, p. 4 
Ilse Eben -Servaes, "Wissen ist uns Verpflichtung ", FK, op. cit., p. 13. 
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by making contact with groups of professional women and, especially, 
women in the universities. The next step was to create a section 
within the DFW - alongside the sections for political education, 
German culture and training in domestic science and child -care - 
for what she called "academic work ", in the summer of 19371. In 
June of that year, a circular went out to the Gau NS- Frauenschaft 
leaders announcing that Ilse Eben- Servaes had been chosen to 
lead this new section, and asking that "a suitable woman graduate" 
be selected to head a section for "academic work" in each Gau 
office 
Dr. Eben Servaes described the main task of her new section 
as "the construction of a bridge between learning and practical work ", 
by which the women involved in both these kinds of activity could 
benefit from exchanging ideas and experiences. There would be, for 
example, study groups in which women on the staff of the DFW's 
section "domestic economy -national economy" would meet the small 
number of women who were lecturers in economics; in other groups, 
doctors and members of the child -care courses put on by the DFW 
could discuss matters of mutual interest. Women on the staff of 
Arts faculties were assigned the area of "culture and education" 
for making contact with women outside the academic world. These 
activities were to take place not only at the national level but also 
in the Gaue, organised by the appointed representative; it was hoped 
also to begin study groups in the smaller unit of the Kreis3. 
1. Loc. cit. 
2. HA, Reel 13, folder 253, DFW Reichsstelle, "Rundschreiben Nr. 
Fat 51/37 ", 18 June, 1937. 
3. Ilse Eben -Servaes, loc. cit. 
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To bring the women of the DFW into closer touch with women 
in all sections of the professions, the organisation's magazine 
began to feature articles about women's place in them. The more 
contentious areas, particularly, were given wide coverage in such 
articles as "Woman as lawyer ", "The tasks of women in the law ", 
"The woman doctor ", "The tasks of women in economic science ", all 
of which emphasised that the work of the professions was now being 
conducted in a new spirit which considered the good of the nation 
above all, with the interests of individuals of secondary 
importance. In addition, women were assigned special areas of 
interest within each profession: child -care and all matters of 
racial health and population growth were women's chief concern 
in medicine; in law, it was matters connected with the family and 
youth; and, with housewives the largest consumers in the home 
market, women economists ought, it was said, to have a special 
interest in price movements and patterns of consumptionl. 
The climax of all this activity was a conference held at the 
beginning of 1938, to which Frau Scholtz -Klink invited twenty -five 
women lecturers at universities and teacher- training colleges. The 
programme for the first day consisted of a tour of a new training 
centre for domestic science and child -care, a talk by Dr. Eben- Servaes 
1. Ilse Eben -Servaes, "Die Frau als Rechtswahrerin ", FK, January 1937, 
p. 13. 
Wiltraut von Briinneck, "Die Aufgaben der Frau im Recht ", FK, 
November 1937, pp. 9 -10. 
Ursula Romann, "Die Arztin ", FK, op. cit., pp. 8 -9. 
Marilese Cremer, "Mitarbeit der Frau in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft ", 
FK, op. cit., p. 11. 
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about the purpose of the section for "academic work" in the 
DPW, followed by a discussion whose subject was "Women in research 
at the universities ". Frau Scholtz -Klink herself spoke briefly to 
the assembled company, and then left matters in the capable hands 
of Dr. Eben- Servaes1. Two lecturers from the technical university in 
Aachen wrote subsequently of the pleasure and value they had 
derived from this meeting, secure now in the knowledge that "we are 
needed: ", after the uncertainties which had surrounded the position 
of women in academic life. In addition, the isolation they had 
felt, working away in their own university, had now largely been 
dispelled by meeting colleagues from other institutions, many of 
them for the first time2. Frau Scholtz -Klink, then, had shown that, 
in her view, there was a special place in the life of the nation for 
women on the staff of a university, although she still hoped to 
have some clarification of the Party's view of the position of 
these women, preferably by Hitler himself3. 
In fact, women were still being appointed to positions on 
university staffs, which indicates that no attempt was being made 
to phase them out altogether. In the autumn of 1938, Dr. Maria Lipp 
was promoted to the Chair of Chemistry in the technical university at 
Aachen. This was the first time a woman professor had been appointed 
in a technical university. Professor Lipp had begun her lecturing 
career in the 1920s, managing to survive the purges of the post -1933 
1. "Die deutsche Frau in Lehre und Forschung ", FK, February 1938, pp. 
4 -5. 
2. Gertrud Savelsberg and Doris Korn, "Rttckblick auf die Tagung der 
Deutschen Dozentinnen in Berlin 3.- 6.1.1938 ", FK, February 1938, 
p. 12. 
3. BA, op. cit., letter from Gertrud Scholtz -Klink to Bormann, 24 
January, 1938. 
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period, although she was not a Party member1. Earlier in 1938, 
Gertrud Ferchland, a Party member since May 1933, had been 
appointed as a professor at the Schneidemühl teacher- training 
college2, and at the beginning of 1939 Dr. Maria K8sters became 
a senior lecturer in dentistry in the medical faculty of Munich 
University3. She was certainly not appointed as a Party member; 
but she did join the NSDAP within a year of her appointment4. 
One Party stalwart to be promoted was Charlotte Lorenz, who moved 
to a senior lecturing position in political science and economics 
at the University of Berlin from the post of adviser in the 
National Statistical Records Offices in October 1940. She had joined 
the Party in May 1933, and was also a member of the NSLB, the 
Dozentenbund, the RDB, the NSV, and a number of other groups in 
addition6. In the light of such developments, the Frankfurter 
Zeitung observed: 
"In the initial uncertainty about the working of National 
Socialist principles in practice, the widespread conviction 
prevailed that in the new State women would sooner or later 
be phased out of the professions, and particularly out of 
the academic life. So far, this expectation has not been 
realised. On the contrary.... "7. 
1. "Zur Lage der deutschen Frau ", Die Frau, November 1938, p. 98. 
BDC, Maria Lipp's NSLB card, dated 1.10.38. 
2. Ibid., Gertrud Ferchland's NSLB card, dated 1.1.37. 
"Personalnachriohten ", DWEuV 1938, 5 February, 1938, p 57 
3. "Zur Lage der deutschen Frau ", Die Frau, February 1939, p. 271. 
4. BDC, Maria K8sters' Party Membership and NSLB cards. 
5. Stockhorst, op. cit., p. 276. 
6. BDC, Partei -Kanzlei Korrespondenz, and Charlotte Lorenz's Party 
Membership and NSLB cards. 
7. "Dozentinnen ", FZ, 4 February, 1938. 
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The change in official attitudes to women in the professions 
which had become apparent in 1936 became even more marked by 1938, 
in spite of the two decisions made by Hitler to the disadvantage of 
women in the interim. The growing shortage of male candidates for 
the professions, eventually foreseen in 1936, was beginning to make 
itself felt, even before the outbreak of the Second World War. In 
teaching, it was reported in November 1937 that women's prospects 
had improved considerably: whereas only nineteen women had been 
given permanent jobs in Prussian girls' senior schools in the years 
1932 -35, twenty -five had been appointed in 1936 alone, with thirteen 
probationary women teachers also found places in that year1. A 
year later, the position of male teachers had improved to such an 
extent that, for the first time for over a decade, every applicant 
was found a place. This at once raised the prospect of a shortage, 
which, it was estimated, would become acute from about 1942, when 
those teachers born in the 1880s - a decade with an extremely high 
birth -rate - began to retire. It was estimated that there would be 
enough women teachers, given the number of applicants in 1938, to 
supply the needs of the senior schools for some time to come, even 
allowing for the decline in men's numbers2. Far from altering the 
ratio of male to female teachers in girls' senior schools radically 
in favour of men - as had been intended - the Government was now 
obliged to turn increasingly to women to fill these positions; the 
1. Luise Raulf, "Frau und Naturwissenschaft ", FK, November 1937, 
13. 
2. "Studienräte und Studienrätinnen an höheren Schulen ", Die Frau, 
November 1938, p. 94. 
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census returns show that even in 1939, long before the shortage of 
male teachers was expected to be at its worst, women constituted 
35% of all persons involved in education of one kind or another, 
which was an increase of 1% over the 1933 figure1. 
Teaching, of course, had always been more or less approved 
by the Nazis as a sphere of activity for women. But now, in 1938, 
the Government awoke to the fact that it would have to make good the 
shortages of male candidates throughout the professional spectrum 
from the significant reserve of candidates among the women of the 
nation, even in areas which were, from the Party's point of view, 
unsuitable for women. In February 1938, the Frankfurter Zeitunp 
reported that women doctors, economists, scientists and "even women 
lawyers" were now regarded favourably in high places2. Dr. 
Margarete Esch, a careers officer at Berlin University, observed that 
there were widespread opportunities for women doctors; significantly, 
she mentioned possibilities for them as medical officers of health 
and as advisers in administrative positions as well as the fields 
normally assigned to them by the Nazis, in the care of women and 
children. Prospects were still limited in dentistry, since there 
was a continuing surplus of candidates, but there were now 
opportunities for women in veterinary medicine, and in medical research 
of all kinds. In the technical and scientific professions, "which 
had ", said Dr. Esch, "been considered a male preserve for a long 
time ", women were increasingly being employed because of a shortage of 
men; in fact, women chemists, physicists, engineers and biologists 
1. Calculated from figures in St.J., 1941/42, p. 38. 
2. FZ, loc. cit. 
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were finding positions in industry or in research without any 
difficulty. In spite of the limitations on women's participation 
in the legal profession, there was a constant need for women 
lawyers in the organisations, in the employment exchanges and in 
administrative positions; the same was true for women economists1. 
The 1939 census showed that 15.5% of all persons employed in 
administration at the national and local level, including the 
administration of justice, were women, which was an increase of 
4% on the 1 33 fi 9 gore 
2 
This was hardly to have been expected if 
the restrictions placed on women in the civil service and the legal 
profession had been rigorously applied. 
The outbreak of war in September 1939, and the withdrawal of 
men from the professions into the armed forces, made the country's 
dependence on women very much greater. In recognition of this, a 
national agency for advising women graduates about vacancies in 
positions in the administration, the economy and the social services 
was opened in Berlin on 1 October, 19393. But even in October 
1939 reports came in from all over Germany of shortages in all areas 
of the professions. There were not enough doctors generally4, and in 
Trier, for example, the situation was extremely serious, with only 
thirty -four doctors practising where there had previously been 
seventy- four5. In teaching, the overall situation was so bad that 
1. Margarete Esch, "Die Aussichten des Frauenstudiums ", FZ, 19 March, 
1939. 
2. St.J., loc. cit. 
3. Report in Die Frau, December 1939, p. 85. 
4. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750069, BziL, "Kulturelle Gebiete ", 13 
October, 1939. 
5. Ibid., frame 2- 750043, BziL, 9 October, 1939. 
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retired teachers and married women who had resigned were being 
asked to return to work1, but even so the situation remained 
extremely serious2. In the following month, it was reported that 
schoolboys and schoolgirls in the senior classes were being 
encouraged to enrol for the new crash courses for elementary 
school- teaching3. There was also a serious and growing shortage 
of lawyers, particularly of barristers and judges, so that the 
Ministry of Justice devised a less lengthy training course for 
junior members of the profession; even so, it was estimated that 
the number of counsel in Berlin courts would drop by anything 
up to 40% in the near future4. A month later, in November 1939, it 
was decided to shorten the period of training for intending lawyers 
as well, whether they were being called up for active service or 
not, in view of the general shortage of personnel in both the 
legal profession and the administrations. Even the Party eventually 
had to make sacrifices: in August 1940, the order went out that 
teachers should be asked to attend Party meetings in school hours 
only if their absence would prejudice the Party's interests, and that 
1. Ibid., frame 2- 750042. 
2. Ibid., frame 2- 750087, BziL, 16 October, 1939. Anxiety on this 
matter featured in a number of reports in the following month, 
on 10, 17 and 24 November, 1939. 
3. Ibid., frame 2- 750197, BziL, 6 November, 1939. 
4. Ibid., frame 2- 750072, BziL, 13 October, 1939. 
5. Ibid., frames 2-750073/4, BziL, 10 November, 1939. 
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Party events in which large numbers of teachers would be 
involved should be held in the school holidays1. 
The seriousness of this situation did not deter the 
NS- Rechtswahrerbund from complaining to Frick at the end of 1939 
about the appointment of women lawyers, who had originally hoped 
to work in the courts, to permanent positions in the senior 
ranks of the civil service; although this had been precisely what 
Freisler had been trying to achieve, after Hitler's order of 
August 1936 restricting the scope of women lawyers, the NSRB 
expressed the opinion that only men should be appointed to such 
positions. Frick discussed the matter with Hess, and then 
produced a draft circular in which he explained that Hitler's 
decision that only men should be appointed to senior civil service 
positions had allowed for exceptions to be made in cases where the 
post was one to which a woman would be particularly suited. He 
went on to say that 
"In a rational administration, where there are several 
possibilities, the most suitable must be chosen. This 
rule must also hold good for appointments to administrative 
positions." 
From this point he argued that if it was felt that a woman would be 
a better choice for a particular position, even a permanent post in 
the higher civil service, then she ought certainly to be appointed. 
Her suitability, he added, might seem the greater in view of the 
growing shortage of administrators2. Once again, Frick appears to 
1. BA, NSD 3/5, Verfiigungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, vol. 1, 
"Teilnahme von Lehrern und Lehrerinnen an Veranstaltungen und 
Schulungstagungen der Partei - B. 60/40 vom 14.8.40 ", p. 129. 
2. BA, R4311/427, draft circular signed by Frick, January 1940 
(exact date not given). 
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have been concerned that doctrinaire Party policy should not be 
applied in a fully comprehensive manner without any thought to 
practical consequences; as head of a large Government department, 
he, after all, had to ensure that the administrative machinery of the 
nation worked effectively, particularly in war -time. If there were 
not suitable men available to fill the gaps in the civil service 
caused by conscription, then, if it was to continue to function, 
women with the necessary training and qualifications would have to 
be brought in. 
The draft circular went first to Hess, who passed it on to 
Lammers for his opinion. Lammers, who still employed women in 
responsible positions in the Chancellery', replied that the sense of 
the circular was not, as far as he could see, in conflict with the 
ruling Hitler had given in July 1937, about the appointment of 
women to senior posts in the civil service. He appears not to 
have consulted Hitler on this occasion2, which probably prevented 
objections from being raised. Frick was, after all, allowing a 
much wider interpretation of the original order than Hitler's ruling 
would have permitted. With no obstacles raised, the circular went 
out in final form to all the Reich Ministers and senior officials 
of the Party in May 19403. Already, in the same month, a law had been 
1. Ibid., demonstrates that lists of officials to whom classified 
documents were to be shown include some women, e.g. on 19 July, 
1935, 18 September, 1937, 17 March, 1938, 3 January, 1940. 
Three women (all unmarried) figure on the lists for all of these 
dates, with an additional three for the last one. 
2. Ibid., letter from Lammers to Hess, 9 April, 1940. 
3. Ibid., circular from Frick to the highest authorities of the Reich. 
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passed to the effect that women in the service of the State who 
married "need not be dismissed if their maintenance seemed guaranteed 
in the long term from the size of their family income ". Women who had 
resigned or been dismissed for this reason could be reinstated, 
according to this new law1. The wording of the act suggests that this 
was intended as a war -time measure, at least in the first instance, and 
not as a statement of a fundamental change of principle. It was 
still possible for a woman to request to leave the civil service on 
marriage, and to receive severance pay, as a statement by the Minister 
of Finance confirmed even in February 19412, at a time when it would 
have been more practical to discourage women from giving up work, 
given the chronic shortage of personnel. 
As early as February 1940, it was reported that in many 
areas of the Reich local government was nearing a state of collapse 
on account of the shortage of personnel. To try to avert chaos, a 
number of district governors were beginning to appoint women to 
manage departments in their offices3. But such moves were to be regarded 
as emergency measures, and in areas of less pressing need women 
were to continue to be restricted by the orders Hitler had given 
in 1936 and 1937. Frau Scholtz -Klink discovered this in 1942 when 
she supported the application of Dr. Ilse Esdorn, a Party member 
since 19374, for promotion to the senior civil service post of 
1. "2. VO über Massnahmen auf dem Gebiet des Beamtenrechts ", RGB, 
1940 I, 3 May, 1940, P. 732. 
2. BA, op. cit., Reichshaushalts - und Besoldungsblatt Nr. 6, 
"Abfindung der weiblichen Beamten bei Verheiratung ", 27 February, 
1941, p. 90. 
3. IfZ, MA 441/1, frame 2- 750855, MadR, "Erneute Meldungen zum 
Personalmangel bei den Landratsämtern ", 19 February, 1940. 
4. BDC, Ilse Esdorn's Party Membership card. 
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of scientific adviser in the research institute where she worked 
as a botanist. Her candidature was also supported by the Director 
of the institute and by the National Forestry Office, but a 
dispensation was required for the appointment in view of Hitler's 
ruling of July 1937. Frau Scholtz -Klink therefore approached an 
official of the Party office, Dr. Klopfer, who put the matter to 
Lammers with the recommendation that Frick's circular of 1940, 
allowing for the appointment of women "in suitable cases ", did not 
apply in this instance1. Dr. Klopfer received a prompt answer 
from an official in the Chancellery, to the effect that Hitler's 
order of 1937 was still in force as he had since voiced no other 
opinion on the matter, and that the post for which Dr. Esdorn was 
being recommended hardly came within the scope of the exceptions 
to which he had agreed. For this reason, the question of the 
shortage of senior civil servants, mentioned in Frick's circular, 
had no bearing on the matter2. 
Epilogue 
It is hard to make a reasonable projection of what would 
have happened in peacetime to those women brought into professional 
positions as a result of the war, if Germany had won in 1941 or 1942. 
No doubt their short -term prospects would have been good, with 
male casualties and the low numbers of male students during the war. 
1. BA, op. cit., copy of notes about the case of Ilse Esdorn, 5 
February, 1942, and of a letter from Dr. Klopfer to Lammers, 18 
February, 1942. 
2. Ibid., letter from Lammer's office to Dr. Klopfer, 11 March, 1942. 
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But in the long term - as with employment in general - a new 
generation of qualified men would presumably have been given 
precedence, for reasons of population policy particularly. And 
yet, while the war had precipitated the need for professionally - 
qualified women, the demand was already there before it broke out. 
If there had been no war, there would still have been a considerable 
demand for such women, given the expansion, and intended further 
enlargement, of the Party's own organisations. Indeed, women were 
supposed to be restricted to matters involving women, children, 
marriage and the family; but to be able to cope with the administration 
of the women's organisations, and to provide the training, medical 
treatment and legal advice necessary in them it was essential that 
girls be admitted to universities in large numbers and given some 
practical professional training after graduation. The Party's view 
was that women should be organised by women - even if they were 
always ultimately subordinate to male authority - and so the most 
capable women had to be found for this function. ?rau Scholtz -Klink 
came gradually to the conclusion that women with an academic 
education were eminently suitable here, as long as they allowed 
themselves to be wholeheartedly drawn into the women's work of the 
nation, and did not cut themselves off from members of their own sex 
who were in other occupations - particularly the housewife and mother. 
Thus, a division was created between men and women in the 
same profession, after the massing together of all teachers, doctors, 
lawyers at first, in 1933, regardless of sex. This can, perhaps 
ironically, be seen as a return to the pre -Nazi system - the one the 
Nazis so roundly condemned - in which a strong element of feminism 
led to the creation of separate organisations for women who 
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nevertheless worked alongside men. The appointment of women 
representatives in the professional organisations as early as 1934 
shows acceptance of the de facto situation, that women were quite 
firmly entrenched in the professions, even if positive encouragement 
was not given to them until autumn 1936; but it is clear that, almost 
from the start of the Nazi regime, "politically reliable ", or even 
neutral, women were not to be driven out of the professions. However 
meagre the gains of the 1920s may have seemed to the feminists, they 
were the result of long years of campaigning and were not to be 
eradicated overnight on the whim of a governing élite whose ideology 
bore little relation to economic or social reality outside the 
abnormal conditions of a world depression. 
No doubt the fundamental conflict between Party doctrine and 
the needs of the country would have continued, if the Nazis had 
survived, with men like Frick - who had to get the results - trying 
to circumvent orders issued by people removed from the reality of 
day -to -day government, people like Hitler and Bormann. The case of 
Ilse Esdorn well illustrates the mindlessness of the bureaucrats who 
unquestioningly accepted edicts from above, however irrational or 
impractical they might be, while the increasing use of qualified women 
by some local authorities for jobs normally done by men shows that those 
remote from the centre were often prepared to act in what seemed to them 
the most appropriate way, without feeling the need to ask the central 




The Nazi Organisation of Women 
Introduction 
In contrast with the admission of women to formal political 
activity and even to prominent positions in the political parties 
of the left, the centre, and, to an extent, the right after 1918, 
the NSDAP's first general meeting in January 1921 unanimously passed 
the resolution that "Women cannot be admitted to the leadership or the 
executive committee of the Party ". It is recorded that those women 
who attended the meeting supported this decision enthusiastically1. 
Twenty -one years later, in the depths of the Second World War, Adolf 
Hitler was to boast that he had not only adhered to this resolution 
in the intervening period, but even surpassed it: "In no local section 
of the Party has a woman ever had the right to hold even the smallest 
post... "2. At no time during the existence of the Nazi Party did the 
male leadership waver from its implacable opposition to feminism; 
indeed, it claimed that this did not mean that the Party favoured the 
subordination of women to men, but rather that there were men's affairs 
and women's affairs, and that the latter did not include active 
participation in political life. But in reality the result of this 
"equivalent but different" theory was that while women might exercise 
some control over their own organisations and activities, all that they 
did was required to remain strictly within the confines imposed on them 
by the exclusively male leadership of the Party. 
Thus, it would be totally misleading to call any organisation 
1. G. Franz Willing, Die Hitlerbewegung, Hamburg, 1962, p. 82. 
2. Hitler's Table -Talk, no. 126, 26 January, 1942 (evening), p. 252. 
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of Nazi women a "Nazi Women's Movement ", for such a designation 
would imply that the specifically female activity that there 
undoubtedly was within the NSDAP had feminist aims and enjoyed a 
considerable degree of independence from Nazi men. The latter was 
certainly not the case, and if there were manifestations of 
feminism among the early female supporters of Hitler, these were 
finally eradicated once the immediate aim of the Party - the winning 
of political control in Germany - was achieved. A Nazi women's 
organisation, in fact, came into being only because it fulfilled 
certain needs of the male -dominated Party. It developed and 
became an integral and even essential part of Nazi Germany, but 
always in order to perform a particular function in the interests of 
the Party as a whole; if any benefit accrued to individual women, 
or even to groups of women, this was only ever incidental to the 
benefit derived by the Party. In this respect, the NSDAP was to 
some extent similar to both socialist parties, the SPD and the KPD, 
although it differed markedly from them in keeping women strictly out 
of the purely political struggle. 
There were four distinct phases in the development of the 
Nazi women's organisation. In the first, in the later 1920s, there 
was some systematisation of what had begun as apparently spontaneous 
female "assistance" to the Storm Troopers. The formal takeover by 
the Party of the main group involved in this, in 1928, began a new 
period which was to last only until autumn 1931, when the Party 
reorganised its women's section in order to be prepared for the final 
assault on the Weimar democracy. The subordination of all other 
activity to the single -minded aim of seizing and then consolidating 
power allowed the development within the women's section - as within 
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the Party as a whole - of conflicting groupings and points of view, 
which were to give rise to considerable confusion and finally to a 
power struggle in winter 1933 -34. The resulting victory for those 
who favoured unity and harmony above all within the Party and its 
member -organisations, strictly under Hitler's unchallenged leadership, 
brought forward Gertrud Scholtz -Klink as the leader who was to 
represent German womanhood from February 1934 until the end of the 
Third Reich. Her emergence ushered in a new phase, that of the 
detailed development of an integrated women's organisation which 
would carry out the will of the Party unquestioningly and involve 
German women in those activities considered suitable for them - and 
useful to the Party's political purpose at any given time. Constant 
propaganda managed most of the time to disguise the fact that the 
intricate administrative network evolved by Frau Scholtz -Klink and 
her staff was to some extent a facade, behind which there was 
relatively little real activity: the mass of German women did not want 
to be organised, and their passive resistance to attempts to involve 
the housebound housewife, above all, in the "women's work of the 
nation" ensured that the Nazi women's organisation remained very much 
a minority concern. 
A. The Organisation of Nazi Women before the " Machtübernahme" 
The nature of the early "assistance" given by women to the 
SA was completely in keeping with Nazi views about the role of women: 
it mainly consisted of first aid for those "comrades" wounded in 
street brawls and the provision of bowls of soup for indigent Party 
members. This was done on a local and completely spontaneous basis 
at first, without either central direction or planning of even a 
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short -term naturel. The first sign of organisation in this area 
came with the founding of the "German Women's Order (of the Red 
Swastika)" (DFO) by Elsbeth Zander2 in September 1923. This 
völkisch (racist -nationalist) group, which was formally affiliated 
to no political party, began to support and give aid to local Nazi 
groups, on its own initiative3. The value of this activity and the 
beginnings of the DFO's rationalisation on a national basis were 
recognised by the formal accrediting of the DFO as the women's 
auxiliary of the NSDAP at the 1926 Party Congress at Weimar. Elsbeth 
Zander, now official leader of the DFO4, wanted an even closer 
connection with the NSDAP, and at the end of 1927 she wrote to 
Hitler asking him to place the DFO under the direct jurisdiction 
of the Nazi Party5; this was effected in 19286. 
The DFO was now given formal regulations by the Party; these 
described its aims as: the removal of women from the disorders 
of party politics; the training of women in all aspects of nursing 
and welfare work; the affording of assistance to large families, to 
political prisoners, and to Germans abroad - especially those in the 
"occupied areas" taken from the Reich at Versailles; and the training 
of girls to become "racially conscious" German women and responsible 
1. "Nationalsozialistische Frauenarbeit ", FK, April 1937, p. 6. 
2. Elsbeth Zander was born in 1888, remained unmarried, and joined 
the NSDAP on 1 April, 1926, with the low membership number of 
33511. Information from BDC, her Party membership cards. 
3. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, "Die National -Sozialistische Frauenschaft 
(Deutscher Frauenorden) ", Meyers Konversations- Lexikon, 1932. 
4. FK, op. cit., p. 7. 
5. BA, op. cit., letter from Elsbeth Zander to Hitler, 12 December, 
1927. 
6. Ibid., Meyers Konversations- Lexikon, 1932. 
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members of the Volksgemeinschaft. Applicants for membership of 
the DFO had to be at least eighteen years of age and of German 
stock; and, confirming the inclusion of the DPO within the Party 
organisation, only women who were already full members of the 
NSDAP could be accepted into the DFO. The intention was clearly 
to make the DFO a tight -knit, reliable élite which would be more 
appropriate to the Kampfzeit (period of struggle) than an unwieldy mass 
organisation. As head of the DFO, Elsbeth Zander was designated 
Reichsftlhrerin (National Leader)1. She apparently had difficulty 
in persuading some of the existing members of the DPO to join 
the Nazi Party, and finally had to offer the incentive of a reduced 
membership fee together with the threat of being thrown out of the 
DFO for failure to join the Party2. But the women's groups which 
supported the NSDAP were still not unified; there remained other 
organisations besides the DFO, of which the Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaften 
(Women's Work Groups) were the largest and most important3. There 
also remained a large number of women Party members who were content 
to remain such without feeling the need to join a specifically 
women's group4. 
In the course of 1931 it became increasingly apparent that the 
continuing independence and the lack of co- ordination of much of the 
women's activity associated with the Party necessitated a fundamental 
1. Ibid., "Richtlinien des Deutschen Frauenordens ", n.d. 
2. BDC, Sig. Sch., 230, notice from Elsbeth Zander, "An die Mitglieder 
des Deutschen Frauen- Ordens ", 20 January, 1929. 
3. FK, loc. cit. 
4. BA, op. cit., "Die Organisation der nationalsozialistischen Frauen 
in der Nationalsozialistischen Frauenschaft ", order signed by 
Gregor Strasser, 6 July, 1931. 
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overhaul of the women's groups. By the summer of that year such 
a task also became possible, as the Party's preoccupation with 
other internal matters diminished1. The problem with the women's 
groups was not merely that there were several unrelated associations, 
but, more important, that the limits of the powers and functions of 
the main group, the DFO, had been left somewhat vague; thus there 
were variations in its activities and claims to jurisdiction, 
according to the extent of the local DFO leader's assertiveness and 
ambition. This contributed to a situation where leading members of 
the Party began to resent the activities and - as they saw it - the 
presumptuousness of the DFO. Goebbels, for one, felt that in his 
Berlin Gau the DFO was not firmly enough under his authority, and 
that its leadership was acting too independently of the Party machine 
to which it was, he understood, supposed to be subordinate. To try 
to exert greater control over the DFO, he sent instructions to his 
district leaders in June 1931 that they were to make a point of 
scrutinising and, if necessary, restricting the activities of the 
DFO in the districts2. This, however, was intended as only a 
temporary expedient; Goebbels also wrote to the Party's Organisation 
Chief, Gregor Strasser, recommending that, as a matter of urgency, 
the DFO be dissolved and replaced by a new organisation for women 
Party members which would be more integrated into the structure of 
the Party itself, and therefore easier to control3. 
1. Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, vol. I, Newton 
Abbott, 1971, p. 229. 
2. BA, op. cit., letter from Goebbels to his district leaders, 10 
June, 1931. 
3. Ibid., letter from Goebbels to Gregor Strasser, 10 June, 1931. 
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Goebbels's apparently modest and reasonable request was the 
outward manifestation of deep discontent which had been mounting in 
his Gau at the activities and general demeanour of members of the 
DFO. It was felt that, far from giving "assistance" to the SA, the 
DFO was a positive liability; for one thing, its members were not 
trained nurses and did not even have medically- qualified supervision, 
although they claimed to be competent to cope with sick and 
wounded SA men. Even worse, they were said to comport themselves 
in a rowdy and vulgar manner, so that trained nurses were 
discouraged from joining in their work; and the DFO women insisted on 
working independently, refusing to co- operate with the SA's own 
emergency service, which was well established in Berlin, at least, 
by 1931. Dr. Conti, reporting these views to Goebbels, emphasised 
that he had plenty of witnesses to substantiate not only these 
complaints but also the even more serious one of corruption. The 
blame for all the trouble was attributed unequivocally to Elsbeth 
Zander herself, whom Conti described as a psychopath, and against 
whom he threatened to take proceedings in the Party's High Court 
unless there was a radical reform of the conduct and control of the 
DFO1. 
Goebbels's letter apparently confirmed an impression that 
was already forming in Strasser's mind2, and was no doubt decisive in 
leading him to proceed at once to the preparation of an ordinance to 
transform the organisation of women's activity in the Party. On 6 
July, 1931, he issued an order which was distinguished by its tact: 
1. BDC, op. cit., report from Dr. L. Conti to Goebbels, 3 June, 1931. 
2. BA, loc. cit. 
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"The hitherto existing women's organisations, 
which have only ever been able to embrace a section 
of National Socialist women, could not, with the best will 
in the world, perform Lthe necessary/ tasks...." 
This situation was to be remedied by the creation of a new body, 
to supersede the old ones, which was to come into existence on 1 
October, 1931, and bear the name Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft 
(NSF), the National Socialist Women's Group. All women Party 
members in each locality would automatically constitute the NSF 
organisation in the locality; thus there would no longer be the 
need to wait for Party members to apply for membership of the 
women's group. But the women's group was not to be a separate 
organisation in the local branches of the Party; it was merely the 
collective body of Nazi women in an area, which would perform the 
specifically women's tasks of the Party; as such, it was directly 
subordinate to the Party's local branch leader. He, however, was 
empowered - although not obliged - to appoint to his executive a 
woman representative who would be responsible for supervising the 
women's work. There was, in addition, to be a staff of advisers 
on women's affairs at the national level, which would transmit 
general policy guidelines to the Gau leaderships, and, through them, 
to the local branches 
The existing groups were to continue their work until 1 
October, and then dissolve themselves, their members automatically 
becoming members of the NSF. Thus, members of the DFO, the 
Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaften, and the other women in the Party who had 
been members of neither of these groups, would all be brought together 
1. BDC, op. cit., order by Gregor Strasser, 6 July, 1931. 
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under one constitution and one leadership. Elsbeth Zander had 
been consulted about the reform, "as leader of the biggest and 
oldest of the women's groups ", and had given her agreement; no 
doubt consulting her was a wise move, since the allegiance of the 
DFO's individual members was, in the first instance, to her. As a 
quid pro quo for her co- operation - and in spite of the complaints 
made about her - she was appointed "adviser on women's affairs" in 
the Party's national leadership. This was not a breach of the 1921 
resolution since her position was advisory, not executive, and was 
specifically concerned with women and not with the Party's 
activities in general. As a further token of recognition of the 
role played by the DFO in the Party's early days, Strasser 
decreed that the full title of the new organisation should be 
Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft ( Deutscher Frauenorden)1. 
In accordance with Strasser's schedule, the DFO held an 
extraordinary annual general meeting on 6 September, 1931, at which 
its dissolution was formally carried through at the national level2. 
Communications between the national executive and the local groups 
seem to have been variable; the Berlin Gau DFO dissolved itself on 
24 September3, and issued its organisation plan for the NSF on 
1 October, as planned4; but the DFO continued to exist, as a group 
1. Ibid. 
2. BA, op. cit., "Ausführungsbestimmungen über die Neuorganisation 
der nationalsozialistischen Frauen in der Nationalsozialistischen 
Frauenschaft (Deutscher Frauenorden) ", 1 November, 1931. 
3. Ibid., "Rundschreiben nr. 26 ", Organisation Section of the NSDAP 
Gau Gross- Berlin, 24 September, 1931. 
4. Ibid., "Organisations -Plan für die Arbeit der Frauenschaft ", 
1 October, 1931. 
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of thirty or forty women, in Trier after 1 October1, and according 
to a report made in January 1932, it was into November 1931 before 
it was dissolved2. The NSF organisation in Berlin, at least, at 
once busied itself enrolling women Party members in the new 
organisation and involving them in the provision of soup -kitchens 
for unemployed Party members, especially those in the SA, since 
winter was drawing in and prospects for the unemployed were growing 
only bleaker3. In addition, the Berlin NSF, under the energetic 
leadership of Fraulein von Gustedt, assumed responsibility for 
providing sustenance for participants in the large rallies being 
held by the Party in the city in autumn 19314. 
Strasser was well pleased with the new arrangements; the 
biggest advance, in his view, was that at all levels women's 
activity for the Party was now under the direct control of the 
political leadership; this meant, he felt, that women could be 
brought into work of a more general nature than hitherto. This 
work was to be divided into three broad categories: material aid 
in terms of food and clothing for the unemployed among the SA, as 
well as practical first aid; "culture and education ", which largely 
meant propaganda to German women, to try to attract them to National 
Socialism; and training for housewives in domestic science, in 
keeping with. Party ideology. This work was to be performed on a 
1. Heyen, op. cit., "Berichte des Regierungsprasidenten von Trier 
an den Oberprasidenten der Rheinprovinz ", 13 October, 1931, p. 73. 
2. Ibid., 14 January, 1932, p. 76. 
3. BDC, op. cit., draft questionnaire for intending members of the 
NSF, and "Rundschreiben Nr. 1 ", "Rundschreiben Nr. 2 ", NSDAP 
Gau Gross - Berlin Frauenschaft, both dated 1 October, 1931. 
4. Ibid., "Rundschreiben Nr. 6a ", 9 November, 1931. 
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decentralised basis, with the locality as the basic organisational 
unit. The Party leader in the locality was instructed to choose the 
woman Party member he thought most suitable to be the NSF leader 
there. Similarly, each Gauleiter chose the NSF leader for his 
province, after consultation with Elsbeth Zander, as national 
NSF leader. The Gau NSF leader was similarly consulted by the 
Party's district leaders on the matter of choosing the district 
NSF leaders. Thus, although the NSF's work was decentralised, a 
chain of command was established from the locality through the 
district and the Gau to the national leadership, to ensure uniformity 
throughout Germany 
The powers of the NSF leaders at all levels were, in fact, 
very restricted, and almost exclusively advisory; the Gau NSF 
leader, for example, could not give orders to the leaders in the 
districts or the localities; her function was to give advice about 
how best to fulfil the policies determined by the Party leadership. 
Elsbeth Zander was appointed leader of the section for women's work 
in the Party Organisation office, to advise Strasser on all orders 
and policies he might contemplate which would affect women; she was 
allowed to suggest policies, also, but was given no independent 
decision -making power whatsoever2. Her tasks and that of all other 
NSF officials, was to find how best to implement the decisions of 
the Party as they affected women, not to question them. Elsbeth 
Zander's appointment in the Party Organisation office had one 
beneficial effect as far as Goebbels and his colleagues in Berlin 
1. BA, op. cit., "Ausführungsbestimmungen... ", 1 November, 1931. 
2. Ibid. 
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were concerned, even if she was still in a position of some influence: 
it removed her from Berlin to Munich, so that she would no longer be 
a thorn in the flesh of the Berlin Party organisation. 
The women who were in the leadership of the NSF along with 
Elsbeth Zander in 1931 and 1932 sometimes chafed at the tight rein 
imposed on them by the Party's central organisation. Strasser's 
somewhat prosaic outline of the NSF's tasks was given colour and 
flamboyance in the more detailed "Principles of the NS- Prauenschaft" 
produced by the women themselves. These certainly included the 
Party's basic idea that women, as guardians of the race and nation 
by virtue of their biological function, should cherish their maternal 
instincts, and that these should condition the kind of education 
and training given to girls and women. Also, there was the resolution 
that what was seen as the debasement of maternal instincts and the 
degradation of women's honour in the Republican period should be 
fiercely combated. But there was more spirit than the Nazi leaders 
might have wished for in the demands for a women's "renewal movement" 
and for the training of the most able women to take their place at 
the head of the nation1. There are clear signs here of the kind of 
independence and even feminism which the Party had rejected from 
the start, with very little of the compliant docility it expected 
from its women. Their enthusiasm was not, however, to be checked at 
this time, when ardour and vigour were only too necessary, but once 
the Party had won power the female militants were to find that they 
were expendable. 
Gregor Strasser - who was also to prove expendable - seems to 
1. Ibid., "Grundsatze der Nationalsozialistischen Frauenschaft ", n.d. 
341. 
have had some sympathy for the militants' position, and was more 
than willing to give the NSF leaders increased scope for initiative. 
At a national conference of Gau NSF leaders in March 1932 he asked 
for opinions about the working of the 1931 regulations, and was 
convinced, as a result of the response he received, that the women's 
activity should be brought more into the mainstream of Party work, 
with the Party's leaders at the local level taking more of an interest 
in it than formerly. More opportunities should be provided, he 
felt, for the participation of women in useful Party work, and 
encouragement should be given wherever possible to stimulate the 
women's enthusiasm. This was particularly necessary, since the 
Presidential and Land elections in the early months of 1932 had 
clearly shown that the Nazi Party was making relatively little 
headway among women; the subordinate role assigned to women by the 
Party was hardly a vote- catcher outside the ranks of the Party 
faithful. By contrast, Strasser cited the power exerted in the 
election campaigns by the propaganda directed specifically at women 
by other parties1. The Communists were, of course, stepping up 
their propaganda assault on women very considerably at this time2; 
the Bavarian People's Party had specifically warned women against the 
"chaos and civil war" which a Nazi victory would bring3; and there had 
been a vigorous - and successful - campaign by the female supporters 
of 
1. IfZ, MA 644, frame 2- 867017, "NSDAP: (1) Neuorganisation der nat.- 
soz. Frauenschaft ", April 1932 (exact date not given). 
2. See above, Chapter 1, pp. 17 -18 and Chapter 2, pp. 79 -80. 
3. BA, "Reichstagswahl 1930 ", Augsburger Postzeitung, 14 September, 
1930. I am most grateful to Dr. Geoffrey Pridham for pointing 
out this extract to me. 
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Hindenburg to attract women voters to the candidate of "stability 
and order "1. 
Strasser took it upon himself to give concrete assurance to 
women both in and outside the Party that the Nazis were not as 
anti -feminist as they had seemed; to this end, he upgraded the 
status of the NSF's leaders, by decreeing that the Gau NSF 
leaders should in future be full members of the Gau leadership. And, 
as a major innovation, the Gau NSF leaders were to be empowered to 
issue orders to the NSF leaders in the districts and the localities. 
Thus, the Gau NSF leader was allowed a degree of authority, some 
decision- making power, and higher status. The reservation was made 
that her orders and decisions must be in line with general Party 
policy, and in accordance with the particular policies of her own 
Gau leadership, to whose chief she was directly subordinate. On 
the other hand, Strasser emphasised that, equally, the Party's 
political leaders at all levels were to promote and support the work 
of the NSF in every way they could2. This clearly did not find the 
welcome he had hoped among the male officials of the Party, since 
Strasser felt the need to send out a reminder about the last point 
to all Gau offices at the end of August 1932, and to stress the 
responsibility of the political leaders for ensuring that the NSF's 
resources were being put to the best use3. 
1. Ibid., R4511/64, DIN Reichsgeschäftsstelle, Frauenrundschau, 
4 March, 1932, "Deutscher Frauenausschuss für die Hindenburg - 
wahl", and 6 April, 1932, "Zur Hindenburgwahl am 10. April ". 
2. IfZ, op. cit., frames 2- 867017 -18. 
3. BA, S1g.Sch., 230, order by Strasser to all Gau leaderships, 31 
August, 1932. 
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Strasser's insistence that women could play an extremely 
valuable role in the Party seemed to be underlined in September 
1932 when, in his general reorganisation of the associations 
affiliated to the Party, he gave the NSF the status of a main 
department, as Hauptabteilung VIII, in the Party Organisation 
office; hitherto, the NSF had been only one of a number of groups 
constituting a main department1. This move further enhanced the 
status of the NSF leaders at the national and Gau level, and 
especially that of Elsbeth Zander, the only woman in the Party 
leadership. In the absence of firm evidence, it can only be 
surmised that Strasser had decided that the antagonism felt towards 
her by some of the male Party officials2 was at least partially 
unjustified, and that it was chiefly his protection which kept 
her at the head of the NSF; that she lost her leading position 
soon after his resignation adds credence to this interpretation. 
For the time being, on 1 October, 1932, Strasser issued a skeleton 
plan for the new department which was to form the broad basis of the 
NSF's organisational structure throughout the Third Reich30 Thus, 
in one year the organisation of Nazi women had been transformed from 
a loose association of groups affording material aid to Party members 
into a highly -centralised and closely- controlled body within the 
Party organisation itself and geared to the general political 
objectives of the NSDAP. 
In the last months of the Kampfzeit, as a Nazi victory seemed 
1. Orlow, op. cit., p. 274. 
2. See above p. 335. 
3. BA, op. cit., " Hauptabteilung VIII ", 1 October, 1932. 
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tantalisingly close, this meant that the NSF was to engage 
vigorously in a variety of activities. Above all, its members were 
to continue to give first aid and sustenance to members of the SA 
and SS; they were also to try to raise funds for the Party - not 
for themselves, since they had no income and no treasury of their 
own - and to hold lectures, discussions and social evenings for 
their members and for potential recruits. NSF members were also to 
participate actively in election campaigns - especially the November 
Reichstag election campaign - in order to win over women to the 
Party at this vital time, and to improve the Party's image among 
the female population in general. It was felt especially 
important that young girls be attracted to the movement, and that they 
be given practical instruction in games and handwork with, 
naturally, a strong infusion of "political education "1. The 
involvement of NSF women in this last area brouglt sharp opposition 
from within the Party itself: Baldur von Schirach, leader of the 
Hitler Youth, complained to Strasser in the strongest terms about 
the creation of "NS- Mädchenschaften" as youth groups associated with 
the NSF; these, he said, were clearly in competition with his own 
Bund deutscher Madel2. Schirach won his point; no doubt to avoid 
internal dissension at a crucial time - but also because the Nazis 
believed in monolithic bodies and rejected rivalry between 
organisations as wasteful and divisive - it was decreed that the NSF 
1. Ibid. 
Ibid., "Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft ", instructions issued 
in Gau München- Oberbayern, 25 February, 1932. 
FK, op. cit., p. 8. 
2. BA, op. cit., letter from Schirach to Strasser, 8 November, 1932. 
345. 
girls' groups should be disbanded, and the Hitler Youth and its 
constituent associations given a monopoly of Nazi youth 
organisation 
But if the organisation of the NSF seemed smooth on the 
surface, at the national level, and if co- operation could eliminate 
some areas of dissension, there were rivalries and personal 
animosities within the women's organisation which were certainly 
apparent in 19322, and which would reach a climax in 1933 -34. It 
seems reasonable to attribute much of the dissension to the way 
in which the NSF was created, with women who had worked relatively 
independently for the Party, whether in the work groups or as 
individual Party members, finding themselves now in a tightly - 
organised association at whose head was the leader of the former 
DIO, an organisation which they had obviously deliberately decided 
not to join. Discontent could also be found at the other end of 
the scale, with the NSF's leadership by no means always satisfied 
with the women who were supposed to be their representatives in the 
Gaue and at the more local level. An example of this was to be 
found in the case of Frau Polster, Gau NSF leader in North Westphalia. 
She had been appointed by Gauleiter Alfred Meyer on his own 
initiative, without the recommended consultation with the NSF 
leadership, and clearly regarded him as her superior, feeling no 
allegiance to Elsbeth Zander, and indeed - it was said - refusing to 
recognise her as leader of the NSF. This situation was felt by the 
1. Ibid., Slg.Sch., 257, order signed by Strasser and Schirach, 7 
July, 1932. 
2. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, London, 1966, 
p. 75, refers to the "internal bickering that characterised the 
Women's Auxiliary in Thalburg "a 
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organisational chief of the NSF (with the title of Reichsinspekteurin), 
Dr. Kate Auerhahn, to be intolerable, and she complained to 
Meyer that Frau Polster was tactless, undisciplined, and, in short, 
not at all suitable to be a Gau NSF leader. Kate Auerhahn 
proposed to Meyer that he request Frau Polster's resignation, and 
threatened that if this was refused, she would bring proceedings in 
the Party's High Court against Frau Polsterl. 
Meyer, however, was well aware of his powers as Gauleiter, 
and replied to Kate Auerhahn that Frau Polster might be somewhat 
impetuous, but had done prodigious work in building up the NSF in 
his Gau. In addition, he said - and this is the other essential 
part of the picture - Frau Polster had been grievously hindered 
by the unco- operativeness of some of her subordinate officials who 
had behaved in a way which was "anything but National Socialist ". 
Alfred Meyer was prepared to investigate the charges made against 
his Gau NSF leader, but he made it very clear that the decision as 
to whether she should be dismissed or not lay with him, and not with 
the NSF's national leadership2. In the event, he chose to retain 
Frau Polster, who enjoyed a long period of office - compared with 
many of the pre -1933 Gau NSF leaders - and was still to be found as 
NSF leader in North Westphalia in November 19373, long after Kate 
Auerhahn and Elsbeth Zander had faded into complete obscurity. Meyer's 
attitude and actions well illustrate how little real power even the 
1. BDC, Käte Auerhahn's file, letter from Kate Auerhahn to Alfred 
Meyer, 8 August, 1932. 
2. Ibid., letter from Alfred Meyer to Kate Auerhahn, 15 August, 1932. 
3. Ibid., Slg.Sch., 230, list of Gau NSF leaders, 10 November, 1937. 
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national leadership of the NSF had, and how dependent a Gau NSF 
leader was on the good will of her Gauleiter. They also underlined 
the primacy of the male political leadership in the NSDAP, in 
every sphere of its activity, which was to prevail throughout the 
Third Reich even as the organisation of Nazi women became more 
sophisticated and, at least apparently, more autonomous. 
B. The Power -struggle in the Nazi Women's Organisation, 1933 -34 
With the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on 30 
January, 1933, the task of the NS- Frauenschaft became, in the words 
of the official account, "the construction of the work of women in 
the Third Reich and the education of the entire female population 
of Germany to think in the National Socialist way "1. It was not 
to be as straightforward as that. The dissolution of the non Nazi 
women's groups was achieved easily enough2, even if there remained 
throughout the Nazi era pockets of resistance to the complete 
ordering of women's affairs by the NSF, and, controlling it, the 
Party3. The most immediate problem, however, was an internal one, 
that of the leadership of the NSF itself. The in- fighting over 
this issue involved not only the women of the NSF, but also the leaders 
of the Party's organisation machine and other Party notables, and 
was considered so harmful to a movement which stressed unity, 
authority and harmony that it was kept out of the Party's press as 
1. FK, loc. cit. 
2. See above, Chapter 1, pp. 31-37. 
3. Examples of this will be given later in this Chapter. 
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far as possible at the time; subsequently, when the story of the 
development of Nazi women's activity came to be related - the Nazis 
were fascinated by the history of their own movement - the events of 
the first year of Nazi rule were glossed over with brief 
generalisationsl. 
Given the meticulousness with which the Nazis kept their 
records, particularly once the Party's own archive was inaugurated 
in 19342, the complete absence of documentary evidence for women's 
affairs between October 1932 and January 1934, and the paucity of 
evidence between January and March 1934, suggests that great pains 
were taken to destroy documents regarded as damning, so that no 
trace would be left of the leadership struggle. But some material 
did survive, in the proceedings of the Party's High Court which 
were no doubt overlooked when the process of expurgation was taking 
place. This material is sufficiently substantial to permit a 
reasonable attempt at a reconstruction of the events which the Nazis 
were so anxious to conceal, although areas of doubt necessarily 
remain. That is perhaps most puzzling of all is why the Nazis should 
have been so single - mindedly determined to cover all trace of the 
leadership struggle in the relatively unimportant area of women's affairs; 
1. FK, op. cit., pp. 6 -8. The account given here was apparently 
considered authoritative, since it was reproduced verbatim in 
Nachrichtendienst der Reichsfrauenführerin, April 1937, pp. 90- 
95, and May 1937, pp. 114 -21. An almost identical account was 
given in Der Neue Tag, Prague, 3 April, 1941 (Wiener Library 
Personality File G15). 
"5 Jahre Reichsfrauenftihrung ", FK, February 1939, p. 3, categoric- 
ally dates the beginning of the "women's work" of the Third Reich 
from 24 February, 1934, the date of Gertrud Scholtz- Klink's 
appointment as NSF leader. 
2, BDC, Slf.Sch., 211, letter from Reichsschulungsleiter Gohdes to 
all Party and State officials and to journalists, 30 January, 1934. 
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their obsession with presenting at least the outward appearance of 
unity may not seem a totally satisfactory explanation, but it is 
the only obvious one. 
Gregor Strasser had realised that the creation of the NSF in 
1931 brought together in one centralised organisation a large number 
of Party members and officials who had been active solely in their 
own region and did not know each other. The two national meetings of 
Gau NSF leaders which he convened in March and October 1932 were 
largely designed to bring these women into contact with each other. 
Prominent among those present were Paula Siber and Gertrud Scholtz- 
Klink, who quickly agreed that they were opposed to Elsbeth Zander's 
leadership of the NSF1. Paula Siber, born in 1893 and married to a 
Major in the army, with one son, had joined the NSDAP in 1931, after 
working informally for it for a year, and almost at once became Gau 
NSF leader in Dffsseldorf 
2 
. Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, born in 1902, first 
married to a headmaster and eventually mother of four children, had 
joined the Party in about 1929 and become Gau NSF leader first in 
Baden and then, in addition, in Hesse3. 
Whether the combined opposition of Paula Siber and Gertrud 
1. BDC, AOPG, 2684/34, letter from Paula Siber to Erich Hilgenfeldt, 
14 January, 1935. 
2. BDC, Paula Siber's Party membership card and "Lebenslauf ", 16 
February, 1938. 
3. Ibid., Party membership card, NSLB card, and Party employee's 
salary card. 
Cutting from Der Neue Tag, Prague, 3 April, 1941, Wiener Library 
Personality File G15. 
Different sources place her date of entry to the Party as being in 
1929 or 1930, with Professor Charles Singer, in his Nachlass in the 
Wiener Library PF G15 putting it as early as 1928. Even her Party 
membership card gives 1929 and 1930 in different places. 
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Scholtz - Klink, along with a number of other NSF leaders whom they 
won over, had much bearing on the dismissal of Elsbeth Zander from the 
leadership of the NSF is difficult to tell, since she disappeared 
almost without trace, and there is no record of her going. It 
does seem likely that the resignation of Gregor Strasser from his 
position as Reich Organisation Leader on 8 December, 1932, and 
Hitler's subsequent campaign to discredit him and his work1, was a 
factor in her removal from office, if only because with Strasser's 
departure there was no one left to defend her. However, she seems 
to have hung on to her position until the spring of 1933; William 
Sheridan Allen describes a meeting addressed by Elsbeth Zander, 
"the National Leader of the Nazi Women's Auxiliary ", on 2 March in 
"Thalburg "2, and Paula Siber writes of "the new leader of the NSF ", 
referring to the situation in June 19333. 
Elsbeth Zander remains a shadowy figure, and it is clear that 
this was precisely what the Party leadership intended to happen. She 
appears in a relatively humble position in the Gau leadership office 
in Kurmark in July 1934, and two months later is awarded the Party's 
highest honour, the Gold Badge, as a veteran Party member. It is 
tempting to conclude that she accepted her dismissal from office with 
a good grace, and was rewarded with a steady job and a medal for going 
quietly. At any rate, she was still a member of the Party and an 
employee in the Kurmark Gau leadership in February 1941. Enquiries 
1. Orlow, op. cit., pp. 293 -94. 
2, Allen, op. cit., p. 150. Allen wrongly cites Fr5,ulein Zander's 
Christian name as "Elisabeth" on more than one occasion. 
3. BDC, AOPG, 2684/34, letter from Paula Siber to Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, 
21 May, 1934. 
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about her past and current activities elicited a bare, sometimes a 
sharp, response: in 1938 the Gau leadership in Thuringia was told 
simply her date of birth, entry date to the NSDAP and membership number, 
and her address in Kurmark, with the additional remark that she 
held the Party's Gold Badge. A request for information in 1940 by a 
private individual, Martha Schmidt, not herself a Party member, was 
met by the reply that "information about Party members is imparted only 
to Party offices and officials "1. Another of the old guard, Kate 
Auerhahn, was summoned to Party headquarters in the Brown House in 
Munich at the beginning of February 1933, which suggests promotion, 
but she, too, was relegated to obscurity; Paula Siber was to claim that 
she and Gertrud Scholtz -Klink had been opposed to giving her a 
leading role2. Whether this was or was not the cause of Kate Auerhahn's 
failure to succeed Elsbeth Zander, she left Munich for Heidelberg 
in October 1933, and seems not to have had any further Party employment, 
her occupation thenceforth being described as "housewife "3. 
Once Elsbeth Zander had been removed, the choice of a successor 
lay jointly in the hands of Hess, as head of the Party's Central 
Political Committee, with Bormann as his chief of staff, and Robert 
Ley, Hitler's chief of staff at the Party Organisation office. This 
duality of control over Hauptabteilung VIII, the NSF, was the result 
of the deliberate division of the authority Strasser alone had formerly 
1. BDC, Elsbeth Zander's Party membership cards, Partei -Kanzlei 
Korrespondenz, and Dr. Konrad Witzmann's file. 
2. Ibid., AOPG, 2684/34, letter from Paula Siber to Erich Hilgenfeldt, 
14 January, 1935. 
3. BDC, Kate Auerhahn's Party membership card and letter from the 
Gauschatzmeister, Baden, to the Membership Office at Party HQ, 
12 December, 1940. 
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held1. The Party bosses together chose as the new NSF leader a 
twenty -six- year -old girl, Lydia Gottschewski, who had recently been 
national leader of the BdM2. She was not, however, given Elsbeth 
Zander's former place in the Party leadership. It soon became clear 
that Lydia Gottschewski was an unfortunate choice. Although she 
fulfilled a useful function by violently ridiculing the middle -class 
women's movement, and Gertrud Bäumer in particular3, she was 
extremely outspoken, often sounding uncomfortably feminist to the 
Party leadership. Her aim was to create a new "women's movement" to 
replace the old, pacifist, internationalist one, and she claimed that 
a society dominated by theories of male superiority would be a 
divided society4. For a time, however, she carried with her the support 
of about half óf the Gau NSF leaders5, but the opposition of the 
remainder, again led by Paula Siber and Gertrud Scholtz- Klink6, created 
a situation that was both unstable and unproductive. 
This was further aggravated by the fact that, now the Party was 
in Government, the conflict and confusion which was apparent in 1933 
between competing agencies of Party and State over the limits of their 
1. Orlow, op. cit., p. 295. 
2. BDC, AOPG 2684/34, letter from Paula Siber to Gertrud Scholtz -Klink, 
21 May, 1934. 
BA, Slg.Sch., 251, "Richtlinien für den 'BdM "', 
3. Lydia Gottschewski, "Zur Einführung", Die Deutsche Frauenfront, August 
1933, p. 1. 
4. Lydia Gottschewski, MRnnerbund und Frauenfrage, Munich, 1934, 
pp. 8 -9, 13, 20, 39 -43, 70 -77. 
5. BDC, op. cit., statement by Bormann, 30 May, 1934. 
6. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
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jurisdiction had its effect on the women's organisation. Wilhelm 
Frick, as Reich Minister of the Interior, maintained that at least 
some of the responsibility for running the affairs of German women 
should lie with his Ministry, and it was with this in mind that he 
appointed Paula Siber to be his "adviser on women's affairs" on 12 
June, 1933. Her immediate task was, as 
"representative of German women and of the women's 
organisations 597 bring together in the service of the 
national community the various women's groups in a united 
National Federation of German Women's Organisations ", 
under the authority of the Minister of the Interior'. This 
activity brought her into immediate conflict with Lydia Gottschewski, 
who was engaged in exactly the same task, the bringing of all German 
women's organisations into a new combine, the Frauenfront (Women's 
Front), this time under the leadership and control of the Party2. As 
far as Hess and Ley were concerned, this was the only right thing to 
do, since in their view anything affecting group activity was a Party 
matter3. 
Already, however, opposition to Lydia Gottschewski was mounting 
from a number of quarters. Gertrud Scholtz -Klink clashed with her 
at a Gau NSF leaders' meeting in June 1933, and the next month led 
a deputation of Gau NSF leaders to Berlin to report that the condition 
of the NSF could only be described as disconsolate and uncertain4. Frau 
1. Ibid. 
2. Lydia Gottschewski, Die Deutsche Frauenfront, loc. cit. 
BDC, op. cit., letter from Walter Buch to Dr. G. A. Krummacher, 
20 September, 1933. 
3. Ibid., statement by Bormann, 30 May, 1934. 
4. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Gertrud Scholtz -Klink, 21 May, 1934. 
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von Hadeln, leader of the conservative Bund K8niAin Luise, which 
had supported Hitler in the 1932 elections and joined the Frauenfront 
immediately on its creation, complained that Lydia Gottschewski had 
refused to admit the BKL to the work of the Frauenfront, and had 
actually encouraged NSF members to launch verbal attacks on the 
BKL. Frau von Hadeln - an army officer's wife who was not herself 
a Party member - found a sympathetic listener in Walter Buch, chairman 
of the Party High Court, who passed on her complaints to Bormann, and 
who now became an enemy of Lydia Gottschewski in a powerful positionl. 
Thus, although Hess and Ley wanted to uphold her position 
against Paula Siber's, they found that Lydia Gottschewski was fast 
becoming a liability, and finally her "position became untenable on 
organisational grounds ", as Bormann later put it. She was replaced 
as leader of the NSF in mid- September 1933 by Dr. Gottfried Adolf 
Krummacher2, a local government official in the Rhineland and member 
of the Prussian Landtag, who had been a Party member since 19303. 
Since it had become clear that the women were incapable of ordering 
their own affairs rationally and amicably, and since considerable 
damage was being done to the image of the Party and the effectiveness 
of its women's organisation, the Party leaders had decided to see if 
1. Ibid., letter from Walter Buch to Dr. Krummacher, 20 September, 1933. 
2. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Gertrud Scholtz -Klink, 21 
May, 1934. 
Stockhorst, op. cit., p. 254. 
3. BDC, G. A. Krummacher's Party membership card, and letter from the 
Gauleitung, Mil-Aachen, to the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP, 1 
September, 1934. 
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a man could restore authority and order. One result of these 
events was that the Labour Service Leader, Hierl, insisted for a 
long time that a man should be put in charge of the Women's Labour 
Service, although Gertrud Scholtz -Klink had, at Ley's request, 
drawn up an organisation plan for it, and her name had been put 
forward for this post. Dr. Krummacher, in fact, held this position 
until January 1934, when, in spite of his protests, Frau Scholtz- 
Klink was finally created leader of the Women's Labour Servicel, 
the first of a number of offices which she was soon to amass. 
This overriding of Dr. Krummacher's wishes in January 1934 was 
an accurate reflection of how low his stock had sunk in four months. 
Far from resolving the divisions in the women's organisation, his 
appointment had, if anything, made them more acute. Paula Siber, 
particularly, resented it, since she had seen herself as the obvious 
candidate to succeed Lydia Gottschewski - and also because she believed 
that women's affairs should be under the leadership of a woman. She 
also claimed that she had the support of the Gau NSF leaders, although 
Bormann was prepared to concede only that she and Lydia Gottschewski 
each had the support of half of them2. Paula Siber was also proud of 
having created the new mass organisation of German women - in contrast 
with the NSF, which was the élite leadership group - the Deutsches 
Frauenwerk (DFw), which was recognised by the leaderships of both 
1. Ibid., AOPG 2684/34, loc. cit. 
Nieuwenhuysen, op. cit., p. 234. 
2. BDC, op. cit., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
Ibid., statement by Bormann, 30 May, 1934. 
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Party and State in September 1933 as the superseder of both the 
Frauenfront and her own Federation1. But at this same point in time 
she had to accept a compromise reached by Hess and Frick in September 
1933, by which she was appointed deputy leader of the DPW, whose head 
was to be Dr. Krummacher, the NSF leader. He, for his part, returned 
Paula Siber's animosity, seeing her appointment as an anomaly and a 
potential source of discord, since she was responsible to Frick, and 
not to the Brown House2. 
In Dr. Krummacher the Party leaders had made another bad 
choice. For one thing, his holding of other offices besides those in 
the women's organisation meant that he could not give the latter the 
attention it required at this crucial time. As Landrat in Gummersbach, 
in the Rhineland, and holder of other provincial appointments, he 
spent relatively little time in Munich, on NSF business, Moreover, 
since the DFW's central office was in Berlin he seldom managed to 
visit it; Paula Siber asserted that on the few occasions he did, he 
created confusion by countermanding orders he had previously given. 
In a long report on the state of the DFW, made in mid -January 1934, 
she attributed to Dr. Krummacher's neglect, indecisiveness and 
abrasive manner the fact that the DFW had no funds, no plans for future 
activity, and that a number of the organisations enrolled in it were 
now applying to withdraw. There was, in Paula Siber's view, plenty that 
the DFW could do - indeed must do - in the Nazi State, but this would 
be possible only if immediate action were taken to prevent its collapse, 
1. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
2. Ibid., letter from Dr. Krummacher to Frick, 25 April, 1934. 
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and to give it firm direction1. Naturally enough, Dr. Krummacher 
saw the situation differently, and blamed Paula Siber, who, being 
permanently based in Berlin, was in charge of the day -to -day running 
of the DFW, for the confused and demoralised condition of the 
organisation 
To try to remedy the situation, Dr. Krummacher tried to 
transfer the DFW's office to Munich; this would have the two -fold 
benefit of easing his own travelling problem and removing the DFW's 
affairs from Paula Siber's control completely, since her position in 
the Ministry of the Interior kept her in Berlin. The agreement which 
had been reached by Frick and Hess in September 1933 did not provide 
for such a move, but Ley, the other Party boss with direct authority 
over the women's organisation, had no compunction in giving Krummacher's 
proposal the Party's approval. Krummacher has perhaps been unfortunate 
in having been branded the villain of the piece3; he seems to have had 
considerable problems, not least in feeling genuinely in doubt about 
the "limits of responsibility" for the DFW between the Party and the 
Ministry of the Interior, since the Frick -Hess agreement had left that 
question open - no doubt to avoid conflict. Frick continued to assert 
that he was the "protector" of the DFW, while Hess and Ley were of the 
opinion that the DPW was subordinate to the Party's authority. 
Krummacher, anxious to avoid being the cause of strife between the two, 
1. Ibid., Paula Siber, "Bericht fiber das DFW", 15 January, 1934. 
2. Ibid., letter from Dr. Krummacher to Frick, 25 April, 1934. 
3. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp. 60 -61, is critical of Dr. Krummacher 
while calling Paula Siber "tolerant and conciliatory ". He seems 
unaware of the deeper, underlying conflict between Party and State 
over the leadership issue. 
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asked that they decide the matter between themselves1. 
He did not, however, manage to avoid becoming a scapegoat: 
because of his "organisational blunders ", as Bormann put it, he was 
relieved of his positions in the women's organisation at the end of 
January 1934. Hess was now determined that order should be brought 
out of the confusion into which the women's organisation had been 
allowed to drift, and appointed Erich Hilgenfeldt, who was leader of 
the Party's welfare organisation, the NSV, leader of the NSF. 
Hilgenfeldt was regarded as a strong man who would be able to resolve 
the conflicts and problems of the women's organisation; Hess found 
it additionally suitable that there should be close co- operation 
between the welfare organisation and the NSF, since women were 
expected to play a large part in welfare activities in the Nazi 
State. But the problem of duality of control over women's affairs 
remained, and so Hess - who had always seen this as anomalous and 
damaging - decided that the time had come for the Party to assume 
sole control of the DFW, and to place its leadership in the hands of 
the leader of the NSF, namely Hilgenfeldt2. To do this, however, 
would be to provoke a direct confrontation with Paula Siber and, more 
important, with Frick. The evidence available overwhelmingly suggests 
that the Party leadership came to the conclusion that the only way to 
achieve their aim without causing an ugly, and possibly a public, 
conflict between themselves and the Minister of the Interior was to 
act quickly to discredit Paula Siber in such a way that Frick would be 
unable to uphold her position. With her removed, the Party could take 
1. BDC, loc. cit. 
2. Ibid., statement by Bormann, 30 May, 1934. 
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over the functions she had exercised, and there would be little 
chance for Frick to reverse the position at a later date. 
With a mandate from the Party to proceed quickly and decisively, 
then, Hilgenfeldt assumed the leadership of the DFW as well as the 
NSF, and at once ordered an inspection of its accounts1. While this 
was being carried out, Hilgenfeldt agreed to meet the Gau NSF leaders, 
who were perplexed by the changes in the leadership and in any case 
hoped that a woman would again be appointed. When Gertrud Scholtz - 
Klink's name was suggested - presumably at the Party leaders' 
instigation - on 21 February, 1934, Paula Siber was completely taken 
aback and did all she could to persuade Hilgenfeldt that Frau 
Scholtz -Klink would be an unwise choice. She had no doubt expected 
that she would now be the obvious candidate, since she did enjoy 
substantial support among the Gau NSF leaders, compared with Gertrud 
Scholtz -Klink who was less well -known nationally. Nevertheless, on 
24 February Gertrud Scholtz -Klink's appointment to leadership of the 
NSF and the DFW - in addition to the position she already held as 
leader of the Women's Labour Service - was announced. Paula Siber 
now, with a fairly good grace, agreed to accept this, and promised to 
co- operate fully with the new leader, resentful though she was that, 
as founder of the DFW, she was not to be permitted to lead it2. 
The Party leadership, however, wanted her removed from any 
position of prominence, since she had, so it seemed, caused nothing 
but trouble by her apparent inability to collaborate peaceably 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Gertrud Scholtz -Klink, 21 May, 
1934. 
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with any of the NSF leaders appointed by the Party, from Elsbeth 
Zander onwards1. In addition, she may have had support among the 
Gau NSF leaders, but she had also antagonised and, apparently, 
manoeuvred against, some of them2. Her speeches had even began 
to show a self -confidence bordering on independence, as well as 
traces of feminism3: in short, she had become a liability in 
herself, quite apart from being an obstacle to complete control by the 
Party over the organisation of women. 
The inspection of the DFW's accounts which Hilgenfeldt had 
ordered revealed a discrepancy which suggested that the person in 
charge of them, Paula Siber, was guilty of either mismanagement or 
embezzlement. At the same time as this was discovered, early in March 
1934, the charge was laid against Paula Siber, by Charlotte Hauser - 
for a short time an official of the DFW - that she had pocketed money 
collected at DFW meetings to finance her own publications4. This was 
either extremely convenient for the Party bosses or - which seems 
more likely - the result of collusion between Hilgenfeldt and 
Charlotte Hauser, who had a grudge against Paula Siber, and who was 
admitted by Hilgenfeldt to have "deficiencies of character "5. 
1. Ibid., statement by Bormann, 30 May, 1934. 
2. Ibid., letters to Hilgenfeldt from Gau NSF leader M. Blass and E. 
Moll (Sekretariat Florian), both dated 10 March, 1934. 
3. BDC, Paula Siber's file, letter from Paula Siber to Hinkel, in the 
Prussian Ministry of Education, 16 February, 1934. 
Gertrud Baumer certainly thought that Paula Siber was trying to start 
a new women's movement which would challenge the male chauvinism of 
National Socialism, BA, Kl.Erw., 296 -(1), letter from Gertrud 
Bäumer to Dorothee von Velsen, 23 October, 1933. 
4. BDC, AOPG, 2684/34, statement by Bormann, 30 May, 1934. 
Ibid., statement by Paula Siber, 2 June, 1934. 
Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
5. Ibid., letter from Hilgenfeldt to Major Siber, 14 March, 1934. 
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On the basis of these two points, the faulty finances of the DFW - 
discovered by an investigator who, Paula Siber claimed, regarded 
her with animosity1 - and Charlotte Hauser's accusation, Hilgenfeldt 
began his manoeuvre to oust Paula Siber from active participation 
in the women's organisation. On 9 March, he sent a telegram 
banning her from public speaking2, and a few days later threatened 
that if she did not resign from her position in the Ministry of the 
Interior he would publicise the charges against her and generally 
blacken her name in such a way that it would be impossible for her 
to continue in her position3. Frick, in fact, suspended her from 
office on 17 March, while he carried out his own investigation of 
her activities; this satisfied him that, while she had perhaps shown 
a lack of competence in some respects, she had not behaved dishonestly 
and was an enthusiastic worker. Accordingly, he reinstated her in 
office on 12 May, 19344. 
As far as Frick was concerned, the question of where authority 
over the women's organisation lay was still an open ones. But 
Hilgenfeldt was not to be stopped now, and refused to work with Paula 
Siber. She came to the conclusion that, now that she was excluded 
from the work of the DFW, her position in Frick's Ministry had lost its 
function, and so, reluctantly, she felt obliged to tender her 
1. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, 21 May, 
1934. 
2. Ibid., telegram from Hilgenfeldt to Paula Siber, 9 March, 1934. 
3. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
4. Ibid., letters from Frick to Hilgenfeldt and Paula Siber, 12 May, 
1934. 
5o Ibid., letter from Frick to Hilgenfeldt, 12 May, 1934. 
362. 
resignation, with effect from 1 July, 19341. Thus, the central 
objective of the Party leadership was achieved, and the control of 
all the organisational activity of women in the Third Reich was in 
the hands of the Party. Hilgenfeldt retained his title as "Head of 
the NS- Frauenschaft "2, but had little more to do with the affairs of 
the women's organisation; these were ordered by Gertrud Scholtz -Klink, 
under the supervision of Hess and Ley. 
Paula Siber was never again to hold office in the women's 
organisation. She damned herself conclusively in the eyes of the 
Party leadership by bringing a libel suit against Hilgenfeldt 
in the Party's High Court, a case which dragged on from June until 
December 1934. Indeed she won in the end a retraction by Hilgenfeldt 
of his charges against her of "dishonourable behaviour "3, but this 
did not achieve her aim of full public rehabilitation, after the 
damage done to her reputation by Hilgenfeldt's public assertions that 
she had been guilty of corruption. Throughout 1935 she and her 
husband campaigned for her rehabilitation which, they pointed out 
in the massive correspondence with which they bombarded Party leaders, 
could be achieved only by reinstatement in office4. But they were 
fighting a losing battle, and fighting it in total ignorance of the 
deeper issues involved. Paula Siber naively wrote to Bormann, asking 
1. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
2. BDC, Erich Hilgenfeldt's Party membership card, dated 1 March, 1939. 
3. Ibid., AOPG, 2684/34, statement by Hilgenfeldt, 5 December, 1934. 
4. The large volume of detailed material relating to the case in the 
Party's High Court and to the correspondence between the Sibers and 
Party officials is to be found in BDC, loc. cit.. Limitations of 
space prevent a full discussion of this material here. 
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for his support1, obviously unaware of his attitude. This was 
unequivocally revealed in a confidential letter to Walter Buch, 
chairman of the Party's High Court, in which he wrote: 
"The exclusion of Frau Sieber 5i ' from the handling of 
women's affairs lay completely within the policy of the 
Party leadership, since the activity of Frau Sieber as 
adviser for women's affairs in the Ministry of the Interior 
led to constant unrest ". 
He added that since her departure there had at last been peace and 
harmony within the women's organisation2. Hilgenfeldt, too, wrote 
to Buch, to explain that he had become involved in the matter only 
to prevent a split in the women's organisation, and harboured no 
personal animosity against Paula Siber3. She was at least right in 
deducing that Hilgenfeldt's aim was her complete exclusion from the 
women's organisation4; but she remained in ignorance of the role 
he was performing, as the agent of the Party leadership. She was 
further mistaken in imagining that her former associate, Gertrud 
Scholtz - Klink, would come to her aids; on the contrary, the new 
women's leader threatened to resign if Paula Siber was again given 
a position in the women's organisation 
Paula Siber had more reasonably expected that Frick would act 
as her champion, and in February 1935 she asked him to demonstrate his 
1. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
2. Ibid., letter from Bormann to Buch, 1 October, 1934. 
3. Ibid., letter from Hilgenfeldt to Buch, 3 November, 1934. 
4. Ibid., Paula Siber's accusation against Hilgenfeldt, 2 June, 1934. 
5. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Hilgenfeldt, 14 January, 1935. 
6. Ibid., letter from Gertrud Scholtz -Klink to Hess, 20 December, 1934. 
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confidence in her by giving her another positionl. His reply 
was most encouraging , but nothing concrete emerged, and it fell 
to Pfundtner, months later, to answer her repeated reminders with 
the information that "so far it has unfortunately not been possible 
to reinstate you in the women's work "3. By this time, July 1935, 
it was too late for Frick to try to regain influence over the 
women's organisation; its development was proceeding smoothly under 
Party control, and he himself had had many other interests and 
involvements during the period of the "Siber affair ". He did, 
however, warmly recommend Paula Siber for work in the Reich Chamber 
of Culture , to which she had applied, faute de mieux5, and she 
worked there in the Reich Committee of Journalists until 1937, and 
after that became a free -lance journalist6. For someone who had 
caused so much trouble for the Party leadership, she was perhaps 
fortunate to emerge unscathed, even if she finally had to abandon her 
ambition of playing a decisive role in the Nazi organisation of 
women. 
1. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Frick, 2 February, 1935. 
2. Ibid., letter from Frick to Paula Siber, 22 February, 1935. 
3. Ibid., letter from Pfundtner to Paula Siber, 23 July, 1935. 
4. BDC, Paula Siber's file, letter from Metzner, at the Ministry of 
the Interior, to Hinkel, at the Reich Chamber of Culture, 28 
January, 1936. 
5. Ibid., letter from Paula Siber to Hinkel, 5 September, 1935. 
6. Ibid., Paula Siber, "Lebenslauf ", 16 February, 1938. 
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C. The Women's Leaders, Women's Organisation and "Women's Work" 
in the Third Reich 
While Paula Siber had been fighting for reinstatement, Gertrud 
Scholtz-Klink had been proceeding with the task of unifying the 
women's organisational activity of the nation. She was helped 
initially by a barrage of propaganda to the effect that the 
apparent problems of the first year of Nazi rule had been of small 
consequence, but had been exaggerated in the press - an implausible 
story, given the strict censorship that was in force. Orders now 
went out that any statement about the NSF, the DFW, the women's 
Labour Service, or relations between these organisations, was to 
be vetted by a senior NSF official before publication or expositionl. 
From the spring of 1934, the Nazi women's organisation was, 
particularly on the surface, but for the most part also in its local 
branches as well as its national leadership, a model of harmony and 
a faithful agent of the Party Organisation's political and social 
policies. 
For this, the Party owed a debt of gratitude to Gertrud Scholtz- 
Klink; at last, in her, the Party bosses had made a wise choice. 
She was to provide the two things they sought in their women's 
leader, co- operation - at times to the point of toadying - and a firm 
hand to ensure obedience and uniformity within her organisations. Her 
reward was to become a show -piece woman, the one representative of, 
and yardstick for, the German woman; she was not built up as a 
charismatic figure - this treatment was accorded to the Flihrer alone - 
1. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, "Gau- Verordnungsblatt 2/34 ", Altona, 1 March, 
1934. 
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but rather she became the personification of human womanly 
achievement and virtue in the Nazi State. Her value to the Party 
was quickly recognised, and in November 1934 she was accorded the 
title of ReichsfrauenfUhrerin, National Women's Leader1. Her 
unchallenged dominance in the women's organisation was underlined by 
her being invested as leader of every group involving women. She 
retained her position as leader of the Women's Labour Service when 
she was appointed leader of both the NSF and the DFW in February 
19342. Then, in July 1934, when Ley created a Women's Office in 
the Labour Front he chose Frau Scholtz -Klink to be its leader3. In 
the following month, she was appointed "adviser for the protection 
of women at work" on a committee of the NSB04. Already she had 
become leader of the National Women's Association of the German 
Red Cross, "by virtue of her appointment" as NSF leader, and in the 
years that followed she continued to amass new titles and new offices5. 
Frau Scholtz -Klink °s holding of positions in organisations 
whose members were predominantly male gave women representation in 
these, andthus gave at least the impression that women were being 
fully involved in most aspects of German life, contrary to what 
were characterised as misconceptions, and even lies, perpetrated 
abroad about women being totally excluded from all activities outside 
1. "5 Jahre Reichsfrauenf{ihrung ", PK, February 1939, p. 3. 
2. BA, loc. cit. 
3. Ibid., "Einrichtung eines Frauenamtes in der DAF, 12.7.34 ", 
NS- Korrespondenz, no. 162, 13 July, 1934. 
4. BDC, Partei- Kanzlei Korrespondenz, letter from an NSBO official 
to Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, 28 August, 1934. 
5. E.g., she became a member of the honorary leadership of the RdK 
in May 1936, and leader of a section in the Praesidium of the 
German Red Cross on 1 January, 1938. FK, op. cit., pp. 3 -5. 
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the home in Nazi Germany1. But, in truth, her status within 
the NSDAP remained a source of doubt and disagreement. Bormann 
eventually issued a statement in October 1937, to clarify the 
matter, to the effect that Frau Scholtz -Klink held the rank of 
Hauptemtsleiter, leader of a main department, in the national 
leadership of the Party2. Nominally, this put a woman in the top 
rank of the Party élite; but this was not in fact a contradiction of 
Party policy, since she carried no authority outside the women's 
organisations, and thus had little real power within the Party 
itself, and none at all in the Government. As late as January 1938, 
she had to admit that she had never had the chance to discuss the 
women's organisation and its activities with Hitler3, but she did 
have contact with leading members of the Party, quite apart from 
the normal course of business where she was frequently in 
communication with Hess and Ley. There was, for example, a fairly 
regular correspondence between Gertrud Scholtz -Klink and Alfred 
Rosenberg between 1935 and 1939, at least; sometimes this concerned 
invitations to speaking engagements, sometimes it was merely of the 
order of birthday greetings4. And the National Women's Leader's 
position was sufficient to ensure that she was regarded as a valuable 
1. "Einsatz der Frau in der Nation ", speech by Gertrud Scholtz -Klink 
at the 1937 Party Congress, published by the DFW. 
Trude Bürkner, quoted in Die Frau, April 1937, P. 4020 
2. BDC, op. cit., "Rundschreiben nr. 128/37 ", issued by Hess's office, 
6 October, 1937. 
3. BA, R431I /427, letter from Gertrud Scholtz -Klink to Bormann, 24 
January, 1938. 
4. TfZ, MA 253, Rosenberg-Akten, e.g. frames 677 -78, 683, 687 -92, 695- 
96 are invitations from Frau Scholtz -Klink to Rosenberg, or vice - 
versa, to speak at functions, with replies; frame 671 is Rosenberg's 
birthday greeting to Frau Scholtz -Klink on 9 February, 1939, and 
frame 670 is her acknowledgment; she sent him a Christmas card in 
the same year, which he acknowledged, frame 661. 
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source of patronage. For example, Rosenberg's secretary, Thilo 
von Trotha, wrote to her asking that his mother, who was an NSF 
official in Pomerania, be given the chance to speak with Frau 
Scholtz -Klink when she visited that areal. 
If Frau Scholtz -Klink was the showpiece of German women, 
there were nevertheless others who also achieved positions of 
influence and prestige, although always either within the women's 
organisations or as a female "adviser" on a committee that was 
otherwise entirely male. For example, Auguste Reber -Gruber, a 
married woman teacher who was born in 1892 and who joined the 
NSDAP in May 1932, became "adviser for girls' education" in the Nazi 
Teachers' League in 1934, and two years later was, in addition, 
appointed to the position of senior administrator in the Reich 
Ministry of Education2. Again, there was Dora Hein, who was the 
same age as Dr. Reber -Gruber and who, like her, was a leading 
member of the NSF; she joined the Party as early as May 1925, 
remained unmarried, and, as a professional civil servant, became 
"expert on women's affairs" and leader of a section in the 
Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten on 1 October, 19343. Another Party 
veteran, Anne -Marie Koeppen, who was born in 1899, remained single 
and joined the NSDAP in June 1928, was a journalist who became editor 
of the Reichsnáhrstand's magazine for women and leader of a section in 
1. Ibid., frame 723, letter from Thilo von Trotha to Gertrud Scholtz - 
Klink, 28 March, 1935. 
2. BDC, Party Census of 1939 and a letter from Hess, 9 October, 1936. 
3. Ibid., Party Census of 1939 and a statement by Dora Hein, 28 
July, 1939. 
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Walter Darre's office from 1934 to 19371. Both she and Dora Hein 
were awarded the Party's Gold Badge2, along with a select group of 
women on Frau Scholtz- Klink's staff on the sixth anniversary of the 
Machtübernahme in January 19393. Gertrud Scholtz -Klink had already 
received the Gold Badge at the commemoration service for the "martyrs" 
of 1923, on 9 November, 19364. 
It was also possible for those who had joined the Party after 
30 January, 1933, to achieve high office in the women's organisation. 
The outstanding example here is Dr. Ilse Eben- Servaes, who was born 
in 1894, was married, with one child, and who joined the NSDAP 
in April 1933. She went on to become a member of the Party leadership 
in February 1935, and leader of the section for women lawyers in the 
NSRB, the Nazi Lawyers' Association. Dr. Eben- Servaes had a 
successful legal practice before 1933, and her professional experience 
was a valuable asset to the women's organisation; in 1934, she 
became legal adviser on Frau Scholtz - Klink's staff, and on the first 
day of 1936 took up the position of leader of the section for law 
and arbitration there5. Like Frau Scholtz-Klink6, she was appointed 
a member of the Academy of German Law in October 19367. Although 
1. Ibid., Anne -Marie Koeppen's file, "Lebenslauf ", 12 May, 1938. 
2. Ibid., Party Census of 1939. 
3. "Nachrichten aus der Reichsfrauenfiihrung. Januar -MArz 1939 ", FK 
May 1939, inside of title page. 
4. HA, Reel 13, folder 254, "Partei- Archiv ", November 1936. 
5. BDC, Ilse Eben -Servaes's file, answers to a questionnaire for the 
NSDAP leadership, 2 October, 1939. 
6. HA, loc. cit. 
7. BA, R61/168, letter from Ilse Eben- Servaes to Loyal, at the Academy 
of German Law, 12 December, 1938. 
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Else Paul was officially Frau Scholtz- Klink's deputy in the 
National Women's Leadership1, she remained very much in the 
background, her functions being largely administrative, and Dr. 
Eben -Servaes in fact held a position among women in the Party second 
only to Gertrud Scholtz - Klink's, at least until 19422; as such, she 
was similarly used as a showpiece of what women could achieve in the 
Third Reich. 
The organisation which these women and others built up, both 
within the Party, with the NSF, and affiliated to it, with the DFW, 
had begun to take shape while the leadership struggle was going on. 
The NSF had, like other sections of the NSDAP, been geared to 
effecting the takeover of power; once this was accomplished, its role 
changed and it became the élite group which was - under the Party 
leadership - to order the affairs of German women. In this, it had 
benefited from the general process of Gleichschaltung, by which all 
women's groups of a political nature had disappeared with the parties 
with which they were associated, and organisations promoting aims 
which the Nazis opposed - particularly the pacifist and feminist ones - 
had been banned3. Of the remainder, the women's professional and 
vocational organisations were absorbed, along with their masculine 
counterparts, into the relevant Nazi organisation4, and those considered 
inoffensive were allowed - at least for a time - to continue in 
existence if they became corporate members of the monolithic association 
1. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, "Stab des Hauptamtes NS -F und DPW", n.d. 
2. BDC, Ilse Eben -Servaes's file, letter of 22 January, 1942. 
3. See above, Chapter 1, pp. 31 -37. 
4. See above, Chapter 5, pp. 286 -90. 
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which was run by the NSF and from September 1933 called Das 
Deutsche Frauenwerk1. 
Paula Siber had, in practice, been in charge of the day -to -day 
running of the DFW during its first four months, and her view of 
it was as the promoter of social, cultural and economic activity 
among women2. Most of its function during her period of office was 
simply the co- ordination of agencies which already existed for 
encouraging an interest in German culture and for advising women 
and girls on matters of child -care and household management3. It is 
often assumed that the Nazis initiated schemes of this nature, with 
the purpose of encouraging German nationalism and forcing women to 
accept that their sphere of activity and interest was the home 
and family; certainly, these motives can justly be attributed to 
them, but, as usual, they could claim no originality in devising 
organisations to promote them. Before 1933 there were active groups 
of women in, for example, the National Union of German Housewives 
and the National Association of German Housewives' Organisations, 
in the Women's Group of the National Association of German Musicians 
and Music Teachers, in the body called German Women's Culture, and in 
organisations giving instruction in infant and child -care and general 
1. BDC, AOPG, 2684/34, letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 
1934. 
2. BDC, Paula Siber's file, letter from Paula Siber to Hinkel at 
the Prussian Ministry of Education, 16 February, 1934. 
3. Organisations which figured in reports in BF in the section 
"Aus unseren Vereinen und Verbanden" during the period October 
1931 to May 1933 appear in BA, op. cit., "Liste dem DFW 
angeschlossenen Reichsspitzenverbände, April 1935 "; the same 
applies to some of the groups mentioned in BA, Nachlass Katharina 
von Kardorff, no. 28, "Der XI. Prauencongress in Berlin, 17- 22.6.1929: 
Ehrenbeirat der Verbanden. 
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training for motherhood1. The Nazis' aim was to nationalise 
existing activity, and to give it uniformity on the basis of Party 
ideology - once the chaos of 1933 -34 had been resolved - within the 
structure of the DEW, whose policy was determined by the NSF2. 
The NSF continued to be essentially the collective body of 
women Party members that it had been from its inception, although 
during the 1930s modifications of its composition were made. Early 
in 1935, Ley altered Strasser's original order that "All women 
Party members are automatically members of the NS- Frauenschaft" 
to read "Only those women Party members who are prepared to be 
active participants in the NS- Frauenschaft automatically become 
members of it "3. There was clearly no room in the NSF for dead 
wood. This order was the beginning of attempts to control the size 
of the NSF, so that it would indeed retain its élitist character, 
after the rush to join the Party and its affiliates in and after 
1933. The NSF thus followed the example set by the NSDAP itself: 
a firm restriction on entry to the Party had come into force on 
1 May, 19334. Doubtless impressed by this precedent, Gertrud 
Scholtz -Klink asked Hess in January 1936 that there be a moratorium on 
admission to the NSF as quickly as possible. Ley's approval was 
quickly obtained, and the order went out that "The NS- Frauenschaft 
has now reached a membership which is fully sufficient 
1. BF, loc. cit. 
FK, February 1939, loc. cit. 
2. Reichsfrauenftihrung (ed.), NS- Frauenschaft, Berlin, 1937, p. 16. 
3. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, "Information (6) Nr. 0.18/35 ", issued by Ley, 
27 February, 1935, p. 2. 
4. Broszat, op. cit., p. 253. 
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for the performance of its tasks... ", and that, accordingly, 
admission to it was closed to all except members of the BdM, from 
1 February, 19361. In fact, Hess decided that only girls in the 
BdM leadership should be admitted to the NSF, but to prevent 
disappointment among those girls in other ranks of the BdM who 
would have hoped to be admitted to the NSF in 1936, a compromise 
was reached by Gertrud Scholtz -Klink and Trude BUrkner, the 
national BdM leader, for 1936 only, so that almost all of the girls 
who would have been admitted under the previous regulations in fact 
became members of the NSF2. 
Three years later, Frau Scholtz -Klink issued new guidelines 
for membership, "since the NS- Frauenschaft should be consolidated 
more strongly than hitherto as an lite organisation ". Thus, all 
women who held office in the DFW or any organisation affiliated to 
the NSDAP, such as the NSV, the Labour Front, the Nazi Teachers' 
League, would be considered for membership of the NSF after eighteen 
months' "faultless" tenure of that office. Members of the BdM 
leadership, office- holders and "active comrades" in the ANSt - the 
group of Nazi girl students - and leaders in the Women's Labour Service 
would also be accepted3. By this time, with Germany at war, it was 
felt to be particularly important that anyone in a position of 
leadership should be under close Party control; membership of the 
NSF facilitated this, especially since the NSF had been declared a 
1. BA, op. cit., letter from Friedrichs, in Hess's office, to Ley, 
17 January, 1936. 
2. Ibid., notice from Trude Bürkner to the Reich Youth Leadership and 
the Gau BdM leaders, 17 October, 1936. 
3. Ibid., "Anordnung nr. 2/39 ", 25 October, issued by Gertrud Scholtz- 
Klink, 1939. 
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member- organisation of the NSDAP itself in March 19351. Thus, 
the needs of war - with NSF members responsible for supervising women's 
war -work and for maintaining morale among the female population2 - 
led once again to an expansion of the NSF's membership, beyond the 
two million reliable women who belonged to it in 19383. 
The main function of the NSF was "the cultural, spiritual and 
political education of German women "4. Thus, it was vital that its 
members be thoroughly trained in Nazi ideas about racial "science ", 
militant nationalism, and enthusiasm for large families. To this 
end, a special seminar was begun in January 1935, to provide 
lectures and group discussion for NSF members. The topics were 
either "weltanschaulich" (ideological), or else about German 
history and culture, or about practical housekeeping. These were 
studied in an intensive two -week course, which also included sight- 
seeing tours of Berlin and visits to the city's museums as light 
reliefs. The literature about the seminar explained that it was 
deliberate policy to lay strong emphasis on "political education" 
in the course, since most of the participants were, by occupation, 
primarily involved in work of a practical nature, and yet were now 
put in the position of providing spiritual leadership for the mass of 
1. FK, loc. cit. 
2. BA, NSD 3/5, "Aufgaben der NS- Frauenschaft ", 16 July, 1940, 
p. 659. 
3. Figure calculated from information in BA, Slg.Sch., 230, 
Reichsfrauenftihrun Jahresbericht 1938, pp. 11 and 14. 
4. "NS- Frauenschaft und Deutsches Frauenwerk ", Führerlexikon 
1934/35, p. 93. 
5. IfZ, MA 609, frames 56489 -92, "Amt für wissenschaftlicher 
Arbeit ", n.d. 
375. 
German women1. Certainly, of the 3,260 women who had attended the 
seminar by autumn 1939, most were involved in practical 
occupations, the best -represented being that of clerical worker2. 
The NSF, then, relied overwhelmingly on part -time, voluntary officials; 
all of its 20,000 or more workers in the localities participated 
on this basis, while in the districts only 9% of the NSF's 
officials were full -time, salaried employees. All of the 32 
Gau NSF leaders and most of their assistants in the Gau NSF offices - 
together making a proportion of 81% there - were professional 
Party workers3. As was often the case in the Third Reich, then, the 
Nazis depended on the enthusiasm and devotion of large numbers of 
their female adherents for the operation of their system and avoided 
spending more than a limited amount of money on salaries. 
The NSF's task was, then, to give ideological leadership to 
the female population of Germany, and especially to ensure that the 
activities of the largest body of organised women, in the DFW, 
corresponded with the Nazi view of the nature and role of women. Thus, 
it was the task of the DFW to orientate its activities in such a 
way that women were constantly reminded that child - bearing was 
the greatest joy they could experience, and also it was a solemn duty 
to be performed for the benefit of the nation. In addition, a large 
part of the DFW's work was to lie in helping women to keep physically 
healthy for this function, and in teaching them how to bring up 
1. BA, NS15/15, frame 56526, Else Petri, "Ziel und Aufgabe des 
Seminars ", Seminar für die NS- Frauenschaft an der Hochschule 
für Politik, Winter 1939/40. 
2. IfZ, op. cit., frames 56477 -84, "Bericht über die bisherige 
Tatigkeit des Seminars...1935 -39 ". 
3. BA, S1.Sch., 230, op. cit., pp. 5-6, and p. I. 
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healthy children. Looking after children meant two more things: 
German women would have to learn proficiency in cookery, sewing, 
washing and ironing clothes, and general household management; and 
as the first educators of children, passing on their own views and 
standards to the young, they would have to be thoroughly inculcated 
with Nazi ideology. Finally, as recreation, women had a "cultural" 
task, namely the promotion of interest in German literature, art and 
music, and the discouraging of foreign cultural influences. 
Paula Siber had begun the work of co- ordinating courses in 
domestic science and child -care already run by the various 
confessional and housewives' organisations1, but the leadership 
struggle had hindered this development. After her appointment in 
February 1934, Gertrud Scholtz -Klink moved quickly to rationalise 
this activity which was vital to the Party's purpose, and within 
two months she had drawn up regulations for a unified service, the 
Reichsm{ltterdienst (National Mothers' Service), which was to be 
operated throughout Germany by the DFW. Its tasks fell into two 
main categories, instruction for mothers and the provision of welfare 
for mothers. The courses of instruction were supervised in each 
Gau by a woman with a suitable professional qualification, while in 
the welfare activities there was close co- operation with the NSV. 
The groups which had formerly engaged in work of this kind were plainly 
told that if they wished to continue their activity they would have 
to work under the leadership of the DFW, or else be dissolved2. This 
1. BDC, AOPG, 2684/34, statements made by Paula Siber, 28 and 30 April, 
1934. 
2. "Das Deutsche Frauenwerk fiber die Eingliederung der Verbande ", 
Die Frau, April 1934, pp. 506 -07. 
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ultimatum was considered necessary because the purpose of the 
Reichsmtitterdienst - which was inaugurated on Mother's Day in May 19341 
- was 
"not only to instruct women in domestic science within the 
context of national economic policy: the aim of the 
ReichsmItterdienst is political education 5hich if the 
development of a particular attituder2. 
The courses were well publicised in the Party's women's 
magazines3, and meticulous records of attendance were kept in each 
Gau4. To try to accommodate employed women as well as housewives, 
the courses were offered in mornings, afternoons and evenings for 
three different groups in the cities, while in rural areas travelling 
instructors were employed5. The courses seem to have met a real 
demand; if 100,000 participants was a modest beginning in their first 
year6, the numbers soon rose sharply, so that in 1936 there were 
452,000 participants in more than 22,000 courses7. This was even 
1. FK, loc. cit. 
2. Quoted from NS- Mádchenbildung in "Zur politischen Schulung im 
Reiohsmtitterdienst ", Die Frau, November 1936, p. 108. 
30 E.g., FK, May 1939, loc. cit. 
"Die kameradschaftliche Volksmutter ", NS- Frauenwarte, May 1936, 
pp. 774 -75 and p. 778. 
4. BA, op. cit., pp. 8 and 37. 
5. BA, R2/12771, letter from the Deutscher Gemeindetag to Rust, 20 
October, 1937. 
IfZ, MA 388, frame 726440, "Die Gaubräuteschule des Deutschen 
Frauenwerkes Mütterdienst, Brüggen /Niederrhein ", n.d. ( ?early 1939). 
6. "Frau Scholtz -Klink über: Die Mitarbeit der deutschen Frau im neuen 
Staat - Der Sinn des Muttertages ", VB, 8 May, 1935. 
7. "Arbeit des Reichsmftterdienstes, 1934 -37 ", Deutsches Frauenschaffen 
1938, pp. 36 -37. 
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before an element of compulsion was introduced for certain 
categories of women - for the fiancées of SS men from November 
19361, and for the wives and fiancees of SA men in 19382. The 
wives of SS men were also strongly encouraged to take part in a 
course3. Altogether, in 1944 it was estimated that in ten years 
about five million women and girls had attended a Reichsmatterdienst 
course, at an average annual rate of half a million women in thirty 
thousand courses4. Large numbers of staff were required to operate 
a scheme of this size, and this created financial problems, although 
participants had to pay fees. The situation was such that Frau 
Scholtz -Klink felt the need to express regret at being unable to pay 
the various administrators and instructors at a better rate, and as 
compensation ensured that they had longer holidays than other vocational 
workers5. Meagre resources did not, however, lead to a slowing down 
of the activity, since the courses were felt to serve the interests of 
the Party's permanent preoccupation, the raising of the birth rate6. 
As part of the continuing expansion, residential courses were 
1. BA, loc. cit. 
2. HA, Reel 13, folder 253: order by Brigadeführer Giesler of SA 
Gruppe Hochland, i October, 1937; order by Gruppenführer Günther 
of SA Gruppe Thüringen, n.d. ( ?October 1937). 
Report in FZ, 9 February, 1938. 
3. "'Die Hausfrau der Zukunft', Schulung aller SS- Bräute durch den 
Reichsmütterdienst ", FZ, 2 December, 1936. 
4. "Bevölkerungspolitik ", Die Deutsche Sozialpolitik, July 1944, P. 63. 
5. HA, op. cit., Reichsfrauenführung "Rundschreiben FW Nr. 48/37 ", 
n.d. ( ?June 1937). 
6. Ibid., folder 254, Reichsfrauenführung "Rundschreiben FW Nr. 94/ 
37 ", 14 October, 1937. 
379. 
provided in 1937, and there were special "Brides' Schools" which 
were run by the DFW for the wives and fiancées of SS and SA men 
and members of the armed forces1. In these, an inexperienced young 
woman was put in a situation where she had the model of a home to 
run for six weeks - a house which included children, to stress that 
the child was a natural, indeed an indispensable, part of a complete 
household. The cost of this venture was met by fees, which could 
be partly offset by a marriage loan, thus again encouraging procreation, 
since the loan could be substantially cancelled by the birth of 
children2. But the interest initially shown in this project by the 
SS, and particularly by Rimmier3, was short -lived: although the SS 
asked in April 1939 for reports to be made about the progress of its 
members' brides in the course4, the outbreak of war within five 
months and the hasty marriages it occasioned led Himmler to drop 
attendance at a course of instruction from his list of requirements 
for SS brides5o 
While the Reichsmütterdienst was intended as an exercise in 
propaganda as well as a practical venture, the real work of "political 
education" was the responsibility of the section in the DFW called 
"Kultur- Erziehung- Schulung ". By 1939 this included, in addition to 
1. "Die Aufgaben der Bráuteschulen ", FZ, 30 December, 1937. 
2. IfZ, op. cit., frames 726440 -41. 
3. BA, loc. cit. 
BA, Slg.Sch., 230, "Zusammenarbeit des Deutschen Frauenwerkes mit 
der SS zwecks Mütterschulung der SS- Braute ", order issued by Himmler, 
22 April, 1937. 
4. IfZ, op. cit., frames 726442-43, letter from SS- Pflegestelle 20 to 
the Gau NSF leadership, Düsseldorf, 24 April, 1939. 
5. Ibid., MA 387, frame 6254, order issued by Himmler, 1 September, 
1939. 
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the provision of courses of instruction on matters of race, 
heredity and German history, divisions for "academic work ", girls' 
education, literature, art and music, handcrafts and physical 
training1. This entire section was closely associated with the 
activities of the Labour Front's Kraft durch Freude (Strength 
through Joy) enterprise2. By 1939, it was reported that almost 
every Gau had established an agency for instruction in ideological 
matters; while Halle - Merseburg, Mecklenburg and Schleswig -Holstein 
had yet to do this, there were two or more such agencies in 
Dusseldorf, Cologne-Aachen, South- Hanover- Brunswick and Württemberg- 
Hohenzollern3. The content of the instruction consisted mainly of 
explanations of Nazi policy, in terms both of long -term objectives 
and day -to -day measures, and justification of them in order to 
encourage co- operation from as much of the female population as 
possible4. 
The task of ensuring that the DFW was kept under the 
leadership and control of the NSF was facilitated by the policy of 
Personalunion, the holding of positions in both by reliable women. 
At the top, Frau Scholtz -Klink had been appointed leader of both 
groups at the same time, to provide continuity at the national 
level; correspondingly, it had been policy from the founding of 
the DFW to continue this kind of arrangement in the Gaue, so that 
1. "Organisationsplan der Reichsfrauenführung", Deutsches Frauen- 
schaffen, 1939, p. 8. 
2. BA, op. cit., Reichsfrauenftihrung Jahresbericht 1938, p. II. 
3. Ibid., p. 9. 
4. "Die Arbeit der NS- Frauenschaft und des Deutschen Frauenwerks im 
Jahre 1935 ", NS- Frauenwarte, March 1936, p. 613. 
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the woman responsible for the work of the DFW in the Party's 
largest administrative unit was normally the Gau NSF leaded. 
In 1934, this degree of personal union was declared compulsory2. 
But for the time being this was where the policy stopped; it was 
also decreed that no NSF official should preside over all the 
different groups of DFW activity in her area, because of the 
specialised nature of the work done in some of them3. 
The DFW's structure and organisation were, however, felt by 
Hess and Ley to be unsatisfactory for the function the association 
was intended to perform, and after much discussion4, a new 
constitution was produced in April 1936 which described its aim 
as "the organisational unification of women prepared to collaborate 
in the Ftihrer's work of construction, under the leadership of the 
NSF ", and extended the policy of personal union. Now, the Dr'W 
was formally divided into the same geographical units as the NSF, 
and therefore as the NSDAP, and, as an innovation, the NSF leader 
in any area was designated the automatic choice for DFW leadership 
in the same area. This streamlining of the DFW, hitherto divided 
according to the interests of the constituent groups, was a natural 
result of its elevation to the status of an "affiliated organisation" 
of the Party, to which the principles of the Party itself applied, 
whereas formerly its connection with the Party had been indirect, 
1. BDC, op. cit., letter from Paula Siber to Bormann, 22 May, 1934. 
2. Ftihrerlexikon, loe. cit. 
3. Die Frau, April 1934, loe. cit. 
4. BA, op. cit., letter from Sommer, in Hess's office, to Ley, 28 
August, 1935. 
Ibid., letter from Ley to Hess, 8 October, 1935. 
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through its association with the NSF1. Thus, the Nazification of 
the women's organisation followed upon the nationalisation of its 
work in the early Gleichschalturng period; this further step 
involved a breach of the 1933 Concordat with the Vatican, as 
Stuckart pointed out to Hess2, but for the Party it was an obvious 
step to take, to increase its control over the direction of women's 
affairs. 
It was not only the DFN which had to be kept in line with 
NSF, and ultimately Party, policy; for there were other offices 
and organisations which dealt with matters of interest to and 
involving women. It was to facilitate co- operation, and even 
uniformity, among these that Frau Scholtz -Klink was given positions 
within the Labour Front and the NSBO, for example. Because she was 
thus expected and enabled to provide "unified leadership...for all 
areas of womanly work in the community "3, she built up a 
centralised bureau of officials around herself as National Women's 
Leader, which was formally accorded the title of Reichsfrauenführung 
(National Women's Leadership) in June 1936. This, "the only office 
responsible for all matters of concern to the German woman ", developed 
close links with the other groups in which women were involved, but 
which were outside Frau Scholtz -Klink's direct authority, by means of 
agreements for co- operation, to avoid demarcation disputes and to try 
to prevent duplication of functions. Such arrangements were made, for 
1. Ibid., "Satzung des Deutschen Frauenwerks ", Der FLlhrerorden, 
11 April, 1936. 
2. BA, R22/24, letter from Stuckart to Hess, 14 December, 1936. 
3. "Nationalsozialistische Frauenarbeit ", FK, April 1937, p. 9. 
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example, with the NS- Cultural Community in January 1935, with the 
ANSI at the same time, with the Nazi Teachers' League in June 1936, 
and in the following month with the section for "Mother and Child" in 
the NSV-t1. 
There were other groups, too, which were expected to co- 
operate with Frau Scholtz - Klink's office; prominent among these 
were the Red Cross and the NS- Schwesternschaft, the Party's own 
nursing corps, which was under the jurisdiction of the NSV2. But Ley 
made it clear in January 1934 that no agency of the Party nor any 
State organisation was to try to establish its own women's groups 
which would, in effect, be rivals to the NSF or the DFW. Ley 
emphasised that these two were specifically intended to be monopoly 
organisations, for women Party members and for other female citizens 
respectively, to eliminate class or other divisions among German 
women - chiefly, obviously, to avoid the kind of diversity and even 
conflict which the Party considered so harmful to national harmony and 
uniformity. Ley pointed out that women might indeed be members of 
an occupational or professional group, but such a group would also 
have male members, and would thus not aspire to become a specifically 
women's interest group, taking a particular section of women out of 
the mainstream of female activity, which was to find its expression 
in the DFW . It was this attitude which underlay the Party's 
insistence on making women's sections of professional organisations, 
1. FK, February 1939, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
2. Schafer, op. cit., p. 63. 
3. BA, op. cit., " Rundschreiben nr. 1/34", 5 January, 1934, issued 
by Ley. 
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for example, corporate members of the DFW, and, in the later 1930s, 
at least, involving their members as much as possible in the work of 
the DFW. 
Ley's edict did not prevent confusion occurring from time 
to time thereafter. For example, Frau Scholtz -Klink found it 
necessary to resolve the "considerable lack of clarity about the 
relationship of the housewife to the D.W and the Labour Front ", in 
summer 1936. She had agreed with Hess and Ley that all employed 
housewives belonged, by virtue of their being employees, to the 
DAF, while all housewives who were not employed outside the home 
belonged - insofar as they wished to be organised, she was careful 
to add - to the NSF or the DFW, whichever was appropriate. She felt 
obliged to clarify this point because a group within the DAF, the 
National Association of Domestic Workers, had been trying to enlist 
full -time housewives as members. Now, in July 1936, Frau Scholtz- 
Klink banned such activity, and announced that where the interests 
of housewives and domestic employees coincided, provision would be 
made for joint meetings to take place at the district level, under the 
supervision of the NSF1, to ensure that her orders were observed. 
The National Women's Leadership was not itself an organisation 
but rather the central administrative agency in which the various 
branches of women's activity were represented by "experts ". 
Predictably, Ilse E'ben- Servaes became the authority on legal matters, 
while Auguste Reber- Gruber was the adviser on education. There were 
also experts on foreign affairs, nursing, the Labour Service, "Mother 
1. Ibid., NSF information leaflet, "Zugehörigkeit der Hausfrauen zum 
DFW bzw. zur DAF", signed by Gertrud Scholtz -Klink, July, 1936. 
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and Child ", and the radio, for propaganda'. These officials, along 
with other general assistants, were appointed to enable Frau Scholtz- 
Klink to discharge her many duties in a vast number of organisations, 
in a wide variety of fields. The office evolved during the 1930s, 
but although modifications were made after 1936 it was by then that it 
had developed its essential form. Its nine sections were divided 
into two groups, with those responsible for culture and education, 
national and domestic economy, foreign activity, social assistance, 
and training for motherhood coming into being in the years 1934 -36, 
to co- ordinate the DFW's activity in the same areas. The other four 
sections dealt with purely organisational matters, including finance, 
personnel, information collation, and press and propaganda, which 
included radio, films and exhibitions 
The propaganda network of the National Women's Leadership was 
modelled on the propaganda machine of the NSDAP. Within its 
jurisdiction came the publications of both the NSF and the DFW, 
including the NS- Frauenwarte, the NSF's official magazine, which had 
the highest circulation of any Party periodical3. In addition, there 
were pamphlets, newsletters, and films and radio broadcasts directed 
specifically at women . The radio programmes consisted chiefly of 
cookery hints, including the skilful use of cheaper foodstuffs, and 
"cultural" items concerned with German literature and music; in keeping 
with the Party's view of women as the mothers of the nation, there was 
1. Ibid., Reichsfrauenführung Jahresbericht 1938, "Stab des Hauptamtes 
NS- Frauenschaft und Deutsches Frauenwerk ", n.d., ?1935. 
2. FK, April 1937, loc. cit. 
3. BA, R61/172, letter to the Academy of German Law, 29 January, 1936. 
4. Deutsches Frauenschaffen, loc. cit. 
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also a regular "Listen with Mother" feature for small children1. 
Propaganda included the staging of exhibitions, at both the 
national and local level; these were generally on the theme of 
"Woman and Nation ", the title of a national exhibition held in May - 
June 1935, or "The Contribution of Women in the Community ", the title 
of the women's exhibition held during the 1937 Party Congress2. The 
content of these tended to be tableaux depicting women's role, the 
products of the DFW's sewing bees and illustrated records of the 
work of NSF and DFW women at home and abroad. In 1937 there were 
altogether 3,000 such exhibitions, visited by a million and a half 
people, while in 1938 there were almost 3,600 exhibitions - this 
time, however, visited by the smaller number of 1.1 million 
people3. In addition, there were fetes, sales of work and meetings, 
which attracted a reasonable attendance: in 1937, almost 1.4 
million women attended the 16,330 events of this nature, while in 
1938 both these figures were nearly doubled4. 
If German women took an interest in these events and were 
prepared to participate in them to some extent, it seems clear that 
this was an indication more of their liking for social gatherings than 
of their enthusiastic support for National Socialism. The 
nationalisation of social life gave everyone - who was racially and 
politically acceptable to the Nazis - the chance to participate, 
1. HA, op. cit., "Der Frauenfunk der Woche, 21.3 - 27.3.1937 ", pp. 1 -6. 
2. FK, February 1939, op. cit., pp. 3 and 5. 
3. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, op. cit., p. 29. 
4. Ibid., p. 28. 
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and excluded no -one. It was, of course, deliberate Party policy 
to try to involve everyone, and thus to control them; there were, 
however, special problems to be faced in organising women for this 
purpose. The full -time housewife - nominally, at least, the Nazi 
ideal as far as women were concerned - was potentially the least easy 
member of the community to organise, and so special propaganda had 
to be directed at her, to encourage her to believe that it was her 
duty to be "politically aware" of her role in the life of the 
community, and to be involved in activities outside the home, to 
make contact with her female fellow -citizens'. For many women who 
felt isolated as housebound wives, and who had possibly developed an 
inferiority complex in the relatively feminist atmosphere of the 1920s, 
the vitality and sense of direction provided by the Nazi women's 
organisation was a new lease of life2. 
The organisational activity could, it transpired, be overdone. 
In December 1935, the Party's agent in Bad Kreuznach, near Mainz, 
reported that the recruiting drives, cultural evenings, assemblies 
and Christmas festivities conducted by the Party and its affiliates 
had been so intensive and persistent that the local population was 
beginning to sigh, "We're being organised to death:" The net results 
of this energetic activity were, accordingly, disappointing: the only 
new recruits won for the women's organisations had been from among the 
1. Lore Bauer, "Die 'politische' Frau ", VB, 6 September, 1935. 
"Erziehung zur politischen Verantwortung: Die Frau, die 
Erzieherin der Jugend, muss teilnehmen an der Entwicklung des 
staatlichen Lebens ", VB, 27 September, 1935. 
2. This, at any rate, was what the Nazis claimed to have achieved, 
and there was clearly some truth in it. This was confirmed by a 
former minor official of the NSF in Munich, in conversation; she 
seemed sufficiently uninhibited and free from a guilt complex to 
be credible. 
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wives of Party members and civil servants1. Clearly, resistance to 
involvement could be the result of saturation by propaganda in favour 
of it. But resistance could also be the result of deliberate 
activity by the few agencies outside the NSDAP and its groups which 
continued to exist; with most sources of actual and potential 
opposition quickly eliminated in 1933, the largest ones remaining 
thereafter were the Churches. Both the Evangelical and the Roman 
Catholic Churches offered resistance to the monopolising of 
organisational activity by the Nazis, since it was bound to encroach 
on their own territory. The degree of obstructiveness was at times 
such that the Party's local representative had to report, as in the 
case of Neuwied, near Koblenz, in 1935, that 
"it is not possible to form an NSF group in parish D. The 
lack of success is attributed to the women's association, 
which is under the influence and leadership of the pastor's 
wife "2. 
As late as February 1938, it was reported from a district in the 
Trier area that it had still not been possible to form an NSF 
group because of the opposition of the priest3. 
Much has been made of the blind and often hysterical enthusiasm 
1. Heyen, op. cit., "Aus dem Lagebericht des Landrates von Bad 
Kreuznach fiber den Monat Dezember 1935 ", no. 164, pp. 291 -92. 
2. Ibid., "Aus dem Lagebericht des Landrats von Neuwied fiber den Monat 
12.1935 ", no. 89, p. 179. 
3. Ibid., "Politische Beurteilungen der einzelnen Ortsgruppen des 
Kreises Trier-Land-West, vom 1 Februar 1938 ", no. 200, p. 341. 
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for Hitler and the Nazis manifested by some women1. But it ought 
also to be stressed that in the day -to -day opposition and passive 
resistance offered by the Churches in the Third Reich, women were 
often in the forefront2. If it can be argued from this that women 
were opposing one kind of superstition and domination because of 
their attachment to another, this does not detract from the fact 
that there was considerable resistance to Nazi organising drives 
among women at the local, often parochial, level. 
This was doubtless a reason for the slow rate at which DFW 
membership grew, in spite of the effort expended on publicising its 
activities and the initial compulsion exerted on existing groups to 
take out corporate membership. According to the Party's statistical 
records, there were in 1935 eighty -seven groups in the DFW, with a 
total membership of 2.7 million3. But since the National Women's 
1. L. P. Lochner (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries 1942/43, London, 1949, 
entry for 12 September, 1943, P. 358. 
Douglas L. Kelley, Twenty -Two Cells in Nuremberg, London, 1947, 
p. 60. 
Heinrich Fraenkel, German People versus Hitler, London, 1940, 
pp. 222 and 227. 
W. L. Shirer, Berlin Diary 1934 -41, London, 1941, entries for 
4 September, 1934, pp. 22 -23, and 4 -5 September (3 am), 1940, 
p. 389. 
2. Heyen, op. cit., "Aus dem Lagebericht des Landrates von Bad 
Kreuznach aber den Monat Januar 1936 ", no. 90, p. 180. 
Ibid., from answers to a questionnaire in Koblenz, August 1938, 
no. 93, p. 185. 
BA, Slg.Sch., 243/II, vol. 2, "Demonstration kath. Frauen in 
Beulich ", 2 May, 1939. I am most grateful to Dr. J. S. Conway 
of the University of British Columbia for generously sending me 
a copy of this document. 
3. NSDAP Partei -Statistik, 1935, vol. III, p. 58. 
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Leadership reported that the figure for DFW membership in December 
1937 was only about 670,0001, it seems likely that the 1935 figure 
included NSF members, probably some two million of them. It is 
reasonable to suppose, however, that there was a decline in DFW 
membership between 1935 and 1937, since a number of the groups which 
had become corporate members in 1933 and 1934 were dissolved in 1935 
and 19362. If their members wished to maintain their connection with 
the DFW - and many probably did not, once their own organisation 
was dissolved - they would have had to apply for individual 
membership. But at last in 1938 there was a significant rise in 
DFW numbers, with the total for the end of that year rising above 
1.1 million in Germany itself, and, in addition, there were over 
400,000 members in Austria nine months after the Anschluss3. The 
total membership claimed at the end of 1940 for the Greater German 
Reich was around six million for the NSF and DFW together4, an 
increase of about two million over the comparable total for 
December 19385. 
Frau Scholtz -Klink and her staff were well aware that the 
conflict between the generations had been a major problem for the 
feminist organisations in the later 1920s, and were determined that no 
1. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, op. cit., p. 11. 
2. This concerned chiefly the former conservative or nationalist 
organisations. See above, Chapter 1, p. 34. 
3. BA, loc. cit. 
4. IfZ, MA 253, frame 653, "Der Einsatz der NSF /DPW im Kriegsjahr 
1940" 
5. BA, loc. cit. 
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such difficulties should upset the harmony of the Nazi women's 
organisation. Clearly, twenty -one -year -old girls coming straight 
from the BdM into the NSF, and young women joining the DFW, would 
have to be provided with interesting activities; otherwise, they 
might feel that they were being submerged in a housewives' club 
run by middle -aged matrons, and subside into apathy or 
disaffection. The tactic adopted to try to avoid this, and to 
encourage new recruits for the DFW and groom potential NSF members 
and leaders, was the creation of "youth groups" within both the 
NSF and the DFW, in 1936, for the eighteen to thirty age -group. 
The official regulations for the youth groups stated that their 
purpose was primarily to bring young women together and to provide 
the opportunity for them to do the things people of their age 
liked to do; these were deemed to include singing and dancing, with 
a high content of physical exercise, including hill - walking. But 
there were special "education" - political indoctrination - courses 
as well, which were vital to the Nazi scheme given that young women had, 
in the Party's view, constantly to be reminded that their destiny 
and their duty lay in marrying and starting a family - or adding to 
a family they might already have. To emphasise this, the girls were 
also expected to take an active part in the DFW's sectional work, 
particularly in the realm of domestic management and child -caret. 
In order to keep young women in this important age -group as 
much under Party surveillance as possible, a vast array of activities 
was designated as desirable, including training with the Red Cross 
1. BA, op. cit., "Anordnung Nr. 2/37", issued by Gertrud Scholtz- 
Klink, 12 February, 1937. 
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and voluntary assistance in first -aid and welfare work, training 
in air -raid protection, and, for the more energetic, reaching a 
standard of proficiency in physical pursuits to win the women's 
National Sport Badge1. But in spite of the barrage of propaganda 
directed at attracting young women to the youth groups, recruitment 
here - as to the DFW generally - was disappointing. Perhaps the 
Nazis had, after all, misjudged the disposition and desires of 
young women; or perhaps they had simply overestimated the extent to 
which they could, in a one -party State, with a monopoly of 
propaganda, mould the disposition and desires of groups of Germans, 
according to the role they were assigned in Nazi plans. At any rate, 
by the beginning of 1939 the youth groups had a modest membership 
of 168,533, while, it was observed, there were nearly 400,000 women 
between eighteen and thirty in the NSF alone, with a considerable 
number in the DFW in addition. It was, however, felt to be 
encouraging that the year 1938 had seen an increase of 48% 
in the membership2, and there was to be a further rise to 292,000 
by September 1939, and the achievement of a membership of over 
400,000 in August 1942. But these last figures apply to the Greater 
German Reicha, and are therefore not directly comparable with the 
1938 figures, which apply to Germany within its 1937 borders. 
There remained one group of Germans, other than pre- school -age 
children, for whom organised activity had to be provided, if the 
1. Dorothea Thimme, "Die Jugendgruppen des Deutschen Frauenwerkes 
bekennen sich zur Leistung ", FK, September 1938, p. 5. 
2. BA, op. cit., Reichsfrauenfiihrung Jahresbericht 1938, pp. 19 -20. 
3. BA, NSD 3/5, "Jugendgruppen der NS- Frauenschaft /Deutsches Frauen- 
werk", 13 October, 1942, p. 660. 
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totalitarian State was to try to control all its citizens: this was 
the six -to- ten -year -old group, which was too young to join the 
junior branches of the Hitler Youth, but nevertheless at a highly 
impressionable age. It was therefore made the task of the NSF to create 
"children's groups ", which by early 1938 catered for 350,000 
children, in almost 9,500 groups; attendance increased during 1938, 
so that at the end of the year the figures were, respectively, over 
400,000 and 11,0001. The stated aim of these groups was that the 
entire German youth should grow up in a community from early 
childhood, to inculcate in them the ideals of comradeship and mutual 
consideration, and to "strengthen their love for Ftlhrer and nation ". 
But indoctrination was not the only purpose of the groups, in the 
later 1930s; at a time when women were increasingly being encouraged 
to enter employment outside the home even before the outbreak of war, 
and more urgently after it, it was imperative that mothers of young 
children should have facilities provided for the care of their 
children while they worked. The children's groups, then, were to 
remedy the insufficiency of crèches, which was one of the many 
complaints made by working women in the early days of the war about 
conditions2. To try to expedite this, Ley ordered that accommodation 
at the disposal of the Labour Front be given over to the children's 
groups3. 
While the female population generally was being exhorted to 
serve the Fatherland in war -time, increased demands were made on the 
1. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, op. cit., p. 25. 
2. If2, MA 4411, frames 2- 750490 -91, MadR, 18 December, 1939. 
3. BA, op. cit., " Anordnung 1/40", issued by Ley, 16 January, 1940. 
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women's organisation, too. Members of the NSF and the DFW were 
called upon to undertake voluntary work - which had the supreme 
virtue for the Government of costing little or nothing in terms of 
remuneration - in agriculture, or first -aid, or factory work, if they 
were unable to engage full -time in productive work. Certainly, there 
were areas where piecemeal, amateur activity was extremely suitable, 
for example in the staffing of créches, the undertaking of clothes 
repairs and the provision of auxiliary nursing assistance for 
civilians; these tasks, and others, were performed by members of the 
DFW from the start of the war. But the NSF's own statistics revealed 
how very sporadic and sparse the voluntary activity was: in 1940, 
more than three - and -a -half million women in the NSF and the DFW 
worked for over 200 million hours without pay, that is at the 
average rate of about an hour a week, which was only a gesture when 
the country was at war. The NSF, of course, had additional duties, 
particularly in terms of propaganda activity, to maintain the "inner 
front" of ideological conformity among the women of the nation at a time 
when solidarity was even more necessary than evert. But it is clear 
that the Government tried to make good the shortages of labour, which 
its own failure to coerce women into war -work perpetuated, by 
relying on voluntary, part -time women workers who turned out to be 
as reluctant to expend more than a very minimal amount of time and 
energy outside their own routine, in spite of the exhortations and the 
pleas, as to take up full -time, paid employment in vital war industry. 
Again and again, concrete information belies the proud boasts 
made by Frau Scholtz- Klink, her staff and her propaganda network 
1. IfZ, MA 253, frames 649 -54, "Der Einsatz der NSF /DFW im Kriegsjahr 
1940". 
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that the Nazi -directed activity of women in the Third Reich was 
energetic, all- embracing and performed with enthusiasm by vast 
numbers of German women. There was certainly an impression of 
industry and large -scale participation, chiefly because the Party's 
press generally, and the women's press in particular, gave 
comprehensive coverage of events of even the most minor significance, 
exaggerating their scope and importance. In this context, the 
example of press circulation is itself instructive: the National 
Women's Leadership published its own newsletter, the official 
magazines of both the NSF and the DFW, and two other magazines 
designed to interest women, Mutter and Volk (Mother and Nation) and 
Deutsche Hauswirtschaft (German Housekeeping). In 1938, when there 
were over two million NSF members, the NS- Frauenwarte, the official 
magazine of the NSF, had a circulation of 1.2 million; if this was 
perhaps respectable, it nevertheless meant that only just over half 
of the Party's élite organisation of women subscribed to their own 
magazine, which hardly indicated real enthusiasm. Also in 1938, when 
the DFW's membership was, at its highest point, 1.1 million, a mere 
23,000 women took the D.N's magazine, Frauenkultur im Deutschen 
Frauenwerk; and only 76,000 subscribed to the Nachrichtendienst, 
the Leadership's newsletter. The other two magazines together 
attracted about 300,000 readers between them, on a roughly half -and- 
half basis1. Thus the success of Frau Scholtz -Klink's office in 
promoting its publications - and two of its three official ones, 
particularly - was limited, not to say poor; the net result was that 
1. BA, Slg. Soh., 230, Reichsfrauenftthrung Jahresbericht 1938, p, 28. 
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the barrage of propaganda did not reach even all the women who had 
chosen to join an organisation, let alone the vast majority who had 
not. 
If it is true that the housewife in any community is the 
hardest member of it to organise, this is not a particularly 
alarming situation in a liberal democratic society or even an old - 
fashioned conservative autocratic regime. But in a modern dictatorship 
which aspires to be totalitarian it must be a source of concern, since 
it means that a whole category of citizens cannot be controlled and, 
of even greater importance, this is the category which has control 
over the youth of the nation in its earliest years. Their obsession 
with uniformity and control, and their deep concern for the 
upbringing of future generations of Germans, made the Nazis try 
continuously, by flattery and by appeals, to attract women to 
organisations under the supervision of the Party. They had some 
success with employed women, who at least had to pay lip -service to 
the Nazi system to feel secure in a job, but these tended to join 
specialist groups for both sexes rather than a group composed 
exclusively of women. For example, the records kept about women 
civil servants show that members of a group employed in the Chancellery 
itself chose, in addition to their occupational group, the RDB, the 
National Air -Raid Protection Society, the NSV and the Colonial Society 
regularly, but the DBW seldoml. It can hardly be surprising that, in 
a society where such stress was laid on the comradeship of men and 
women and the necessity of raising the birth rate, the women gravitated 
1. BA, R4311/1091c, information from personal records kept in the Reich 
Chancellery about its employees, compiled between March and May 1939. 
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- as most women normally do - into mixed rather than segregated groups, 
thus confounding the other, at times contradictory, Nazi preoccupation 
that the functions of the two sexes should, on the whole, be kept 
separate. 
The NSF was indeed a well -organised, elite, leadership group, 
as had been intended, "to educate in the spirit of community life 
through the union of women from all sections of the population in 
the service of the National Socialist idea "1. But its "followers" 
remained dispersed, and to a large extent apathetic. It was loudly 
boasted that the DFW was successfully cutting across the barriers of 
class and occupation, with "the housewife and the employed woman, 
the domestic servant and the professional woman, the unskilled woman 
worker and the artist" all finding common ground in the activities 
of the Frauenwerk2. But the herding of as many women as could be 
persuaded into a segregated organisation was an essentially 
artificial manoeuvre, for, as Ley himself observed, 
"The DFW cannot, in my opinion, be termed a 
'National Socialist community'.... The name 'community' 
can only be applied where there is a gathering of people 
from all sections of the nation. The organisation of 
members of one sex can therefore not be termed a community "3. 
Even the streamlining of the DFW, and its closer association 
with the Party, from 1936 could not disguise the fact that it was 
still basically the product of the nationalisation of groups which 
had existed before 1933. Certainly, much of the activity, especially 
in terms of child -care, homecraft and first -aid, was set on a more 
1. Reichsfrauenführung, op. cit., p. 14. 
2. Ibid., p. 20. 
3. BA, Slg.Sch., 230, letter from Ley to Hess, 8 October, 
1935. 
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systematic footing, and those organisations which were dissolved 
after the initial purge were either not relevant to the sectional 
work of the DF'Ñ or else rationalised into larger groupings. Thus, 
the membership of the DIW continued largely to consist of those 
women who had previously chosen to join a group for specifically 
women's interests, since coercion was not used. Coercion would 
hardly have been practicable, given that it would have been difficult 
to impose sanctions on full -time housewives, who had no outside job to 
be dismissed from, and who were in the delicate position of bringing 
up the nation's children. This latter function meant that there was 
a real need to make these women well -disposed towards the regime, so 
that threats were out of the question. To this extent, perhaps, the 
Nazis succeeded; if there was little positive enthusiasm for Party 
activities there was no organised opposition either. The resistance 
that manifested itself was resistance to involvement; as long as the 
Nazis were prepared to leave the mass of women unorganised, German 
women gave at least passive acquiescence to the regime. This was, 
of course, of incalculable value, but it nevertheless was a poor 
return for the incessant propaganda directed at mobilising positive support 
for the regime on the part of women. To the extent that the Nazis 
tried hard to organise women and to prevent the relative isolation 
of the full -time housewife, they must be deemed to have failed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The study of even the few selected aspects of women's 
position in German society in the 1930s which have figured in this 
work permits the making of observations, and the drawing of tentative 
conclusions, in three broad areas. Firstly, and most obviously, the 
general position of women at the end of the decade, compared with 
that in 1930, must be evaluated. Then there are remarks of a more 
general kind that can be made in the German context, particularly 
with regard to the Nazi regime, its policies, and its aspirations 
to totalitarian control of Germany. And finally more should be said 
about the position of women in other countries, since there is only 
limited profit in looking at the situation in one country in a 
vacuum. But, obviously, to attempt to consider other countries in 
a comprehensive way would unreasonably extend a work that is already 
lengthy, and so it is possible here to look only at a few aspects of 
women's position in some European countries, and to look at them 
briefly. 
A. The German Scene 
In the general German context, six aspects stand out most 
clearly, and provide an interesting insight into the politics and 
problems of the later Weimar period and into the operation of the Nazi 
regime. In the first place, it appears that the inability of the 
Reich governments from 1930 -33 to take effective action in the 
economic crisis was in part a product of the democratic system, 
eroded as it became in these years. In this system, precarious 
coalition governments of often basically incompatible elements 
followed one another in rapid succession; decisions were arrived at 
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only slowly - and sometimes never - at a time when speed was 
essential; and the power of the Reich government was in any case 
limited as a result of the substantial autonomy still jealously 
guarded by the Lander. The stagnation, at times to the extent of 
paralysis, to which these features contributed caused frustration 
among the supporters of the Republic and provided ready ammunition 
for the growing body of opposition to it, on both right and left. 
In a sense, this created a vicious circle, since governments could 
not act without further antagonising either the right or the left. 
And while the last governments of the Republic would hardly have 
favoured the kind of action that would have met strong opposition on 
the right, they also feared to generate support for the left by 
deliberately outraging it. Most of the time, then, inaction seemed 
the least harmful course. 
But if governments did not give clear evidence of energetic 
attempts to solve Germany's problems in the late 1920s, particularly 
in the depression, they nevertheless were busy discussing possible 
plans, appointing committees and consulting experts. The direction 
in which their investigations took them was, it is clear, often very 
similar to that subsequently followed - generally with vigour, 
ruthlessness and effectiveness - by Hitler's Government. The attempt 
to reduce student numbers in the early 1930s and to pursue a positive 
population policy are two examples of this. If the policies 
eventually implemented by the Nazis were often a distortion of those 
provisionally envisaged by the Brüning Government, particularly, there 
was nevertheless a strong degree of continuity in the policies 
considered and followed in the years 1930 to 1935/36. This is hardly 
remarkable, since any government of Germany at this time, even one with 
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a disproportionate number of prejudices and a heavy weight of 
ideological lumber, was bound to have as its first priority the 
alleviating of the problems of the economic crisis. Given the Nazis' 
basic lack of originality, it was even more natural that they should 
borrow - even if to intensify and distort - skeleton plans already 
conceived and tentative schemes still at the experimental stage. 
Thus, they based a comprehensive public works scheme on the piecemeal 
expedients introduced under the Papen and Schleicher Governments, and 
extended and redirected the Labour Service, begun on an official basis 
under Brüning when already a concept that had been current in Germany 
for over thirty years. 
Certainly, the Nazis introduced new measures in their early 
years of power; but the real change in the direction of their policies 
came in the mid- 1930s, once the unemployment problem was under control, 
and when they had had time to design their medium -term plans and were 
able to begin to implement them within the framework of their long- 
term objectives. The reform of senior schooling, begun in 1936 and 
formalised at the beginning of 1938, is an obvious example here. But 
the fundamental point is that the Nazis were indeed - as they claimed 
- planning for the long term, for the "thousand -year Reich "; this is why 
apparent departures from basic principles during the 1930s, and particularly 
from the outbreak of war in 1939, are far less significant than has 
been assumed. Critics of the Nazis both at the time and since have 
delighted in pointing out inconsistencies and the apparent ease with 
which points of principle were jettisoned. Such commentators overlook 
the time -scale to which the Nazis were working, and their list of 
priorities. Better, they felt, to sacrifice an ideal for a short time 
in the immediate future, if thereby the long -term future of 
the Reich 
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would be secured: this is why the Nazis not only tolerated, but even 
energetically encouraged, the bringing of women into work once 
publicly designated "unsuitable" for them, when the needs of war 
seemed to demand it. Once the war was over and Germany's supremacy 
assured, women would for ever be relieved of the need to work in 
heavy industry and other potentially "biologically" damaging 
occupations. 
This, however, immediately raises another point: the regime in 
fact failed to persuade women to respond adequately to its appeal for 
their co- operation in the war- effort, and, furthermore, failed to 
compel them to comply. This was not because the Nazis had abandoned 
their immediate aim of making Germany supreme, but can be attributed to 
two other factors. In the first place, in the early years of the war, 
at least up to the point where German forces failed to take Moscow in 
November 1941, and conceivably even later, it was still generally 
believed in Germany and by the Government that a German victory was 
assured and, more, was imminent. There seemed little point in forcing 
women into work against their will if in the near future their 
contribution would not in fact be required. More interestingly, perhaps, 
in the upper echelons of the Party, at its headquarters in Munich, far 
from the centre of government and remote from military and economic 
Planning, the ideologues around Hess and Bormann failed to realise that 
their insistence on upholding the traditional Party view that woman's 
place was in the home with her family, and certainly not in heavy 
industry, was incompatible with their real priority, that Germany should 
establish herself in a position of European, even world, hegemony, 
by force of arms if necessary. This na1vety was a source of continuing 
irritation and frustration to the men who had to make the 
system work, 
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and who could see that aims of this kind were indeed - if temporarily - 
in conflict. 
Thus, a man like Wilhelm Frick, a prominent member of the 
NSDAP before 1933, found himself, as Reich Minister of the Interior, 
in the first place defending the prerogatives of the State against 
the encroachments of the Party, and then having to counter objections 
to policy made on grounds of Party ideology with the plea of expediency. 
On the whole, given the weight of influence against him, he tended to 
fail, whether in trying to prevent the Party's monopolisation of 
women's organisational activity or in trying to oppose or circumvent the 
Party's demand that women be restricted to the areas assigned to them 
by the Party - which did not include the higher civil service, for 
example. Frick's problem was that Hitler never forgot that he was the 
Party's leader as well as Germany's ruler, and his few arbitrary 
pronouncements on women's affairs - on the admission of women to 
legal practice, for example - reflected the primacy of ideological 
considerations in his mind, even once the war and its demands suggested 
that these ought to be put into cold storage for a time. In the 
constant tension - or, as Schoenbaum says, "the anarchic relations "1 - 
between Party and State in the Third Reich, Hitler's authority as leader 
of both, and his increasing irrationality and sentimental commitment 
to the NSDAP, its officers and its theories, all ensured that in most 
disputed areas the Party won the day - disastrously for the "thousand - 
year Reich ", as it ironically transpired. 
Two other points of general interest remain. Firstly, there is 
the at times almost comic insistence of the Nazis on voluntary effort 
and the saving of Government money by encouraging private enterprise in 
1. Schoenbaum, op. cit., p. 294. 
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in the furthering of the Government's aims. In the name of a spurious 
- but, to many, convincing - "socialism" the Nazis wrung money out of 
German citizens for the Winter Aid scheme to help the poor, rather 
than release Reich funds for this purpose; the encouragement given 
to students to work voluntarily and without remuneration to afford 
fellow -citizens extra paid holidays was couched in the same terms, and 
served much the same purpose. If employers benefited to the extent 
that they did not have to provide the money for the extra holidays, the 
Government had nevertheless achieved a propaganda victory without 
itself putting up the money or antagonising employers by asking them 
to do so. Private industry as well as the individual was, in any case, 
expected to play its part in this alleged demonstration of national 
solidarity. Whether or not the Government had previously brought 
pressure to bear on the Reemstma cigarette company to induce it to 
supplement the marriage loan for its female employees out of its own 
funds1, this example was widely publicised as a model for other firms 
to emulate. 
The reluctance of the Government to spend money on social 
projects was doubtless in part the result of its desire to devote as 
much of its resources as possible to rearmament. No doubt there was 
also genuine enthusiasm within the Party for the ideological aspects 
of money for community purposes being raised within the community, 
without overt Government direction. It is also possible, however, that 
the fiscal orthodoxy of Krosigk and his advisers at the Ministry of 
Finance played a part. Certainly, Krosigk was alarmed when large -scale 
projects necessitated substantial Government expenditure, as he 
demonstrated when the Labour Service was greatly expanded in the later 
1. See above, Chapter 3, pp. 140 -41. 
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1930s1. On a smaller scale, the Ministry of Finance felt less than 
enthusiasm for the SS's scheme to pay State aid to unmarried mothers2. 
But the overall picture which emerges from the visible penny- pinching 
in social projects and the encouragement given to private initiatives 
and voluntary efforts seems somewhat paradoxical in the light of the 
Nazis' passion for imposing uniformity and nationalising as much of the 
German people's activity as possible. 
Finally, the failure to achieve this uniformity, to impose 
total control, and to involve everyone in the life of the Nazi state, 
reveals that the Nazis had not created a fully totalitarian regime, 
whatever Robert Ley, for one, might claim3. They could not even 
stamp out coeducation or contraception, although they had anathematised 
both. Their failure was partly due to their continuing dependence on 
the co- operation of the German people, and their consequent reluctance 
to antagonise those who were "politically reliable ", "racially 
desirable ", and who were broadly content under Nazi rule as long as it 
made few demands on them. Women, particularly, had to be treated 
carefully: not only were they in a unique position of influence over 
the nation's youth, but, in addition, the Nazis no doubt remembered 
the threat of a "Geb'drstreik" (strike against child - bearing) which had 
been made before the Great War, when working -class women were urged 
not to provide cannon -fodder for a regime which did not provide adequate 
sustenance for their children. Thus, persuasion rather than coercion, 
1. See above, Chapter 3, p. 168. 
2. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 109 -10. 
3. Schoenbaum, op. cit., p. 113, quotes Ley as saying: "There are 
no more private citizens. The time when anybody could do or not 
do what he pleased is past ". 
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incentives rather than threats, and withdrawal with a good grace 
when opposition from the ordinary population seemed formidable, were 
the tactics to which Hitler's Government was restricted. The 
limitations thus imposed on Government action left a greater degree 
of freedom in the Third Reich than is apparent at first sight, and 
than has generally been supposed, and ensured that Nazi control of 
Germany was rather less than complete. 
B. International Comparisons 
On the whole, it appears that women in Germany in the 1930s - 
even in the Third Reich - were neither better nor worse off than 
women in other countries in terms of status and opportunities. In 
the Weimar years, the impression is that women were in a particularly 
fortunate position: for one thing, Germany had a far higher 
proportion of women legislators than most other countries. 
when there were three women in the United States' Congress and six 
women in the Austrian parliament, there were thirty -two female 
Reichstag deputies. Again, in 1929, women constituted 1.1% of the 
membership of the House of Representatives, 2.1% of the House of 
Commons, and 6.7% of the Reichstag'. Still in early 1933, there were 
fifteen women Members of Parliament in Britain and thirty -five women 
deputies in the Reichstag2. But, as the feminists were well aware, 
membership of the legislative body alone could not guarantee progress 
towards equality for women. Much is made of how women lost their 
1. Lowie, op. cit., p. 209. 
2. "Women MPs ", The Women's Who's Who, 1933. 
Report in BF, January, 1933, p. 5. 
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representation in the Reichstag under the Nazis, once Germany 
became a one -party State; but it ought also to be remembered that in 
two of Germany's neighbours, Fiance and Switzerland, women did not 
even have the vote in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Clearly, it is felt to be less reprehensible not to introduce 
a reform than to reverse one that has taken place. Much of the time 
the Nazis are - generally rightly - criticised for revoking progressive 
measures, regardless of how effective they had been, and putting 
German women once again in a position similar to that obtaining in 
countries where reforms had not been effected. Perhaps the outstanding 
example of this is the law of 30 June, 1933, which permitted the 
dismissal of married women from the civil service and departure from 
the principle of equal pay for men and women in civil service 
positionsl. But in Britain, for example, women had been, and were 
still being, discriminated against in these areas: it has already 
been observed that British women had to wait until the mid -1950s before 
equal pay in the civil service was introduced2, while married women 
were - other than exceptionally - banned from the teaching profession 
until after the Butler Act of 19443 The implication, then, is that 
Germany of the Weimar Republic was in the vanguard of those countries 
which accepted a more equitable position for women in public and 
professional life. 
But the problem in Germany in the 1920s, as the feminists never 
tired of complaining, was that the Weimar Constitution, which affirmed 
1. See above, Chapter 5, pp. 281 -82. 
2. Ibid., p. 255. 
3. H. C. Dent, The Education Act, 1944, London, 1964, p. 35. 
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equality of the sexes in education, in civil service appointments, and 
in terms of remuneration in the professions, was not the law of the 
land; it was possible at times to ignore its provisions, or at 
least to try to circumvent them, as Bavaria and Wurttemberg did in 
the case of married women teachers in the 1920s1. Where the intentions 
of the Constitution were observed, progress in winning a more 
equitable position for women was slow; but those who imagined that it 
could be otherwise were surely naive. In the Soviet Union, too, where 
the Constitutions of 1918 and 1936 declared equality of rights 
between the sexes, men continued to hold a near -monopoly of the 
senior administrative positions, although women did increase their 
representation significantly in administrative and professional 
positions which carried less authority and responsibility2. Indeed, 
women quickly came to dominate - numerically, if not in terms of 
authority - the medical profession; but it is suggested that this was 
because doctors were poorly paid in the Soviet Unions. 
Certainly, if there was no distinction between the sexes as 
regards professional opportunities in some other countries - for 
example, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Iceland, as well as the Soviet 
Union - in two of Germany's western neighbours, France and Belgium, 
the professions were not universally open to women; in addition, in 
other countries, including Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Norway (until 1938) 
La 
and the Netherlands, there remained restrictions on women's eligibility 
1. See above, Chapter 5, p. 262. 
2. M. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, London, 1963, p. 377. 
3. Maurice Larkin, Gathering Pace, London, 1969, p. 292. 
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for professional positions throughout the inter -war years. In 
Austria, under the Dollfuss regime, an order was issued in 1933 
which was very similar to the German law of 30 June, 1933, 
restricting opportunities for married women in the civil service1. 
Germany was, in fact, in the majority camp in the 1930s, with the 
Nazis' more reactionary measures well according with the trend in the 
many other European countries which in the 1920s and 1930s were 
falling under right -wing dictatorships. 
Reactionary measures included the attempt to eliminate 
abortion and contraception in the Third Reich, a policy that was 
being followed in other European countries, particularly the 
predominantly Roman Catholic ones. In France, for example, where there 
was, as in Germany, deep concern about the declining birth rate, 
abortion was illegal and harsh penalties were provided in the Penal 
Code for offenders. In 1920, a law was passed which provided that 
those manufacturing, selling or advocating contraceptive devices could 
be punished by a fine or imprisonment; it was to this obstacle to 
effective contraception that a rate of abortion estimated at between 
300,000 and 500,000 per year during the 1930s was largely attributed. 
The one concession made was that therapeutic abortion - where the 
life of the mother was endangered - was permitted in 1939; but it 
was in the same year that the Code de la Famille sanctioned the 
imposition of more severe penalties for those selling abortifacients 
and contraceptives. No doubt influenced by war -time German policy2, 
the French Government in 1942 made abortion a crime carrying very 
1. Douie, op. cit., pp. 10 -14, 20. 
2. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 93 -94. 
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severe penalties, including the possibility of the death penaltyl. 
Toleration of abortion and free access to contraceptive 
advice were generally associated with Communism and, above all, 
Soviet Russia. Certainly, the Draconian penalties for abortion in 
Tsarist Russia were revoked by decree immediately after the 
Bolshevik Revolution, and in November 1920 abortion was formally 
legalised2. But those who criticised this policy as "licentious" 
failed to add that the Soviet authorities regarded abortion as an 
evil, but one which would remain until adequate contraceptive 
provision obviated the need for it. It was less because this 
desideratum had been achieved than because of the growing international 
tension of the 1930s that abortion was banned in the 1936 Constitution 
of the Soviet Union; the raising of the birth rate became in the 
USSR, as in Hitler's Germany, a major official preoccupation, and 
Stalin's Government, again like Hitler's, offered at the same time 
a number of incentives for procreation. The carnage of the Second 
World War led to the provision of more, and more attractive, incentives 
in 1944 to encourage the citizens of the USSR to compensate for the 
immense losses, in the field and among civilians3. 
To this extent, dictatorships of "left" and "right" followed 
similar, even identical, policies: Mussolini, too, imposed heavy 
penalties for abortion and the dissemination of contraceptive advice, 
and offered tax incentives and allowances to large families to encourage 
procreation. Again like Hitler and the Soviet regime he provided 
1. C. Watson, "Birth Control and Abortion in France since 1939 ", 
Population Studies, 1951 -52, pp. 261 -68. 
2. Halle, op. cit., p. 39. 
3. Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 269 -79, 371 -72. 
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improved welfare for mothers and infants, and attempted to remove 
the stigma from unmarried motherhood'. If their attitude towards 
abortion and contraception was repressive and harsh, the dictators 
gave the impression - for bellicose motives, no doubt - that they 
were more enlightened in matters of social welfare than most 
democratic governments, including the British ones in the inter -war 
years. 
C. Women in German Society in the 1930s 
It is possible, but it would be misleading, to compile a 
balance -sheet of comparisons of women's position in 1930 with that in 
1940. One could, for example, point to the contrast between the 
mounting opposition to the employment of married women in all areas, 
from industry to the professions, in the depression years at the 
start of the decade, and the growing urgency with which attempts were 
made to persuade married as well as single women to enter employment 
in the later 1930s, particularly once Germany went to war in the 
autumn of 1939. Indeed the former situation reveals prejudice, but 
if this was to some extent a legacy of the German past, in which 
working -class men as well as members of the middle and upper classes 
had disliked the appearance of women in large numbers in employment 
outside the home, its extent in the late 1920s and early 1930s was 
primarily an automatic response to the desperate economic situation 
in which job opportunities only diminished in the inexorable 
deflationary spiral. The changed attitude of the later 1930s was not 
1. S. W. Halperin, Mussolini and Italian Fascism, New York, 1964, 
pp. 63 -64. 
I.L.O. Yearbook, 1937 -38, pp. 260 -62. 
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a reflection of enlightenment, of a desire to encourage women to 
realise their individual potential outside the home, but was rather 
indicative of the Government's desire to harness the nation's 
resources to the war -machine it was determined to construct. It is 
to be hoped that this study has shown that the situation in Germany 
in both 1930 and 1940 was highly abnormal, with an unprecedented 
shortage of jobs in the earlier year and a shortage of labour in the 
latter year which had developed quickly and showed signs of only 
becoming more acute. Thus, the extent of the prejudice in 1930 was 
abnormal in the Weimar context, just as the attempt ten years later 
to winkle housebound wives and mothers out of their domestic routine, 
and into the factory or the field, was an emergency measure as far 
as the Nazis were concerned, one which was not expected to continue 
once the national crisis of the war was over. 
It is, however, possible only to surmise what the position of 
women in a "thousand -year Reich" would have been. Clearly, the 
Nazis' chief concern with women was for their capacity as child - 
bearers. Women with a full -time job might be reluctant to start 
or add to a family, and so women were to be encouraged to give up 
work to spend their time in the home, and to have many children in 
order to fill this time. Girls with an academic education might be 
reluctant to forego the opportunity of an interesting, responsible, 
and possibly well -paid career, even if they were married; accordingly, 
the emphasis was to be shifted away from the study of academic subjects, 
and where a preponderance of these remained in a curriculum, girls 
were also to be reminded of their maternal role at every opportunity, 
by taking compulsory courses in domestic science and by mixing socially 
in the organisations and usefully in the Labour Service with girls and 
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women from different backgrounds, who would be more interested in 
human relationships than in physics or foreign languages. Above all, 
women were to be kept physically healthy for child - bearing, and had 
therefore to be removed from work that was actually or potentially 
damaging to their reproductive capacity. 
The motive was world domination; one of the means to this was 
to be a dramatic increase in the population, by means of creating an 
atmosphere in which procreation was considered natural and was 
rewarded in both material and psychological terms, and by attempting to 
make any means of conception control beyond total abstinence from 
sexual intercourse unavailable. But some of the side -effects were 
desirable. For example, the Nazis were considered puritanical in their 
condemnation of tobacco and alcohol - no doubt partly influenced by 
Hitler's abstinence from and aversion to them1 - but they were 
medically correct in urging pregnant women not to smoke or drink 
alcohol. While the Nazis claimed to advocate temperance rather than 
abstinence with regard to alcohol, they were uncompromising in their 
opposition to cigarette smoking2, at a time when it was accepted as 
fashionable among women as well as men, and before the health hazards 
directly connected with it were widely accepted. Foreigners were 
mildly amused by the zeal of some of the Party faithful in 
encouraging café's to hang notices prominently on their premises bearing 
the legend "The German woman does not smoke "3, but it was the Rector 
1. Kelley, op. cit., pp. 178, 190 -91. 
2. Erich Bruns, "Die Bekámpfung des Alcohol- und Nikotinmissbrauchs 
und die deutsche Frau ", NS- Frauenwarte, 1938, p. 599. 
3. "'Die deutsche Frau raucht nicht?", FZ, 1 May, 
1933. 
Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Europe I Saw, London, 1968, p. 34, 
relates how in Berlin in March 1933, a Storm Trooper 
"snatched a 
cigarette I was smoking from my mouth, informing 
me that the 
Fahrer disapproved of women smoking ". 
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of Erlangen University, whose own field was medicine, who stated 
unequivocally that "For a woman, smoking is without doubt a vice "1 
Another aspect of social mores which seemed to the Nazis to 
have implications for the birth rate was women's clothing. They 
condemned the foreign influences - of Paris and the United States - 
which, they claimed, had encouraged German women to adopt a style of 
dressing that was either frivolous or else an imitation of men's 
clothes, and was in any case decadent and not conducive to a healthy 
rate of population growth ( "fortpflanzungsfeindlich "); the reasoning 
behind this assertion was not explained2. To give guidance about the 
kind of clothing that was considered desirable in the Nazi State, the 
German Fashion Bureau was opened in Berlin in the spring of 1933, 
under the honorary presidency of Magda Goebbels3, who claimed that 
she was "trying to make the German woman more beautiful "4. At first, 
there was emphasis on the creation of a "German style" for German 
women5, but the women's magazines continued to carry fashion articles 
featuring clothes which were considered fashionable in Paris and 
London, and eventually in 1937 the D W denied that there had been, 
or should be, attempts to devise a "German style "6. These ideas, 
however, were not new in the 1930s; during the Great War there had been 
criticism of the "improper" clothes some women and girls were wearing, 
and the call went out for the creation of a "German style ". The 
1. H. Wintz, "Die Frau und das Rauchen ", Schriften des "Verein 
Deutsche Volksheilkunde e.V. ", Nuremberg, 1938. 
2. Agnes Gerlach, "Klarheit in Modefragen ", DAZ, 23 July, 1933. 
3. "Ein deutsches Mode- Amt ", Vossische Zeitung, 11 June, 1933. 
4. "Frau Goebbels über die deutsche Frauen ", Vossische Zeitung, 6 
July, 1933. 
5. "Ziel und Aufbau des deutschen Modeamtes ", FZ, 5 July, 
1933. 
6. "Keine eigene 'Deutsche. Mode", PZ, 23 April, 1937. 
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objections were against something which was clearly too terrible to 
be described explicitly, but the implication was that new styles were 
being adopted which were at once unpatriotic - presumably imported 
from enemy countries - and morally riskyl. 
The ideal type of woman in Nazi theory was the peasant wife, 
whose peaceful, wholesome life was devoted to her work on the land and, 
above all, her family. The picture of this woman at her spinning- 
wheel2 was offered as the alternative to the city -bred chic 
sophisticates of the decadent 1920s. To encourage the simple 
perfection embodied - it was quite unrealistically believed - in this 
rural figure, edicts were issued castigating and ridiculing those 
women who "shave their eyebrows, use rouge, dye their hair" in an 
altogether foreign manner3. The Party's puritans conducted a 
vigorous campaign against cosmetics, although Hitler was apparently 
not averse to women's using them4. Himmler, however, maintained 
a strict attitude, giving instructions that the mothers in the SS's 
Lebensborn homes should not be permitted to use lipstick, to paint 
their nails, or to shave their eyebrows5. It was further made clear 
1. "Planmässiger Kampf gegen Wtirdelosigkeit im weiblichen Geschlecht, 
von einem Beobachter am Wege ", Frankfurter Zeitgemasse Brosch- 
tiren, January 1916, pp. 2 -4. 
2. Hildegard von Rheden, "Bauerlicher Hausfleiss aus Blut und Boden ", 
VB, 2 February, 1936. 
3. "Muckertum und geschminkten Frauen ", DAZ, 15 November, 1933. 
4. Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler was my Friend, London, 1955, pp. 141 -42, 
describes Hitler's taste in women's appearance thus: "If he had 
any preference at all, then I should say that it was a leaning 
towards the elegant, slim figure. Nor did he object to lipstick 
and painted fingernails, which were so scornfully castigated in 
Party circles ". 
5. IfZ, Fa 202, frame 78, letter from "Dr. E." to the Council of 
Lebensborn, 6 September, 1940. 
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that the SS expected the future wives of its members to demonstrate 
their wholesomeness by achieving the Reich Sport Medal, since the 
kind of woman who was suitable for the nation's elite to marry was 
not the one 
"who can dance nicely through five -o'clock teas, but 
who has proved her fitness by sports activity. For 
good health, the javelin or the pole -vault are of more 
value than the lipstick "1. 
This motif ran throughout Nazi speeches about women2 - naturally 
enough, since it was directly relevant to the function regarded as 
most important, child- bearing, the function to which all Nazi 
thought about women was ultimately related. 
It is this consistent obsession that renders comprehensible 
some of the apparent inconsistencies in Nazi thought and practice; 
for example, while some Nazis undoubtedly took a more puritanical 
view of social and sexual life than others, there was general 
acceptance that the family was the essential basic unit of society, 
to be maintained and protected by every possible means. But the very 
existence of the family was an obstacle to the Nazis' attempt at 
totalitarian control, and so the Nazi organisations had to try to 
exert some influence over individual members of the family in the 
hope that the family unit as a whole would be permeated by National 
Socialist ideas and would grow in corporate loyalty to the Nazi 
regime. A strict line of demarcation was, however, to be drawn 
1. SS Obergruppenftthrer Jeckeln, "Ein Wort an die Frauen ", FZ, 1 
June, 1937. 
2. E.g., Gertrud Scholtz- Klink, "Die Frau im nationalsozialistisch - 
en Staat ", VB, 9 September, 1934. 
"Die Körperschulung und deren Wichtigkeit für die Frauen ", 
NS- Frauenwarte, 1938, p. 587. 
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between business and pleasure: Hess repeatedly reminded Party 
members that they were not allowed to wear Party uniform when out 
on social occasions with women, unless the function was an official 
one to which wives were invited. Hess particularly condemned 
those who wore Party uniform when taking their wives for a ride in 
a car, and ordered that on no account was a woman to be driven in 
an open car with her husband when he was in uniform1. This 
potential source of petty family friction was, however, trivial 
compared with the apparent threat to the family unit by some 
Nazi social policies. 
The more tolerant attitude towards unmarried motherhood2 
and the introduction of "irretrievable breakdown" as a ground for 
divorce3 in the Third Reich alarmed some of those who had believed 
Nazi promises of restoring respectability to German life after the 
permissiveness of the Weimar Republic. They were, in fact, policies 
which were more similar to those of liberals and even Communists 
than to the standard Christian morality of those conservatives who 
had supported Hitler in preference to socialists of any colour. No 
doubt Himmler and the SS and Hess were in a minority in the NSDAP in 
positively encouraging unmarried motherhood, but the Party clearly, 
after some initial hesitation, moved to a position where it accepted 
that motherhood was desirable, therefore those women who became mothers 
out of wedlock should not be discriminated against, even if they should 
neither be acclaimed as examples worthy of imitation. The result was 
1. IfZ, Db 15.02, "Anordnung 
Hess, with express orders 
2. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 
3. Ibid., pp. 72 -73. 
214/35 ", 5 November, 1935, signed by 
that it was not for publication. 
99 -110. 
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more humane treatment of unmarried mothers, of the kind advocated 
particularly by radical feminists both before and after the Great 
War and by Communists, in imitation of the Soviet Russian example. 
On the whole, the Nazis recognised that there was an implicit 
contradiction in their claim to be upholding the family unit and 
their attempt to diminish prejudice against the unmarried mother; 
but their overriding desire for children led them to welcome any 
"racially valuable" child, regardless of the marital status of its 
parents, and therefore to value the parents themselves. 
Population policy, again, underlay the peculiar situation which 
arose from the Nazis' being more concerned with the health and 
welfare of women workers than some of the avowed champions of women's 
rights. While the Communists and the Socialists were, like the Nazis, 
anxious to develop schemes of labour protection for women, particularly 
for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the radical feminists 
the Open Door International, who were the first to claim that the 
Nazis had no regard for women and aimed to subject them fully to 
male domination, denied that special provision for women's welfare was 
anything other than a device for discriminating against women'. Thus, 
the most militant feminists were prepared to countenance a situation 
where women and girls were free to work during the day or at night 
for as many hours as they chose, regardless of the damage they might 
do to their health. Indeed, they, along with the Communists, 
demanded equal pay for equal work, which might have discouraged 
employers from using women for heavy work since men were more 
obviously fitted for it; but it was the Nazis who actually introduced 
1. See above, Chapter 3, p. 119. 
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equal pay in some cases for this very purpose1. And the radical 
feminists never suggested that their aim in agitating for equal 
pay was to discourage employers from using female labour on the 
same terms as male. In the end - always for the natalist motive - 
the Nazis showed more concern for the physical well -being of women. 
Perhaps this helps to account for the acceptance of the 
Nazis by women generally, and even by some of those who had been 
opposed to the Nazis in the pre -1933 period. Three former DVP 
Reichstag deputies, Doris Hertwig- Bunger2, Elsa Matz3 and Clara 
Mende4, apparently came to terms with the regime to the extent of 
applying for Party membership and working in Nazi organisations. 
Doris Hertwig - Bunger was admitted to the NSDAP in 1937, and was also 
a member of other organisations, including the NSF, in which she was 
recognised as a particularly active and diligent member, thoroughly 
"politically reliable "5. Elsa Matz became a Party member as early as 
May 1933, on the recommendation of the Berlin Gau leadership of the 
NSDAP6. Clara Mende had been too outspoken against the Nazis before 
1933 to be admitted to the Party even in 1938, but she had been a 
1. Ibid., p. 144. 
2. Born in 1882, a senior school teacher and leader of women's 
organisations in the Weimar period. Horkenbach, op. cit., p. 681. 
3. Born in 1881, a senior school teacher and president of the DYP's 
Women's Committee. Reichstags- Handbuch, Berlin, 1930, p. 417. 
4. Born in 1869, headmistress of a domestic science school and 
adviser in the Ministry of Economics in 1929 -32. Horkenbach, op. 
cit., p. 714. 
5. BDC, Gestapo report on Doris Hertwig- Bunger, 27 December, 1940. 
6. Ibid., Partei -Kanzlei Korrespondenz, letter to the Gauschatzmeister 
of Mark Brandenburg, 5 February, 1940. 
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member of the NSF since 1934 and was the Berlin Gau's expert on 
domestic science training in the NSV1. If the DVP was in truth a 
conservative party, these women must nevertheless have had to 
compromise their former views in order to co- operate with the Nazi 
regime to the extent that they did; no doubt personal ambition 
facilitated this, but it seems reasonable to infer that they also 
found elements in Nazism which positively, and not necessarily 
wrongly, recommended themselves to them. 
There were, of course, those who could not fully accept the 
Nazi system, and who would never be fully acceptable to the Nazis. Of 
those who were so unacceptable as to be unable to continue to work in 
Germany and who were also possibly in personal danger, some, like 
Marie Juchacz2 and Anna Siemsen3, both of the SPD, returned to Germany 
after exile abroad during the Third Reich, while others, like Alice 
Salomon4, remained abroad for the rest of their lives. Of those who 
stayed, often at great personal risk, Hilde Benjamin, the former 
lawyer who suffered imprisonment for her part in the Communist 
underground, was given the position of attorney general in Berlin under 
the Soviet Military Administration in 19455. Marie -Elisabeth 'Alders, 
one of Gertrud Bäumer's associates, was also imprisoned because of some 
1. Ibid., Gestapo report to the President of the Reich Chamber of 
Journalists, 26 April, 1938. 
2. Max Schwarz, MdR, Hanover, 1965, p. 684. 
3. Kosch, op. cit., p. 1110. 
4. Ibid., p. 1060. 
5. Stockhorst, op. cit., p. 51. 
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of the material she had published; after the war, she worked with the 
United States' occupation authorities before returning to politics as 
a Free Democrat. As the oldest member of the Bundestag in 1953, she was 
its President, as well as being Honorary President of the Free 
Democratic Party1. 
Gertrud Bäumer herself seems to have managed to arrive at a 
modus vivendi with the Nazi regime. Indeed, she continued to criticise 
it in her private correspondence, but even there she insisted that 
there were aspects of National Socialism that were acceptable; this 
attitude drew criticism from her friend Dorothee von Velsen, who 
objected above all to the fundamental lack of freedom in the Nazi 
State, as well as to the anti -semitism, brutality and opportunism of 
the regime. If open opposition was impossible, Dorothee von Velsen 
argued that that was no reason to co- operate with Gertrud Scholtz -Klink; 
"silent opposition" was, she felt, the only honourable course2. 
Gertrud Bäumer, however, still looked for signs of feminism in the 
Nazi women's organisation, claiming to discern traces of it among the 
leaders of the Women's Labour Service in 19403, and with the hope of 
encouraging a sense of female independence and solidarity she insisted 
that her magazine, Die Frau, must abstain from open criticism - even 
of the SS's encouragement to girls to procreate outside marriage4 - and 
political comment of any kind. No doubt she was sensible to be cautious, 
1. Kosch, op. cit., pp. 792 -93. 
2. BA, Kl.Erw., no. 296 -(1), letter from Dorothee von Velsen to 
Gertrud Bäumer, 21 November, 1936. 
3. Ibid., no. 267 -(2), letter from Gertrud Baumer to Emmy Beckmann, 
17 October, 1940. 
4. Ibid., no. 296 -(1), letter from Gertrud Baumer to Dorothee von 
Velsen, 4 April, 1940. 
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having been struck off the list of those permitted to edit 
magazines for almost two years1, but her apparent readiness to 
co- operate with the National Women's Leadership, albeit on minor 
matters2, suggests something more than prudence. Her priority was to 
try to keep the spirit and activity of the old Women's Movement alive 
at all costs, in however small a way, and to try to infiltrate some 
of its ideas into Frau Scholtz- Klink's organisation. She rather 
deluded herself in imagining that this was possible - or relevant, given 
the lack of influence of the Nazi women's organisation. And her 
policy here was little understood and less welcomed by those 
women who had formerly admired and supported her and who started 
from the premise that National Socialism was inherently evil, and that 
any kind of compromise with it was out of the questions. 
Perhaps the failure to reconstruct a Women's Movement out of 
the remains of Gertrud BRumer's organisation after the Second World 
War was a reflection of its being discredited by at least tacit 
co- operation with the Nazis. Certainly, Gertrud Bäumer herself did 
1. Beckmann, op. cit., letter from Gertrud BRumer to Emmy Beckmann, 
May 1935 (exact date not given), p. 82. 
BA, op. cit., no. 267 -(1), letter from Gertrud Bäumer to Emmy 
Beckmann, 19 March, 1937. 
2. Ibid., letter from Gertrud BRumer to Emmy Beckmann, 14 September, 
1938. 
Ibid., no. 267 -(2), letter of 17 October, 1940. 
3. Ibid., no. 296 -(1), letter from Dorothee von Velsen to Gertrud 
BRumer, 24 May, 1939. 
Ibid., letter from Dorothee von Velsen to Gertrud Bä,umer, 11 April, 
1940. 
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not return to a position of próminence, dying in 1954 at the age of 
eighty1. But her concern with the young generation of women2 was 
perhaps belated, since the Women's Movement had suffered from a 
generation problem before the Nazi takeover of power, and might in 
any case have died out with its old leadership. There was, in fact, 
a vacuum in women's organisational life after 1945, until new 
groupings emerged, since Frau Scholtz - Klink's organisation was, 
naturally, disbanded and discredited. The National Women's Leader, 
too, disappeared into obscurity, after successfully evading arrest 
with her third husband, former SS officer Heissmeyer, until March 
1948, and then serving an eighteen -month sentence after trial by 
a French military court3. 
It is one of the many ironies of National Socialism that its 
policies and its defeat created a situation in which discrimination 
against women in many areas, particularly in employment, was not a 
practical proposition. The need for many women to assume the role 
of breadwinner after the Second World War, in the absence of men who 
were dead, incapacitated, or in prison, led to the opening up of 
new opportunities for women in the Federal Republic4. In the 
Democratic Republic, that which so many of the Nazis' supporters had 
feared above all, and which the Nazis had been pledged to prevent, the 
victory of Communism, has meant that there has been a much more 
1. Das Grosse Brockhaus, 1967, vol. 2, p. 393. 
2. BA, op. cit., no. 267 -(2), letter from Gertrud Bgumer to Emmy 
Beckmann, 17 October, 1940. 
3. Wiener Library Personality File G15, reports on Gertrud Scholtz- 
Klink in several newspapers, e.g., New York Times, 3 February, 
1948; Neue Zeitung, 18 November, 1948, Die Welt,, 18 November, 
1949; New York Herald Tribune, 18 November, 1949. 
4. B. Rich, "Civil Liberties in Germany ", Political Science Quarterly, 
1950, p. 81. 
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decisive change of policy, so that women have - within the limits of 
a new dictatorship - equal rights and equality of opportunityl. The 
Nazis, then, unwittingly acted as the agents of the kind of changes 
they had aimed to prevent or reverse, and women became more self - 
reliant and were accorded a greater degree of legal and social equality. 
But the Nazis had certainly given the impression of arresting 
developments in the direction of greater equality for women; it 
remains to decide how far this was true. 
In the first place, progress was made in improving 
opportunities for women even before 1914, notably in education; 
"emancipation" did not suddenly begin in 1918. Then, after the 
Great War far less progress was made than feminists had hoped and 
conservatives had feared. Indeed, certain areas of activity were 
opened to women for the first time, including full participation in 
politics and entry to the legal profession. But the progress made in 
winning real influence for women in politics and significant 
representation for them in professions other than teaching - where they 
were already well- established - was slow and gradual, as it was 
bound to be, while the provisions of the Imperial Civil Code continued 
to affirm the superiority of the male sex in society, and especially in 
marriage. In addition, no sooner were modest reforms introduced 
after the Great War than the forces of reaction asserted themselves, 
so that German women - insofar as they were interested - were, like 
the nation as a whole, bitterly divided between those who resented 
even cautious change, associating it with "Bolshevism ", and those who 
poured contempt on the small improvements that were effected. 
Even 
moderate feminists, who accepted that evolution 
was the best course, 
1. David Childs, East Germany, New York, 1969, p. 
219. 
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but a slow one, began to be disillusioned by the later 1920s, and 
to be alarmed in the early 1930s when the effects of the depression 
seemed to many justification - or an excuse - for a retreat from the 
Weimar Constitution's commitment to equal rights for members of both 
sexes. The conservatives, the Churches, and even some trade unionists 
were very ready to see in, for example, deliberate discrimination 
against the employed married woman the solution to Germany's 
problems which were, in the view of the Churches and the conservatives, 
at least, not merely of an economic nature but political and moral 
as well. 
Thus, the clock was stopped not in 1933 but in 1930. The 
Nazis, with their at times weird backward -looking philosophy, benefited 
from attitudes which had already developed and hardened, and found 
at least tacit - and often open - support for their promised policy 
of restoring women to a position of security, decency and domesticity. 
But it was not their intention, they repeatedly asserted, to restrict 
women to the traditional "three K's" - "Kinder, Kiiche, Kirche" (nursery, 
kitchen, church)1 - as conservatives hoped. Once again, German 
conservatives had mistaken the Nazis for old -style, nationalist 
reactionaries like themselves, failing to comprehend the essentially 
revolutionary nature of Nazism. Certainly, in the Nazi State women 
were to concern themselves to a considerable degree with children and 
with household matters; but a regime which aspired to totalitarian 
control had to urge all its citizens to look outward from their private 
1. The "three K's" appear in many different places, in a variety of 
forms. The one given is the most common of these. In Imperial 
times, mention was sometimes made of "four K's ", the additional 
one being for "Kaiser ". 
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lives, to surrender their privacy and allow themselves to be 
imbued with the Nazi Weltanschauun, and to accept the primacy of the 
needs of the State as interpreted by the Nazi leadership. Thus, 
German women were to be less "requisites of German men "1 than - 
like German men - agents at the disposal of the Nazi regime. It 
was crucial to women's position that the needs of the regime became 
such that women could be discriminated against to only a very 
limited extent. 
In the Third Reich, men were, after all, controlled and 
confined to the same extent as women, and often, given the relative 
immunity of the housewife from official surveillance, even more. If 
men monopolised positions of power in the Nazi State, only a 
minority of men exercised power, and the great mass of men were 
excluded in the same way as women. Male and female opponents and 
of racist policies discriminated against and 
persecuted on an equal basis. Certainly the Nazis were determined 
to persuade as many women as possible - in the early years, at least 
- that their natural sphere of activity was the home and family; 
but it is often overlooked that the majority of women choose to 
marry and have children in the absence of official pressure to do so. 
The Nazis were starting their campaign with the advantage of women's 
biological character and natural disposition on their side. Their 
aim was to reverse the evident trend towards contempt for the "nur- 
Hausfrau" (the woman who is "only a housewife "), which was a side - 
effect of the provision of more opportunities for women outside the 
1. Hans- Jochen Gamm, Der Fliisterwitz im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1966, 
p. 50, gives one of the popular corruptions of the BdM's initials 
as "Bedarfsartikel deutscher Männer ". 
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home. In this, they to some extent succeeded; where they were 
wrong was in trying to coerce women into complying with their 
policy, by limiting opportunities outside the home and by trying to 
remove all means of birth control. 
Attempts to limit opportunities for women outside the home 
were made, at a time when the massive unemployment problem made them 
doubly attractive. But the change which came in the economic situation 
in the mid -1930s made even the campaign against employed married 
women first redundant and then positively harmful. Similarly, 
the steps taken to reduce the academic content of girls' school 
curricula - a reaction against the strong emphasis there had been on 
academic ability after the Great War - proved to be damaging even 
before the Second World War gave rise to an urgent demand for girl 
students in all disciplines. In the later 1930s, women were not only 
to be given the opportunity to work and to study, whether they were 
married or single, but were to be positively encouraged to do these 
things. The motive was, as ever, the serving of the needs of the 
Nazi State at the time, not the improvement of opportunities for 
women; but such an improvement was in fact a result. The unrealistic 
and purely ideologically- motivated barriers to women's advancement in 
the highest échelons of the civil service and to the practice of law 
by women were indeed indicative of what was, in the Nazi view, ideal, 
and of what would no doubt have been their aim in the "thousand -year 
Reich ", if other policies had permitted it. But these instances were 
exceptions, and the result of the abnormal 1930s - abnormal in 
political and economic terms and culminating in war - was that 
women's position in employment outside the home, including the 
professions as a whole, was consolidated, not eroded, while, 
in addition, 
the status of the housewife and mother was raised. 
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Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (General 
German Trade Union Association), trade union 
combine associated with the SPD 
ADLV Allgemeiner Deutscher Lehrerinnenverein (General 
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AfB Archiv fUr Bevölkerungspolitik, Sexualethik und 
Familienkunde (periodical) 









Arbeitsgemeinschaft marxistischer Sozialarbeiter 
(Association of Marxist Social Workers), affiliate 
of the KPD 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft nationalsozialistischer Studentinnen 
(Association of National Socialist Girl Students) 
Akten des Obersten Parteigerichts (Proceedings of the 
NSDAP's High Court), found in the Berlin Document 
Center 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialpolitischer Organisationen 
(Association of Social Policy Organisations), affiliate 
of the KPD 
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz 
Berlin Document Center 
Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (Federation of German 
Women's Associations) 
Bund deutscher Mädel (League of German Girls) 
branch of the Hitler Youth for girls aged from 14 
to 18 or 21 





Bund Königin Luise (Queen Luise League), conservative 
women's organisation 
Bericht zur innenpolitischen Lage (early name for the 
reports of Himmler's security agents) 
Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labour Front) 
Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party - 




Deutscher Frauenorden (German Women's Order), the 
first Nazi women's organisation, founded and led 
by Elsbeth Zander 
Deutsches Frauenwerk (German Women's Work), the 
Nazi -led national organisation for women in the 
Third Reich 
DMäd Deutsche Mädchenbildung (periodical) 
DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German Nationalist 
People's Party) 
Doppelverdiener the second earner in a family, generally used to 
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DS Der Deutsche Student (periodical) 
DVP Deutsche Volkspartei (German People's Party) 
DWEuV Deutsche Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung 
(periodical), the Reich Ministry of Education's 
gazette 
FiS Die Frau im Staat (periodical), radical feminist 
magazine 
FK Frauenkultur im Deutschen Frauenwerk (periodical), 
official magazine of the DFW 






administrative unit, most often applied to a province 
of the NSDAP's organisation. There were 32 Gaue of 
the NSDAP in 1933, and 40 in the Greater German Reich 
of 1939 
NSDAP Hauptarchiv 
Institut für Zeitgeschichte Archiv 
International Labour Organisation 
International Labour Review (periodical) 
Informations- Informationsdienst für die soziale Arbeit der NSV 
dienst... (found in BA, NSD 30/1836) 
JADG 
Kl.Erw. 
Jahrbuch des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes 
(periodical) 
Kleine Erwerbungen (small collections), catalogue 
description in BA, under which Gertrud Bäumer's 
letters are found 
444. 
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German 
Communist Party) 
Kreis district -- administrative unit of the NSDAP into 
which the Gaue were divided 
Machttibernahme the "takeover of power" by the Nazis, generally 
referring to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor 
on 30 January, 1933, and on the whole preferred 
by the Nazis to the term "Machtergreifung ", the 
"seizure of power" 
MadR Meldungen aus dem Reich (reports of Himmler's 
security agents throughout Germany, from late 
1939) 
n.d. date of publication not given 
n.p. place of publication not given 
NSBO Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation 
(National Socialist Factory Cell Organisation) 
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
(National Socialist German Workers' Party - 
the Nazi Party) 
NSDStB Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund 
(National Socialist Students' Association) 
NSF Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft (National 
Socialist Women's Organisation) 
NSLR Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund (National 
Socialist Teachers' League) 
NSRB Nationalsozialistischer Rechtswahrerbund (National 
Socialist Lawyers' League), formerly the Bund 
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Juristen - name 
changed in 1936 
NSV Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (National 
Socialist People's Welfare), the national welfare 
organisation in the Third Reich 
ODI Open Door International for the Emancipation of the 
Woman Worker (radical feminist organisation) 
Ortsgruppe local branch of the NSDAP, the subdivision of the Kreis 





Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten (National Association 
of German Civil Servants), the only civil servants' 
union in the Third Reich 
Reichsbund der Kinderreichen Deutschlands zum Schutz 
der Familie (pro- natalist national organisation of 
large families, founded in 1923 and taken over by 
the Nazis) 
Reichsfrauen- National Women's Leader, the title conferred on 
führerin Gertrud Scholtz -Klink in November 1934 
RGB Reichsgesetzblatt (periodical), official publication 
of German federal statutes and decrees 
RGO 
RMdI/NsdL 
Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts -Opposition (Revolutionary 
Trade Union Opposition), Communist trade union group, 
founded in 1929 
Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des 
Innern an die Nachrichtenstellen der Lander, the 
confidential reports made by the Reich Ministry of 
the Interior to the Land information offices about 
KPD activities, 1931 -33, found in the BA, R58 files 
SA Sturm Abteilungen (Nazi storm troopers) 
Slg.Sch. Schumacher Sammlung (collection of documents about 
Nazi organisations and projects, found in BA and 
BDC) 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social 
Democratic Party) 
i 
SS Schutzstaffeln (Nazi elite bodyguard formations, under 
the leadership of Heinrich Himmler) 
St.D.R, Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (periodical) 
St.J. Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (periodical) 





Verein Deutscher Evangelischer Lehrerinnen (Union of 
German Evangelical Women Teachers) 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (periodical) 
Verein katholischer deutscher Lehrerinnen (Union of 
Catholic German Women Teachers) 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 
(founded at The Hague, 1915) 
WuS Wirtschaft und Statistik (periodical) 
